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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the possibility of conducting a more independent 
monetary policy through the adoption of an inflation targeting regime in a small, 
open and Euroised transition economy where banks are dependent on foreign 
financing. The major aim of this research programme is to investigate the 
effectiveness and determinants of the interest rate and bank lending channels in 
the case of Republic of Macedonia, since their effectiveness is seen as one of the 
preconditions for adoption of an inflation targeting regime. This thesis contributes 
to the existing literature for transition economies in two main ways. Firstly, it 
investigates the size and determinants of individual bank‟s lending rate 
adjustments to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Secondly, it examines two loan 
functions according to the currency disaggregation of loans, and investigates what 
bank-specific characteristics are the major determinants. The findings with respect 
to the first research contribution indicate that the size of the short-run adjustment 
of lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is quite sluggish and 
heterogeneous among Macedonian banks. Moreover, bank-specific characteristics 
and macroeconomic variables play different roles in individual bank‟s lending rate 
setting decisions. These results are consistent with the presence of aggregation 
bias in previous research that uses sector-level data, due to the suppression of 
banks‟ heterogeneous behaviour. The results regarding the second research 
contribution imply that the bank lending channel in Macedonia works mainly 
through foreign currency loans and the foreign reference rate, whereas the 
responsiveness of domestic currency loans to the changes in the domestic 
reference rate is quite low. Moreover, different banks react differently to changes 
in the domestic and foreign reference rates due to their specific characteristics. 
These findings suggest that the impact of domestic monetary policy on the 
Macedonian economy through the interest rate and bank lending channels is quite 
limited. Therefore, the current monetary policy regime of a fixed exchange rate 
may be more effective in achieving the price stability aim than adoption of an 
inflation targeting regime in economies like Macedonia. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
 Since the 1980s the legal status of central banks has changed rapidly 
towards gaining greater independence. Along with this, the major goal of almost 
all central banks has become price stability. For instance, this is the ultimate goal 
of the monetary policy for the European Central Bank (ECB), the rest of the 
European Union (EU) countries e.g. the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark, 
and the transition economies from the Central and South Eastern Europe (CSEE), 
including the Republic of Macedonia. 
Achieving this aim is seen to be one of the main preconditions for 
macroeconomic stability and sustainable growth. In seeking to achieve this price 
stability goal, monetary policy makers apply various monetary policy regimes. 
The most frequently applied monetary policy regimes in the past and in recent 
time are: inflation targeting, exchange rate targeting (including various types of 
exchange rate regimes such as a fixed exchange rate, currency board, crawling 
peg etc.), money supply targeting and nominal income targeting.    
 The Republic of Macedonia as a European Union (EU) candidate country 
is faced with the issue of what will be the most appropriate monetary policy 
regime. More precisely, the monetary policy makers are faced with the issue of 
whether the current regime of a de facto currency peg to the Euro is still 
appropriate or whether an inflation targeting regime may be more effective in 
achieving the price stability aim. This may be especially important to consider 
before it fully liberalises its capital account. Hence, examining the effectiveness 
of some of the channels of the monetary transmission mechanism, such as the 
interest rate and bank lending channels and their major determinants, is of crucial 
importance in order to inform the monetary policy-makers in designing and 
implementing the most appropriate monetary strategy. More precisely, examining 
whether, and if so to what extent, these two channels of monetary transmission are 
operational and how various bank specific and macroeconomic characteristics 
affect them, may indicate if some of the initial conditions for adoption of an 
inflation targeting regime are met. These issues are also of importance to other 
transition economies that have a fixed or currency board regime and the 
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approaches to investigate these questions and the findings for Macedonia may 
also have relevance there. Carere et al. (2002) argue that one of the initial 
conditions for adopting an inflation targeting regime is the efficient transmission 
of monetary policy defined as: “.... connection between the changes in the 
monetary stance and their effect on the operating target, and ultimately, the 
inflation.” (p. 19). Furthermore, Batini et al. (2006) also argue that the existence 
of an effective monetary transmission mechanism is one of the „technical‟ 
requirements for conducting the inflation targeting regime. 
 In that respect, the main research questions of the thesis are: 
1) What is the size of the lending rate adjustment to changes in the 
domestic „cost of funds‟ rate and is it homogeneous and synchronised 
among Macedonian banks? 
2) What factors affect the size of banks‟ lending rate adjustment? 
3) Does the bank lending channel exist in an economy with a fixed 
exchange rate like Macedonia and what is the size of the adjustment of 
banks‟ loans to changes in the reference rate? 
4) Is the adjustment of the quantity of loans  heterogeneous among various 
banks and what are the major determinants for any heterogeneous 
adjustment? 
5) Do the interest rate and bank lending channels work in the same 
direction (complement each other) or in the opposite direction (conflict 
with each other) and are they operational from the monetary policy 
point of view? 
In order to answer these main research questions of the thesis, the major 
aim of this chapter is to provide an assessment of the main characteristics of 
monetary policy in the Republic of Macedonia and the banking sector. The 
rationale for doing this is that it will provide a general review of the banking 
sector and changes in the banks‟ specific characteristics that are directly related to 
the major research aims of this thesis. More precisely, this will help us in 
conducting the empirical analysis presented in chapters 3 and 5 later in this thesis, 
whose major aims are directly related to the interest rate pass-through and bank 
lending channel. For this reason, an assessment of the general characteristics of 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION: THE BANKING SECTOR IN MACEDONIA 
4 
 
the banking sector will be provided accompanied by a consideration of the 
aggregated banks‟ assets and liabilities. Additionally, a detailed appraisal of the 
loan market and structure of loans will be provided, as well as the interest rate 
series.  
 This chapter is organised as follows: section 1.2 provides a brief overview 
of monetary policy in Macedonia in the context of this research. Section 1.3 
explains the aims and objectives of the thesis. Section 1.4 presents a general 
picture about the structure of the banking sector. Section 1.5 provides an 
assessment of the aggregated banks‟ assets and liabilities in Macedonia. Stylised 
facts about the loan market and the structure of outstanding loans in Macedonia 
are presented in section 1.6. Section 1.7 analyses the interest rate movements, 
while the conclusions of this chapter are presented in the final section.  
 
1.2 Monetary policy in Macedonia in the context of this research 
 
 Since gaining its monetary independence in April 1992, the type of the 
monetary policy regime in the Republic of Macedonia has changed once. From 
the period of gaining its monetary independence till the end of 1995, a money 
supply regime was applied by targeting the narrow monetary aggregate M1 that 
consists of currency in circulation and demand deposits [National Bank of the 
Republic of Macedonia (NBRM, 2006c)]. The rationale for applying this 
monetary regime was due, at that time, to the undeveloped financial markets and 
institutions and a non-functional interest rate channel (Trajkovic, 2006). Given 
these conditions, it was argued that this was the most appropriate monetary policy 
regime at that time (Trajkovic, 2006). However, during this monetary regime 
macroeconomic performance was generally unsatisfactory. For example, the 
inflation rate was quite high and volatile, the real GDP growth rate in all years 
during that period was negative, the unemployment rate grew from 27.7% in 1993 
to 35.6% in 1995 and the nominal exchange rate depreciated
1
 substantially (see 
                                                 
1
 The exchange rate of the Macedonian denar is expressed as units of domestic currency per unit of 
foreign currency. 
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table 1.1).  The nominal exchange rate depreciation and the relatively high trade 
openness of the Macedonian economy at that time (see table 1.1) may be one the 
reasons for the relatively high and volatile inflation during that period. This „poor‟ 
macroeconomic performance was one of the major reasons for the monetary 
policy makers to re-examine this monetary regime and to assess the possibility for 
switching to another. Consequently, as a result of the instability of the money 
demand function, the weakening of the correlation between the money growth and 
aggregate demand and the high openness of the Macedonian economy, the 
monetary policy makers from 1996 adopted a nominal exchange rate targeting 
regime by de facto pegging the Macedonian Denar to the German Mark and 
latterly to the Euro. Applying this strategy so far has been quite successful in 
stabilising the price level and has coincided with the improvement of the rest of 
the macroeconomic performance. For instance, since the adoption of this regime, 
inflation was reduced to below 6%, real GDP started to grow (except in 2001 due 
to the armed conflict in the country), foreign exchange reserves increased 
substantially and foreign trade increased (see table 1.1). 
Table 1.1: Main macroeconomic indicators of the Republic of Macedonia 
 
* Up to 1999, this is the retail price index, since 2000 it is the consumer price index.   
** Estimated data (source: State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia). 
*** For the period 1993-1995 this is the unemployment rate estimated by the State Statistical 
Office of the Republic of Macedonia, while for the period 1996-2003 this is the unemployment 
rate from the Labour force survey of Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia. 
Source: NBRM and State Statistical Office of the Republic of Macedonia.  
 
 
 
 
Average annual 
inflation*
GDP                   
(real growth 
rates)
Unemployment 
rate (in %)***
Average exchange 
rate MKD/DEM and 
from 2002 to the 
EURO
Gross foreign reserves 
(millions of US dollars, 
stock - end of period)
Trade openness: (Exports 
f.o.b. + Imports f.o.b.) / 
GDP
1993 349.8 -7.5 27.7 14.2 123.2 82.4
1994 121.8 -1.8 30.0 26.6 172.4 69.6
1995 15.9 -1.1 35.6 26.5 282.9 59
1996 3.0 1.2 31.9 26.6 277.5 59.1
1997 4.4 1.4 36.0 28.7 258.7 76.6
1998 0.8 3.4 34.5 31.0 323.9 86.5
1999 -1.1 4.3 32.4 31.0 449.9 78.3
2000 5.8 4.5 32.2 31.1 699.5 92.5
2001 5.5 -4.5 30.9 31.1 755.6 82.6
2002 1.8 0.9 31.9 61.0 725.3 80.4
2003 1.2 2.8 36.7 61.3 903.4 77.2
2004 -0.4 4.1 37.2 61.3 975.3 83.6
2005 0.5 4.1 37.3 61.3 1324.7 88.5
2006 3.2 4.0 36.0 61.2 1865.8 95.5
2007 2.3 5.9 34.9 61.2 2239.6 106.3
2008 8.3 4.8 33.8 61.3 2107.6 110.5
2009 -0.8  -0.7** 32.2 61.3 2290.5 100.4
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1.3 Aims and objectives of the thesis 
  
The major research aims of this thesis are to empirically investigate the 
effectiveness of two channels of the monetary transmission and their major 
determinants. The first one is the interest rate channel from the „cost of funds‟ rate 
to banks‟ retail rates (the lending rates). The second one is the so-called bank 
lending channel that, according to the literature (see sections 4.2 and 4.3), may 
either amplify or attenuate the interest rate channel. Therefore, we aim to assess if 
these two channels of monetary transmission are operational in the Macedonian 
banking system and whether the bank lending and the interest rate channels 
„work‟ in the same direction by complementing each other. Additionally, we aim 
to explore what are their major determinants, mainly from the bank-level 
perspective. In particular, we attempt to investigate how banks‟ specific 
characteristics affect the effectiveness of these two channels of monetary 
transmission. Assessing the effectiveness and the determinants of the interest-rate 
and bank lending channel in Macedonia will provide evidence on one of the key 
research questions of this thesis: whether the current monetary policy regime is 
appropriate, or if a different policy regime should be applied. 
Regarding the first channel of the monetary transmission (the interest rate 
channel), we intend to explore the major determinants of lending rate adjustment 
to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. In that respect, we explore the impact of 
various bank-specific characteristics, two macroeconomic control variables and 
the impact of the concentration in the banking system on the size of the lending 
rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate.  
Concerning the second channel of monetary transmission that is also a 
subject of our investigation (the bank lending channel), we aim to investigate the 
impact of various bank specific characteristics in order to determine if there is 
heterogeneous loan adjustment function among the Macedonian banks. 
In order to answer to the main research questions of the thesis considered 
in section 1.1, the chapters of the thesis cover the following aspects: 
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 Related to the first and second research questions, the major aims of chapter 2 
are to provide a critical appraisal of the theoretical literature that establishes the 
main models of how banks set their retails rates and what factors are seen to 
affect banks‟ lending rate setting decisions. Additionally, to provide a basis for 
our empirical chapter we critically survey empirical studies and their 
estimation methods. Hence, this may also help us in selecting an estimation 
strategy and method, arguably correcting for possible weakness in the existing 
empirical studies for Macedonia.  
 Chapter 3 directly examines the first and second research questions by 
empirically investigating what is the size of short-run adjustment of lending 
rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate and is it homogeneous among banks 
in Macedonia. Investigating this issue will enable us to draw a conclusion 
regarding whether the interest rate channel is effective in the Macedonian 
banking system. This is an important issue from the monetary policy makers‟ 
perspective because it will enable us to draw conclusions later on in the thesis 
as to whether one of the main preconditions for adopting an inflation targeting 
monetary regime is met. Moreover, in chapter 3 we also intend to identify the 
major determinants that affect the size of banks‟ lending rate adjustment to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. For this reason, we use a set of variables of 
up to eight bank balance sheet items, two macroeconomic control variables and 
an indicator for the concentration in the banking system. These variables are 
identified as the major factors that have been claimed to affect the size of retail 
rates adjustment and lending rate setting behaviour among banks in various 
economies in the theoretical and empirical literature.    
 To investigate the third and fourth research questions, chapter 4 assesses the 
theoretical literature that establishes the basis of the bank lending channel and 
identifies the major determinants of the loan adjustment. In order to conduct 
our empirical investigation of the determinants of the bank lending channel in 
the case of Macedonia, we intend to critically survey previous empirical studies 
and their estimation methods. By fulfilling this aim we will be able to identify 
the main empirical methods of estimation and thus, to identify any problems. 
This will help us in selecting an appropriate estimation strategy, in order to 
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correct for the possible weakness related to the estimation method(s) 
previously applied in empirical studies.  
 Questions three and four are directly addressed in chapter 5 whose aim is to 
empirically investigate if the bank lending channel exists in the case of the 
Macedonian banking system, having in mind its specific structure (see sections 
1.4, 1.5 and 1.6), the high trade openness of the economy as well as the 
monetary policy strategy of de facto fixed exchange rate regime (see section 
1.2). Moreover, we aim to explore whether the Macedonian banks react 
identically in adjusting the stock of loans when the reference rate changes. 
There is no previous study (to the author‟s knowledge) that empirically 
investigates if the bank lending channel exists in the Macedonian banking 
system and, if so, what are its major determinants. This can be seen as an 
important issue having in mind that the financial market in Macedonia, as in 
many other transition economies, is still underdeveloped compared to western 
economies and remains bank dominated (see section 1.4). 
 In the context of the last research question, the aims of chapter 6 are to 
consider whether the bank lending channel amplifies or attenuates the interest 
rate channel and are these two channels operational from the monetary policy 
point of view. Hence, chapter 6 provides a policy recommendation regarding 
whether the precondition for effective interest rate and bank lending channels 
are met. By achieving this research aim we should be able to provide a policy 
recommendation regarding whether the current monetary policy regime of a de 
facto fixed exchange rate should be maintained, or whether there is a rationale 
for a shift towards inflation targeting. 
 
1.4 Overview of the banking sector in Macedonia 
 
 This section aims to provide a general assessment of the structure of the 
banking sector in Macedonia. It assesses the level of competitiveness and 
concentration in the banking sector, as well as the progress achieved in the area of 
banking sector reforms and interest rate liberalisation assessed by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) index. In this section is also 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION: THE BANKING SECTOR IN MACEDONIA 
9 
 
presented an analysis of the structure of the banks according to their type of 
ownership. Furthermore, this section briefly explains the main monetary 
instruments used by the monetary authorities in Macedonia, and the reasons for 
changes in their use through time.    
 In analysing the banking sector in Macedonia throughout the whole of this 
thesis we consider the privately owned banks and hence, we do not consider the 
only state owned bank - “Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion” a.d. 
Skopje. The reason for not including this bank is that it is entirely state-owned and 
was established only for the purpose of supporting certain underdeveloped 
industrial areas of the Macedonian economy. Hence, this bank is not working 
according to market-based principles and has a negligible average loan market 
share of 3% during the 2000-2009 period. 
Table 1.2: Characteristics of the banking sector in Macedonia 
 
* HHI is calculated by the following formula: HHI =( 2
1
)( j
j
sn ) * 10000; where S is the 
market share of each bank on the loan market; n is the total number of banks. 
** The share of the two largest banks. 
Source: NBRM Annual Report (1998, 1999b - 2009b) and EBRD Transition Report, November 
2009.  
 The financial sector in the Republic of Macedonia, as in many other 
transition economies, is bank dominated. Banks‟ share in the total financial assets2 
is around 90% in the last 4 years (see table 1.2). From 1998 the number of 
commercial banks has varied. The reasons for this variation are due to mergers, 
                                                 
2
 Total financial assets are defined as a sum of the assets of all financial institutions that operate in 
the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. The financial institutions are defined as legal entities 
that are involved in any type of financial intermediation and include: commercial banks, saving 
houses, leasing companies, investment funds etc. 
Number of 
banks
Share of the banking 
assets in the total 
financial assets (in %)
HHI*  of total 
assets
Share of total  banks' 
assets owned by the three 
largest banks (in %)
Share of total outstanding 
loans owned by the three 
largest banks (in %)
EBRD's index for 
banking reform and 
interets rate liberalisation
1998 22 / / 63.1 / 2+
1999 22 / / 62.0 / 2+
2000 22 / / 64.0 / 2+
2001 21 / 1738 55.8** 46.8 2+
2002 21 / 1667 54.1** 46.9** 2+
2003 21 / 1842 55.5** 48.3 2+
2004 21 / 1685 66.8 66.2 2+
2005 20 / 1607 66.1 69.2 2+
2006 19 88.9 1595 66.1 69.2 2+
2007 18 90.5 1625 67.1 70.3 2+
2008 18 89.2 1579 66.1 69.0 3
2009 18 88.6 1636.7 67.5 70.1 3
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acquisitions, the entrance of new banks and some becoming bankrupt (NBRM 
Annual Report, 1998, 1999b - 2007b). However, despite the decline in the number 
of banks, the level of concentration in the banking sector, measured through the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) for total banks‟ assets, has been quite stable 
since 2005, being around 1600 index points (see table 1.2). Compared to the new 
EU member states from CSEE and the Euro zone, the value of the HHI is among 
the highest (see table 1.3). This implies that the Macedonian banking sector lacks 
the same degree of competition as found in most other European countries.  
Table 1.3: HHI for the CSEE economies and the EMU, 2008 
 
* The value of the HHI for Macedonia is for 2009. 
Source: NBRM Annual Report, 2009b; and ECB, 2010. 
  
 The relatively high level of concentration in the Macedonian banking 
sector can also be seen from the share of total assets and total outstanding loans 
owned by the three largest banks. For instance, the three largest banks from 1998 
to 2009 (apart from the period 2001-2003), owned more than 60% of total assets 
of the banking sector and more than 66% of total outstanding loans during the 
period 2004-2009 (see table 1.2). Moreover, during this period there has been a 
tendency the number of large- and medium-sized banks grouped according to 
their asset size to increase (see table 1.4).  
 
 
Country: HHI
Bulgaria 834
Czech Republic 1,000
Estonia 3,120
Euro zone 1,084
Hungary 822
Latvia 1,205
Lithuania 1,714
Macedonia* 1675
Poland 562
Romania 922
Slovakia 1,197
Slovenia 1,268
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Table 1.4: Number of large, medium and small sized banks in Macedonia, 2002-2009 
 
According to the classification done by the NBRM, large sized banks are those whose assets are 
worth more than 15 billions of denars, medium sized banks are those whose assets are worth 
between 4.5 and 15 billions of denars and small sized banks are those whose assets are worth less 
than 4.5 billions of denars (source: NBRM Annual Report, 2006b). 
Source: NBRM Annual Report, 2002b - 2009b.  
 
  The degree of banking sector reforms and interest rate liberalisation can be 
assessed by the index constructed by the EBRD that comprises set of various 
indicators related to the legal requirements of the banking system
3
. As shown in 
table 1.2, the only improvement in this index was from 2008. This may imply that 
the reforms related to the banking sector and interest rate liberalisation are still 
progressing slowly and additional reforms have to be completed in order to 
achieve the maximum score of 4+. If we compare this index to the other transition 
economies from CSEE, as shown in table 1.5, the Republic of Macedonia, 
together with the Western Balkan countries, has the lowest value of the index. 
This implies again that the Macedonian banking sector still requires additional 
reforms in order to reach the level of the more advanced CSEE economies.  
Table 1.5: EBRD‟s index for banking sector reform and interest rate liberalisation for 
various economies from CSEE, 2009 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, November 2009. 
 
Regarding the type of the ownership structure of the banking system, 
expressed as percentage of total banking capital, the predominant part is privately 
                                                 
3
 For more details of how this index is constructed and what indicators does it comprise, see 
EBRD 2009 Transition Report, November 2009, p. 249.  
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Large banks 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Medium banks 6 2 3 7 8 8 8
Small banks 13 16 14 9 7 7 7
Albania 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3
Bulgaria 4-
Croatia 4
Estonia 4
Hungary 4
Latvia 4-
Lithuania 4-
Macedonia 3
Montenegro 3
Poland 4-
Romania 3+
Serbia 3
Slovakia 4-
Slovenia 3+
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owned. Since 1999 from when the data is available, public ownership takes 
around or less than 10% of total banking capital (see table 1.6) and has declined to 
less than 1% by 2009. This relatively small share of public ownership in the 
banking sector is dispersed among various banks. It accounts for a negligible part 
of banks‟ shareholders capital left unsold after the process of privatisation begun 
at the beginning of 1990s. Accordingly, the state does not have any significant 
shareholder capital in any banks and hence, cannot influence the decision-making 
process in any of the banks.  
Table 1.6: Characteristics of the banking sector in Macedonia 
 
Source: NBRM Annual Report (1998, 1999b - 2009b). 
 
Foreign capital as a percentage of total banking capital, used as an 
indicator for the presence of the foreign ownership in the banking sector, was less 
than 20% before 2000. However, since that year its share in the total banking 
capital has more than doubled. Hence, from the year 2000, foreign ownership has 
increased continually and by the end of 2008 it reached the peak of 74%. 
However, in 2009 there was a decline of the foreign capital in the total banking 
capital due to the world economic recession and the related withdrawal of 
portfolio investments from the Macedonian banking system (Source: NBRM 
Annual Report, 2009b). Regarding the number of banks that are predominantly 
foreign-owned (where the foreign capital combines more than 50% of total 
shareholders capital), from 2007 it has increased rapidly, i.e. from 8 banks in 2006 
up to 14 in 2009 (see table 1.6). If we compare the share of foreign-owned banks 
in the structure of total banks‟ assets for various economies from CSEE for 2007, 
from figure 1.1, the share in the Republic of Macedonia is among the highest. 
Share of private capital 
in total banking capital 
(in %)
Share of foreign 
ownership of total 
banking capital (in %)
Number of foreign 
owned banks (more than 
50% of banking capital)
1998 / 15.5 /
1999 86.7 19.3 5
2000 87.8 40.1 7
2001 88.6 40.1 8
2002 90.3 44.6 7
2003 91.4 48.6 8
2004 95.6 50.4 8
2005 97.0 52.5 8
2006 98.4 56.1 8
2007 98.7 69.1 11
2008 98.9 74.3 14
2009 99.3 68.6 14
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Figure 1.1: Percentage share of foreign-owned banks in total assets for various economies 
from CSEE, 2007 
 
Source: NBRM Annual Report, 2008b, p.10. 
 
Related to the foreign ownership in the banking sector in Macedonia, it 
has to be taken into account the divergence between the legal definition of 
foreign-owned banks (de jure) and the one in practice (de facto). In the case of the 
Macedonian banking system, the de jure foreign-owned banks are defined as 
foreign-owned banks that are owned by non-residents. Nonetheless, the non-
residents may be domestic residents who have established their own company 
abroad and have established or acquired a bank in Macedonia that is not linked to 
any other „parent‟ financial institution. Moreover, the de jure foreign-owned 
banks may also be owned by a couple of individual shareholders from abroad that 
are again not linked to any other „parent‟ financial institution. From the point of 
view of the aims and objectives of the thesis (see section 1.3), in defining the 
foreign ownership we are primarily interested if the foreign-owned bank is related 
to another „parent‟ financial institution due to the existence of an internal capital 
market and/or easier access to foreign financing. This may be defined as a de 
facto foreign-owned bank. Accordingly, in the case of Macedonia, it may not 
always be clearly determined which banks are de facto and which de jure foreign-
owned and hence, how the internal capital market affects banks‟ lending rate 
setting decisions and the quantity of loans supplied. The reason for this is that 
many domestically-owned banks are dependent on foreign financing and may 
have the possibility to borrow funds (short- and long-term) from another 
institution from abroad by a relatively „cheaper‟ price. These factors bring 
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problems with defining a variable „foreign ownership‟ from the context of the 
research aims of the thesis. 
 Another specific characteristic of the Macedonian banking system is that 
up to 2000 there was a general shortage of liquid assets (NBRM Annual Report, 
2000a - 2004a). Accordingly, the NBRM in order to increase banks‟ liquidity to a 
satisfactory level, as a main monetary policy instrument conducted an auction of 
deposits. However, from 2000 onwards, Macedonian banks entered into structural 
excess liquidity, defined as having more liquid assets than required. 
Consequently, at the beginning of 2000 the NBRM changed its main monetary 
policy instrument from the auction of deposits into auctions of Central Bank Bills 
(CB Bills). The main purpose of issuing CB Bills was to absorb the excess 
liquidity of the banks. After this change in the main monetary policy instrument in 
2000, in the ensuing period, depending on the liquidity of the banking system and 
the pressures on the foreign exchange market; the type of the auctions of CB Bills 
was changing from an “interest rate tender” to “volume tender”. The major 
characteristic of the former is that the NBRM administratively sets the amount of 
CB Bills that banks may buy, whereas the commercial banks bid for the interest 
rate they want to offer in order to buy CB Bills. The major characteristic of the 
latter is that the NBRM administratively sets the interest rate of the CB Bills, 
whereas the commercial banks bid for the amount of CB Bills they want to buy. 
The periods characterised by “volume tender” or “interest rate” tender are 
presented in the table below.  
Table 1.7: Periods of conducting “volume tender” and “interest rate tender” auctions of 
CB Bills, 2000-2009 
 
Source: NBRM Annual Report, 2000a - 2009a.  
 
However, nowhere in the NBRM Annual Reports is there a discussion of 
the cause(s) as to why the banks suddenly moved from a position of a shortage of 
liquid assets to one with an excess of liquid assets. Moreover, nowhere in the 
NBRM Annual Reports or the official documents issued by the NBRM is given 
any indicator by which we can assess the shift from banks‟ shortage of liquid 
"Volume tender"
January 2000 - 
November 2000
May 2001 - 
June 2002
May 2003 - 
October 2003
February 2004 - 
October 2005
February 2008 - 
December 2009
Total 
months: 76
"Interest rate 
tender"
December 2000 - 
April 2001
July 2002 - 
april 2003
November 2003 - 
January 2004
November 2005 - 
January 2008
Total 
months: 44
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assets into banks‟ excess liquidity. As a rough indicator we may provide 
information on banks‟ fulfilment of the reserve requirement presented in figure 
1.2.  
Figure 1.2: Banks‟ fulfilment of the reserve requirement (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 
As can be seen from figure 1.2, banks more than fulfilled their reserve 
requirement before 2000, with a range of between 100% and 110% of their 
required holdings. During 2002-2004 holdings were again much above the 
NBRM‟s required reserves reaching a peak of 140% at the end of 2003. This 
occurred notwithstanding that the reserve requirements were changing depending 
upon changes in banks‟ liquidity. The only period when banks‟ reserve 
requirement was below 100% was in the middle of 2001 due to the armed conflict 
in the country. In the more recent period banks‟ excess holdings have been 
declining. This may be due not only in the changes in the quantity of liquid assets 
by the banks, but also to the changes in percentage of value of the reserve 
requirement that banks have to fulfil and the accounting and methodological 
changes in calculating the reserve requirement fulfilment. More precisely, in 
2001, 2005 and 2009 there has been increase of the percentage of value of 
fulfilment of the reserve requirement
4
, whereas in 2006 and 2008 there have been 
a major changes in the methodology of calculating the fulfilment of banks‟ 
reserve requirement
5
. Regarding the latter, the figures may not be directly 
comparable before and after the periods of these alterations.  
                                                 
4
 For details see NBRM Annual Report (2001a; 2005a and 2009a). 
5
 For details see NBRM Annual Report (2006a and 2008a).  
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As an additional proxy indicator for the banks‟ excess liquidity we may 
examine the share of banks‟ cash and balances within the NBRM (see section 1.5 
and figure 1.6). As shown on figure 1.6, this share in total banks‟ assets has gone 
up over time. However, this indicator represents a narrow definition of total 
banks‟ liquid assets and it does not include the rest of the liquid assets. 
Overall, after presenting the main characteristics, it can be seen that the 
Macedonian banking system is still in the process of development. For example, 
the concentration in the banking system is still among the highest in the CSEE 
economies. Moreover, the EBRD‟s index for banking sector reform and interest 
rate liberalisation indicates that apart from in 2008, no other reform has been 
completed. Hence, compared to the more advanced transition economies from 
CSEE, Macedonia has amongst the lowest values of this index. This implies that 
additional reforms need to be completed in the banking sector, such as in the 
liberalisation of entrance and exit in the market, in order to reach the level of the 
more advanced transition economies from CSEE. The entrance of foreign capital 
in the banking system has been more pronounced in recent years. Compared to the 
other economies from CSEE, the share of foreign-owned banks in the total banks‟ 
assets is relatively high. However for a complete analysis of the developments of 
the banking system, it is necessary to provide a general overview of aggregated 
banks‟ assets and liabilities, and the structure of banks‟ outstanding loans and 
banks‟ retail rates, which are the subject of more detailed analysis in the following 
sections.    
 
1.5 Overview of the assets and liabilities of the banking sector in 
Macedonia 
 
 The main aim of this section is to provide a general assessment of the 
aggregate assets and liabilities of the Macedonian banking sector. We use 
aggregated balance sheet data for the period 1998-2009, taken from Banks‟ 
Regulation and Banks‟ Supervision Departments of the NBRM. The data set(s) 
used are constructed according to the same methodology and same definitions as 
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the data used in the two empirical chapters 3 and 5 in this thesis. Data is not 
available before 1998.  
Figure 1.3: Annual rates of growth of aggregated banks‟ assets and liabilities (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 
The total assets of the banking sector in Macedonia, apart from 2002, have 
been increasing through time (see figure 1.3), with an average annual rate of 
growth of 15%. Hence, since 1998 banks‟ assets have almost quintupled. The 
highest annual rates of growth occurred in 2001 and 2007, reaching 29% and 28% 
respectively. It might be thought surprising that given the armed conflict in 2001, 
banks‟ assets grew rapidly however, this can mainly be explained by the Euro 
conversion of the foreign currencies of the private sector in that year. 
 More precisely, in the last quarter of 2001, due to the forthcoming process 
of Euro conversion, the private sector (especially the households), deposited their 
foreign currency savings that were kept in form of cash „under the mattresses‟ in 
the banks, mainly in the form of foreign currency sight deposits that affected 
banks‟ assets and liabilities (NBRM Annual Report, 2001a, b). However, during 
the following year, as soon as the process of Euro conversion was completed, the 
private sector (mainly the households) started to withdraw their previously 
deposited foreign currency sight deposits. This was the major cause of the annual 
decline of banks‟ assets and liabilities in 2002 (NBRM Annual Report, 2002a, b).  
Between 2003 and 2007 banks‟ assets and liabilities were growing 
steadily. Nonetheless, from the last quarter of 2008 and throughout 2009, there 
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was a substantial slow down of their growth (see figure 1.3). This can be largely 
explained by the world economic recession and the spill-over effects on the 
domestic economy.  
Figure 1.4: Banks‟ total assets-to-GDP ratio among various economies from CSEE, 
Eurozone and Republic of Macedonia (%) 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations upon the data from ECB, 2010 and NBRM and State Statistical 
Office for the Republic of Macedonia. 
 The ratio of the total assets of the banking system to the GDP, as an 
indicator of the level of financial intermediation, in most years (the exception 
being in 2002), has been growing steadily over time. Hence, from 30% in 1998 it 
had more than doubled in 2009, reaching 67% of the GDP. However, compared to 
the other more advanced transition economies from CSEE that are already 
members of the EU, the Republic of Macedonia together with Romania has the 
lowest level of asset-to-GDP ratio (see figure 1.4). This indicates that the 
Macedonian banking system is still relatively underdeveloped.  
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Figure 1.5:  Total banks‟ assets and their main components (millions of denars) 
  
Source: NBRM. 
 
 Analysing the structural components of total banks‟ assets (see figures 1.5 
and 1.6), the dominant role of banks‟ outstanding loans to the non-financial 
private sector is evident. However, during this period, the structure of banks‟ 
assets has been changing. For instance, between 1998 and 2003, banks‟ 
outstanding loans to non-financial private sector and the placements to other 
banks had almost an equal part in the structure of total banks‟ assets. 
Nevertheless, since 2004 banks were mostly oriented towards their lending 
activities. The share of banks‟ outstanding loans to non-financial private sector in 
the total asset structure started to increase steadily and in 2008 and 2009 it 
reached 60%. During these two years they have been the major driving force of 
the growth of total banks‟ assets, contributing 80% of the annual growth, whose 
detailed structure is explained in the next section. 
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Figure 1.6: Structure of total banks‟ assets (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
  
The second largest component of total banks‟ assets is the total placements 
to other banks (see figures 1.5 and 1.6). The biggest element of this component is 
accounts with foreign banks driven by the foreign currency sight deposits of the 
domestic non-financial private entities, mainly the households. Banks for various 
reasons transfer these funds into accounts abroad, for which no explanation is 
given in the NBRM Annual Reports. Banks‟ placements in accounts with foreign 
banks have been growing continually through time until 2008, when they 
suddenly declined by 40% causing a decline of total banks‟ placements with other 
banks in 2008 and 2009 (see figures 1.5 and 1.6). The major reason for their sharp 
decline is likely to have been psychological fears of the domestic private entities 
caused by the uncertainty related to global economic developments. Accordingly, 
the domestic entities, mainly the households, started to withdraw their foreign 
currency deposits from the banks, scared by the possibility of a general banking 
failure, as it was the case in some of the developed economies during the second 
half of 2008. 
 The third largest component of total banks‟ assets is their securities 
portfolio (see figures 1.5 and 1.6). Banks‟ securities portfolio is predominantly 
composed of CB Bills, long-term bonds issued by the state and treasury bills. The 
average share of the CB Bills in the total securities portfolio of the banks during 
the analysed period was 36%. Analysed through time, their share in the total 
securities portfolio has been changing rapidly. For instance, the average share of 
CB Bills in the total banks‟ securities portfolio in 1998-1999 was only 16%, but 
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from 2000 this share starts to grow rapidly, reaching a peak of 68% in 2008. This 
is not surprising having in mind that in the period before 2000 the main monetary 
policy instrument was the auction of credits, whereas since 2000 the main 
monetary policy instrument has been auctions of CB Bills (see section 1.4). The 
next two largest components of the total securities portfolio of banks are long-
term bonds issued by the state for various purposes and the treasury bills. 
Regarding the treasury bills, their stock starts to grow from the beginning of 2004 
when they were firstly issued as a separate financial instrument by the state. In 
2009 their share in the total securities portfolio rose sharply (see table 1.8), due to 
the intensive government borrowing on the primary market in order to finance its 
expenditures in the face of falling tax incomes as a result of the economic 
recession. The rest of banks‟ portfolio includes securities like equity securities in 
domestic non-financial and financial entities; whose role in the total banks‟ 
securities portfolio is marginal (see table 1.8).  
Table 1.8: Structure of the total banks‟ securities portfolio 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculation upon the data from NBRM. 
The fourth largest component of total banks‟ assets is the cash and 
balances within the NBRM (see figures 1.5 and 1.6). This type of assets is mainly 
2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009
Total banks' securities portfolio 28967 25495 27967 100% 100% 100%
Debt securities by the state and CB Bills 
of which:
27609 24186 26954 95% 95% 96%
CB Bills 20999 17437 15736 72% 68% 56%
Total long-term bonds by the state of which: 6170 5803 3344 21% 23% 12%
 - Bond for privatisation of "Stopanska Banka" 
AD Skopje
3676 3162 / 13% 12% /
 - Bond for old foreign currency savings and 
denationalisation
1734 1860 / 6% 7% /
 - Continuous Government bond securities 760 781 / 3% 3% /
Treasury Bills 6530 3362 7873 23% 13% 28%
Other securities by the state 440 946 1075 2% 4% 4%
Equity Securities of which: 1358 1309 1014 5% 5% 4%
 - Securities in domestic non-financial legal 
entities
436 357 52 2% 1% 0%
 - Securities in domestic banks and other 
financial organisations
731 761 962 3% 3% 3%
 - Other equity securities 191 191 / 1% 1% /
Banks' securities portfolio
Amount in millions of denars
Percentage share in total 
banks' securities portfolio
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composed of the required reserves and excess cash in domestic currency that 
banks hold for precautionary reasons. 
Figure 1.7: Total banks‟ liabilities and their main components (millions of denars) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 Analysing the structure of banks‟ liabilities, the major component is the 
total deposits of the non-financial private sector (see figure 1.8). By analysing the 
annual movements of banks‟ deposits, it can be noticed that they have also been 
growing steadily through time (see figure 1.7).   
Figure 1.8: Structure of total banks‟ liabilities (%) 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations upon the data from the NBRM. 
Regarding the structure of banks‟ deposits, the dominant share till the end 
of 2005 was sight deposits with an average over 1998-2005 of 62% of total 
deposits. From the beginning of 2006, there was a gradual shift in the structure of 
banks‟ deposits towards short-term deposits. These became the dominant 
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component in the structure of total banks‟ deposits, with an average share over the 
period 2006-2009 of 51%. The share of the long-term deposits is much lower, 
with an average share over this period of 7%, although in 2009 there was an 
upward trend (see figure 1.9) that can probably be explained by the increase in the 
deposit rates by the commercial banks during 2009 (NBRM Annual Report, 
2009a).  
Figure 1.9: Structure of total banks‟ deposits from the non-financial private sector 
(millions of denars) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
The second largest component of banks‟ liabilities is equity capital (see 
figures 1.7 and 1.8). However, their share in the total banks‟ liabilities has been 
decreasing continually over the years (see figures 1.7 and 1.8). This equity capital 
is mainly composed of equity plus reserves that combine up to 98% of total equity 
capital. 
The third largest component of total banks‟ liabilities are banks‟ short- and 
long-term borrowings from other banks and other financial institutions (see 
figures 1.7 and 1.8). Regarding the structure of total borrowings from other banks 
and other financial institutions, the dominant share of more than 70% during 
1998-2009 is composed of short- and long-term borrowing from abroad, whose 
average share in the total banks‟ liabilities during 1998-2009 equals 7%. This 
ratio has been quite stable throughout the years, ranging from 6% to 9%. 
However, for some banks and in some periods this ratio has been much higher, 
reaching a share of 35% in some individual bank‟s liabilities. This indicates that 
banks in Macedonia are to some extent dependent on foreign financing by taking 
funds from other banks and/or financial institutions from abroad in the form of 
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short- and long-term foreign currency borrowing including the subordinated 
deposits. The latter is defined as a foreign currency deposit with maturity over 1 
year that is borrowed by the foreign-owned bank(s) in Macedonia from their 
„parent‟ institution from abroad. Hence, banks‟ borrowing from abroad may 
indicate that domestic banks may be involved in some kind of „arbitrage‟. More 
precisely, domestic banks may borrow funds from abroad at lower interest rates 
and lend those funds in the domestic loan market at much higher interest rate (see 
section 1.7 and figure 1.26). Although it may be argued that the differences 
between domestic and foreign interest rates may be due to a premium reflecting 
the risk of depreciation of the Macedonian currency; however banks in Macedonia 
try to transfer this type of risk to their borrowers by either granting foreign 
currency loans or foreign currency indexed loans. Nonetheless, the banks are not 
fully hedged against the risk of currency depreciation because if depreciation 
happens, then their borrowers may not be able to fully repay their loans that may 
result in losses for the banks.  
 The rest of the items in the structure of total banks‟ liabilities such as the 
item „other liabilities‟ that include payable interest, other liabilities in domestic 
and foreign currency is negligible, with an average share of 2% in during the 
period of analysis.  
 If we assess the currency structure of both banks‟ assets and liabilities, as 
shown on figure 1.10, we can notice that more than 50% of total banks‟ assets and 
liabilities are denominated and/or indexed to a foreign currency. Moreover, the 
shares of foreign currency and foreign currency indexed assets and liabilities in 
the structure of total banks‟ assets and liabilities respectively, have been 
increasing in the last two years. 
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Figure 1.10: Structure of total assets and liabilities according to their currency 
denomination, in percentage of total assets/liabilities, respectively 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 Overall, this section has provided a general assessment of the assets and 
liabilities of the banking sector and changes in their structure over the years. It can 
be concluded that banks‟ assets and liabilities have been growing steadily through 
time, especially since 2003. Accordingly, the asset-to-GDP ratio, as an indicator 
of the level of financial intermediation, has also been increasing steadily over 
time. This implies that the level of financial intermediation in Macedonia has also 
been growing continually. However, compared to the more advanced transition 
economies from CSEE, the level of financial intermediation (measured by this 
ratio) remains low. Regarding the structure of banks‟ assets and liabilities, the 
dominant components are banks‟ outstanding loans and deposits respectively. 
Another important part of the structure of banks‟ liabilities is banks‟ foreign 
currency borrowing from abroad. Thus, we argued that banks may get involved in 
a kind of an „arbitrage‟. Another characteristic of the structure of the banks‟ assets 
and liabilities is that a majority of them (more than 50%) is denominated or 
indexed to a foreign currency. Having in mind that the dominant component of 
banks‟ assets is banks‟ outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector, and 
that these have importance in fulfilling the main research aims of the thesis (see 
section 1.3), a more detailed assessment of these is provided in the next section. 
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1.6 Stylised facts about banks‟ outstanding loans to the non-
financial private sector in Macedonia 
 
 This section provides an assessment of the main developments of the loan 
market for the period 1997-2009. It presents a general overview of the movements 
of the total outstanding loans and the level of financial intermediation, measured 
by indicators such as credit-to-GDP ratio. In addition, this section analyses the 
main changes over time in the currency, maturity and sectoral structure of the total 
outstanding loans, and the share of non-performing loans (NPL) relative to total 
outstanding loans.  
The reason for restricting the period of analysis from 1997 is due to data 
unavailability. The data used in this section is according to the new accounting 
methodology that took place from the beginning of 2009. Hence, the stock of 
outstanding loans and the rates of growth presented in this section may be 
different from those reported in the annual reports by the NBRM because the 
series used have been revised backwards. Some of the loan series such as the 
maturity structure, have only been revised backwards to 2002 and no earlier data 
is available.     
 The stock of banks‟ outstanding loans to the non-financial private sector in 
Macedonia has been increasing during the whole period of analysis (see figure 
1.11), with an average annual rate of growth of 20%. Analysing the annual rates 
of growth of the outstanding loans throughout the years, two subperiods can be 
distinguished.  
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Figure 1.11: Annual growth rates of total outstanding loans (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
The first one is from 1997 to 2003, characterised by a relatively low credit 
growth and with considerable fluctuations, likely due to the political and military 
instability in neighbouring countries, as well as in the Republic of Macedonia in 
2001. The average annual rate of growth during this period was around 9%, 
whereas the lowest rates of growth of total outstanding loans occurred in 1999 and 
2001. The low credit growth in 1999 can be explained with the political instability 
caused by the military NATO intervention in Kosovo and Republic of Serbia. The 
instability is likely to have caused a lower demand for new loans by the private 
sector, as well as reduction in the loan supply by the banks due to the fears of 
possible borrowers‟ default (NBRM Annual Report, 1999a). In 2001 the loan 
growth reached its lowest rate during the period of analysis and this was the 
period of armed conflict in the western part of the country that affected the whole 
economy (see NBRM Annual Report, 2001a). 
 The second subperiod is from 2003 to 2009, with an average annual rate of 
growth of 25%. This period is characterised by a more stable economic and 
political environment in the region. Accordingly, the credit growth reached its 
highest levels of 39% and 34% in 2007 and 2008, respectively.  
During this second subperiod (2003-2009), the lowest rate of credit growth 
occurred in 2009 probably due to the effects of the economic recession in the 
Macedonian economy (NBRM Annual Report, 2009a). The decline in economic 
activity resulted in lower loan demand and banks reduced the loan supply due to 
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fears of borrowers‟ default and inability to realise their loan collateral (NBRM, 
2009d, 2009e, 2009f and 2010). The reduction in the loan supply by banks was 
also enforced by the monetary policy measures that took place due to the 
economic recession. These included an increase in the reference policy rate (CB 
Bills rate) by 2 percentage points followed by an increase of the money market 
rate (MBKS) (see section 1.7 and figure 1.20); imposing constraints on the credit 
growth of banks and giving an increase in banks‟ reserve requirements (NBRM 
Annual Report, 2009a).   
 If we compare the annual rates of credit growth with those of other 
transition economies from CSEE and the Euro zone in 2007 and 2008 (the period 
before the economic recession; see figure 1.12), the credit growth in Macedonia 
was among the highest within these economies. This should not be surprising, 
having in mind the initial low level of financial intermediation measured through 
the credit-to-GDP ratio. The high credit growth rates in 2007 and 2008 in 
Macedonia may reflect a catching-up process due to the relatively underdeveloped 
loan market and low level of financial intermediation. 
Figure 1.12: Annual rates of growth of total outstanding loans to non-financial private 
sector in CSEE and the Euro-zone, 2007-2009 
 
Source: EUROSTAT and the web-sites of the respective central banks of the economies included 
in the figure.  
 Other indicators of the level of financial intermediation in Macedonia, i.e. 
the credit-to-GDP ratio tell a similar story. Before 2005, the credit-to-GDP ratio 
was below 20%. A rapid annual increase of around 6 percentage points of this 
ratio occurred during 2006-2008 and in 2008 it reached 41%. Nonetheless, the 
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rate of growth of credit-to-GDP ratio was substantially reduced in 2009 due to the 
reduced growth in the stock of the outstanding loans, similar as with the other 
transition economies from CSEE (see figure 1.13). By comparing the credit-to-
GDP ratio with the other economies from CSEE, it can be noticed that Macedonia 
had almost the lowest level of credit-to-GDP ratio during 2007-2009 (see figure 
1.13). This suggests that the loan market in Macedonia is still underdeveloped and 
it needs more time to „catch-up‟ with the level of development of the more 
advanced transition economies. 
Figure 1.13: Credit-to-GDP ratio among CSEE and the Euro-zone, 2007-2009 (%) 
 
Source: EUROSTAT and the web-sites of the respective central banks of the economies included 
in the figure.  
The currency structure of the banks‟ outstanding loans indicates that the 
dominant share, around 80% (average for 1997-2009) of the total outstanding 
loans, were in domestic currency (figure 1.14). However, when analysing 
domestic currency loans, we have to take into account that a relatively high 
proportion of them is composed of loans indexed to a foreign currency
6
. Their 
share in the domestic currency loans has been growing steadily through time, i.e. 
from 30% in 2005 to 44% in 2009. Analysing the dynamics of the foreign 
currency loans (see figure 1.14), two subperiods can be distinguished. The first 
one is up to 2003 and the second one from 2004 to 2009. During the first 
subperiod, the stock of foreign currency loans was more or less on a constant 
level. However, from 2004 this stock has been increasing continually, as was the 
                                                 
6
 The data is available from 2005. 
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case with the foreign currency indexed loans. The main reason for the former may 
be the amendments in the Law of Foreign Exchange Operations in the end of 2003 
that allowed lending in foreign currency to all entities and for all purposes
7
. 
Consequently, after these amendments the annual rates of growth of the foreign 
currency loans in 2004 and 2005 reached around 57% and 51% respectively and 
their share in the total outstanding loans has also increased from 16% in 2003 up 
to 22% in 2009. However, in order to get a better picture of the level of currency 
substitution and the extent to which banks are hedged against the risk of currency 
depreciation of the Macedonian denar, we should take into account the share of 
foreign currency and foreign currency indexed loans in the total outstanding loans. 
The share of both of them has increased from 46% in 2005 to 57% in 2009 of the 
total outstanding loans. This may suggest that borrowers have become more and 
more exposed to the risk of currency depreciation over the years. 
Figure 1.14: Currency structure of total outstanding loans (millions of denars) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
A comparison of the share of foreign currency loans plus the foreign 
currency indexed loans in the total outstanding loans to the non-financial private 
sector among other more advanced countries from CSEE that are already 
members of the EU, is presented in figure 1.15. This may suggest that the 
presence of currency substitution in the Macedonian loan market may be on par 
with the average of the more advanced transition economies from the CSEE. 
                                                 
7
 Source: NBRM, Annual Report, 2004a.  
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Figure 1.15: The share of foreign currency and foreign currency indexed loans in the total 
outstanding loans to non-financial private sector among economies from 
CSEE (%) 
 
Source: ECB Financial Stability Review, December 2009. The data for Republic of Macedonia are 
from the NBRM. 
The maturity structure of the domestic and foreign currency loans 
indicates that the majority is composed of long-term loans (average for the 2003-
2009).  
In assessing the maturity structure of the total outstanding loans, it can be 
noticed that up to the third quarter of 2003 short-term lending had the largest 
share in the structure of the total outstanding loans. However, since the last 
quarter of 2003 till present, there was a shift in the maturity structure of the total 
outstanding loans towards long-term lending (see figure 1.16) whose share in the 
total loans reached 60% in 2008 and 2009. 
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Figure 1.16: Maturity structure of total outstanding loans (millions of denars) 
 
Notes: short-term loans are those with a maturity of up to one year, whereas long-term loans are 
those with a maturity over one year. 
Source: NBRM. 
 The sectoral breakdown of total outstanding loans indicates that the largest 
proportion of banks‟ loans is extended to the corporate sector (figure 1.17). 
However, the share of households‟ loans has been increasing rapidly in recent 
years. For example, the average share of loans to the household sector relative to 
total loans during the period 1997-2003 was 10%, whereas their average share for 
the more recent period 2006-2009 has risen to 40%. 
Figure 1.17: Sectoral structure of total outstanding loans (millions of denars) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 Another important part of the total outstanding loans, that may indirectly 
indicate the quality of the loan portfolio of the banks, is the share of the non-
performing loans in total outstanding loans (NPL ratio). From figure 1.18 it can be 
seen that the share rose rapidly during the period 1998-2001. The sharpest annual 
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increase occurred in 2001 at the time of armed conflict in the country. However, 
since 2001 the NPL ratio has been declining steadily and till the end of 2008 it 
had declined by approximately 19 percentage points, indicating an improvement 
in the quality of the loan portfolio of the banking system. However, in 2009, the 
NPL ratio increased again due to the economic recession in the Macedonian 
economy. 
Figure 1.18: Non-performing loans as a percentage of total outstanding loans - NPL ratio 
(%) 
 
Source: NBRM 
The comparison of the NPL ratio with that of other economies from CSEE 
in figure 1.19, indicates that the Macedonian banking system in 2007-2009 had 
amongst the highest NPL ratio. Although the data in figure 1.19 are taken from a 
single source, they may not be consistent given the various definitions of the NPL 
in each economy. Therefore, the presented figures should be interpreted 
cautiously and should be taken as a rough indicator for the quality of the loan 
portfolio among CSEE economies. 
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Figure 1.19: Non-performing loans as a percentage of total outstanding loans to non-
financial private sector (NPL ratio) among economies from CSEE (%) 
 
Source: EBRD Transition Report, November 2009. The data for Macedonia are from NBRM. 
 In summary, it can be concluded that during the two years before the start 
of the economic recession in 2009, the credit sector developed rapidly. This is 
illustrated by the relatively high rates of credit growth and growth of the credit-to-
GDP ratio, suggesting an increased level of financial intermediation. Another 
characteristic of the structure of the loan market is the gradual improvement in the 
quality of the loan portfolio, as illustrated by the continual decline in the NPL 
ratio up to 2009. Additionally, it can be concluded that currency substitution, as 
measured by the share of the foreign currency loans and foreign currency indexed 
loans, is relatively high. This is typical of many other transition economies that 
have either fixed exchange rate regime or a currency board, such as the Baltic 
States and Bulgaria (see figure 1.15). What determines banks‟ lending decisions is 
the subject of detailed empirical analysis in chapter 5. Hence, in order to get a 
clearer picture about the development of the banking sector, it is necessary to 
assess the movements of the main interest rate series, which is the subject of 
analysis of the next section. 
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1.7 Overview of interest rate movements 
  
This section aims to provide an overview of interest rate movements. 
Accordingly, we aim to assess the movements of the key policy rate, money 
market rate and banks‟ lending and deposit rates for the period ranging from 1998 
to 2009.  
 In analysing the movements of the key policy rate, it is important to 
mention that during the period of analysis, as already mentioned in section 1.4, 
there was a change in the main policy instrument and thus, the key policy rate. 
Until the end of 1999 the key policy rate was the interest rate from the auctions of 
deposits by the NBRM with a maturity of 7 days, while from 2000 the key policy 
rate has been the interest rate on central bank bills (CB Bills rate). 
 In general, starting from 1998, the key policy rate had a downward trend 
(figure 1.20). This rate declined from around 15% at the beginning of 1998 to 
around 5% at the end of 2007. Over the analysed period, as can be seen from 
figure 1.20, the sharpest increase in the key policy rate occurred in May 1999 
when it reached its peak of 25%. The main reason for this sharp increase were the 
military actions and the armed conflict in the neighbouring countries, Serbia and 
Kosovo, that created psychological fears among economic agents in Macedonia. 
Consequently, there was a sudden withdrawal of deposits from the banks and 
difficulties with the loan repayments that resulted in a deterioration in the liquidity 
of the banking sector in a period already characterised as a period with deficiency 
of liquid assets of the banking system (see section 1.4; NBRM Annual Report, 
1999a). Therefore, the demand for liquid assets by the banks increased sharply, 
for which the main source were the auctions of deposits by the NBRM. This 
ultimately resulted in a sharp increase in the key interest rate. However, after the 
end of the armed conflict and the political stabilisation of the region, the liquidity 
of the banks started to return to normal levels and the demand for deposits 
declined, resulting in reductions in the key policy rate. 
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Figure 1.20: Movements of the nominal key policy rate and the money market rate 
(MBKS) in Macedonia, 1998-2009 (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
 From 2000, due to the change in the characteristics of the banking system 
from deficient to structural excess liquidity, the main monetary instrument 
became the sale of CB Bills
8
 with maturities of 7, 14 and 28 days. However, the 
causes of the excess liquidity of the banks in Macedonia and on what empirical 
evidence the decision of the monetary policy authorities to shift in the key 
monetary policy instrument is based, is not mentioned anywhere in the annual 
reports of the NBRM. 
Throughout 2000, the new referent policy rate (now the CB Bills rate with 
maturity of 28 days) has been declining continually. In 2001, a sharp increase in 
the key policy rate occurred again. The main reason for this sharp increase was 
the armed conflict in the country. More precisely, due to large fiscal and related 
military expenditures by the government, banks‟ liquidity increased substantially 
and that created pressures on the foreign exchange market for a depreciation of 
the Macedonian denar. Accordingly, for the purpose of maintaining the fixed 
nominal exchange rate, the NBRM had to intervene in the money market by 
withdrawing liquidity from the banking system through auctions of CB Bills 
whose interest rate increased to 18% in September 2001. After 2001 with the end 
of the armed conflict and greater political and economic stability, and with the 
                                                 
8
 Throughout the period, depending from the monetary developments and economic environment, 
the type of the auctions of CB Bills was changing from “interest rate tender” to “volume tender” 
(see table 1.7).   
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ensuing reduction in the level of liquidity of the banking system, the CB Bills rate 
in general had a downward trend.  
 It is worth noting that after the armed conflict and due to the economic and 
political stabilisation of the country, the CB Bills with maturity of 14 and 7 days 
were abolished in January 2002 and March 2005, respectively (source: NBRM 
Annual Report, 2002a and 2005a). Accordingly, the only CB Bills used as an 
instrument by the Central Bank was the CB Bills with maturity of 28 days.  
 During the last two years of the sample period (2008-2009), the key policy 
rate started to increase again. The major reason for the gradual increase in the key 
policy rate during 2008 was the inflationary pressures caused by the sharp 
increase of the world prices on some of the imported goods such as food, oil and 
energy products. Additionally, due to the relatively high expansion of the 
economic activity in 2008 (see table 1.1); there was also a demand pressure on the 
domestic price level. Consequently, although the NBRM is not an inflation 
targeter, it gradually increased the referent rate in order to reduce the inflationary 
pressures in the domestic economy, with the assumption that those changes in the 
key policy rate will be transmitted on banks‟ retail rates.  
Regarding the gradual increase in the key policy rate during 2009, the 
major reason was the beginning of the economic recession in the domestic 
economy. Accordingly, due to reduced exports and the substantial reduction in 
foreign direct and portfolio investment and private transfers, the inflow of foreign 
currency went down sharply. This caused pressures for depreciation of the 
domestic currency in the foreign exchange market. An additional reason that 
reinforced these pressures for depreciation of the domestic currency was the 
psychological fear in the household sector of possible depreciation of the 
domestic currency, which led households to suddenly start to convert their 
savings, mainly into Euros. As a reaction to that, the NBRM increased the key 
policy rate in order to reduce the liquidity of the banks and hence, the pressures of 
the foreign exchange market (NBRM Annual Report, 2009a). As can be seen from 
table 1.9, this reaction of the NBRM is the reverse of the reaction of the central 
banks for almost all economies from CSEE and the European Central Bank 
(ECB).   
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  By comparing the referent policy rate for the economies from CSEE (table 
1.9) during the period before the economic recession (before 2009), it can be 
noticed that the key policy rate of the Republic of Macedonia was in the middle 
range among the countries of comparison, but much higher than that of the ECB. 
During 2008, due to the increase in world prices of many commodities, all of the 
economies were faced with higher inflationary pressures and reacted in the same 
direction by increasing policy rates. However, in 2009 the reactions of the central 
banks in adjusting their key policy rates were different, due to the differences in 
the monetary poly regimes. Namely, almost all the rest of the central banks 
included in table 1.9 (apart from Croatia), during the economic recession in 2009 
reacted by reducing their referent rates in order to stimulate consumption and 
investment demand in their national economies. However, it should be taken into 
account that majority of them have a different monetary regime, i.e. inflation 
targeting, whereas the NBRM together with the Croatian National Bank conducts 
a regime of a de facto fixed exchange rate regime that imposes a different reaction 
of the monetary policy makers in different phases of the economic cycle. 
Table 1.9: The key nominal policy rates of ECB and CSEE economies, end of period (%) 
 
Source: Central Bank web-sites of the respective countries and the ECB.  
 In order to assess the movements of the money market interest rate, we 
consider the average weighted interbank interest rate (MBKS) that includes all 
transactions on the money market whose longest maturity is up to 3 months. 
 As shown on figure 1.20, the movements in the MBKS rate, in general, are 
similar to the key policy rate; indicating that there may be a relatively high 
correlation among the two rates. For example, the correlation coefficient of the 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Albania 6.50 5.25 5.00 5.50 6.25 6.25 5.25
Bulgaria 2.83 2.37 2.05 3.26 4.58 5.77 0.55
Croatia / / 3.50 3.50 4.06 6.00 6.00
Czech Republic 2.00 2.50 2.00 2.50 3.50 2.25 1.00
Eurozone 2.00 2.00 2.25 3.50 4.00 2.50 1.00
Hungary 12.50 9.50 6.00 8.00 7.50 10.00 6.25
Macedonia 6.15 10 8.52 5.74 4.77 7.00 8.50
Poland 5.25 6.50 4.50 4.00 5.00 5.00 3.50
Romania 20.40 17.96 7.50 8.75 7.50 10.25 8.00
Serbia 10.63 16.30 19.16 15.35 9.57 17.75 9.50
Slovakia 6.00 4.00 3.00 4.75 4.25 2.50 1.75
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levels of both rates for the period 1998-2009 is 0.93 and is statistically significant 
at 5% level. In general, the MBKS, similar to the key policy rate, had a downward 
trend over the analysed period. More specifically, the MBKS declined from nearly 
20% at the beginning of 1998 to nearly 3% at the end of 2007. However, there is a 
divergent movement between the MBKS rate and the key policy rate in 2009. 
More precisely, in April 2009, the key policy rate was increased by 2 percentage 
points and afterwards it was kept constant till the end of the year. In contrast, the 
MBKS rate in 2009 fluctuated (see figure 1.20).         
 In analysing banks‟ retail rates two subperiods will be discussed. The first 
one is from 1998 to 2004 and the second one from 2005 till present. The reason 
for dividing the sample period into two is changes in the methodology of 
collecting and constructing the banks‟ retail rates series. During the first 
subperiod, as a result of a simplistic statistical methodology, there is only one 
interest rate series available for both lending and deposit rates, respectively. 
During the second subperiod, the interest rate series are collected and constructed 
according to a new accounting methodology (for details see later in this section).  
 In the first subperiod, banks‟ lending rate is calculated as a weighted 
average of short-term denar loans with maturities up to 1 year, including both 
household and corporate sectors. The banks‟ deposit rate represents the interest 
rate of short-term denar deposits, with a maturity of 3 months for the household 
sector only
9
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 Source: NBRM, 2001c. 
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Figure 1.21: Movements in the nominal lending, deposit rates and the key policy rate in 
Macedonia for the period, 1998-2004 (%) 
 
Source: NBRM.  
 Examination of the lending and deposit rates during the first subperiod, 
1998-2004, indicates a downward trend (see figure 1.20). The sharpest increase of 
the lending rate occurred in 2001, whereby in September it reached almost the 
same level as at the beginning of 1998 of 21%. The same change can be noticed 
for the deposit rates that increased substantially during 2001 (see figure 1.20), but 
not at the same pace as the lending rates. A possible explanation for this sharp 
increase in the lending rates may be the higher risk of borrowers‟ default and 
worsening of the quality of the loan portfolio associated with the armed conflict in 
the country (see section 1.6 and figure 1.18). Another explanation mentioned in 
the NBRM Annual Report (2001a) was that banks followed the pattern of the key 
policy rate and/or MBKS rate in adjusting their lending rates. An explanation for 
the gradual increase of the deposit rate during 2001 is that banks‟ were faced with 
a withdrawal of deposits due to the psychological fears among the people about 
the security and economic uncertainty in the domestic economy due to the armed 
conflict. Consequently, the banks, in order to maintain their stock of deposits, 
reacted by increasing deposits rates, making them more attractive for the savers 
(NBRM Annual Report, 2001a). Nonetheless, in the annual report these 
explanations are not empirically tested and no more detailed explanation is 
offered. 
 After the end of the armed conflict and the political and economic 
stabilisation of the country from 2002, banks‟ lending and deposit rates started to 
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decline rapidly. During the assessed period, it is worth noting that after the armed 
conflict in 2001, also the interest rate spread between the lending and deposit rates 
started to decline continually (see figure 1.25). According to the NBRM Annual 
Report (2002a - 2004a) as well as the working paper series published by the 
NBRM (Kadievska-Vojnovic and Georgievska, 2006); the major reasons for the 
gradual decline in banks‟ retail rates and the interest rate spread after 2001 are the 
following factors: a) increased competitiveness through the years; b) entrance of 
foreign capital; c) increased political and macroeconomic stability in the region 
(especially from 2001); d) improvement in the quality of the loan portfolio since 
2001 and e) the more favourable macroeconomic environment in Macedonia since 
2001. Nonetheless, for all of these explanations no detailed empirical evidence is 
offered. Consequently, testing if some of these factors have really affected banks‟ 
retail rates will be subject of analysis later on in chapter 3.  
During the second subperiod 2005-2009, the lending and deposit interest 
rates were calculated according to a new statistical methodology. More precisely, 
both interest rate series are now available disaggregated according to their 
currency structure. They are calculated as a weighted average of their maturity 
and sectoral structure, including the interest rates on short and long term 
loans/deposits of both household and corporate sectors (source: NBRM, 2006d).   
Figure 1.22: Movements of the nominal lending and deposit rates in domestic currency 
and in domestic currency indexed to a foreign currency in Macedonia 
respectively, 2005-2009 (%) 
 
Source: NBRM. 
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Analysing the movements of lending rates in domestic currency and in 
domestic currency indexed to a foreign currency respectively, from figure 1.22, it 
can be seen that they have very similar patterns. The major difference is that the 
lending rate indexed to a foreign currency has a lower level by approximately 0.6 
percentage points (average for 2005-2009), compared to the lending rate in 
domestic currency. This may be due to the lower risk premium associated with the 
risk of currency depreciation. Hence, the banks may charge lower rates. The 
downward movement of both types of lending rates continued till the last quarter 
of 2008 when they started to rise again due to the beginning of the economic 
recession in the country.  
Assessing the movement of deposit rate in domestic currency and in 
domestic currency indexed to a foreign currency from figure 1.22 it is clear that 
they have different patterns, especially since the beginning of 2009. Since that 
time, the deposit rate in domestic currency has continued to rise, whereas the 
deposit rate indexed to a foreign currency has declined gradually. The latter may 
be again explained by the higher risk of currency depreciation since the beginning 
of economic recession in the domestic economy for which the banks reduced the 
deposit rate indexed to a foreign currency. In contrast, the banks increased the 
deposit rates in domestic currency in order to attract additional savings a source of 
financing their lending activities (NBRM Annual Report, 2009a).  
 Regarding the movements of the banks‟ retail rates in real terms, figure 
1.23 suggests that their movement is quite similar to those of the nominal rates 
(see figures 1.21 and 1.22). The exception is the deposit rate in real terms in 2008 
when it became negative due to the higher inflation (see figure 1.23), though the 
deposit rate in nominal terms did increase (see figure 1.22). The falling trend of 
the banks‟ retail rates in real terms during 2006-2008 coincides with the falling 
country risk premium during the same period (see figure 1.27). 
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Figure 1.23: Movements of the lending and deposit rates in real terms in Macedonia, 
1998-2009 (%) 
 
Source: author‟s own calculations upon the data from the NBRM and State Statistical Office. 
Analysing the movements of banks‟ retail rates in foreign currency, 
lending rates increased marginally till the end of 2008 whereas the deposit rates 
increased more rapidly (see figure 1.24). However, since the beginning of 2009, 
there is a divergent movement between these two rates, i.e. the lending rate in 
foreign currency has declined, whereas the deposit rate in foreign currency 
continued to rise. Another characteristic of the retail rates in foreign currency is 
that both of them during the whole period of analysis (2005-2009), have been at a 
lower level compared to the banks‟ retail rates in domestic currency. This may 
reflect the lower currency depreciation risk premium by the banks. Additionally, 
both retail rates in foreign currency have a lower variability than the same series 
denominated in domestic currency. The standard deviations of lending and deposit 
rates in foreign currency equal 0.0041 and 0.0072 respectively; while the standard 
deviations of the same series in domestic currency equal 0.0094 and 0.0093 
respectively.  
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Figure 1.24: Movements of the nominal lending and deposit interest rates in foreign 
currency in Macedonia, 2005-2009 (%) 
 
Source: NBRM.     
  
By comparing the movements of banks‟ retail rates in domestic currency 
among the CSEE economies, from table 1.10 it can be seen that all of them before 
the beginning of economic recession in 2009 had a downward trend. By 
comparing the levels of banks‟ retail rates, we can notice in Macedonia had 
among the highest levels of banks‟ retail rates in CSEE (see table 1.10). 
Table 1.10: Nominal lending and deposit rates in domestic currency for the economies 
from CSEE, 2004-2009 (%, end of period) 
 
Source: IMF, IFS and the NBRM.  
In analysing the interest rate spread in Macedonia between the lending and 
deposit rates, frequently used as a rough indicator of the efficiency of the banking 
sector, it can be noticed that it was relatively volatile and at a high level during the 
period 1998-2001 (see figure 1.25). The average interest rate spread of the retail 
rates in domestic currency for this period was 8.7 percentage points. It reached the 
maximum level of 11 percentage points in September 2001 when the lending rate 
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in domestic currency also reached its peak. However, afterwards it started to 
decline continually, and by the end of 2009, it equalled around 3 percentage 
points. A similar downward trend of the interest rate spread can be noticed for the 
retail rates in foreign currency, whereas the pattern of the interest rate spread of 
the retail rates indexed to a foreign currency shows a different (upward) pattern 
from the beginning of 2009 (see figure 1.25). 
Figure 1.25: Movements of the interest rate spread between the various types of nominal 
lending and deposit rates in Macedonia, 1998-2009 (percentage points) 
 
* From 2005, the lending and deposit rates are calculated according to a different accounting 
methodology and are not directly comparable with the previous period.  
Source: Author‟s own calculation upon the data from NBRM. 
If we compare the dynamics of the interest rate spread among the 
economies from CSEE, as shown in table 1.11, in general we can observe a 
downward trend in almost every economy till the beginning of the economic 
recession in 2009. In 2009 in majority of the economies, the interest rate spread 
has increased, however this was not the case with the Republic of Macedonia, 
Romania or Serbia. The interest rate spread during the period of analysis in the 
Republic of Macedonia has been among the highest in CSEE, indicating that 
banking sector efficiency is still lagging behind the more advanced economies 
from CSEE and is still among the most concentrated ones (see table 1.3). This 
indicator provides consistent implications with the EBRD‟s index for the banking 
sector reform and interest rate liberalisation (section 1.4 and table 1.2). 
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Table 1.11: Nominal interest rate spread between the lending and deposit rates for the 
economies from CSEE, 2004-2009 (%, end of period) 
 
Source: IMF, IFS and the NBRM.  
Another characteristic of the lending rate series in Macedonia, regardless 
of which currency they are denominated, is that they have been much higher than 
the referent foreign money market rate (3-month EURIBOR rate taken as a proxy 
indicator) (see figure 1.26). This may be consistent with the argument, as already 
discussed in sections 1.5 and 1.6, that banks may have actually been involved in 
some kind of an „arbitrage‟ by borrowing from aboard by a lower interest rate and 
placing those funds in the domestic loan market by a much higher interest rate. 
Figure 1.26: Movements of the foreign referent money market rate (3-month EURIBOR), 
domestic lending rates and the MBKS rate, 2000-2009 (%) 
 
* From 2005, the lending rate in domestic currency is calculated according to a different 
accounting methodology and is not directly comparable with the previous period.  
Source: EUROSTAT and NBRM. 
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Regarding the assessment of the country risk premium, in absence of any 
official data series, we roughly assess it by the movements of the interest rate 
spread between the Macedonian money market rate (MBKS) and the EMU money 
market rate  (the 3-month EURIBOR), both of them in real terms. As can be seen 
from figure 1.27, this indicator increased sharply during 2001 and 2002 probably 
due to the armed conflict in the country. However, with the economic and 
political stabilisation of the country, it started to decrease in 2006-2008 and again 
it increased sharply in 2009. This is probably due the economic recession in the 
economy when the pressures on the foreign exchange market were quite high 
which increased the risk of depreciation of the domestic currency.  
Figure 1.27: Movements of the country risk premium for the period 2000-2009 
(percentage points) 
 
Source: author‟s own calculations upon the data from NBRM and EUROSTAT. 
 In summary, it can be concluded that in general, all interest rate series 
assessed in this section since 1998 till the end of the armed conflict in 2001, were 
relatively high. Since the end of the armed conflict and the economic and political 
stabilisation of the country, i.e. from 2002 till the beginning of the economic 
recession in 2009, there was a declining trend at all interest rate series. This trend 
can be observed in the key policy rate, money market rate and lending and deposit 
rates in domestic currency and lending rates indexed to a foreign currency. 
However, this is not the case with the banks‟ retail rates in foreign currency. 
Compared to the other economies from CSEE, the Republic of Macedonia 
together with Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Serbia, has the highest retail rates. 
A similar conclusion can be obtained for the interest rate spread between the 
lending and deposit rates that has be declining continually during the whole period 
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of analysis and may indicate increased efficiency in the banking sectors over time. 
Nonetheless, the level of interest rate spread is still among the highest in 
economies from CSEE, implying that the efficiency in the Macedonian banking 
sector is lagging behind the more advanced transition economies from CSEE. 
Additionally, the domestic lending rates as well as the MBKS rate have been 
much higher than the foreign referent money market rate, pointing that banks may 
have been involved in an „arbitrage‟. The country risk premium, although falling 
during in 2006-2008, it started to rise in 2009. 
      
1.8 Conclusions 
 
 The objective of this chapter was to provide a general introduction to the 
overall thesis by presenting the main aims and objectives of the thesis. In this 
chapter we have identified the main characteristics of monetary policy in 
Macedonia and how it has been conducted in recent years. We have also provided 
an assessment of the structure of the Macedonian banking sector, followed by an 
initial assessment of banks‟ assets and liabilities, the major developments in the 
loan market and interest rate movements. 
 It can be concluded that the banking sector in Macedonia is still in the 
process of development. This can be noticed from the relatively high level of 
concentration in the banking sector and the relatively slow pace of banking sector 
reforms assessed by the EBRD‟s index. Regarding the former, the Macedonian 
banking sector is among the most concentrated in CSEE. Regarding the latter, 
Macedonia has completed the lowest level of banking sector reforms amongst 
these economies. Considering the ownership structure, more than 90% of banking 
sector capital is privately owned, whilst foreign capital has been increasing 
rapidly in recent years as the number of banks that are predominantly foreign-
owned has also increased rapidly. Compared to the other economies from CSEE, 
the share of predominantly foreign-owned banks in the total banks‟ assets is 
among the highest. 
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 Regarding banks‟ assets and liabilities, they have been developing quite 
rapidly in Macedonia, especially during the period before the recent economic 
recession. They have been growing at a relatively high pace, indicating a 
catching-up process with the more advanced economies in transition and 
developed economies in the Euro-zone. This higher level of financial 
intermediation is reflected in the growing rates of assets-to-GDP ratio, though it 
remains amongst the lowest in CSEE. This is similar with the loan market where 
it was also developing rapidly before the beginning of economic recession. This 
can be inferred from the relatively high rates of growth before 2009 as well as the 
rapid growth of credit-to-GDP ratio. Concerning the currency structure of the 
outstanding loans, the share of foreign currency and foreign currency indexed 
loans has always been above 50% of total outstanding loans. Compared to the 
more advanced economies from CSEE, this ratio is still not as high as in other 
economies such as Estonia and Latvia. The quality of the loan portfolio (measured 
by the NPL ratio), has been improving gradually, up to the recent recession, 
however it is still among the highest in CSEE. Moreover, the indicator used for 
the country risk premium started to increase again in 2009. 
 Another indicator of the positive changes in the structure of the financial 
and the banking sectors is the general reduction in the major interest rates up to 
the beginning of 2009. Despite the falling banks‟ retail rates, they remain amongst 
the highest in CSEE. An additional indicator of the positive changes in the 
banking sector is the falling interest rate spread between the lending and deposit 
rates. However, compared to the other CSEE economies, the interest rate spread 
in Macedonia remains among the highest. This may indicate that the efficiency of 
the banking sector in Macedonia is still lagging behind the more advanced CSEE 
economies. What are the main reasons for the declining trend of banks‟ retail rates 
and what determines their lending rate adjustment decisions will be the subject of 
a comprehensive empirical analysis in chapter 3. 
 After assessing the main developments in the banking sector, loan market 
and interest rates and raising some key questions, the next step is to begin to 
address the main research questions of this thesis: are the interest rate and bank 
lending channels effective, what determines banks‟ lending rate and loan supply 
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decisions and is there a possibility for an „arbitrage‟ by borrowing at a cheaper 
price from abroad and placing those funds in the domestic loan market at much 
higher prices. Accordingly, in order to fulfil the major aims of the thesis and to 
explore these issues, we aim to conduct a detailed empirical analysis on these 
aspects later in the thesis. Hence, the main task of the next chapter is to assess the 
various theories and empirical studies that investigate what determines banks‟ 
retail rate setting decisions as a foundation for the later economic and statistical 
analysis. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter is related to the second and the third research questions of this 
thesis; the size of lending rate adjustment and what factors have a significant 
impact upon it (see section 1.1). The main aims are to critically assess the key 
theoretical aspects of how banks set their retail interest rates and to explore what 
are the major factors that affect banks‟ retail rates setting decisions. This chapter 
also provides a critical survey of the existing empirical studies that investigate the 
main determinants of interest rate pass-through in various economies, classified 
according to the different empirical approaches applied. The main value added of 
this chapter to the overall thesis is that it provides a comprehensive survey of the 
theoretical models of how banks set their retail rates. It also examines different 
empirical approaches applied in the literature that will help us in conducting the 
empirical analysis in chapter 3, aiming to investigate what factors affect the size 
of adjustment of lending rates among banks in Macedonia.  
 The main underlying theoretical models that analyse how banks‟ set their 
retail rates are those of Rousseas (1985) and Ho and Saunders (1981). They are 
the basic formal models that consider banks‟ retail rate adjustment based on the 
mark-up pricing model typically applied in a non-perfect competitive 
environment. Additional approaches that are also critically surveyed in this 
chapter are the theories of asymmetric information, switching costs, relationship 
lending and “menu costs”. 
 The survey of empirical studies concentrates on how the underlying 
theoretical model has been developed and modified through time in respect of the 
basic macro and microeconomic factors that are seen to affect the interest rate 
pass-through as well as the various econometric approaches applied. This part of 
the chapter investigates what are the common factors that are found to 
significantly affect banks‟ retail rates setting decisions and explores the strengths 
and weaknesses of different econometric methods applied, which will later inform 
our empirical investigation of retail rate setting in Macedonia. 
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This chapter is structured as follows: section 2.2 examines the theoretical 
models that explain how banks‟ determine the retail rate setting. Section 2.3 
critically surveys the empirical studies that investigate the determinants of retail 
rates setting in various economies. In the final section of the chapter, a summary 
of the findings is presented. 
 
2.2 Theories of how banks set their retail interest rates 
 
This section aims to critically assess various theories and models of how 
banks set their retail rates. It is divided into separate subsections according to the 
specific theory examined. 
 
2.2.1 The mark-up pricing theory  
 One of the main formal theories of how banks set their retail rates was 
developed by Rousseas (1985). The author develops a mark-up pricing model for 
a non-perfect competitive banking sector, since it is argued that banks exhibit 
some degree of market power because the typical banking retail market is 
“...dominated by a few large banks of national and international character.” 
(Rousseas 1985, p.136). Hence, a starting argument of Rousseas is that banks in 
the loan market are price setters that set their retail interest rates as a mark-up 
(profit margin) over their prime costs, expressed with the equation: 
i = k(u)  (2.1) 
where, i is the interest rate on loans, u represents the unit prime or variable costs 
and k is the mark-up or the profit margin over the variable costs. The profit 
margin is determined by the market power acquired by bank(s) such that in less 
competitive markets, where banks exhibit greater market power, the mark-up 
(profit margin) will be higher. The prime or variable costs are composed of labour 
costs and „raw materials‟. In the case of the banking sector, according to Rousseas 
(1985), labour costs are taken as fixed because, unlike manufacturing firms, the 
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number of employees does not vary much with the level of financial activities. 
Therefore, banks‟ variations in prime costs are mainly determined from the 
variations in „raw material‟ component which represents the costs of funding of 
their lending activities („cost of funds‟). It is the interest rates that banks pay on 
deposits, interest rates on their borrowing in the money market and some other 
costs. For example, in the case of the US, those other costs partly reflect the costs 
arising from the required reserves that banks must hold at the Federal Reserve and 
the insurance fees on deposits that banks are obliged to pay to the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation.  
 Rousseas‟s (1985) model assumes that „cost of funds‟ rates, represented 
mainly by the funds raised in the money market, are exogenously determined 
because banks in these market segments are price takers due to the relatively high 
level of competitiveness. However, this is not the case on the retail market. Thus, 
Rousseas argues that changes in the lending rates are mainly determined by 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ because the profit margin is taken to be constant 
over the business cycles. However, this is a large assumption that may not always 
coincide with the reality because the model is based on the assumption that the 
banking environment and banks‟ financial characteristics are static over time. 
According to some other extensions of the model (Allen, 1988 and Angbazo, 
1997), it is argued that some of these factors may affect the mark-up margin. 
 Rousseas‟s (1985) argument of a constant mark-up pricing over time is 
empirically supported in the paper. The main hypothesis is that changes in the 
representative loan interest rate (in this case, the prime rate
10
) should follow the 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate (proxied by the Federal Funds Rate (FFR)), 
while the interest rate margin, indicating the mark-up between the two, should be 
constant. By analysing the interest rate fluctuations and the interest rate spread 
during the period 1955-1984, the author found that changes in the prime rate 
coincide with the changes in the FFR and in general, the interest rate spread was 
constant with small fluctuations, except for the periods of 1955-64, 1973-76 and 
1982-83. The reasons for the fluctuations in the first two periods are interpreted as 
a consequence of exogenous factors such as, the post-war recovery and oil shocks. 
                                                 
10
 The prime rate is the administered loan interest rate set by the banks in the US economy.  
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The fluctuations in the last period are attributed to changes in the US monetary 
policy, such as the shift of the monetary policy regime from interest rate to money 
supply targeting and the abandonment of the Regulation Q. An additional 
proposed reason for the sharp increase in the spread in the last period was the 
tendency for increased loan riskiness according to which banks increased their 
profit margin in order to compensate for the increased probability of borrowers‟ 
default. With this explanation, Rousseas implicitly introduces another factor that 
may affect the mark-up margin, i.e. the riskiness of loans. However, these 
interpretations of variations in the spread are mainly based on descriptive statistics 
and not on more sophisticated statistical methods that may provide different 
conclusions.  
A direct criticism of Rousseas‟s (1985) empirical work is provided by 
Niggle (1987) who argues that the selection of both representative rates, the prime 
rate and the FFR as representative loan and „cost of funds‟ rates respectively, may 
not be appropriate especially after the late 1970s. The argument why the prime 
rate may not be taken as the representative loan rate is because the interest rates 
on small loans in the US (up to 1 million US Dollars), as well as the rates on loans 
higher than 1 million US Dollars, have been set on a „prime-plus‟ basis based 
mainly on short term money market rates such as 90 day Certificate of Deposits 
(CDs), the London Interbank Offer Rate or prime commercial paper rate. 
Therefore, the loan rates on small and large loans have almost always been below 
the prime rate and are determined differently on a variable mark-up basis based 
upon the money market rates. On that basis, Niggle (1987) also argues that the 
FFR was no longer the best representative „cost of funds‟ rate because banks use 
various money market rates with different maturities as a „cost of funds‟ rate in 
setting their loan rates. Consequently, Rousseas‟s conclusions of a „constant‟ 
mark-up over the business cycle may be misleading because they are based on 
inappropriate representative loan and „cost of funds‟ rates.  
Laudadio (1987) additionally criticises Rousseas‟s view on the basis that 
not all loan markets are oligopolistic and thus, the mark-up may not be stable in 
various segments on the loan market. For example, Laudadio argues that the 
market for large short-term loans in the USA is highly competitive because the 
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demand side is dominated by large well-known corporations with large assets who 
have other available options for external finance, while the supply side is 
represented by large number of domestic and international banks. This leads to 
competitive pricing by the banks with them setting the mark-up as low as possible 
in order to attract more borrowers. In contrast, the loan market for small short-
term loans in the USA is characterised by an oligopolistic structure because on the 
supply side exist small local banks whose number is limited and thus, have 
relatively high market power. The demand side is dominated by small firms with 
limited assets whose banks‟ loans are their major source of external finance. 
Hence, due to their acquired market power, local banks may set up a higher mark-
up. But even in this case, Laudadio argues that the mark-up is not seen as a stable 
because it may be determined by other factors such as switching costs and the 
existence of „customer relations‟ (see section 2.2.3).       
 The main weakness of Rousseas‟s (1985) theory is related to the argument 
that variations in banks‟ retail interest rates are mainly determined by the 
variations in the „cost of funds‟ rate, without specifying the extent to which those 
variations are transmitted. Another possible weakness of this model is that it lacks 
a consistency in explaining how the mark-up margin is set and whether it is 
defined as a constant proportion of the „cost of funds‟ rate or a constant in 
absolute terms, although in his empirical work the author argues that it is a 
constant in absolute terms. 
 A more comprehensive model, also based on a mark-up pricing strategy, 
was established by Ho and Saunders (1981). The major value added of this model 
is that it explicitly defines how the mark-up margin is determined. The model is 
defined as a static one-period decision model where loans and deposits are taken 
as a single product with one type of maturity that is equal between the two. The 
main hypothesis of the model is that banks exhibit some kind of market power and 
act as risk averse intermediaries between the suppliers of funds (depositors) and 
those who require funds (the borrowers). Hence, the model works under the 
assumptions that loan demand and deposit supply are exogenously determined and 
changes in these quantities are not synchronised. Thus new deposit arrivals and/or 
a new loan demand are unforeseen by banks. Consequently, banks try to match 
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the new deposit arrival with the new loan demand by lending and/or to borrowing 
on the money market, which incurs some risks such as the interest-rate risk 
composed of reinvestment and refinancing risks. More precisely, when banks 
perceive a higher loan demand or face new loan demand without having sufficient 
pull of deposits to fully cover the new loan demand, then they have to borrow in 
the money market. This increases their refinancing risks. In the opposite case, 
when banks have a new deposit supply but have insufficient new loan demand, 
then they have to place their deposits in the money market. This increases their 
reinvestment risk. Due to these risks banks adjust their mark-up margin as a 
hedging instrument against the interest-rate risks they face in the money market in 
order to maximise their utility. The details of how the mark-up margin is adjusted 
when banks are faced with refinancing and reinvestment risks are explained in the 
following paragraph. 
In the model, prices of loans (pl) and deposits (pd), that are inversely 
related to loan and deposit interest rates respectively, are defined as follows: 
pl = p – b  (2.2)     
pd = p + a  (2.3) 
where p is the so-called „true‟ or „pure‟ price of loan and deposit. “b” and “a” are 
fees charged by the bank for the provision of their financial services to the 
borrowers and depositors, respectively. Thus, the interest rate spread between the 
loan and deposit rate (the mark-up margin - β1) is a sum of the two fees (β1 = a + 
b). By manipulating these two fees, banks may actually affect the loan demand 
and deposit supply and consequently may establish the mark-up margin that will 
protect them from the interest-rate risks they face on financial markets. For 
example, in the case when banks face higher deposit inflow than loan demand, 
then they may increase fee “a”, which will increase the price of deposits (reduce 
the deposit interest rate), and will discourage a new deposit supply. On the other 
hand, banks may also react by reducing fee “b” that will increase the price of 
loans (a decrease in loan interest rates) that will stimulate new borrowing on the 
loan market.  
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Ho and Saunders (1981) argue that banks simultaneously change the two 
fees, depending from the supply and demand of funds on the loan market. Similar 
to Rousseas (1985), Ho and Saunders argue that banks set their lending rates on a 
mark-up margin over the „cost of funds‟ rate (the money market rate), where the 
mark-up margin is determined in absolute terms by the banks.  
The Ho and Saunders (1981) mark-up pricing model was amended by 
Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1997), who considered some additional important 
factors that affect the mark-up margin. Allen (1988) abandons the assumption of 
equal maturity of loans and deposits (the single-product assumption), and argues 
that another important factor in setting the mark-up margin is the cross-product 
diversification of loans and deposits in respect to their maturity. According to 
Allen (1988), banks actually try to match deposits and loans with similar 
maturities in order to minimise the interest-rate risk. For example, when the 
coverage ratio of long-term loans with long-term deposits is higher, then lower 
will be the interest-rate risks and thus, the mark-up margin. The reason for this is 
that banks are less likely to have to borrow additionally on the money market in 
order to satisfy the long-term loan demand and vice versa.  
Angbazo (1997) considers another additional factor that may affect the 
mark-up margin: the borrowers‟ default risk. Accordingly, those banks that have a 
higher default risk set a higher mark-up margin in order to compensate for the 
expected higher default losses.   
Overall, within the “mark-up” margin theory there is inconsistency in 
specifying whether the mark-up margin is constant through time and if so, 
whether it is constant in absolute or in relative terms. For example, Rousseas‟s 
(1985) empirical findings suggest that banks keep their mark-up margin constant 
in absolute terms through time. However, he also argues that the mark-up margin 
may vary in some periods due to the increased riskiness of banks‟ loans and/or 
disturbances by some regulatory requirement changes. In contrast, Laudadio 
(1987) argues that the mark-up margin varies according to the market segment in 
which banks operate and the level of market power that banks have. Ho and 
Saunders (1985) argue that banks adjust their mark-up margin according to the 
interest risk they face and that the macroeconomic environment (aggregate 
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demand) may affect the size of adjustment. In their empirical examination they 
argue that the risk neutral mark-up margin (when there are no interest rate risks on 
the financial market), is constant in absolute terms. As the mark-up pricing model 
has been modified through time, Allen (1988) suggests that banks‟ mark-up 
margin is determined by the stability of the sources of financing their loans, i.e. 
their coverage of long-term loans with long-term deposits, and is also seen to vary 
through time in relative terms. Angbazo (1997) argues that the mark-up margin is 
additionally determined by the level of riskiness of loan portfolio that may also 
affect the size of the pass-through     
Based upon the mark-up pricing models of Rousseas (1985) and Ho and 
Saunders (1981), de Bondt (2005) has defined the retail rate setting with the 
following equation: 
i = β1 + β2u   (2.4) 
where, i is banks‟ retail rate (deposit or loan rate), β1 is the constant mark-up in 
absolute terms, u is the „cost of funds‟ rate and β2 represents the demand elasticity 
of deposits or loans in respect of deposit (loan) interest rate, respectively; i.e. the 
size of the pass-through coefficient. According to this equation, variations in retail 
rates are determined by the variations in the „cost of funds‟ rate, but the extent to 
which those variations are transmitted to banks‟ retail rates, depends upon the size 
of β2 coefficient, which may vary. It can be less than one, implying an incomplete 
pass-through from „cost of funds‟ rate to banks‟ retail rates; equal to one, referring 
to complete pass-through; or higher than one.  
After Rousseas (1985) and Ho and Saunders (1981) set up the “mark-up” 
pricing theory of banks‟ retail rates setting, the main field of interest now is to 
explore what factors affect the β2 coefficient. In the theoretical literature, various 
theories provide different explanations. For example, Niggle (1987) argues that 
the size of the loan demand elasticity may be important factor for the banks in 
setting their loan interest rates, especially for those borrowers who have access to 
other external sources of finance. Other authors such as Rousseas (1985), Ho and 
Saunders (1981), Angbazo (1997), provide some indications that the size of the β2 
coefficient may depend on some general macroeconomic factors, market structure 
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in the banking sector and banks‟ specific characteristics but do not clearly specify 
which. The explanations of theories that examine the factors that affect the size of 
the β2 coefficient in equation 2.4, are presented in the following sub-sections. 
   
2.2.2 Theory of asymmetric information and lending rate stickiness  
One of the most cited theories about the reasons for an incomplete pass-
through is the theory of asymmetric information and lending rate stickiness by 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). According to these authors, lending rates exhibit 
upward stickiness and thus, incomplete upward adjustment to the „cost of funds‟ 
rate, for which the main reason is the asymmetry of information that leads to 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. The starting point of their 
hypothesis is that when there is an excess demand in the loan market, the 
equilibrium is not achieved through interest rate adjustment but through credit 
rationing.  
The model of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) is based on the simplifying 
assumption that only two groups of borrowers exist, i.e. risk averse and risk 
seekers and each group of borrowers are homogeneous. Based upon this 
assumption, the authors argue that in a situation of excess demand for loans, or 
when the „cost of funds‟ rate increases, it may not be in the banks‟ interest to fully 
adjust their lending rate upwards to the „cost of funds‟ rate or to raise it high 
enough to clear the excess demand. The reason for this is that informational 
frictions in the loan market will worsen. If a bank increases the loan interest rate 
high enough to clear the excess demand, then they will disproportionately attract 
riskier borrowers who are eager to invest in riskier projects, causing adverse 
selection. Another reason why the bank may refrain from increasing their loan 
interest rate is that, even in the case when the bank has successfully selected low 
risk borrowers; by increasing the interest rate it will affect borrowers‟ behaviour 
towards investing in riskier projects in order to compensate for the higher costs 
caused by the higher interest rate. This will result in a moral hazard problem. Both 
of these outcomes caused by increase of the loan interest rate are undesirable for 
the bank because they will negatively affect its rate of return. Therefore, the bank 
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decides not to fully increase the loan interest rate beyond a certain level and 
instead, it decides to ration credit. The shape of the optimal interest rate that 
provides the optimum rate of return is presented in figure 2.1.  
Figure 2. 1: Banks‟ rate of return as a function of the loan interest rate 
 
Source: Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) p.394.  
 
By increasing the loan interest rate up to r*, the expected rate of return of 
the bank rises reaching the maximum at r*. Additional increases of the interest 
rate will result in a lower expected rate of return due the previously mentioned 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In other words, under the assumed 
structure of the population, up to interest rate r
*
 both safe and riskier borrowers 
will apply for a loan. However, by increasing the loan interest rate beyond the 
level of r*, safe borrowers start to withdraw from the loan market and mainly the 
riskier borrowers apply. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue that credit rationing and the upward 
lending rate stickiness cannot be solved by raising the collateral requirements 
either. In their model, by assuming that smaller projects are riskier than larger 
projects and by assuming that those borrowers who have accumulated higher 
amount of capital are less risk averse because in the past they have invested in 
riskier projects in order to get higher return; the authors analyse two situations. 
The first one is when all borrowers have the same amount of capital, regardless of 
the size of the project. The second one is when the size of the project is fixed (the 
same), but potential borrowers have different amount of capital. In the first 
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situation, by raising the collateral requirement relative to the size of the project, 
mainly the small-project borrowers will apply for a loan (the adverse selection 
problem). In the second situation, if the bank raises the collateral requirements, 
then mainly those borrowers who have accumulated higher amount of capital will 
apply. Both situations will cause an adverse selection problem and will increase 
the risk of borrowers‟ default that ultimately, may reduce the rate of return of the 
bank. Similar to the interest rate, the bank will get the optimum rate of return for a 
collateral requirement at a unique level. However, by increasing the collateral 
requirements beyond that level, the rate of return will start to decrease because 
mainly the riskier borrowers will still apply for a loan, while risk averse borrowers 
will start to withdraw from the loan market. 
 Overall, even though the theory of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) offers a solid 
explanation for the upward lending rate stickiness, it has some general 
shortcomings. For example, the theory is based on a static one-period model that 
disregards the possible interaction between the borrower and the lender through 
repeated transactions. If the borrower is well known to the bank and has 
previously invested in relatively safe projects, then the bank may offer a lower 
interest rate to that borrower in future in order to maintain their relationship (the 
relationship lending theory, explained in section 2.2.3). Furthermore, their 
arguments for the upward lending rate stickiness are not empirically tested and are 
not supported by any empirical evidence in their paper. Nevertheless, Berger and 
Udell (1992) presented statistical evidence consistent with the theory of Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981) for the US banking sector. Their results, based on a logit model 
conducted for the period 1977-1988, indicate that lending rates exhibit upward 
rigidity adjustment to increases in the „cost of funds‟ rate. They also find 
statistical evidence that banks in USA ration credit.  
Another drawback of the Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model is that no 
assumption is made about the distribution of risk averse and risk seeker agents. 
Additionally, their explanation for lending rate stickiness through the collateral 
requirements is built upon two basic assumptions. The first assumption assumes 
that smaller projects are riskier than larger projects, whereas the second 
assumption assumes that wealthier borrowers are less risk averse. However, both 
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assumptions made may not always hold in practice. The reason for this is that the 
authors disregard the possibility that wealthier borrowers may be risk averse too 
and by investing in multiple relatively safe projects for a longer period of time, 
have managed to accumulate higher amount of capital. This possibility is 
excluded from the model because it is designed as a one-period static model.  
  
2.2.3 Switching costs and relationship lending theories  
A different section of literature explains banks‟ retail rates adjustment (the 
size of the β2 coefficient in equation 2.4) through the existence of switching costs 
and related to that, the so-called, „relationship lending‟ between the bank and its 
customers. These two theories are interrelated and provide possible explanations 
for incomplete pass-through from the „cost of funds‟ rate to the banks‟ retail rates, 
i.e. why the size of β2 coefficient from equation 2.4 may be less than 1.  
The switching cost theory is formally associated with Klemperer (1987) 
and later developed by Laudadio (1987), Sharpe (1997), and Lowe and Rohling 
(1992). According to this theory, switching costs exist on both the borrowers‟ and 
lenders‟ sides. On the borrowers‟ side, the switching costs are basically 
transaction costs that arise from searching for the lenders, known as „shoe leather‟ 
costs (Lowe and Rohling, 1992), and learning costs that arise from gaining 
knowledge of the conditions of getting a new loan. On the lenders‟ side, switching 
costs are related to the costs and time incurred in screening the financial position 
of the borrowers due to the adverse selection problem and the costs related to 
monitoring the borrowers due to the moral hazard problem.    
Klemperer‟s (1987) model explains switching costs mainly through the 
borrowers‟ side in a two period model. They basically occur in the second period 
due to ex-post product differentiation that reduces the interest rate elasticity of 
demand for loans. The main characteristics of this model are that switching costs 
and the market share of the banks are taken as exogenous in the loan market. 
According to this model, if we analyse the credit market as a two period game, 
loans as a financial product in the first period are considered as homogenous by 
the borrowers regardless of the characteristics of the bank. In that respect, in the 
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first period, each bank is competing aggressively in order to attract as many „new‟ 
customers as it can. However, in the second period, when the transaction is 
repeated by the borrower, loans become ex-post differentiated due to the existence 
of the switching costs. In other words, in the second period when the same 
borrower wants to obtain another loan, the borrower is no longer indifferent to 
which bank it applies and usually applies to the same bank that has issued the 
previous loan. The reason for this is because if the borrower changes the lender, 
then it would incur additional costs in searching for a new lender. Consequently, 
Klemperer (1987) and Lowe and Rohling (1992) argue that switching costs reduce 
the interest elasticity of the demand for loans and ultimately reduce banks‟ 
incentives to fully adjust their retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
This may cause the size of the β2 coefficient to be less than one (β2 < 1, equation 
2.4). This model implies that when the switching costs are high, then the more 
rigid will be banks‟ retail rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate 
(lower value of β2). The model also implies that switching costs are associated 
with the market power of the banks in the loan market, i.e. the higher the market 
power of the banks, the higher will be the switching costs.  
Flannery (1982) argues that the extent of interest rate smoothing depends 
upon who bears the costs of switching. For example, if the switching costs are on 
the borrowers‟ side, then banks can smooth their retail rates and extract higher 
borrowers‟ surplus because borrowers will be more reluctant to change their bank 
and vice versa. If the switching costs are on the lender‟s side, then banks will 
adjust their retail rates more fully to the „cost of funds‟ rate because otherwise, if a 
borrower decides to change their bank, then it is the bank that bears the costs of 
switching. Furthermore, some authors argue that switching costs and the extent of 
interest rate smoothing depend upon the size of the loan. For instance, Laudadio 
(1987) argues that switching costs are typically fixed in absolute terms and do not 
vary with the size of the loan and thus they represent a higher proportion of small 
loans compared to large loans. Accordingly, when the switching costs exist, the 
rigidity of retail rates adjustment to the „cost of funds‟ rate will be more 
pronounced for small loans.  
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However, concentrating on the assumption that switching costs are 
exogenously given to the market, Lowe and Rohling (1992) criticise Klemperer‟s 
model (1987). They argue that in an oligopolistic market, switching costs are not 
always exogenously given because banks may introduce artificial switching costs 
in order to additionally reduce the loan demand elasticity and extract a higher 
borrowers‟ surplus. The imposed artificial switching costs depend on the 
concentration and market power of the banks in the loan market. When 
concentration is higher and when banks exhibit higher market power, then they 
may impose higher artificial switching costs. Another weakness of Klemperer‟s 
model (1987) arises from the assumption that banks‟ market share is exogenously 
determined. According to Lowe and Rohling (1992) and Berger and Hannan 
(1989), this assumption may not hold because the market share may be 
endogenously determined by banks‟ market strategy and their loan and deposit 
interest rates offered. For instance, if banks compete more aggressively in the first 
period by offering more favourable lending conditions, then those banks that have 
attracted more new customers in the first period will have a higher market share in 
the loan market in the second period if the transaction is repeated by the borrower.  
Vesala (2005) additionally criticises Klemperer‟s model because it 
assumes that higher switching costs incurred on the borrowers‟ side would result 
in higher lenders‟ benefit (surplus). In that regard, Vesala (2005) modifies 
Klemperer‟s model by modelling banks‟ benefits as a “V” shaped function of the 
switching costs. Namely, according to Vesala‟s model, benefits for the lenders are 
high when the switching costs are relatively low. Later on, as the switching costs 
increase, lenders‟ benefit becomes a negative function of the switching costs up to 
a certain threshold level, thereafter with an additional increase in the switching 
costs lenders‟ benefits will start to rise again.  
An explanation for the “V” shaped switching cost function is that when the 
switching costs are low, then every borrower regardless of the riskiness of the 
project or its financial indicators, may easily switch their bank. However, this 
increases the threat of adverse selection because the „bad‟ borrowers will be more 
likely to change their bank. In contrast, the „good‟ borrowers may more easily get 
another loan renewal or other financial service from the same bank. According to 
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this argument, new loan applicants will be mainly perceived as „bad‟ borrowers. 
Hence, this increases the adverse selection problem that forces banks to refrain 
from making too aggressive bids (offering more favourable lending conditions). 
In this case, the incentives for the „good‟ borrowers to change their bank would be 
reduced because they may be perceived as „bad‟ borrowers in the loan market and 
accordingly they will try to stick with their existing bank. Consequently, this 
threat of an adverse selection problem in the loan market will increase a bank‟s 
benefits from an incomplete retail rate adjustment, even when the switching costs 
are low. However, when the switching costs start to rise, then the threat of adverse 
selection problem will start to fade away because now it is mainly the „good‟ 
borrowers (those with good financial performances) that can afford to bear the 
costs of switching (Vesala, 2005). This will force other banks to offer more 
aggressive terms in order to attract the „good‟ borrowers. In order to maintain its 
existing „good‟ customers, a bank would offer more favourable lending conditions 
and more complete retail rate adjustment to the „cost of funds‟ rate that will 
reduce the bank‟s benefits. Nevertheless, after a certain threshold level of the 
switching costs, the benefits of the bank would start to rise again because the 
switching costs would now become relatively high and unbearable even for the 
„good‟ borrowers. Thus, changing their existing bank would become 
economically irrational. On the other hand, the competing banks would be 
discouraged from taking new customers by making aggressive bids, because the 
offered lending conditions would bring a relatively low marginal benefit for the 
bank. This provides a “V” shape form of the benefit function in respect to the size 
of the switching costs.  
The main pitfall of Vesala‟s (2005) and Klemperer‟s (1987) models is that 
they do not take into account the asymmetric adjustment of retail rates. For 
example, incomplete upward adjustment of the lending rate increases the 
borrowers‟ surplus, while incomplete downward adjustment increases the lenders‟ 
surplus, whereas the opposite holds for the deposit rates. 
Another strand of literature, directly related to switching cost theory, is 
relationship lending theory (Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Sharpe, 1997; Boot, 2000), 
or as Weth (2002) refers to as the “hausbank” phenomenon. Relationship lending 
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arises through the repeated transactions between the lender and the borrower that 
may make both sides better off. Sharpe (1997) refers to relationship lending as: 
“.... markets where significant information or transaction costs exist, but they are 
probably most influential where such costs appear to give rise to long-term 
relationships and repeated transactions.” (p.79). 
The benefits for the borrower of relationship lending, according to 
Petersen and Rajan (1994), are mainly in the form of getting more favourable 
lending conditions in obtaining a new loan (lower interest rates charged by the 
bank), other related financial services from the bank and higher credit availability 
in periods of economic downturn and credit rationing. On the lender‟s side there 
are benefits as well. For instance, Boots (2002) argues that relationship lending 
reduces information asymmetries between the lender and the borrower. Thus, the 
lender can more closely monitor the financial activities of the borrower and can 
obtain proprietary information that is not available to other parties, which can help 
the lender to reduce the risk of borrower‟s default when granting a loan (Weth, 
2002).    
According to relationship lending theory, banks can smooth the loan 
interest rate adjustment and increase their benefits. Namely, when the „cost of 
funds‟ rate declines, a bank may decide to reduce the lending rate proportionately 
less and consequently, it may extract a higher borrower‟s surplus (Laudadio, 
1987). In this case, the borrower will be reluctant to change their existing bank 
because such behaviour will worsen „customers‟ relations that may result in lower 
credit availability from that bank in the future. This is especially important in 
periods of credit rationing. In the opposite case, when the „cost of funds‟ rate 
increases, in some circumstances, the bank may decide not to fully adjust their 
lending rate if it perceives that it will worsen borrower‟s cash flow and increase 
their risk of default. 
Boot (2002) identifies two risks (costs) of relationship lending. The first 
one is on the lenders‟ side because in some circumstances it may lead the bank to 
follow a policy of soft budget constraints. In periods of economic downturns, the 
bank may not want to refuse a borrower a new loan renewal or extension to the 
time length for loan repayment, in order not to disturb its relations with the 
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customer. This is especially true if the relationship between the bank and the 
borrower has been built over a longer time horizon and the borrower is identified 
as a „good‟ one. Thus, the bank in order to satisfy borrower‟s needs, it has to raise 
more funding which incurs additional costs and risks for the bank. The second risk 
of relationship lending is on the borrowers‟ side through creation of a so-called 
“locked-in” effect. According to Boot (2002), when the bank has collected 
„enough‟ proprietary information, it may charge higher interest rates than its 
competitors or it may not fully adjust its lending rates to the „cost of funds‟ rate 
downward because the borrower may be reluctant to change the bank for the 
following reasons: a) the borrower is afraid that the acquired proprietary 
information by the bank may be misused and b) if the borrower decides to change 
its bank, it may be identified as a „bad‟ borrower in the loan market due to the 
adverse selection problem.  
Regarding the characteristics of the borrowers, Arak et al. (1983) argue 
that relationship lending and thus, the extent of interest rate smoothing is partly 
determined by the size of the firm. Interest rate smoothing is lower for large firms 
because usually they get sources of finance from more than one bank and have 
built relations with all of them. Consequently, the bank that offers the most 
favourable lending condition will get the deal. In contrast, small firms usually get 
finance from only one or two banks. Therefore, the small firm does not have much 
choice and accepts the loan from their existing bank, although it may be offered 
under less favourable lending conditions.  
The impact of the relationship lending on the interest rate pass-through has 
been empirically tested. For instance, Petersen and Rajan (1994) examine how 
relationship lending affects loan interest rates and availability of credit. Using data 
from US firms on their loan interest rate charged, the results from tobit 
regressions indicated that relationship lending did not have any statistically 
significant impact on their lending rates charged. However, these results 
suggested that relationship lending has a significant impact on credit availability, 
which is consistent with the theory. Additionally, the analyses by Weth (2002) 
and Gambacorta (2008) provide empirical evidence that relationship lending may 
significantly affect the short-run interest rate pass-through. Hence, this factor is 
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seen to be one of the reasons for the banks‟ short-run retail rate adjustment 
rigidity (for details see section 2.3.1).  
 
2.2.4 “Menu costs” theory  
Another influential theory that explains reasons for the incomplete 
adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is the “menu 
costs” theory by Hannan and Berger (1991). The main anchor of this theory is that 
the size of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to „cost of funds‟ rate depends upon 
the „menu‟ costs incurred by changes in the retail rates. The model implies that 
only if benefits of changing the retail rates are higher than the costs incurred, then 
banks will decide to adjust their retail rates to the „cost of funds‟ rate.  
The model is based on the assumption of imperfect competition in the loan 
market where banks exhibit some kind of market power. The „cost of funds‟ rate 
in the model is represented by the security rate in USA which in reality, according 
Hannan and Berger (1991), coincides with the main policy rate or the 
representative money market rate. The deposit rate is taken as a representative 
banks‟ retail rate. The graphical representation of the model is shown on figure 
2.2.  
Figure 2.2: the “menu costs” model by Hannan and Berger (1991) 
 
Source: Hannan and Berger (1991) p.939.  
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The model is based on two main curves, the deposit supply curve and 
marginal outlay curve and two interest rates, the security rate (rs) and deposit rate 
(rd), where the former is assumed to be exogenously determined and exhibits a 
random walk. “c” is the non-interest cost of transferring the deposits into 
securities that is exogenously determined and taken as constant through time.  
In the initial period, at a given security rate rs
1 
and the gain from buying 
securities (rs
1–c); banks maximise their profits by setting their deposit rate at level 
rd
1
. At this deposit rate, banks will attract the amount of deposits d
1
, which is 
determined by the slope of the deposit supply curve. A marginal increase in the 
security rate from rs
1
 to rs
2
 and hence, the increase of the gain from buying 
securities from (rs
1–c) to (rs
2–c), causes banks to adjust their equilibrium deposit 
rate to level rd
2
 and to attract the amount of deposits d
2
, only if the marginal cost 
of increase in deposit rate (“marginal outlay”) is equal or lower than the marginal 
gain from changing the deposit rate. This marginal gain is presented with the 
shaded area “G” in figure 2.2.  
According to the model, the marginal gain is modelled as (1/4)*bi*(∆rs)
2
 
and banks‟ retail rate setting decisions are determined as follows:  
(1/4)*bi*(∆rs)
2
 > F               (2.5) 
where F is the cost of changing the deposit rate (“menu cost”), bi is the inverse of 
the slope of the deposit supply curve and ∆rs is the marginal increase of the 
security rate. In the model, according to Hannan and Berger (1991), it is assumed 
that the absolute slope of the marginal outlay curve is greater than the absolute 
slope of the deposit supply curve (see figure 2.2) because the costs of changing 
the deposit rate are taken as an increasing function of the quantity of new deposit 
supply. Namely, when the deposit rate increases, then banks not only incur greater 
costs of paying  a higher deposit rate on the newly deposited funds but also they 
incur greater costs of paying it on the previously deposited funds under the 
assumption that a certain proportion of the those funds are under a flexible deposit 
rate contract. This is a similar argument to the one for the relationship of the 
demand curve (the average revenue curve) and marginal revenue.  
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In the model, the cost of changing the deposit rate (F) is determined by 
variations in the amount that banks have to pay to their depositors if they decide 
to change the deposit rate and the share of the costs of changing the deposit rate 
relative to the size of the bank. Regarding the latter, bigger banks may have lower 
costs of adjusting their retail rates due to efficiency gains from economies of 
scale, i.e. lower operating costs and/or lower costs of transferring their deposits 
into securities relative to their asset size. Moreover, F is seen to depend 
asymmetrically on the direction of deposit rate adjustment (upward or downward). 
For example, in some circumstances, F may be higher for upward than for 
downward deposit rate adjustment, due to the time lag that arises from the 
moment of deposit rate increase till the moment of depositors‟ reaction to the 
interest rate increase. More precisely, banks‟ have to bear some additional costs 
from the time of deposit rate increase until the time they attract new deposits, due 
to the higher deposit rate they have to pay to their already existing depositors. In 
other circumstances, F may be higher for downward than for upward deposit rate 
adjustment due to the collusive price arrangements between the bank and some of 
its depositors. For example, if the bank violates the price arrangement by 
decreasing its deposit rate low enough, then depositors may withdraw their funds, 
which will incur some additional costs to the bank related to the loss of its 
customers.       
The marginal gain of retail rate adjustment in the model is mainly 
determined by the value of bi that, according to Hannan and Berger (1991), 
depends on factors that affect the slope of deposit supply curve such as, market 
concentration and banks‟ „customer base‟ in the deposit market11. Namely, higher 
market concentration implies a steeper deposit supply curve because in more 
concentrated markets, the interest rate elasticity of deposit supply is lower, 
indicating a lower value of bi. This reduces banks‟ incentives for adjusting the 
retail rates to the „cost of funds‟ rate, resulting in a higher rigidity in the retail rate 
adjustment and vice versa. Regarding the second factor, it works in the opposite 
direction: a higher banks‟ „customer base‟ implies a flatter deposit supply curve 
due to the higher interest elasticity of deposit supply. This may result in a higher 
                                                 
11
 This is defined as “…the deposits that would be supplied to bank i if all firms in the market were 
to offer the same rate.”, (Hannan and Berger, 1991, p.940). 
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value of bi that increases banks‟ incentives for more flexible retail rate adjustment 
and vice versa.  
The “menu costs” model is empirically tested by Hannan and Berger 
(1991). The results, based on multinomial logit model conducted for the US 
banking sector for the period 1983-1986, were consistent with the predictions of 
this model. Namely, higher market concentration is associated with higher retail 
rate adjustment rigidity, while a higher „customer base‟ in the deposit market and 
higher asset size of the banks results in higher retail rate adjustment flexibility. 
The results also indicated that banks exhibit a higher upward adjustment rigidity 
of their deposit rate, which is consistent with the theoretical claim that F varies 
asymmetrically in the direction of adjustment, being greater for the upward 
deposit rate adjustment.  
According to Hannan and Berger (1991), even though their “menu costs” 
model is based on the deposit rate as a representative bank retail rate, it is also 
applicable to loan interest rates. The major difference is that, though the same 
factors that determine the costs and benefits of adjusting the deposit rate, also 
apply to the lending rates and they work in the opposite direction.  
The main weakness of the Hannan and Berger (1991) model is that it is 
based on the assumption of a linear deposit supply curve that may not always be 
the case. Another weakness is that in this model, bank‟s „customer base‟ in the 
deposit market is taken as exogenous factor. This may not be an appropriate 
assumption because banks‟ „customer base‟ may depend on the banks‟ strategy 
and behaviour to their customers (Lowe and Rohling, 1992 and Berger and 
Hannan, 1989). For example, if they behave more aggressively in the market, then 
they may acquire more customers and get a higher „customer base‟. Another 
possible weakness is that, apart from asset size, it does not take into account the 
other banks‟ financial characteristics as a factor that may affect banks‟ retail rate 
setting decisions such as, the loan riskiness or maturity mismatch that may also 
affect the size of adjustment.  
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2.2.5 A critical assessment of the surveyed theories 
The general weakness of the mark-up pricing models is that they do not 
analyse to what extent banks adjust their retail rates to changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate, i.e. the size of the pass-through (β2 coefficient from equation 2.4) and 
what factors may have a significant impact over it. Regarding the latter, there are 
some indications by Allen (1988) and Angbazo (1997) that it may be determined 
by the maturity mismatch of loans and deposits and the level of riskiness of loan 
portfolio. Moreover, some authors such as Rousseas (1985), Ho and Sounders 
(1981) and Angbazo (1997) argue that the size of the pass-through may be 
affected by the macroeconomic environment but nonetheless, they do not 
explicitly point to specific macroeconomic factors. This leaves an open space for 
the empirical studies to include some ad-hoc variables for macroeconomic 
conditions (see section 2.3). 
All surveyed theories are mainly based on mathematical models and 
provide some implications for further empirical investigation. However, the 
majority of these theories do not provide an empirical justification and do not 
provide any indication of how the empirical model(s) should be operationalised 
and specified. Consequently, all these theories have left some open issues in 
designing an empirical model. For example, an open issue is their functional form, 
how some of the factors which are argued to have a significant impact on the size 
of the pass-through may be included and how they can be measured or proxied, 
such as the switching costs. Additionally, the majority of these theories do not 
examine whether the interest rate series (banks‟ retail rates and „cost of funds‟ 
rate) can be expected to be stationary or not, either in nominal and real terms. An 
exception may be the “menu costs” theory that indicates that the „cost of funds‟ 
rate exhibits a random walk. Moreover, having in mind that almost all theories 
were developed in the 1980s and early 1990s, they do not raise the issue of a 
possible cointegrating relationship between the retail rates and „cost of funds‟ rate, 
i.e. whether they are in long-run equilibrium. We can only draw an implicit 
inference about this issue by analysing whether the assessed theories suggest if the 
mark-up margin is constant through time and whether we can expect the size of 
pass-through coefficient (β2 coefficient from equation 2.4), to be stable over time. 
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The mark-up pricing theory is not clear whether the mark-up margin is 
constant through time because some inconsistencies exist within this theory (see 
section 2.2.1). Moreover, the mark-up margin theory does not analyse the size of 
the adjustment, although there are some partial explanations by Rousseas (1985), 
Ho and Saunders (1981) and Angbazo (1997) as to what possible factors may 
affect it. The rest of the theories that investigate the possible determinants of the 
size of the adjustment (the β2 coefficient from equation 2.4), argue that it may be 
determined by various factors. Due to those factors, they implicitly suggest that 
the size of the retail rate adjustment may not be stable over time. Nonetheless, 
there is also a lack of explanation among the theories whether those various 
factors may affect the size of adjustment only in the short-, the long-run or both. 
The switching costs and relationship lending theories are concerned with both 
short- and long-run dimensions. The “menu costs” and the theory of asymmetric 
information and lending rate stickiness are not clear on this issue. Moreover, the 
theories that explore the possible determinants of the size of the adjustment, do 
not consider the possibility that there may be a long-run equilibrium relationship 
between the structural factors that affects the size of pass-through and banks‟ 
retail rates.  
Overall, according to these theories it is not clear if the interest rate 
variables should be expected to be stationary or not. This may be an empirical 
question, the answer to which may depend on the length of period studied, the 
monetary regime etc. In terms of a cointegrating relationship, we can conclude 
that the mark-up pricing theory is not clear. The rest of the theories point some 
possible reasons why the interest rates may not be in equilibrium. Regarding the 
structural factors that affect the size of the adjustment, none of the theories 
assessed consider the possibility for the existence of long-run equilibrium 
relationship between them and banks retail rates.  
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2.3 A critical survey of empirical studies 
 
This section critically assesses empirical studies that investigate the 
determinants of interest rate pass-through in various economies around the world. 
This assessment will be structured according to the conceptual framework of what 
is investigated, how it is estimated and how the underlying theoretical mark-up 
pricing model has been developed and modified through time.  
In selecting the empirical studies to be assessed in more detail in the 
subsequent subsections we have considered those studies that are most relevant 
for the aims and objectives of the thesis. Those studies that are considered as 
„original‟ and „most frequently‟ cited articles and/or have had a significant 
influence on the empirical literature have been selected. Moreover, in selecting 
the empirical studies we have also taken into account the estimation method 
applied and the sample considered. Regarding the latter, we have included all of 
the empirical studies conducted for the CSEE economies because their banking 
and financial environment is similar to the one in Macedonia. 
Many of the empirical studies that are critically surveyed in the next 
subsections include some ad-hoc variables, probably for the reason that the 
theoretical models assessed in previous subsections have left open issues as to 
how the empirical model should be specified (see section 2.2.5). For example, 
most of those ad-hoc variables included refer to the macroeconomic environment 
such as inflation, GDP growth and GDP per capita. Additionally, some empirical 
models include ad-hoc variables from the financial and the banking system like, 
the presence of private and foreign ownership and measures of financial 
deepening for which no clear theoretical justification is provided. Furthermore, 
regarding bank specific characteristics some studies include profitability for 
which again no clear theoretical justification is provided. 
The empirical studies can be divided into three sub-categories in respect of 
whether they examine the determinants of I) the size of the banks‟ retail rate 
adjustment (the pass-through multipliers); II) the average level of retail rates 
setting or III) the interest margins between banks‟ retail rates and „cost of funds‟ 
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rate. The first group of studies empirically investigate what factors determine the 
size and/or the speed of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate, i.e. they investigate what factors affect the β2 coefficient in equation 
2.4. These empirical studies mainly differ according to their estimation strategy 
and methods applied, which are explained in more detail in section 2.3.1. The 
second strand of the empirical literature examines the average impact of various 
structural factors on banks‟ retail rate setting decisions, assuming a linear 
relationship between the structural indicators and banks‟ retail rates. The main 
difference between these analyses compared to the first group of empirical studies 
is that they do not directly explore the size of adjustment coefficient. They only 
investigate the differences among the average level of interest rates charged 
among banks in respect of various structural indicators. These studies are based 
on an augmentation of equation 2.4 by adding a vector  of structural indicators, 
to give the model: 
i = β1 + β2m + β3   (2.6) 
These type of studies are assessed in more detail in section 2.3.2. 
The third category of empirical analyses investigate what fundamental 
factors directly affect the spread between banks‟ retail rates and „cost of funds‟ 
rate and are examined in more detail in section 2.3.3. These studies calculate the 
interest rate spread as a simple difference between banks‟ retail rates and the „cost 
of funds‟ rate, and then they regress this spread on a set of structural indicators 
that are expected to have an impact on it. I.e. these empirical analyses calculate 
the β1 coefficient in equation 2.4 as explained in the previous sentence and then 
they regress this on a set of structural indicators ( ), presented in the equation 
below: 
β1 = C + α1                  (2.7) 
In all the three groups of empirical studies, individual studies differ 
according to their estimation strategy and methods applied, and data used. Some 
studies are based on aggregate data for the whole banking system, while others 
use bank-level data. The latter are of more interest to us because our empirical 
X
X
X
X
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investigation, presented in chapter 3, of the determinants of the size of the interest 
rate pass-through in Macedonia is based on bank-level data.  
 
2.3.1 Studies that examine the factors that affect the size of the banks‟ retail 
rate adjustment (the pass-through multipliers) 
This strand of empirical analyses can be classified into two subcategories, 
according to the estimation strategy used. The first subgroup of this kind of 
empirical studies is known as the two-stage model. The main characteristic of 
two-stage models is that in the first stage of the estimation process, using time-
series econometric techniques, equation 2.4 is estimated in order to get estimates 
for the size and/or speed of the adjustment coefficients of banks‟ retail rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate (the β2 coefficient in equations 2.4 and 2.8). In 
the second stage, the previously estimated pass-through coefficients (β2) are 
regressed on a set of structural determinants (the vector  in equation 2.9), that, 
according to the various theories assessed in section 2.2, are hypothesised to affect 
the size and speed of adjustment of the interest rates. The two-stage estimation 
process can be presented with the following simplified equations:  
  Stage I:   it = β1 + β2ut + εt           (2.8) 
Stage II:  β2 = C + β3  + ε1                      (2.9) 
A summary table of studies that apply the two-stage estimation model, in 
the same order as they are discussed in the following paragraphs is presented in 
table 2.1. A summary of other empirical studies that are not discussed in detail, 
but employ the same estimators and a similar set of structural indicators is also 
presented in table in 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Summary table of the studies that apply the two-stage method 
 
Author(s) Country Time period 
Frequency 
of the data
Type of the 
data
Number of 
cross-sectional 
units
Estimation 
method - stage I
Estimation 
method - stage II
Balanced / 
unbalanced 
panel
Retail rates 
considered
Multipliers 
examined
Structural Variables Significant determinants
Cottarelli and 
Kourelis (1994)
31 economies 
around the world
1980(85)-
1991(93)
Monthly Aggregate 31 Partial adjustment
Cross section 
OLS
/ Loan Short-run
GDP per capita, inflation, 
MMR vol., barriers to 
foreign competition, market 
concentration and public 
ownership in the banking sys.
Inflation, market 
concentration, barriers to 
entry, private ownership of 
the banking sys. and MMR 
vol.
Mojon (2000)
Set of 6 euro-
zone economies
1979-1998 Monthly Aggregate 55-87 ECM Panel model Unbalanced Loan and deposit Short-run
Inflation, MMR vol., the 
level of competition, 
operating and funding costs
Inflation, MMR vol., the 
level of competition and 
operating costs
Sander and 
Kleimer (2004a)
Set of 10 euro-
zone economies
1993-2002 Monthly Aggregate >100 TAR Panel Unbalanced Loan and deposit
Short-run and long-
run
Banking effectiveness, 
MMR vol., inflation, GDP 
growth, credit-to-GDP
Banking effectiveness, 
MMR vol., inflation, GDP 
growth, credit-to-GDP
Sander and 
Kleimer (2004b)
Set of 8 CSEE 
economies
1993-2003 Monthly Aggregate >100 TAR Panel Unbalanced Loan and deposit
Short-run and long- 
run
MMR vol., inflation, 
concentration, credit risk, 
foreign ownership
MMR vol., inflation, 
concentration, credit risk
Sorensen and 
Werner (2006)
Set of 10 euro-
zone economies
1999-2004 Monthly Aggregate 10 DSUR
Cross section 
OLS
/ Loan rates
Speed of 
adjustment (ECT)
20 financial indicators
GDP growth, portfolio 
diversification, interest risk 
and credit risk exposure, 
banking concentration, 
liquidity, capitalisation and 
the extent of portfolio 
diversification
de Graeve et al. 
(2004) 
Belgium 1993-2002 Monthly Bank level 268
Panel Cointegration 
by Swamy's 
estimator
Cross section 
FGLS
/ Loan and deposit
Short-run, long-
run and speed of 
adjustment
Relationship lending, 
concentration, capitalisation, 
liquidity, portfolio 
diversification, interest risk 
and credit risk exposure 
Concentration, 
capitalisation, liquidity, 
portfolio diversification, 
interest risk exposure 
Lago-Gonzalez 
and Salas-Fumas 
(2005) 
Spain 1988-2003 Monthly Bank level 150 SUR SUR Unbalanced Loan and deposit
Speed of 
adjustment 
GDP, Inflation, 
concentration, asset size, 
credit risk exposure
GDP, Inflation, 
concentration, asset size, 
credit risk exposure
Cottarelli et al. 
(1995)
Italy 1986-1993 Monthly Bank level 63 ECM Cross section / Loan rates Short-run 11 structural indicators
Size, maturity mismatch, 
undrawn credit lines, 
concentration and the 
private ownership in the 
banking sector
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One of the pioneering two-stage model studies that empirically applies the 
Ho and Saunders (1981) mark-up pricing model in examining the determinants of 
interest rate pass-through, is by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). Based on 
aggregated data, the authors examine which factors affect the short-run pass-
through multiplier by using a set of structural macro and microeconomic factors 
for a set of 31 economies around the world. The results from the second-stage 
regressions indicated that the most significant determinants of the short-run pass-
through multipliers are inflation, market concentration, barriers to entry, private 
ownership of the banking system and the volatility of the money market rate; 
while GDP per capita did not have any significant impact. More precisely, 
according to the results, higher inflation, less entry barriers and a higher degree of 
private ownership in the banking sector, reduce the short-run rigidities in 
adjustment. In contrast, a higher concentration in the banking market, as well as 
higher money market volatility, increases the adjustment rigidity of banks‟ retail 
rates. 
A disadvantage of this analysis is that in the first stage of the estimation 
process, Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) estimate the pass-through multipliers by 
using a partial adjustment model (PAM), instead of more sophisticated 
cointegrating time series methods based on an error-correction model (ECM). 
Partial adjustment methods compared to error-correction models suffer from some 
conceptual weakness in that former are based on the assumption that markets are 
in long-run equilibrium, and that the short-run dynamics represents the partial 
short-run adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium (Sriram, 1999). Another 
weakness of PAM is that they do not properly deal with the problem of 
autocorrelation and they usually suffer from model misspecification because they 
may omit some significant lags in their structure. An additional possible weakness 
of this study is that the authors in estimating the pass-through multipliers, in the 
regression models do not control for the possible structural breaks arising from 
changes in monetary policy regimes among the economies considered that may 
affect the size and speed of adjustment.  
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Mojon (2000), also using aggregate level data for a set of six euro-zone 
economies, improves on Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) work in estimating the 
pass-through coefficients (the first stage of the estimation process) by applying an 
ECM. Another value added of this study is that it takes into account the 
asymmetric adjustment of retail rates to upward/downward changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate by splitting the sample period according to the economic cycles in the 
sample economies. In the second stage of the estimation process, by using a panel 
data model, the author explores the possible structural factors that may affect the 
size of the short-run adjustment of banks‟ retail rates, including inflation, money 
market rate volatility, the level of competition in the banking system, and 
operating and funding costs. The estimates regarding the loan interest rates 
indicate that all of the aforementioned factors, except funding costs, significantly 
affect the short-run pass-through multiplier with a sign consistent with the theory. 
Regarding the deposit rates, the only significant determinant with the expected 
sign is the proxy for banking competition, while the other structural indicators did 
not have any significant impact or had a sign contrary from what was expected.  
The novelty of this study is that it extends the model by including the 
operating and funding costs and applies a more sophisticated econometric method 
in estimating the short-run relationship of the interest rate series by using an ECM 
where a sufficient condition for the validity of the model is the statistical 
significance of the error-correction coefficient. Nonetheless a possible 
shortcoming of this analysis is that the investigation of the asymmetric adjustment 
of banks‟ retail rates to upward/downward changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is 
done by splitting the sample according to the business cycle periods that are 
defined arbitrarily by the author, instead of using the more sophisticated methods 
such as threshold autoregressive (TAR) models, as carried out by Sander and 
Kleimeier (2004a, b).  
The analyses of Sander and Kleimeier (2004a, b) are based on aggregate 
data and investigate the factors that affect the interest rate pass-through in 10 
euro-zone economies and the eight new EU member states from CSEE, 
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respectively. The major value added of these analyses is that in the first stage of 
the estimation process, when the pass-through coefficients are estimated, the 
authors use more sophisticated time series TAR models that are able to identify 
the structural breaks in the sample as well as to control for the asymmetric 
adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to upward/downward changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate. In the second stage of the estimation process, using a panel data 
model, they regress the previously estimated short- and long-term pass-through 
multipliers on a set of „standardised‟ structural variables in the empirical literature 
(see table 2.1). The results from the second stage regressions suggest that the 
impact of the variables depends on whether they affect the short or long-run pass-
through multipliers of banks‟ retail rates. For example, in the case of the euro-
zone economies, GDP growth and the measure for the effectiveness of the 
banking system positively affect the long-run pass-through multipliers of banks‟ 
retail rates, indicating that higher economic growth and/or higher effectiveness in 
the banking sector may lead to greater size of long-run adjustment. The rest of the 
structural variables, in the case of the euro-zone economies, significantly affect 
only the short-run pass-through multipliers of banks‟ retail rates. For instance, 
money market volatility and inflation are negatively related, whereas the level of 
financial intermediation is positively related to the short-run pass-through 
multipliers. The results for the CSEE economies indicated that the same structural 
factors affect differently the size and speed of adjustment of deposit and loan 
interest rates among banks in these countries. For example, the variables that 
significantly affect only the long-run pass-through multiplier of lending rates are 
inflation and money market volatility. As most influential characteristics of the 
banking sector that significantly affect both, the short- and long-run pass-through 
multipliers of lending rates are estimated to be the level of competitiveness and 
the credit risk exposure of the banking sector. In contrast, foreign ownership 
entered with a contrary sign from what was a priori expected for which no 
detailed explanation is offered. In respect of deposit rates, higher level of 
competitiveness, lower riskiness and higher foreign ownership in the banking 
sector may lead to a faster and more complete short- and long-run pass-through, 
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while increased money market volatility and inflation significantly affect only the 
short-run adjustment. 
The research of Sorensen and Werner (2006), based again on aggregate 
data, explores what factors may affect the speed of adjustment of interest rate 
pass-through for a set of 10 EMU economies. The major originality of this study 
is that it uses a different econometric method in the first stage of the estimation 
process, a dynamic seemingly unrelated regression (DSUR), based on time-series 
ECM. The major advantage of this method is that it controls for contemporaneous 
cross sectional correlation among the units, which is seem to be an important 
factor in estimating efficient estimates. Another innovation in this study is that it 
takes into consideration a broader range of structural indicators (up to 20 
indicators
12
) in determining the speed of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates. 
According to the estimates, the fundamental factors that may affect the speed of 
adjustment of banks‟ retail rates are: GDP growth, portfolio diversification and 
credit risk exposure positively; and concentration, interest risk exposure, the level 
of liquidity, capitalisation and the extent of portfolio diversification in the banking 
sector negatively. However, the main shortcoming of this analysis is related to the 
estimation method used in the first stage of the estimation process. The authors 
apply the DSUR method which is still in the process of development and unit root 
tests for stationarity of the errors from the level equations are still not developed. 
Thus, Sorensen and Werner (2006), in examining whether the interest rate series 
are cointegrated apply the Pedroni panel cointegration test that is based on the 
assumption of no cross-sectional correlation among the units. They find a 
cointegrating relationship among the interest rate series and consequently the 
authors proceed with estimating the ECM (for details see section 3.3). Another 
weakness of this study is that it investigates the determinants only for the speed of 
adjustment coefficients (the ECT), while it does not examine the factors that 
affect the short-term pass-through multipliers. 
                                                 
12
 For details of these indicators see Sorensen and Werner (2006), p.41.  
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Based on individual (bank-level) data, de Graeve et al. (2004) explore the 
determinants of interest rate pass-through in Belgium. In the first stage of the 
estimation process in estimating the pass-through coefficients, they use panel 
cointegration method by employing Swamy‟s (1970) estimator. The results from 
the first stage of the estimation process, suggesting banks‟ heterogeneous size of 
adjustment in both short- and long-run, is in line with the findings of Mueller-
Spahn (2008) for the case of Germany, but in contrast to the findings of 
Gambacorta (2008) for the case of Italy and Weth (2002) for the case of Germany 
(see the following paragraphs). In the second stage of the estimation process, de 
Graeve et al. examine which of the fundamental determinants such as, the 
existence of relationship lending between the bank and its customers, banking 
concentration, capitalisation, liquidity, portfolio diversification, interest risk and 
credit risk exposure of the Belgian banks, may significantly affect the pass-
through coefficients. The results imply that one of the most influential factors that 
affects the short- and long-run pass-through multipliers of both lending and 
deposit rates is the capitalisation ratio. Liquidity also has an important role in 
determining the size and speed of adjustment of deposit rates, but for loan interest 
rates liquidity has more limited role because it significantly affects only the speed 
of adjustment coefficients. Portfolio diversification plays a significant role in 
determining the speed of adjustment coefficients of both lending and deposit rates. 
The interest rate risk exposure and the level of concentration in the banking 
system are estimated as significant factors in determining only the loan interest 
rates. The rest of the financial characteristics did not have any significant impact 
over the pass-through coefficients of either lending and deposit rates. However, 
the main pitfall of this analysis is related to the estimation method. In conducting 
the panel unit root tests for the stationarity of the residuals, the tests employed are 
based on the assumption of no cross-sectional correlation among the units. 
Moreover, not controlling for the cross-sectional dependence among the units may 
also provide inefficient estimates for the size of the pass-through (see section 3.3). 
Thus, a more appropriate method would seem to be a SUR model.  
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Lago-Gonzalez and Salas-Fumas (2005) explore the structural factors that 
determine the speed of adjustment of retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate among Spanish banks. In order to reduce the problems created by the cross-
sectional dependence among the units, the authors apply a SUR method in the 
two-stages of the estimation process. Among the structural factors considered, the 
estimates suggest that the two commonly used macroeconomic factors, i.e. GDP 
and inflation, have (as expected) a positive impact over the adjustment speed of 
both lending and deposit rate. On the bank specific characteristics, the results 
indicated that higher credit risk exposure results in a faster speed of adjustment of 
banks‟ retail rates, while higher concentration in the banking sector and higher 
asset size leads to a lower speed of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates; a finding 
consistent with the study by Sorensen and Werner (2006).  
The second group of empirical studies presented in this subsection directly 
investigate the structural factors that affect the size and speed of adjustment of 
banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate in one-stage only. These 
studies use mainly dynamic panel data models by which they estimate the short 
and long-run pass-through coefficients. More specifically, some studies use the 
following model specification: 
    ikt =  µk + β1ikt-l + β2mt-l + β3Xkt-l + β4Xkt-1mt-l + εkt            (2.10) 
where: i is a bank retail rate (loan or deposit); µk is a bank specific constant; m is the „cost 
of funds‟ rate; X represents the structural factors that may affect the retail rate setting; Xkt-
1mt-1 is the interaction term between the structural factor and the „cost of funds‟ rate that 
enables to examine its impact over the size of the pass-through; k and t are cross-sectional 
and time specific subscripts, respectively; l indicates the number of lags.  
 
The coefficient in front of the interaction term between the structural 
indicator and the „cost of funds‟ rate (β4) estimates the difference between banks 
in respect of their short- and long-run pass multipliers, conditional on their 
structural indicators.  
A summary table of the assessed one-stage model studies, in the same 
order as they are discussed in the following paragraphs is presented in table 2.2. 
l l l l
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Table 2.2: Summary of the one-stage estimation studies based on panel models 
Author(s) Country
Time 
period 
Frequency 
of the data
Type of the 
data
Number of 
cross-sectional 
units
Estimation method
Balanced / 
unbalanced 
panel
Retail rates 
considered
Multipliers 
examined
Structural Variables
Significant 
determinants
Berstein and 
Fuentes (2003) 
Chile 1996-2002 Monthly Bank level 18-20
Dynamic panel, 
"difference" GMM
Unbalanced Lending Short and long-run
Size and credit risk 
exposure of banks
Size and credit risk 
exposure of banks
Berstein and 
Fuentes (2005) 
Chile 1995-2002 Monthly Bank level 20-21
Dynamic panel, 
"difference" GMM
Unbalanced Deposit Short and long-run
Concentration, liquidity, 
size and credit risk 
exposure of banks
Market concentration, 
liquidity, size and credit 
risk exposure of banks
Gambacorta 
(2008)
Italy 1993-2001 Quarterly Bank level 73
Dynamic panel, 
"difference" GMM
Balanced
Deposit and 
lending
Short and long-run 
and the speed of 
adjustment
Liquidity, capitalisation, 
size, the level of non-
deposit funding and the 
existence of relationship 
banking
Liquidity, capitalisation, 
the level of non-deposit 
funding and the existence 
of relationship banking. 
"Size"?
Weth (2002) Germany 1993-2000 Monthly Bank level 492 Panel ECM / Lending
Short and long-run 
and the speed of 
adjustment
Size, non-deposit 
funding, maturity miss-
match and relationship 
banking
Size, non-deposit funding, 
maturity miss-match and 
relationship banking
Mueller-Spahn 
(2008)
Germany 2003-2006 Monthly Bank level 197 Panel ECM Balanced
Lending and 
deposit
Short and long-run
Size, liquidity and 
portfolio diversification
Size, liquidity and 
portfolio diversification
Chmielewski 
(2004) 
Poland 1998-2003 Monthly Bank level  11-14 Panel ECM Unbalanced
Deposit and 
lending
Short and long-run 
and the speed of 
adjustment
Profitability, credit risk 
exposure and 
capitalisation
Profitability, credit risk 
exposure and 
capitalisation
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Examples of studies who apply this approach are Berstein and Fuentes 
(2003 and 2005). The authors investigate the structural determinants that affect 
the pass-through multipliers of banks‟ retail rates in the Chilean banking system, 
using “difference” GMM dynamic panel data estimation. The results presented in 
Berstein and Fuentes (2003) suggest that the major determinants of short- and 
long-run pass-through multipliers of lending rates are the level of credit risk 
exposure and size of the banks. Larger bank size leads to more sluggish short- and 
long-run adjustment of lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Higher 
credit risk exposure leads to more rigid short-run adjustment, but more complete 
long-run adjustment of lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate; an 
inconsistent finding that lacks more detailed explanation. The estimates presented 
in Berstein and Fuentes (2005) indicate that the size of adjustment of deposit rates 
is determined not only from the size and credit risk exposure of banks, but also by 
liquidity and the degree of concentration in the banking sector. More precisely, 
concentration, liquidity and the credit risk exposure negatively affect the short- 
and long-run pass-through multipliers; whereas size is positively related to both 
short- and long-run multipliers. However, the estimated sign of credit risk 
exposure indicator is the opposite from what is expected. The authors explain this 
finding by arguing that this indicator serves as an ex-post risk measure, while the 
banks are actually interested in the ex-ante risk they face for which the authors 
could not find an appropriate proxy measure. A possible weakness of both studies 
of Berstein and Fuentes is that they only explore the factors that affect the pass-
through multipliers without examining the factors that affect the speed of 
adjustment, as is done in other studies, i.e. Gambacorta (2008), de Graeve et al. 
(2004) and Sorensen and Werner (2006). 
Gambacorta (2008) explores the structural determinants of banks‟ retail 
rate pass-through in Italy by using almost the same methodology as Berstein and 
Fuentes. The results indicate only to a short-run pass-through heterogeneity 
among banks in Italy, while in the long-run, pass-through heterogeneity was 
rejected, which is in line with the findings of Weth (2002) for the case of 
Germany but contrary to the findings of de Graeve et al. (2004) for the case of 
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Belgium and Mueller-Spahn (2008) for the case of Germany. This indicates that 
the retail rate setting strategy among banks in Italy differs only in the short-run, 
while in the long-run almost all banks react equally in adjusting their retail rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. The most significant factors that negatively 
affect the speed of adjustment and short-run pass-through multipliers of both 
lending and deposit rates were estimated to be the liquidity and capitalisation of 
banks, the level of non-deposit funding and the existence of relationship banking. 
The size of Italian banks is positively associated with the speed of adjustment and 
short-run pass-through multipliers, indicating that larger banks adjust their retail 
rates quicker and more fully to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Nevertheless, 
the results in respect of the size of the banks should be taken with caution because 
their significance varies with different model specifications. However, as 
Gambacorta (2008) acknowledges, the sample may be biased because it over-
represents large banks in Italy. The reason for this is because interest rate series 
for small banks (so-called mutual banks) is not available. Another weakness of the 
data set is related to the decision of the author to exclude foreign banks.       
One possible general weakness of the afore-mentioned analyses of 
Berstein and Fuentes (2003 and 2005) and Gambacorta (2008), is related to their 
estimation method. These studies are based on dynamic panel model, estimated 
with “difference” GMM. However, having in mind that most of the variables 
included exhibit near unit root process and recent developments in dynamic panel 
estimators, a more appropriate estimator would be “system” GMM (for details see 
sections 4.5.3 and 5.4). Another possible weakness of the study by Gambacorta 
(2008) is that some regressions reported suffer from the possible problem of „too 
many instruments‟ resulting in p-value of the Sargan test between 0.90 and 1, 
which indicates a low power of the test. In the studies by Berstein and Fuentes 
(2003 and 2005) the results of the Sargan test are not reported, which begs the 
issue of the validity of the instruments used.  
 Other empirical studies (Weth, 2002; Mueller-Spahn, 2008 and 
Chmielewski, 2004), investigate what factors affect the size and speed of 
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adjustment of banks‟ retail rates, by again applying a panel data model, but 
estimated according to a different method. This type of empirical studies first 
order the banks according to each of their specific financial characteristics and 
divides them into various sub-groups. Then, by using an ECM, equation 2.4 is 
estimated for each group of banks. In this way, the researchers may compare the 
differences between the size and speed of adjustment coefficients among different 
groups of banks and may indirectly draw conclusions as to which financial 
characteristics may have an impact on the pass-through coefficients. However, the 
main requirement for conducting this methodology is a large cross-sectional 
sample with a relatively large heterogeneity among banks in respect to their 
financial characteristics. The main disadvantage of this methodology is that it can 
only be useful in disentangling which micro structural characteristics may affect 
the retail rate adjustment, but not the macroeconomic factors like GDP and 
inflation and the overall competitiveness in the banking system. The latter are also 
seen as significant factors for the heterogeneous retail rate setting decisions 
(Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a).    
Using this kind of methodology, Weth (2002) investigates which of the 
four financial characteristics (size, non-deposit funding, maturity miss-match 
between long-term loans and deposits and banks‟ involvement in relationship 
lending) affect the size and speed of adjustment of lending rates among banks in 
Germany. The results, similar to Gambacorta (2008) but in contrast to de Graeve 
et al. (2004) and Mueller-Spahn (2008), reject the long-run pass-through 
heterogeneity and indicate a substantial short-run pass-through heterogeneity in 
adjustment. This implies that different characteristics among German banks may 
affect their retail rate setting decisions only in the short-, but not in the long-run. 
According to the results, larger bank size, higher non-deposit funding and 
maturity miss-match between long-term loans and deposits lead to a faster and 
greater size of adjustment of lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. In 
contrast, higher bank involvement in relationship lending (the “hausbank” 
phenomenon) leads to a more rigid short-run adjustment of lending rates 
(consistent with the relationship lending theory, see section 2.2.3). The results of 
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Mueller-Spahn (2008) indicated to both, a short- and long-run heterogeneity of 
adjustment of retail rates among German banks. As significant factors over the 
size of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates were estimated to be: bank size positively 
(consistent with Weth, 2002); and liquidity and portfolio diversification 
negatively.   
In a similar manner, Chmielewski (2004) investigates what determines 
retail rate setting decisions among banks in Poland, by considering the following 
three different financial characteristics: profitability, credit risk exposure and 
capitalisation ratio. The results indicate that more profitable banks and/or banks 
with higher credit risk exposure adjust their retail rates faster and more fully to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate, while more capitalised banks exhibit higher 
adjustment rigidity. The main possible shortcoming of this study is related to the 
type of methodology applied to the relatively small cross-sectional sample that 
consists of only 11 to 14 banks. As mentioned in one of the previous paragraphs, a 
much larger sample is needed in order to group the banks into different categories 
if the aim is to compare the differences in the pass-through multipliers.    
The main possible pitfall of the assessed studies by Weth (2002), Mueller-
Spahn (2008) and Chmielewski (2004) is related to their estimation method. 
Namely, these authors use panel method with ECM, without testing first if the 
variables included are I(1) or I(0). Moreover, they do not test if the variables are 
cointegrated, but they just assume a long-run cointegrating relationship (see 
section 2.3.5). Moreover, the afore-mentioned authors, similar as de Graeve et al. 
(2004), apply panel ECM by assuming that the disturbances among the cross-
sectional units are uncorrelated; as explained in section 3.3, this may provide 
inefficient estimates.  
A general concern with the empirical studies assessed in this subsection is 
related to model specification and how they assess the size of short-run 
adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. The main 
aim of the models is to investigate banks‟ reaction function to changes in the „cost 
of funds‟ rate within the current or previous time period (the impact multiplier). 
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For that reason the time series models, the dynamic panel data models as well as 
the panel data models based on ECM, estimate the short-run pass through 
coefficients within the current or the previous month/quarter (the impact 
multiplier). However, in investigating the impact multiplier, those models 
implicitly assume that the current changes in the retail rates are mainly determined 
by changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate that occurred within the current or the 
previous period. Accordingly, those models do not investigate the possibility of 
whether the adjustment of banks‟ retail rates in the current period may be a result 
of a delayed banks‟ response to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate that might have 
occurred some periods ago. Moreover, banks may also adjust their retail rates in 
the current period as a cumulative response to several changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate that have occurred in the past. Such staggered adjustments may be, for 
instance, the outcome of „menu costs‟ where the banks‟ view of the adjustment 
costs compared to the benefits of changing the retail rates change over time and 
the length of these lagged responses may vary with the development of monetary 
policy and other factors. Assessing whether banks‟ retail rate setting function 
indicates delayed adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is not 
undertaken in the studies analysed in this subsection, given that it is difficult to 
specify an appropriate empirical model or select an appropriate estimation 
method.  
In summary, the surveyed empirical studies in this subsection have 
attempted to investigate the determinants mainly of the size, and some of them, of 
the speed of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
The results have suggested that, among the various economies considered, as 
major determinants of the size and speed of the pass-through coefficients were 
estimated to be a) some macroeconomic factors such as, inflation and economic 
growth; b) some financial indicators like, money market rate volatility and the 
concentration in the banking sector and c) some bank specific characteristics like 
asset size, liquidity, capitalisation, credit risk and interest risk exposure of the 
banks, their involvement in relationship lending activities, portfolio diversification 
and operational efficiency. Although the assessed studies in this section have 
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some weaknesses, in general their results are consistent with the theoretical 
predictions assessed in section 2.2.      
 
2.3.2 Studies that examine the average level of retail rates setting  
The studies in this group mainly differ by the data series used, i.e. whether 
they are based on aggregate or individual (bank-level) data. A summary table of 
the assessed studies which estimate the determinants of retail rate setting 
decisions based on a linear relationship, ordered in the same way as they are 
discussed in the text, is presented in table 2.3. 
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Table 2.3: Summary of the assessed studies which estimate the determinants of retail rate setting decisions based on a linear relationship 
Author(s) Country Time period 
Frequency of 
the data
Type of the 
data
Number of cross-
sectional units
Estimation 
method
Structural Variables Significant determinants
Wrobel and 
Pawlowska (2002) 
Poland 1995-2001 Monthly Aggregate / ECM Banking concentration Banking concentration
Betancourt et al. 
(2008) 
Colombia 1999-2006 Monthly Aggregate / ECM
Industrial production 
index
Industrial production index
Kauko (2005) Finland 1993-2003 Quarterly Aggregate / OLS Credit risk exposure
GDP, credit risk exposure 
and liquidity of banks
Mishra et al. (2010)
109 low income 
economies
1960-2008 Monthly Aggregate <109 Panel data, FE
Concentration in the 
banking sector and 
"institutional quality" 
variable
Concentration in the 
banking sector and 
"institutional quality" 
variable
Berger and Hannan 
(1989)
USA 1983-1985 Quarterly Bank level 470 Panel Data, OLS
Concentration, size, 
operating costs
Concentration
Cihak (2004) Croatia 1999-2003 Monthly Bank level 46
Panel Data, GLS, 
SUR
Size, liquidity, foreign 
ownership, NPL and 
capital ratios
Size, liquidity, foreign 
ownership, NPL and 
capital ratios
Vaskov et al. (2010) Macedonia
 2001Q4 - 
2007Q2 
Quarterly Bank level 15
Panel Data: GLS 
and Fixed effects
Size, banks' market 
share, credit risk 
exposure, liquidity, 
capital, profitability, 
operating costs and 
foreign ownership
Size, banks' market share, 
credit risk exposure, 
capital, profitability, 
"liquidity" and "foreign 
ownership"
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Most of the studies that are based on aggregated bank data apply time 
series methods in order to investigate the direct linear relationship between 
various structural indicators and the average level of banks‟ retail rates. For 
example, Wrobel and Pawlowska (2002), by employing an ECM, investigate how 
the level of concentration in the Polish banking sector affects banks‟ retail rate 
setting. The results are in line with the mark-up pricing theory suggesting that, on 
average, a higher level of concentration allows banks in the short-run to charge 
higher loan and offer lower deposit rates. Based on the same estimation method, 
Betancourt et al. (2008) explore how overall economic activity may affect retail 
rate setting in Columbia. Their results indicate that a higher level of economic 
activity negatively affects deposit rates in the short-run, implying that as 
economic activity intensifies banks on average provide lower deposit rates. This is 
explained by the argument that in periods of economic expansion banks have 
higher inflows of deposits for which they can offer lower deposit rates. In periods 
of economic downturns when banks are faced with deposit withdrawal and/or 
lower deposit supply, banks offer higher deposits rates in order to reduce the 
deposit withdrawal and/or to attract higher deposit supply. However, the 
economic activity variable did not have any significant impact on the lending rate 
setting, for which no explanation is given. Summary of the study by Kauko (2005) 
based on the OLS method and the study of Mishra et al. (2010) based on panel 
data fixed effects are presented in table 2.3. 
The main weakness of the majority of the aforementioned analyses is that 
all of them assume a long-run equilibrium relationship among the interest rate 
series, i.e. the series are cointegrated. On that basis, Wrobel and Pawlowska 
(2002) and Betancourt et al. (2008) investigate the factors that affect only the 
short-run relationship by directly estimating the ECM. Moreover, Kauko (2005) 
directly estimates the long-run relationship by employing the OLS, again without 
investigating first if the series are cointegrated. 
Based on bank-level data, one of the pioneering studies in this area is by 
Berger and Hannan (1989). The authors examine what factors affect the deposit 
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rate setting among banks in the US economy using a panel data model. Among 
the factors considered, such as operating costs, the size of banks and the level of 
concentration in the banking sector, the authors provide statistical evidence that 
only the level of concentration negatively alters the deposit rate setting. This 
implies that banks in more concentrated markets set lower deposit rates. Operating 
costs are also significant in most of the regressions, but this does vary with 
different model specifications. Nonetheless, the main shortcoming of this analysis 
is that it only considers a few banks‟ specific financial characteristics and neglects 
the impact of some other potentially important financial characteristics such as 
interest risk and credit risk exposure, liquidity and capitalisation. These financial 
characteristics in other empirical studies (Sorensen and Werner, 2006 and 
Gambacorta, 2008) have been estimated as significant factors. 
More comprehensive analyses, based on similar estimation methods, but 
with a greater variety of banks‟ financial characteristics as considered as 
determinants of lending rate setting behaviour for the Croatian and Macedonian 
banking systems respectively, were conducted by Cihak (2004) and Vaskov et al. 
(2010), respectively. The analysis by Cihak (2004) suggests that lending rate 
setting behaviour among banks in Croatia is negatively affected by their asset 
size, level of liquidity, capital ratio and the presence of foreign ownership, but 
positively by the NPL ratio. These results are broadly in line with the theoretical 
predictions.  
Vaskov et al. (2010) suggest that banks‟ market share, size, credit risk 
exposure, capitalisation ratio and profitability of Macedonian banks have an 
important influence on the lending rate setting decisions and most of them have a 
sign consistent with theory. For example, banks‟ market share, credit risk 
exposure and profitability are positively related to the lending rates, indicating 
that the higher they are, then the higher will be loan interest rates charged by 
banks. Bank size and capital are negatively related to the lending rates, indicating 
that larger and/or more capitalised banks, on average, charge lower interest rates. 
The former is consistent with the “efficient-market” hypothesis, whereas the latter 
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is in line with the bank lending channel theory (see sections 4.1 and 5.2). Foreign 
ownership variable is negative and marginally significant, suggesting that foreign 
owned banks on average charge lower lending rates. However, the liquidity 
variable is estimated with contrary sign to what was expected and is marginally 
significant, for which no comprehensive explanation is provided. One of the 
reasons for the contrary sign of liquidity indicator from what was expected may 
be the structural surplus liquidity of the Macedonian banking system (see section 
1.4). The estimates of the liquidity variable are consistent with the results 
estimating the determinants of the stock of domestic currency loans in Macedonia, 
where this variable was also estimated with the contrary sign from what was 
expected, although insignificant (see section 5.5.3). The operating costs variable is 
estimated as statistically insignificant for which no explanation is offered. This is 
in line with the estimates discussed in section 2.3.3 of the interest rate spread and 
in section 3.5 for the size of lending rate adjustment in Macedonia. The main 
possible drawback of the study by Vaskov et al. (2010) is that the authors include 
banks‟ market share and profitability variables that, according to Structure-
Conduct-Performance paradigm, may be endogenous to prices (lending rates). 
Regarding the former, firms may use their prices as an instrument to get higher 
market share. In the case of the banking sector, a bank may set lower lending rates 
in order to acquire a higher market share (Berger and Hannan, 1989). Regarding 
profitability, it may also be endogenous to prices (lending rates) because in the 
loan market where a bank has a market power, it may charge higher lending rates 
in order to increase its profitability. Associated with the model specification and 
the variables included, although the study by Vaskov et al. (2010) takes into 
account the impact of various bank balance sheet items (see table 2.3), it omits 
some other, possibly important, bank-level variables such as a relationship lending 
variable, maturity mismatch and the impact of portfolio diversification. Moreover, 
this study does not control for the possible impact of the macroeconomic factors. 
 In brief, the surveyed empirical studies in this subsection have 
investigated what are the major factors that affect the average level of interest rate 
charged by banks. All of them are based on the assumption of a linear relationship 
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between banks‟ retail rates and the structural indicators examined. In general, it 
can be summarised that presented results are consistent with the various 
theoretical predictions assessed in section 2.2. These results imply that more or 
less, similar factors affect both the average level of retail rates charged and the 
size and speed of adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate, as explained in the previous subsection. 
 
2.3.3 Studies that examine the determinants of interest margins between banks‟ 
retail rates and „cost of funds‟ rate  
 There are several studies that explore the determinants of interest rate 
spread between banks‟ retail rates and the „cost of funds‟ rate. They again differ 
according to the type of the data they use, i.e. aggregate or bank-level data and 
their estimation method. A summary table of the assessed studies, ordered in the 
same way as they are discussed in the text, is presented in table 2.4. A summary 
of other studies that use similar estimation methods and similar control variables 
as the ones to be discussed is also presented in table 2.4. 
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Table 2.4: Summary of the studies which estimate the determinants of interest rate spreads 
 
Continued on next page. 
Author(s) Country Time period 
Frequency 
of the data
Type of the 
data
Number of 
cross-
sectional units
Estimation method
Balanced / 
unbalanced panel
Spread calculated 
as a difference 
between:
Structural variables Significant determinants
Corvoisier and 
Gropp (2002) 
10 euro-zone 
economies
1993-1999 Annual Aggregate >10
Panel Data, Fixed and 
Random effects
/
Lending (deposit) 
and money market 
rate
Concentration in the banking 
sector, financial deepening of 
the economy and operating 
costs
Concentration in the 
banking sector, financial 
deepening of the economy
Angbazo (1997) USA 1989-1993 Annual Bank level 286 Panel Data, GLS Balanced Net interest margin
Credit risk and interest risk 
exposure, capitalisation and 
liquidity
Credit risk and interest risk 
exposure, capitalisation and 
liquidity
Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (1999) 
set of 80 economies 
around the world
1988-1995 Annual Bank level >1000
Panel Data, Weighted 
Least Squares
Unbalanced Net interest margin
GDP growth, inflation, level of 
financial deepening, 
capitalization, size of the banks, 
the level of concentration and 
the presence of foreign 
ownership in the banking sector 
and a set of legal variables
Inflation, level of financial 
deepening, capitalization, 
size of the banks, the level 
of concentration and the 
presence of foreign 
ownership in the banking 
sector 
Sanders and 
Schumacher (2000)
5 EU economies 
plus USA
1988-1995 Annual Bank level 614
Cross-section by OLS 
and Panel Data 
Groupwise regressions: 
2 STEP GLS estimator
/ Net interest margin
Non-interest expenses, capital 
ratio, reserve requirements, 
interest rate volatility and 
institutional differences
Non-interest expenses, 
capital ratio, reserve 
requirements, interest rate 
volatility and institutional 
differences
More and Nagy 
(2003)
8 CSEE economies 1998-2001 Annual Bank level >80
Panel Data, Fixed and 
Random effects
/ Net interest margin
GDP growth, inflation, level of 
financial deepening, operating 
costs, credit risk exposure, 
banking concentration 
Level of financial 
deepening, operating costs, 
credit risk exposure, 
banking concentration 
Cihak (2004) Croatia 1999-2003 Monthly Bank level 46
Panel Data, GLS and 
SUR
Balanced
Loan and deposit 
rates
Size, liquidity, foreign 
ownership, NPL and capital 
ratios
Size, liquidity, foreign 
ownership, NPL and capital 
ratios
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Continued from previous page. 
Author(s) Country Time period 
Frequency 
of the data
Type of the 
data
Number of 
cross-
sectional units
Estimation method
Balanced / 
unbalanced panel
Spread calculated 
as a difference 
between:
Structural variables Significant determinants
Vaskov et al. (2010) Macedonia
 2001Q4 - 
2007Q2 
Quarterly Bank level 15
Panel Data, GLS, Fixed 
effects
Balanced
Loan and deposit 
rates
Size, banks' market share, credit 
risk exposure, liquidity, capital, 
profitability, operating costs and 
foreign ownership.
Size, banks' market share, 
credit risk exposure, 
profitability, foreign 
ownership and "liquidity".
Boutillier et al. 
(2006) 
France 1992-2004 Quarterly
Aggregate by 
bank product
 9-11 SUR /
Loan and money 
market rates
GDP growth, unemployment, 
volatility of money market rate, 
credit risk exposure, debt 
burden  
GDP growth, volatility of 
money market rate, credit 
risk exposure  
Crowley (2007) 
18 English-Speaking 
African Countries
1975-2004 Annual Aggregate 18
Panel Data, Fixed 
effects
Unbalanced
Lending and deposit 
rate, adjusted for 
inflation
GDP growth, inflation, 
competition and public 
ownership in the banking sector, 
operating costs, credit risk 
exposure and capitalisation
Inflation, competition and 
public ownership in the 
banking sector
Maudos and de 
Guevara (2004) 
5 EU economies 1993-2000 Annual Bank level 1436-1796
Panel Data, Fixed 
effects with Within-
group estimator 
Unbalanced
Lending (deposit) 
and money market 
rate
Concentration in the banking 
sector, interest risk, credit risk 
exposure, operating costs and 
the management quality
Concentration in the 
banking sector, interest risk, 
credit risk exposure, 
operating costs and the 
management quality
Doliente (2005) 
Philippines, 
Indonesia, Thailand 
and Malaysia
1994-2001 Annual Bank level / Panel Data / Net interest margin
Capitalisation, operating costs, 
liquidity, non-interest earning 
assets and credit risk exposure
Capitalisation, operating 
costs, liquidity, non-interest 
earning assets and "credit 
risk exposure"
Afanasieff et al. 
(2002) 
Brazil 1997-2000 Monthly Bank level 142
Panel Data with Within-
group estimator 
Unbalanced
Loan and deposit 
rates
GDP growth, inflation and 
interest rate volatility, non-
interest bearing deposits, 
operating costs, credit risk 
exposure and liquidity 
Interest rate volatility, non-
interest bearing deposits 
and the operating costs
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Based on aggregated data, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) examine the 
determinants of interest rate spreads for different loan products at the aggregate 
level for the 10 euro-zone economies. Their results suggest that interest rate 
spreads are positively determined by the level of concentration in the banking 
sector and the degree of financial deepening of the economy, while operating 
costs do not have any significant impact over the spreads. However, the estimated 
positive sign of the financial deepening variable (measured by the credit-to-GDP 
ratio), is not in line with standard a priori expectations that imply a reverse 
relationship. The authors suggest this is because when the financial deepening 
indicator is higher, then economic agents are more dependent on bank loans, the 
market power of banks increases, and thus they can set higher spreads.  
Using bank-level data, Angbazo (1997) investigates how banks‟ financial 
characteristics influence spread setting decisions among banks in the US 
economy. The results of the panel data estimation imply, consistent with the 
theory, that higher credit risk and interest risk exposure, and capitalisation ratio 
are positively related to interest rate spreads while liquidity is negatively related. 
However, a possible weakness of this study is that it only investigates the impact 
of banks‟ financial characteristics on interest rate spreads without taking into 
account the influence of the macroeconomic factors like GDP growth, inflation 
and the level of financial deepening that according to Corvoisier and Gropp 
(2002) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) are also found to be significant 
factors in spread determination. 
Based on a similar estimation method, using bank-level data for up to 80 
economies around the world, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) explore what 
macroeconomic and banks‟ financial factors determine interest rate spreads. 
Regarding the macroeconomic factors, the results indicate that interest rate 
spreads are significantly and positively determined by inflation and negatively by 
the level of financial deepening (a finding consistent with Corvoisier and Gropp 
discussed above, for which they offer a similar explanation); while GDP growth 
did not have any significant impact. Their estimates also suggest that interest rate 
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spreads are positively determined by the capitalization ratio and banks‟ size, the 
level of concentration and the presence of foreign ownership in the banking 
sector. This research is conducted for a set of 80 economies around the world with 
different monetary policy regimes and financial structures which may 
significantly alter banks‟ spread-setting. Some of these factors are controlled for 
in the model by including country specific dummies and a set of legal variables 
proxing the country specific effects, however this may not fully capture the 
changing country specific effects in the banking systems of the sample economies.   
Saunders and Schumacher (2000) explore what factors affect interest rate 
spreads among banks in the sample of five EU and the US economies. The results 
indicate that interest rate spreads are significantly determined by the ratio of non-
interest expenses, capital ratio and the reserve requirements imposed by the 
monetary authorities. Regarding the country differences, interest rate spreads are 
significantly determined by differences in the interest rate volatility and the 
institutional differences among the sample economies. However, a possible 
drawback of this research, similar to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga above, is that 
in order to capture the impact of the various institutional settings among the 
sample economies the authors include country specific dummies, which may not 
fully capture the country specific changing effects in the banking systems of the 
sample economies.   
Regarding the transition economies, More and Nagy (2003) investigate 
how some macroeconomic and banks‟ financial characteristics determine spread-
setting among banks in the eight new EU member states from CSEE. Their results 
from a panel data model suggest that among the macroeconomic factors included, 
only the level of financial deepening plays a significant and negative role on the 
spread setting decisions, consistent with the findings of Corvoisier and Gropp 
(2002) and others discussed above. Regarding the banks‟ financial characteristics, 
the results are consistent with the theory, indicating a positive relationship 
between the operating costs, credit risk exposure and interest rate spreads. 
However, the results in respect to the banking concentration variable are estimated 
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to be negative, which is contrary to the previously assessed studies (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 1999 and Corvoisier and Gropp, 2002). This finding is 
explained by the “efficient-market” hypothesis, i.e. more concentrated markets are 
dominated by larger banks that, due to the economies of scale, are more efficient 
and thus set lower spreads. A pitfall of this study is that during the sample period 
some economies, such as Czech Republic, underwent a monetary policy regime 
shift. This is not taken into account in the model, which is problematic as the 
monetary policy regime may directly affect the interest-rate channel of the 
monetary transmission and hence banks‟ interest-rate and spread setting decisions.   
Regarding the case of Croatia and Macedonia, the analyses of Cihak 
(2004) and Vaskov et al. (2010) estimate how the same banks‟ financial 
characteristics as the ones already analysed for lending rates (considered in 
section 2.3.2) affect the interest rate spreads in both economies respectively. The 
estimates presented in Cihak indicate that interest rate spreads in Croatia are 
positively determined by the NPL and capital ratios, but negatively by their size, 
level of liquidity and the presence of foreign ownership.  
The results of Vaskov et al. (2010) from various model specifications 
indicate a significant and positive impact on the interest rate spreads of banks‟ 
market share, profitability and liquidity; whereas asset size and foreign ownership 
variables are negatively related, consistent with the prior expectations. However, 
the credit risk exposure and bank liquidity had a significant impact but with 
contrary sign from what was expected, for which no detailed discussion is 
provided. The contrary impact of the liquidity variable is similar to the results 
reported in section 2.3.2. The operating costs variable is again statistically 
insignificant, for which no argument is provided. This is consistent with the 
previous results discussed in section 2.3.2 and the results in section 3.5. A 
possible weakness of this study is that the authors include profitability and banks‟ 
market share indicators that may again be endogenous to the interest rate margin 
setting, for the reasons already considered in section 2.3.2. Additionally, as 
already explained in section 2.3.2, this study in assessing the determinants of the 
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interest rate spread among Macedonian banks omits some other „important‟ bank 
specific characteristics and the impact of the macroeconomic environment. 
In summary, the empirical studies assessed in this section investigating the 
determinants of banks‟ interest rate margins, again point to similar indicators to 
the studies already surveyed in the previous two subsections. The presented 
results are largely in line with the theoretical predictions. The major 
macroeconomic determinants of interest rate margins were identified as inflation 
and economic growth. The major indicators for the financial system were 
estimated to be the money market rate volatility and the level of concentration in 
the banking sector. The most significant bank balance sheet items are indicated to 
be banks‟ credit risk and interest rate risk exposure, liquidity and capital ratios, 
operating costs and the extent of their portfolio diversification.     
 
2.3.4 Empirical studies that investigate the interest rate pass-through in 
Macedonia 
Apart from the study by Vaskov et al. (2010) that investigates the 
determinants for the average level of lending rates charged and the determinants 
of interest rate margins among Macedonian banks (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), 
there is no existing study that explores the determinants of the size of adjustment 
of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. There are just a few 
studies that investigate only the size and speed of adjustment of lending rates in 
Macedonia whose details are presented in table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5: Summary of the studies that investigate the size and speed of interest rate pass-
through in Macedonia 
 
 Jovanovski et al. (2005) investigate the interest rate pass-through from the 
monetary policy rate as well as the money market rate to the banks‟ lending rate 
using the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). Their results suggest a 
complete long-run pass-through from the policy rate to banks‟ lending rate and 
negative short-run pass-through between the key policy rate and lending rate. The 
latter is explained by the argument that the reference policy rate (the CB Bills 
rate) serves as an alternative rate of return for the banks and not as „cost of funds‟ 
rate due to the fixed exchange rate regime and the way how the monetary policy is 
conducted (see sections 1.4 and 1.7). However, a possible pitfall of their analysis 
is that they employ a VECM on a time span of only 2 years, which may be 
inappropriate. Another possible weakness arises from multicollinearity, since in 
the model the authors include two separate regressors, the policy rate and money 
market rate, as proxy variables for the same thing, i.e. „cost of funds‟ rate; which 
are highly correlated (see section 1.7).  
Velickovski (2006 and 2010) investigates the size of the pass-through 
from CB Bills rate to the banks‟ retail rates. The results from Velickovski (2006), 
based on the Engle-Granger (E-G) method, indicate the non-existence of a 
cointegrating relationship between the two rates and he concludes that the interest 
rate channel is incomplete. However, this author does not proceed with the 
analysis by estimating the size of the pass-through with different methods, i.e. 
differenced variables or Vector Autoregression (VAR). In contrast, the findings of 
Velickovksi (2010) by using a VECM have indicated that, after restricting the 
Author(s) Time period 
Frequency of 
the data
Type of the 
data
Estimation 
method
Jovanovski et al. 
(2005)
2002-2004 Monthly Aggregate ECM: VECM
Velickovski 
(2006)
1997-2006 / 
2000-2006
Monthly Aggregate ECM: E-G
Velickovski 
(2010)
1997-2008 / 
2003 - 2008
Monthly Aggregate
ECM: E-G, 
VECM and VAR
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time period from 2003 to 2008 (due to the lower variability of the key policy rate 
during this period); there is almost a complete long-run relationship between the 
key policy rate and banks‟ lending rate. Nonetheless, the results implied that the 
speed and size of the short-run adjustment between these two rates are quite 
sluggish and far from incomplete. 
Additionally, Velickovski (2006 and 2010) investigates the size and speed 
of transmission from the referent policy rate to money market rate. The results 
have indicated that it is complete in both the short- and long-run.  
The major weakness of the aforementioned studies is that they are 
conducted on aggregate data and may suffer from aggregation bias (see section 
2.3.5). Furthermore, these studies conclude that the interest-rate pass-through 
from the „cost of funds‟ rate to banks‟ lending rate is incomplete at least in the 
short-run, but do not identify what are the factors that impede the interest rate 
channel.  
In brief, although the assessed empirical analyses for the size and speed of 
the adjustment of lending rates in the case of Macedonia have some weaknesses, 
they are the pioneering studies that quantitatively measure the size and speed of 
adjustment. Their major finding is that in the short-run, the adjustment of lending 
rates to changes in the reference rate is incomplete. For the long-run relationship, 
the evidence is mixed. The study by Jovanovski et al. (2005) indicates a 
cointegrating relationship between the reference rate and money market rate on 
one side and the lending rate on the other side. However, this statistical evidence 
should be treated with caution due to the short-time span. Similarly, the study by 
Velickovski (2010) points to complete long-run pass-through from key policy rate 
to lending rate. Another finding of the assessed studies is that the pass-through 
(short- and long-run) from the CB Bills rate to the money market rate is complete. 
Overall, although these studies have not directly explored the determinants for the 
incomplete short-run adjustment of lending rates in Macedonia, however they 
provide some useful indicators for future research.  
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2.3.5 A general criticism of the reviewed empirical studies 
One of the main possible weaknesses of some of these reviewed studies is 
related to their data sets used. Many of the studies are based on aggregate level 
data (see tables 2.1, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5), that are composed as a simple sum or as a 
weighted average of the bank-level data. However, aggregating the data of the 
micro units, according to Theil (1957) and Zellner (1962), may lead to 
aggregation bias. The theoretical basis of the aggregation bias is that the 
individual (micro) units from which the aggregated data is composed may be 
individuals with different (heterogeneous) behaviour. Consequently, by estimating 
the economic relations with aggregated data, the individual behaviour of each unit 
is suppressed and thus, it may be hidden in the disturbances of the model based on 
aggregated data that may result in biased estimates. The derivation of the 
aggregation bias based on simple (bivariate) time series regression, according to 
Theil (1957), Zellner (1962) and Lee et al. (1990) is as follows:  
The general disaggregated model for each unit may be presented as: 
Yit = βiXit + ui ; i = 1, 2, 3 ......n          (2.11) 
where: Y is the dependent variable; X is an independent variable; β is a coefficient 
to be estimated; u are white noise residuals; i and t are unit and time specific 
subscripts. The same equation derived for the aggregated data would be: 
Yit = βiXit + ui     (2.12) 
However, in the empirical research based on aggregated data, the economic 
relations are estimated as follows: 
Yit = β Xit + vi                (2.13) 
Equations 2.12 and 2.13 would be equal if the residuals of both equations are 
equal ( ui = vi), for which the following condition (H0) must be satisfied: 
n
i 1
n
i 1
n
i 1
n
i 1
n
i 1
n
i 1
CHAPTER 2 REVIEW OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON THE DETERMINANTS OF INTEREST RATE PASS-
THROUGH 
106 
 
H0: βiXit – β Xit = 0                      (2.14) 
or in a simplified form (Zellner, 1962): 
  H0: β1 = β2 = β3 = 
. . . . . .
 = βi              (2.15) 
Condition (H0) actually indicates that the parameters β from equation 2.12 must be 
equal between each individual unit, implying to homogeneous behaviour among 
the units from which the aggregated data are composed. Otherwise, if the 
condition (H0) is not satisfied, then it implies that the units have heterogeneous 
behaviour that will be hidden in the error term of equation 2.13 and would result 
in biased estimates.  
In the case of the banking sector, de Graeve et al. (2004) argues that 
estimating the pass-through multipliers with aggregate data may also lead to 
aggregation bias arising from the heterogeneous nature of the data. This argument 
is empirically supported by in their paper which presents estimates for Belgium 
where the pass-through estimates based on aggregate data were lower compared to 
the same estimates based on individual (bank-level) data. 
Another possible drawback regarding the studies that use bank-level data 
and some of the studies that use aggregated data for the same group of economies 
(EMU and CSEE economies) may be related to the estimation method used. The 
studies based on time series methods like: ECM (Mojon, 2000 and Cottarelli et 
al., 1995); TAR (Sander and Kleimer, 2004a, b), Panel Cointegration (de Graeve 
et al., 2004) and panel ECM (Weth, 2002; Mueller-Spahn, 2008 and Chmielewski, 
2004) may provide inefficient estimates because they do not control for the 
contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation among the units. This may be 
especially pronounced for the studies based on panel cointegration because the 
estimators employed in those studies are based on the assumption of no cross-
sectional correlation among the units (see section 3.3). Moreover, majority of the 
studies based on static panel data models that use both aggregated data for similar 
group of economies and/or bank-level data, may again suffer from the cross-
n
i 1
n
i 1
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sectional correlation among the units, e.g. Mishra et al. (2010), Crowley (2007); 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), Maudos and de Guevara (2004), Angbazo (1997), 
Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), More and Nagy (2003), Doliente (2005) and 
Afanseiff et al. (2002). However, some studies have tackled this issue by either 
using the SUR model (Sorensen and Werner, 2006; Lago-Gonzalez and Salas-
Fumas, 2005 and Boutillier et al., 2006) that has been specifically developed for 
that purpose (see section 3.3); or have corrected the estimator employed by 
controlling for the cross-sectional correlation among the units (Berger and 
Hannan, 1989; Cihak, 2004 and Vaskov et al., 2010).  
A general weakness of the studies based on ECM in estimating the size of 
the pass-through (Mojon, 2000; Cottarelli et al., 1995; Sander and Kleimeier, 
2004a, b; Sorensen and Werner, 2006; de Greave et al., 2004; Weth, 2002; 
Mueller-Spahn, 2008; Chmielewski 2004; Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002; 
Betancourt et al. 2008; Velickovski, 2006 and 2010 and Jovanovski et al., 2005); 
is that these a priori expect to find a cointegrating relationship between the „cost 
of funds‟ rate and banks‟ retail rates. Consequently in estimating the ECM model, 
some of the studies (de Greave et al., 2004; Weth, 2002; Mueller-Spahn, 2008; 
Chmielewski 2004 and Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002) do not test if the interest 
rate series employed are stationary or not. Furthermore, many of the studies such 
as Weth (2002), Mueller-Spahn (2008), Chmielewski (2004), Wrobel and 
Pawlowska (2002) and Betancourt et al. (2008) do not test for the existence of a 
cointegrating relationship among the interest rate series. They directly estimate an 
ECM based on the assumption that the interest rate series a cointegrated. This 
approach of estimating the size of the pass-through within an ECM may be 
inappropriate. The reason for this is that, as explained in section 2.2.5, the mark-
up pricing model is not clear whether a priori we might expect a long-run 
equilibrium relationship among the „cost of funds‟ rate and banks retail rates. 
Moreover, the rest of the theories assessed in section 2 are more inclined to 
suggest that a priori we might not expect a long-run equilibrium between the two 
interest rate series (see section 2.2.5). This maybe a reason why in the studies by 
Sander and Kleimeier (2004a, b), de Graeve et al. (2004), Egert and al. (2007) and 
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Velickovski (2006), the authors failed to find a cointegrating relationship for most 
of the interest rate series used. Thus, apart from Velickovski (2006), they proceed 
by estimating the size of the pass-through with model by using first differences of 
the variables or by employing a VAR model.      
Another possible problem with the majority of the studies conducted for 
the developing and transition economies from CSEE (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994; Betancourt et al., 2008; Berstein and Fuentes, 2005; Crowley, 2007; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004b; Chmielewski, 
2004; Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002; Mishra et al., 2010; Cihak, 2004 and Vaskov 
et al., 2010), arises from the interest rate series used. These authors use loan 
and/or deposit rates composed of a weighted average of all currency 
denominations, i.e. loans and/or deposits denominated in foreign as well as 
domestic currency, including the foreign currency indexed loans/deposits. In 
contrast, as the reference policy rate they use either the domestic policy interest 
rate and/or the domestic money market rate, both of which relate to transactions 
denominated only in domestic currency. Accordingly, the authors in attempting to 
investigate the determinants of interest rate pass-through between the bank retail 
rates and the „cost of funds‟ rate, indirectly disregard the impact of the currency 
substitution phenomenon. This phenomenon is present in the afore-mentioned 
group of economies through the relatively high share of foreign currency 
loans/deposits and foreign currency indexed loans/deposits to total stock of 
loans/deposits. Not controlling for this phenomenon in the models may bias the 
results. Namely, the degree of pass-through may be under- or over-estimated 
because part of the aggregated retail interest rates does not only react to changes 
in domestic referent rate, but also to changes in the respective foreign reference 
rate(s). For example, according to the empirical studies of the bank lending 
channel conducted for the transition economies (see section 4.5.2), it is estimated 
that in many CSEE economies banks‟ total loans are more responsive to changes 
in foreign reference rate than domestic rate. This may be more pronounced where 
the currency substitution is larger. 
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2.4 Conclusions 
 
The aims of this chapter were to critically assess various theories of how 
banks adjust their retail rates and the main factors that affect the size of 
adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
Additionally, this chapter has critically surveyed various empirical studies that 
explore the structural factors that affect banks‟ retail rate setting decisions, 
classified according to the conceptual framework of what is investigated and how 
the underlying theoretical mark-up pricing model has been developed and 
modified through time. This analysis provides the foundation for the conduct of 
our empirical research in chapter 3, investigating what factors affect the size of 
adjustment of lending rate among banks in Macedonia. 
Regarding the theoretical background to how banks‟ set their retail rates, 
the „core‟ model is the mark-up pricing model designed for a non-perfect 
competitive pricing environment. This model implies that variations in banks‟ 
retail rates are determined by the variations in the „cost of funds‟ rate plus the 
mark-up margin. The mark-up margin, according to Ho and Saunders (1981), is 
inversely related to the interest-rate risks that banks face, or as Allen (1988) and 
Angbazo (1997) argue, it is also determined by the cross-product diversification 
of loans and deposits in respect to their maturity and banks‟ credit risk exposure 
respectively.  
The main focus of the later developed theories is in investigating the 
factors that affect the size of banks‟ retail rates adjustment, i.e. the proportion by 
which variations in the „cost of funds‟ rate are transmitted in banks‟ retail rates. 
Those theories are: the theory for asymmetric information and lending rate 
stickiness by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981); switching cost and related to that, 
relationship lending theory and “menu costs” theory established by Hannan and 
Berger (1991). Although these theories have some weaknesses, they provide some 
explanations for the possible reasons for the incomplete (sluggish) adjustment of 
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banks‟ retail rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate, i.e. retail rate adjustment 
rigidity. 
 Considering the empirical studies, although they have some weaknesses 
and there is substantial heterogeneity among them in respect of what they are 
estimating, how they are estimating and the type of the data they use; overall their 
findings are broadly consistent with the theoretical predictions. Namely, they 
point to common macroeconomic and banks‟ financial characteristics as 
significant determinants of banks‟ retail rate setting decisions. Among the 
macroeconomic factors considered, the most important ones appear to be 
economic growth and inflation. Considering the indicators for the development of 
the financial sector, the generally significant ones are estimated to be: money 
market volatility and the concentration in the banking sector. Regarding the 
banks‟ financial characteristics, the significant factors are: asset size, interest risk 
and credit risk exposure, liquidity, capitalisation, banks‟ involvement in 
relationship lending activities, operational efficiency and their portfolio 
diversification. However, none of the assessed empirical studies has examined the 
size of adjustment coefficients (pass-through multipliers) in the Macedonian 
banking sector using bank-level data and what are their major determinants, which 
is the main challenge of the next chapter.  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
After critically assessing the various theoretical and empirical approaches 
to how banks set their retail rates in the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is 
to directly respond to the first and second research questions of the thesis. Hence, 
this chapter will empirically investigate the size of banks‟ lending rate adjustment 
to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate and whether this is heterogeneous among 
banks. In doing this, this chapter also aims to identify what factors affect the pass-
through multipliers in Macedonia. The rationale for exploring these issues in more 
depth is to provide a fuller picture of the effectiveness of the monetary 
transmission through the interest rate channel. From the monetary policy-makers‟ 
perspective, this is seen as important issue, having in mind the significance of the 
interest rate channel in the monetary transmission mechanism. Additionally, this 
chapter will also eventually enable us to compare whether the same factors affect 
both the interest rate and bank lending channels (see chapter 5). Hence, this 
research may provide some policy implications regarding the effectiveness of the 
interest rate channel and identify the factors that impede „smooth‟ transmission in 
Macedonia, which ultimately may help monetary policy makers to take more 
appropriate policy measures.  
In order to conduct this research we primarily follow the mark-up pricing 
model of how banks‟ set their retail rates designed for a non-perfectly competitive 
environment, established by Rousseas (1985) and Ho and Saunders (1981), as 
well as the applications of this found in the empirical literature (see sections 2.2 
and 2.3). The latter may give us an indication as to how the theoretical 
underpinnings can be investigated in our empirical work (see section 2.3). 
According to the existing theoretical and empirical literature, various macro and 
microeconomic factors are seen to affect banks‟ pricing policy such as the 
structure of the financial system, macroeconomic characteristics of the economy 
and banks‟ balance sheet items.  
The empirical studies that investigate interest rate pass-through in the 
Macedonian banking sector suggest that it is incomplete in the short-run 
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(Jovanovski et al. 2005 and Velickovski 2010) or in both the short- and long-run 
(Velickovski, 2006), see section 2.3.4. However, we have argued that an 
important possible drawback in these studies is that they may suffer from 
aggregation bias (see section 2.3.5). Thus, the core aim of this chapter is to 
examine the size of lending rate adjustment, whether it is heterogeneous among 
banks as well as to explore how and what factors considered in the previous 
paragraph affect the size of lending rate adjustment among Macedonian banks to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate,  
Accordingly, the value added of this chapter is as follows: First, it 
investigates the size of lending rate adjustment, whether it is heterogeneous 
among Macedonian banks and what factors may have a significant impact over it. 
Accordingly, this investigation is based on a disaggregated (bank-level) data set, 
which has not been previously used to study the size of the pass-through in 
Macedonia (see section 2.3.4). Indeed, the literature for other countries, especially 
for the CSEE, based on bank-level data is quite limited (see tables 2.1 and 2.2). 
This may be of importance since studies that use industry level data may suffer 
from aggregation bias (see section 2.3.5). Second, in order to investigate whether 
there is banks‟ heterogeneous size of lending rate adjustment to changes in the 
„cost of funds‟ rate and what factors may have a significant impact over it by 
using bank-level data, this research employs the different and arguably more 
appropriate estimation method of Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). This 
technique has not been previously used in the Macedonian research and is rarely 
used in the empirical studies even for the developed economies (see sections 
2.3.1, 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). Third, this study focuses only on lending rates of 
loans denominated in domestic currency unlike the rest of the studies for 
Macedonia as well as CSEE that use aggregated data set including domestic and 
foreign currency denominated series. The rationale for this is explained in section 
(2.3.5).  
This chapter is structured as follows: section 3.2 explains the model in 
detail. Section 3.3 provides the estimation method and strategy. Section 3.4 
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describes the data used. The estimation results are presented in section 3.5, while 
the final section concludes. 
 
3.2 The model 
 
The model aims to explore the heterogeneous size of short-run adjustment 
of banks‟ lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate and its major 
determinants. It is designed to take into account the impact of various banks‟ 
specific variables (8), macroeconomic control factors (2) and a banking 
concentration index that, according to the theoretical predictions and the empirical 
studies assessed in sections 2.2 and 2.3, may affect banks‟ retail rate reaction 
functions to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate.  
In order to investigate the short-run relationship of the interest rate series, 
i.e. the size and the factors that affect the pass-through multiplier within one-
month (1-month impact multiplier), the model is estimated in first differences. 
Here, like the rest of the empirical literature (see section 2.3.1), we do not model 
for the possible delayed and variable adjustment reaction of banks‟ retail rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Another reason for estimating the model in 
first differences is that the mark-up pricing theory (see section 2.2.1) as well as 
the various other theories assessed in section 2.2 are not explicit whether the 
interest rate series are expected to be in a long-run equilibrium relationship, 
although they tend to incline that they might not be (see section 2.2.5). Also the 
theory does not consider if the rest of the structural variables included as possible 
determinants of the size of the pass-through multipliers are in a long-run 
equilibrium relationship with the size of retail rate adjustment (see section 2.2.5). 
Considering the empirical evidence, the majority of studies assessed in sections 
2.3.1 and 2.3.2 examine the short-run relationship of the size of the pass-through 
by using an ECM. However, although this approach is based on the assumption of 
the existence of a cointegrating relationship among the variables, the majority of 
these studies do not conduct a unit root test of the variables to investigate if they 
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are I(1) or I(0) and do not test for the stationarity of the residuals from the long-
run relationship equation (see section 2.3.5) in order to investigate if the variables 
are cointegrated. Additionally, the empirical analysis that investigates the 
possibility of cointegrating relationship between the „cost of funds‟ rate and 
banks‟ retail rates for the case of three EMU economies and four CSEE 
economies suggests: “The most remarkable feature of the results is the absence of 
cointegration for a large number of interest rate series.” Egert et al. (2007, p.215). 
Overall, the theoretical basis is unclear on the existence of a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among the lending rates and „cost of funds‟ rate (see sections 2.2.1 
and 2.2.5) and the empirical evidence does not support this.  
There are several reasons why we are primarily interested in investigating 
the short-run variations in the interest rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
First, from the monetary policy-makers‟ perspective examining the extent of the 
short-run adjustment of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the reference rate and the 
factors that impede the smooth transmission is seen as quite important. The 
monetary policy authorities, in order to fulfill their policy objectives, are primarily 
interested in the short-run effectiveness of the immediate stage of monetary 
transmission, i.e. short-run banks‟ reaction to changes in the policy stance and 
how predictable this is (assuming no shifts in the relationships). Additionally, for 
the central banks in setting their monetary policy it is also important to know 
whether the banks‟ lending rate adjustment is stable through time. However, 
having in mind the length of the data set (see section 3.4), the model employed 
(see equation 3.1) as well as the estimation method used (SUR model with FGLS 
estimator, discussed in section 3.3), it is difficult in this study to pursue statistical 
methods that test the stability of the model. In a limited fashion we can examine 
predictability assuming no shifts in the relationships for each bank individually by 
assessing the in-sample root mean squared error (RMSE) for each bank specific 
equation. This RMSE is calculated as the square root of the mean of the squared 
differences between the in-sample values estimated by the model and the actual 
observed values of the dependent variable. Since this calculation is 'in sample', the 
values of the independent variables are known and thus it needs to be recognised 
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that these RMSEs underestimate the forecasting error that would be associated 
with central bank use of such relationships, even assuming no structural breaks. 
Additionally, when the size of lending rate adjustment is heterogeneous among 
banks and/or not stable through time, this will complicate the monetary policy 
setting framework, indicating that the interest rate channel may not be operational 
from the monetary policy point of view. Second, according to the mark-up pricing 
theory, in an imperfect competitive pricing environment, rigidity of lending rate 
adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate should be more pronounced in 
the short rather than long-run. More precisely, banks are faced with a downward 
sloping loan demand curve, which is usually more inelastic in the short-run. In the 
long-run, depending on the financial structure of the economy, the loan demand 
curve may become more elastic because the economic agents (households and 
especially firms) may find alternative sources of finance. Hence, this may 
ultimately force banks in the long-run to adjust their lending rates more fully to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate compared to the short-run (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994). Moreover, under the assumption of the absence of large entry 
barriers, due to a threat of new entrants into the market, banks‟ long-run price 
setting behaviour may favour the setting of more competitive prices in order to 
acquire a higher market share. This may ultimately make the long-run adjustment 
less rigid then that of the short-run, although it does not suggest that it may be 
complete. Third, according to the “menu costs” theory (see section 2.2.4), banks 
may decide to adjust their retail rates only if the marginal gain from changes in 
retail rates is higher than the costs incurred in changing their interest rates. 
However, the longer the lending rate is kept unadjusted to the changes in the „cost 
of funds‟ rate, then the higher the potential costs of not changing the lending rate 
with forgone multi-period benefits, including the lost income from attracting new 
borrowers. This implies that banks are more likely to exhibit higher adjustment 
rigidity in the short- than in the long-run. Fourth, in order to explore whether 
there is a cross-sectional heterogeneity of banks‟ retail rate adjustment and, if 
there is, what are the possible factors causing it; then exploring the short-run pass-
through behaviour among the units may be relevant. According to the empirical 
evidence presented by Gambacorta (2008) and Weth (2002), a homogeneous 
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reaction among all banks‟ to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is found in the 
long-run, but not in the short-run (see section 2.3.1). This indicates that in the 
short-run, banks with different financial characteristics react differently to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. In contrast, the findings of de Graeve et al. 
(2004), Sorensen and Werner (2006) and Mueller-Spahn (2008) have suggested 
not only to a short-run pass through heterogeneity among banks, but also to 
differences in the long-run (see section 2.3.1). This indicates that the literature is 
not clear whether in the long-run we should expect a homogeneous banks‟ 
reaction function to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Moreover, the existing 
empirical evidence in the case of Macedonia, although based on aggregated data, 
suggests that the short-run adjustment rigidity of lending rates is more pronounced 
then the long-run (see section 2.3.4). On that basis, we argue that investigating the 
short-run pricing behaviour of banks is of relevance. 
Some of the empirical studies assessed in section 2.3.1 investigate the long 
run relationship among the banks‟ lending rates and „cost of funds‟ rate by 
employing an ECM. We explore whether a cointegrating relationship exists 
among the interest rate series and hence, whether it is appropriate to use an ECM 
given our data. The cointegration test results based on the Engle-Granger method 
with a small sample adjustment of the critical values of the t-statistics by 
MacKinnon (1991), indicate that the null hypothesis of no cointegration can be 
rejected for only three out of fifteen banks in the sample at 10% level (see 
appendix 3.1). Additionally, by assessing the statistical significance of the error 
correction term from the error correction model (see appendix 3.1), it is 
statistically significant at the 5% level for the same three banks for which the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected plus one more bank (bank 2) 
for which it was just significant at this level. However, for the latter the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration could not be rejected and thus the results together 
provide mixed evidence as to whether a cointegrating relationship among the 
interest rate series exists for this bank. Regarding the rest of the banks in the 
sample, in none of them is the error correction term estimated as statistically 
significant even at the 10% level. Overall, having in mind that those banks for 
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which the results suggested the existence of a cointegration relationship are small 
and medium sized banks whose average loan market share during the whole 
sample period was less than 10%, we conclude that in general in our sample the 
interest rate series may not be in a long-run equilibrium relationship. This is 
consistent with the theoretical background presented in section 2.2 and various 
empirical studies such as: Egert et al. (2007), Velickovski (2006), Sander and 
Kleimer (2004a, b) and de Graeve et al. (2004) and hence, we proceed with 
estimating the short-run relationship among them.  
 In the model it is assumed that, in the short-run, banks are agents with 
heterogeneous behavioural functions. In the theoretical literature there are pro- 
and contra-arguments as to whether banks behave differently in the short-run, thus 
it is an empirical issue, and one which the literature has not yet resolved (see the 
previous paragraph and section 2.3.1). Consequently, in order to investigate if this 
assumption holds, we have selected an estimation method that allows us to test if 
the slope coefficients statistically differ between banks for the case of Macedonia 
(see section 3.3). In this sector there are some possible a priori theoretical 
arguments (explained in the following paragraph), as well as some a priori 
empirical indicators, based on simple eyeball analysis of the 1
st
 differences of the 
loan interest rate series for each bank separately (see appendix 3.2). These suggest 
that the short-run lending rate setting behaviour is heterogeneous among the 
banks, indicating that the timing of interest rate changes has differed considerably 
between the banks. Whether this conclusion statistically holds or not and what are 
the possible factors causing it, is the subject of a more comprehensive 
econometric analysis later in this chapter (see section 3.5).  
 According to the theoretical literature, in the case of imperfect 
competition, there are arguments explaining why banks may have different price 
setting strategies and consequently, may have different sizes of short-run 
adjustment. One of the possible factors that may affect the optimal size of 
adjustment in banks, and thus affect the slope coefficients among them, is the 
different price elasticities of loan demand in the various loan market segments in 
which banks operate. For example, some banks may prefer granting more 
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consumer loans while others favour real estate loans and some banks are more 
specialised in granting loans to the corporate sector while others concentrate on 
the household sector. Hence, loan demand elasticity may not be equal among 
various loans market segments which may directly affect the pass-through 
coefficients to differ between units (see sections 2.3.1 and 3.4). Bearing in mind 
that disaggregated interest rate series by sectoral structure and according to 
different types of loans by purpose are not available (see section 3.4), then 
unequal loan demand elasticity among different loan market segments may be a 
non-modelled factor leading to banks having heterogeneous slope coefficients. 
Another possible factor that may give heterogeneity in the short-run could be 
financial market imperfections and changes in regulatory requirements imposed 
by the monetary authorities by which banks are obligated to adjust their balance 
sheet items (Ho and Saunders, 1981; Angbazo, 1997 and Cottarelli and Kourelis, 
1994). These may not affect all banks equally, and may make some banks better 
off and others not, depending upon their financial performances. Another non-
modelled factor which may contribute for banks‟ short-run heterogeneous 
behaviour may be the existence of different degrees of switching costs among 
different loan market segments and different banks. For example, it is expected 
that short-run interest rate smoothing will be more pronounced for those 
borrowers that are faced with higher switching costs and vice versa (see section 
2.2.3). The reason for not modelling for the impact of switching costs is mainly 
because the theories do not provide any indication of how they can be measured 
or by which variable(s) they may be proxied (see section 2.2.5). These costs are 
quite difficult to measure and in the empirical studies conducted so far no proxy 
measure for them has been included (see section 2.3). However, having in mind 
the theoretical basis of the switching costs and relationship lending activities of 
the banks (see section 2.2.3), their impact over the size of the banks‟ lending rate 
adjustment is partially captured by the relationship lending variable and the 
market concentration variable (see section 3.2).  
The assessed empirical literature in section 2.3 implies that there is no 
straightforward and commonly accepted empirical model derived from the theory. 
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There is a large variation in the empirical models used, both in respect of the 
variables included and the estimation methods employed. Some authors have 
considered some theoretical aspects and omitted others. Other authors have 
attempted to deal with some issues from a statistical point of view by applying 
some specific estimation methods, but have disregarded others. Hence, having in 
mind the complexity of this whole area, in our model specification we attempt to 
deal with the following aspects. First, to investigate the determinants of the short-
run lending rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate by considering a 
comprehensive set of bank balance sheet items as well as some macroeconomic 
control variables. Second, we attempt to explore if the slope coefficients differ 
among the units and consequently, to directly test if the assumption that banks are 
agents with heterogeneous behaviour, conditional on the controls, holds in the 
case of Macedonia. Third, we take into account the possible contemporaneous 
cross-sectional correlation among the units (see section 3.3). Overall, due to the 
complexity of the whole area, with the model specification below, as with other 
empirical studies in this field, we cannot encompass all possible complications. 
However, we use a model and econometric technique that is appropriate to 
investigate the above areas that we have argued are of importance. 
The basic model specification that allows for different slope coefficients 
for each cross-sectional unit, based on a common equation structure is as follows: 
∆ijt = β0j + β1j∆mt-1 + (Χjt-1∆mt-1)’β2j + (Φjt-1∆mt-1)’β3j + (Πjt-1∆mt-1)’β4j + εjt;               
j = 1, . . ., N      (3.1) 
Where: 
 β0 is the intercept term; 
 i is bank‟s lending rate of domestic currency loans; 
 m is the „cost of funds‟ rate (MBKS rate); 
 X is a matrix of bank specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capital, NPL 
ratio, maturity-mismatch, relationship lending, operational efficiency and 
portfolio diversification); 
 Φ is a matrix of macroeconomic characteristics (inflation and economic 
growth);  
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 Π is a matrix of variables measuring the level of concentration in the banking 
sector (Hirschman-Herfindahl index: HHI and HHI
2
);    
 ε is the error term13; 
 j and t refer to the bank and time specific subscripts; 
 ∆ is a first difference operator; 
 β1 is a parameter to be estimated; 
 β2j is a vector of parameters to be estimated of the interaction terms between 
the change in the „cost of funds‟ rate and each bank specific characteristic 
respectively; 
 β3j is a vector of parameters to be estimated of the interaction term between 
the change in the „cost of funds‟ rate and macroeconomic variables (inflation 
and economic growth);  
 Β4j is a vector of parameters to be estimated of the interaction term between 
the change in the „cost of funds‟ rate and HHI indices.  
The independent variables in the model 3.1 are included with one period 
(month) lag. The rationale for this, instead of including their contemporaneous 
values, is that there is likely to be some adjustment inertia of lending rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. This inertia may be caused by the existence of 
some “menu costs” and the time-lag caused by the decision-making process. 
Using a one period time lag is also preferable for the balance sheet items and the 
macroeconomic control variables because it is seen to be a minimum adjustment 
period of banks‟ retail rates to changes in the structure of balance sheet items and 
macroeconomic environment to take a place. Moreover, bearing in mind that the 
bank‟s interest rate series reported are those for the end of each calendar month, 
and that the „cost of funds‟ rate or changes in balance sheet items and/or 
macroeconomic variables may take place near the end of the calendar month, then 
using the current month reduces the possible reaction time considerably.  
According to the mark-up pricing theory, all independent variables 
included in model 3.1 such as the „cost of funds‟ rate, bank balance sheet items, 
macroeconomic indicators and market concentration variables are taken to be 
strictly exogenous. Even if for some of the bank balance sheet items this might be 
arguable; however their inclusion with one period time lag allows the 
                                                 
13
 The form of the error term depends on the econometric model employed that will be discussed 
in more detail in section 3.3. 
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contemporaneous exogeneity assumption to be satisfied (see section 3.3). As 
Gambacorta (2008) argues, “…..bank-specific characteristics should refer to the 
period before banks set their interest rates.” p.798.  
In the model specification 3.1, changes in banks‟ lending rate are dependent on 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate, the interaction terms between changes in the 
„cost of funds‟ rate and the bank specific variables, macroeconomic control 
variables, and variables measuring the level of concentration in the banking 
sector. In the model, we refrain from including the individual terms of bank 
balance sheet items, macroeconomic control variables and the HHI because, 
although we might expect these single terms to affect the level of interest rates, 
the single terms do not affect the size of adjustment which is the core aim of the 
research. According to equation 2.4, the theories presented in section 2 are 
concerned with modelling the factors that affect the β2 coefficient that, as 
explained in section 2.2.1, is the size of adjustment of banks‟ lending rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. For example, the theory of asymmetric 
information, relationship lending and menu costs theories (see sections 2.2.2, 
2.2.3 and 2.2.4, respectively) investigate the factors that affect this coefficient and 
not the average level of lending rate setting, regardless of the change in the „cost 
of funds‟ rate. In order to explore the impact on the size of adjustment of lending 
rates, as explained previously in this section, we have included interaction terms. 
Namely, as Gambacorta (2008) argues: “..... interaction terms between interest 
rates and the bank-specific characteristics ......... capture heterogeneity in the 
monetary transmission mechanism.” (p.801).  
In model 3.1, the vector parameters β1j, β2j, β3j and β4j cannot be directly 
interpreted on a ceteris paribus basis by isolating the impact of the rest of the 
variables. This is because the equation contains interaction terms, which makes 
the interpretation of the results more complicated. Our main interest is to analyse 
their statistical significance and sign from which we may be able to draw a 
conclusion on whether there is any impact of the independent variables over the 
size of the pass-through and if there is, in what direction they affect it. To obtain 
the partial effect of the changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate to the size of the pass-
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through multipliers of lending rates (ceteris paribus), we do a first order 
differentiation of equation 3.1 with respect of „cost of funds‟ rate at a certain 
value of the rest of the variables that include the interaction terms such as their 
mean value. The first order differentiation in respect of the „cost of funds‟ rate is 
shown with the following formula: 
     
)(
)(
1t
jt
m
i
 =  β1 + (Χjt-1) 'β2j + (Φt-1) 'β3j + (Πt-1)'β4j                                  (3.2)                
This equation indicates the size of the one month adjustment of banks‟ 
lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate, is conditional on specific value 
of the rest of the variables included in the model, e.g. their mean value. In other 
words, the estimated size of these coefficients implies what proportion of changes 
in the „cost of funds‟ rate in the previous month has been transmitted to banks‟ 
lending rates in the current month, conditional on the value of the bank specific 
characteristics, macroeconomic variables and concentration in the banking sector. 
In order to investigate the impact of banks‟ specific variables, macroeconomic 
variables and the impact of the concentration in the banking sector over the size of 
adjustment, we again do a first order differentiation of the model. But the 
difference now is that the first order differentiation of the model is done in respect 
of the independent variable that is of our interest, conditional on a given value, 
such as the mean of the change in the money market rate over the sample period. 
All coefficients, as indicated by equation 3.1, are estimated for each cross-
sectional unit separately and this enables us to test if they statistically differ 
among the units. 
The economic argument for each regressor and the expected a priori sign 
of the parameters (table 3.1), is discussed in what follows. 
The change in the „cost of funds‟ rate is included to measure the size of the 
adjustment of banks‟ lending rates. The expected sign of β1 coefficient is positive. 
In selecting the „cost of funds‟ rate we aimed to select an interest rate of 
transactions denominated in denars in order to be consistent with the lending rate 
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series (see section 3.4) which also refer to loans denominated in denars. In 
choosing between the key policy rate, i.e. the Central Bank (CB) Bills rate and the 
money market rate (MBKS), we have considered the theoretical underpinnings of 
the mark-up pricing theory suggesting that banks adjust their retail rates according 
to the „cost of funds‟ rate because it represents the financing costs of their lending 
activities (see section 2.2.1). Thus, we aim to select the interest rate that 
represents more closely the „cost of funds‟ rate in the case of Macedonian banking 
system. In considering the CB Bills rate, it should be taken into account that due 
to the fixed exchange rate regime and the structural excess liquidity of the 
banking system, the NBRM controls the liquidity of the banking system by 
conducting weekly auctions of CB Bills (see sections 1.4 and 1.7). Consequently, 
this interest rate acts more as the rate on an alternative investment for the banks 
rather than the „cost of funds‟ because banks can only place their liquid assets in 
order to buy CB Bills and cannot borrow to finance their lending activities (see 
sections 1.4 and 1.7). Moreover, the secondary market for the CB Bills is not yet 
developed, so changes in the policy rate may affect only those banks who have 
decided to participate in the weekly auctions. In contrast, banks‟ short-term 
borrowing takes place at the money market rate where they may finance their 
lending activities. Hence, according to the mark-up pricing theory, we argue that 
in the case of Macedonia, the money market rate may represent more closely the 
„cost of funds‟ rate than the CB Bills rate. Consequently, following the approach 
by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Mojon (2000), Sander and Kleimeier (2004a, 
b), Sorensen and Werner (2006), de Graeve et al. (2004), Chmielewski (2004), 
Weth (2002), Gambacorta (2008) and Lago-Gonzalez and Salas-Fumas (2005), 
we have taken the weighted average monthly money market (MBKS) rate as the 
representative „cost of funds‟ rate. An additional reason for selecting the money 
market rate as a representative „cost of funds‟ rate is because it is determined via 
the market principles of supply and demand of funds, while the CB Bills rate over 
most of the sample time period has been administratively set by the NBRM (see 
table 1.7). This process gives a lower variability in the CB Bills rate compared to 
MBKS rate.  
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Bank size, measured by total assets, is included in order to estimate how 
the asset size affects the size of adjustment. The “menu costs” theory indicates 
that larger banks should exhibit lower interest rate adjustment rigidity because 
their “menu costs” of adjusting the retail rates, as well as some other fixed costs 
such as the transactions costs and costs of monitoring and screening the 
borrowers, represent a smaller proportion of their total costs. This may lead the 
larger banks to adjust their retail rates more flexibly to changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate than smaller banks (Laudadio, 1987). Additionally, bigger banks, due 
to the economies of scale, may be more efficient and therefore may adjust their 
retail rates more fully to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate (“efficient-market” 
hypothesis). Another argument why it is expected larger banks to adjust their 
retail rates more flexibly than smaller banks is because large banks may engage in 
lending relations with large borrowers (firms) that usually have a relatively high 
loan demand elasticity (Laudadio, 1987; Niggle, 1987; Ho and Saunders, 1981 
and Weth, 2002). This is because large borrowers can more easily raise external 
funds from other sources on the financial market since they are seen as less risky 
due to their size, as well as „good reputation‟ on the market. This may force large 
banks to adjust their retail rates more closely to the market conditions in order to 
maintain and/or attract large borrowers. In contrast, the bank lending channel 
theory predicts a contrary impact of banks‟ size. More explicitly, in periods of 
monetary policy tightening, bigger banks have greater access to, and can more 
easily raise, non-deposit funds in order to offset the changes in the reference rate 
(see sections 4.2 and 5.2), which makes them less dependent on changes in the 
„cost of funds‟ rate. Hence, according to the arguments presented, the expected 
sign of size variable is ambiguous. 
 The variables measuring the levels of bank liquidity and capitalisation 
serve as proxy variables for liquidity and the insolvency risk of banks (Angbazo, 
1997). The rationale for their inclusion in the model, according to the bank 
lending channel theory (see sections 4.1 and 5.2), is that banks with more liquid 
assets and/or better capitalised banks are seen as less risky in the financial market 
and therefore they may more easily raise external funds in order to meet new loan 
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demands or deposit withdrawals. Moreover, these banks may also use their 
already accumulated liquid assets or capital in order to meet new deposit 
withdrawals or new loan demand requirements, making them less dependent on 
money market borrowing and thus, less sensitive to changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate. Consequently, the expected sign of these two variables is negative. However, 
in the case of liquidity variable, this theoretical rationale may not apply in 
Macedonia due to the structural surplus liquidity of the banking system (see 
sections 1.4 and 5.2). The empirical analysis for Macedonia in investigating the 
determinants of lending rate setting and interest rate spreads (Vaskov et al. 2010; 
see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3) have found a contrary sign from the prior 
expectations. Moreover, the results of the analysis conducted in chapter 5 were 
also unable to confirm the theoretically anticipated sign of liquidity variable on 
the supply function for the domestic currency loans (see section 5.5.3).  
 The non-performing loans (NPL) ratio is a proxy variable for the credit 
risk exposure of the banks and their risk averse behaviour (Angbazo, 1997). 
According to the mark-up pricing theory, those banks with higher credit risk 
exposure, in order to compensate for the lost income of borrowers‟ default, are 
expected to charge higher lending rates and to set-up higher interest margins 
compared to banks with lower credit risk exposure (Rousseas, 1985 and Ho and 
Saunders, 1981). Thus, those banks are expected to increase their lending rates 
proportionately more than the „cost of funds‟ rate in order to compensate for the 
lost income with borrowers‟ default. This implies to a positive sign of the 
coefficient. However, according to the theory of asymmetric information and 
lending rate stickiness (see section 2.2.2), banks may instead decide to ration 
credit and adjust their lending rates less fully to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
More precisely, when the „cost of funds‟ rate increases, those banks with a higher 
NPL ratio are expected to increase their lending rates proportionately less than the 
„cost of funds‟ rate and ration credit. This is due to their higher intolerance of 
incurring additional risks: if they increase their lending rates fully to changes in 
the „cost of funds‟ rate, then they have higher probability of attracting even more 
riskier borrowers (see section 2.2.2). In the opposite case, when the „cost of funds‟ 
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rate decreases, those banks with higher NPL ratio are expected to reduce their 
lending rates proportionally less in order to maintain their higher interest rate 
margins. Consequently, the theory of asymmetric information and lending rate 
stickiness predicts a negative sign of the coefficient. Overall, according to the 
arguments presented the impact of this variable is also ambiguous. 
The maturity-mismatch variable indicates the maturity gap between long-
term loans and long-term deposits and is taken as a proxy variable for the interest 
rate risk that banks face and the stability of financing the long-term loans (Allen, 
1988, Angbazo, 1997; Weth, 2002 and Sorensen and Werner, 2006). In other 
words, this variable seeks to measure what proportion of long-term loans is 
financed by long-term deposits and thus, the extent of interest rate risk exposure 
of banks on the money market (see section 2.2.1). When the maturity-mismatch 
ratio is low, it implies that a higher proportion of long-term loans is financed by 
long-term deposits, making banks less dependent on money market borrowing and 
hence, less sensitive to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate and vice versa (Allen 
1988). Consequently, when the „cost of funds‟ rate changes, those banks with a 
lower maturity-mismatch do not have to fully adjust their lending rates to changes 
in the „cost of funds‟ rate because they do not have to additionally borrow on the 
money market in order to meet the new loan demand. The greater part of their 
financial resources is already secured by the long-term deposits. In the case of 
Macedonia, the stability of long-term loans is additionally secured by banks‟ long-
term borrowings from abroad in the form of long-term foreign currency 
borrowing and/or subordinated deposits (see section 1.5). Thus, in this study this 
variable is modified by including the long-term borrowings from abroad because 
these borrowings may act as long-term deposits, i.e. with a maturity longer than 
one year. The expected sign of this variable is positive.   
 The ratio of long-term loans over total loans, as suggested by Berger and 
Udell (1992), is an indicator of the relationship lending activities between the 
bank and its borrowers. The rationale for including this variable, according to the 
relationship lending theory (see section 2.2.3), is that when the bank is more 
engaged in relationship lending activities with its borrowers, then the higher will 
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be the interest rate smoothing over the changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. 
Accordingly, when the proportion of long-term loans is higher relative to total 
loans, then it is considered that the bank has more long-term commitments with its 
borrowers and the reverse. In this way the bank can more closely monitor the 
borrowers and obtain more proprietary information and thus, smooth the interest 
rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. Therefore, the sign of this 
variable is expected to be negative. 
 The ratio of operating costs to total costs is a used as a proxy measure for 
banks‟ operational efficiency. Operating costs such as staff costs and other 
administrative costs, according to mark-up pricing theory, are a relatively rigid 
part of banks‟ total costs that do not vary much with the level of lending activities 
(Rousseas, 1985). When the operating costs are lower, then it implies that the 
bank has higher operational efficiency. Hence, a lower value of this variable 
implies that a higher proportion of a bank‟s total costs is determined by the 
funding costs, which are flexible costs, leading the bank to more fully adjust its 
lending rates to the „cost of funds‟ rate changes (Rousseas, 1985 and Mojon, 
2000). Therefore, the sign of this variable is expected to be negative. However, in 
the case of Macedonia, similar to other CSEE economies, the „inherited‟ policy of 
soft budget constraints and over-employment from the previous regime, may 
affect the impact of this variable. Moreover, this variable may differ among 
different groups of banks such as the formerly state owned banks that were 
privatised, foreign acquired banks and foreign greenfield banks (Poghosyan and 
Poghosyan, 2010). For example, the operational efficiency of the formerly state-
owned banks may have varied over the transition period because these banks have 
undergone a transformation process during this period in order to increase the 
management efficiency and improve their financial performances. Namely, this 
type of banks may have decided to reduce the proportion of their fixed costs by 
reducing the number of employees, improving the management efficiency or 
reducing other unnecessary fixed costs in order to maximise their profit. 
Consequently, those banks had to employ more educated workers and make other 
workers redundant due to the inherited over-employment that was typical of the 
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former regime. In contrast, the greenfield banks (especially the foreign owned) 
did not have to go through the same transformation process and have directly 
employed appropriately skilled workers in the numbers needed. Hence, the 
empirical evidence presented in Poghosyan and Poghosyan, (2010) for the case of 
CSEE economies indicates that “Foreign greenfield banks exhibit superior 
operational efficiency in comparison to domestic and foreign acquired banks.” 
(p.592). The operational efficiency of foreign acquired banks “......deteriorates in 
the initial year of acquisition, slightly improving in the subsequent year.” 
(Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010; p.592). Accordingly, this indicator for the 
operational efficiency between these types of banks may indicate different long-
run adjustment processes in restructuring their operating costs and its impact over 
the size of the lending rate adjustment may differ between short- and long-run. In 
the short-run, the relationship between the operational efficiency variable and size 
of the lending rate adjustment may be changing due to the different long-run 
adjustment process in the operating costs of the banks that may affect the stability 
and the impact of the coefficient. On this basis we argue that on a priori grounds 
it is difficult to predict the impact and significance of this variable in the case of 
Macedonian banking system. Moreover, the previous empirical studies examining 
the determinants for the average level of lending rate and spread setting decisions 
among Macedonian banks have estimated an insignificant impact of this variable 
(Vaskov et al., 2010; see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).  
 The ratio of non-interest income to gross income indicates the degree of 
portfolio diversification of the bank. Accordingly it indicates that banks that have 
a higher share of non-interest income to total income “.....do not only rely on 
traditional banking activities such as granting loans and taking deposits......” 
(Sorensen and Werner, 2006, p.27). Thus, those banks have more diversified 
portfolio structure and are engaged in other activities in the financial market, 
perhaps including: insurance, investment banking, and/or activities on the foreign 
and stock exchange markets. When the proportion of total income from these 
activities is higher, it implies that banks are less dependent on the money market 
borrowing, which may lead them to adjust their retail rates more sluggishly to 
CHAPTER 3: INVESTIGATION OF THE DETERMINANTS OF THE SIZE OF ADJUSTMENT OF LENDING   RATES IN 
MACEDONIA – A SUR APPROACH 
 
130 
 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate (Sorensen and Werner, 2006 and de Graeve et 
al., 2004). Hence, this variable is expected to have a negative sign. 
  The rate of growth of industrial production index (IPI) and the level of 
inflation are included as macroeconomic control variables. Grunfeld and Griliches 
(1960) argue that the individual (micro-units) equations may be misspecified due 
to the omission of the macroeconomic factors that may affect the individual 
behaviour of the units. The rationale for inclusion of inflation in the model is to 
indicate the extent of nominal indexing of interest rates to changes in the price 
level (as interest rate series are in nominal terms), and how this indexing affects 
the size of adjustment. For example, in high inflationary environments it is 
expected banks to adjust their retail rates more frequently and thus, more „easily‟ 
to pass-through the changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate to their borrowers, 
compared to periods with stable and relatively low inflation (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994; Mojon, 2000 and Egert et al., 2007). Moreover, high inflation 
may indicate a higher perceived risk from the overall macroeconomic 
environment, which is likely to induce banks to adjust their retail rates faster and 
more fully to changes in „cost of funds‟ rate and to fully pass on the inflationary 
costs to the borrowers. This variable is expected to enter with a positive sign. In 
the model we have included the annual rate of inflation because in that way, price 
fluctuations induced by seasonal factors, e.g. oil and unprocessed food prices are 
reduced. 
 The rate of growth of IPI is included as a control variable for the economic 
cycles and the level of loan demand in the economy. In periods of economic 
growth when the loan demand rises, it will be „easier‟ for the banks to pass-
through the changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate to their lending rates due to the 
rising income of the borrowers (Egert et al., 2007). Moreover, this variable may 
also be an indicator of the level of overall risk faced by the banks. When the 
economy is expanding, then households‟ income and firms‟ profitability are likely 
to be increasing and hence, banks may perceive a better financial environment 
with a lower risk of borrowers‟ default. In this case the banks may more fully 
pass-through the „cost of funds‟ rate changes into their lending rates because the 
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cash flow of the households and firms will not be greatly affected due to their 
rising income and reverse. The expected sign of this variable is positive. 
However, in the case of Macedonia, economic growth and IPI as the proxy 
measure were severely affected by the transition process and this macroeconomic 
control variable may also be capturing other factors related to the process of 
transition. For example, loan demand may be affected by the political instability 
and financial instability in the country, especially in the initial period of transition 
which was characterised by banking failure, and there was another failure of 
saving houses in a later period (see sections 5.2 and 5.5.1). Therefore, the sign and 
size of this variable should be interpreted with caution. In the model we have 
included the annual growth rate of IPI because in that way seasonally induced 
fluctuations in the IPI are reduced. 
The coefficients on inflation and IPI variables, although the variables are 
cross-sectional invariant, are expected to differ across the units. In the case of 
inflation, it may be that not all banks will equally „pass-through‟ the changes in 
the „cost of funds‟ rate to their lending rates when the price level changes due to 
their different forward looking expectations about the future price changes. In the 
case of IPI, the explanation is that various banks are specialised in granting loans 
in different loan market segments and thus, they might be faced with different 
loan demand elasticities as considered above. This may ultimately result in 
heterogeneous size of adjustment and hence, in different slope coefficients among 
the units. 
 The inclusion of the variables measuring the overall level of concentration 
in the banking sector is because banks‟ market power may affect the size of the 
pass-through multiplier. According to the mark-up pricing theory, banks operate 
in a non-perfect competitive environment with entry and exit barriers and thus, 
exhibit some degree of market power (Rousseas, 1985 and Ho and Saunders, 
1981). Hence, when the loan market is more concentrated, all banks in the market 
may extract higher profits and charge non-competitive prices and thus, are 
expected to be less sensitive to changes in the money market conditions. 
Consequently, the banks are expected to adjust their retail rates more sluggishly to 
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changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate, indicating a negative sign of the coefficient. 
This theoretical prediction applies to all banks in the market regardless to their 
size and market share. For instance, the banks with higher market share may be 
price leaders and adjust their lending rates less fully to changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate. The banks with a lower market share may be price followers and 
again are expected to charge non-competitive prices and adjust their lending rates 
less fully to in the „cost of funds‟ rate. These theoretical predictions of the mark-
up pricing theory, where market power of the banks is taken to be exogenous, are 
according to the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” paradigm. In contrast, the 
predictions of “efficient-market” hypothesis by Demsetz (1973) suggest an 
inverse relationship between market concentration and size of the pass-through. 
More specifically, this theory assumes that more concentrated markets are 
dominated by larger banks due to their greater efficiency which is taken as 
exogenous factor. Consequently, in more concentrated markets that are considered 
as more efficient, it is expected banks to set their lending rates more closely to the 
money market conditions and adjust them more fully to the changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate. This implies to a positive sign of the coefficient. In this chapter we 
follow the mark-up pricing model (see section 2.2.1), and given that there are still 
relatively high entry and exit barriers in the market, we expect a negative sign of 
the interaction term containing the concentration index variable. In measuring the 
level of concentration in the banking sector, usually in the literature are taken CR3 
or CR5 indices or the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI). We have decided to use 
the HHI due to certain advantages over the CR3 or CR5 indices. Namely, CR3 or 
CR5 indices place “......equal emphasis on leading banks and ignore the rest; the 
Herfindhal index which, while placing greater emphasis on larger market players 
and allowing for each bank, adopts a calculation method that automatically 
excludes the competitive conduct of banks as a diminishing factor.” (More and 
Nagy, 2003, p.12).  
In the literature it is also argued that a non-linear relationship between 
market concentration and pricing may exist. Namely, firms in concentrated 
markets may charge higher monopoly prices, but after a certain threshold level of 
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concentration, firms may exhibit more competitive conduct because there may be 
a threat of new entrants in the market. Additionally, after a certain threshold level 
of concentration, banks may start charging more competitive prices because the 
„second‟ largest competitor may want to take over the position of the largest 
competitor on the market (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994 and Molyneux, 1993). In 
order to control for these possible non-linear effects of concentration, we have 
included squared value of the concentration index, whose coefficient is expected 
to be positive. Nonetheless, in the case of the Macedonian banking market, the 
impact and significance of this variable might not be a priori clear. The threat of 
probable entry of outside competitors is not considered as serious due to the 
existence of still relatively high entry barriers in this market, despite the change in 
the banking law in June 2007
14
. For example, new entrants into the banking sector 
have to fulfill strict regulatory requirements as well as to deposit relatively high 
funds at the Central Bank, which may partially reduce the possibility of the threat 
of outside competitors. Moreover, the argument that the „second‟ largest 
competitor on the loan market would try to take over the largest bank in the loan 
market may not be of importance. Namely, in the Macedonian banking market 
operate 18 banks and hence, it may not be so much concentrated where the 
„second‟ or the „third‟ largest competitors would try to take over the whole 
market. Furthermore, some banks are de facto foreign owned (as defined in 
section 1.4) and if a competitors tries to take over their position, then they may 
ask for internal borrowing from their „parent‟ company in order to enhance their 
financial performance and maintain their loan market position. 
 
 
                                                 
14
 For more details see Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 67/2007. 
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Table 3. 1: Expected sign of each of the parameters of the model 3.1 
 
Note: the abbreviations in the parentheses represent the names of the interaction terms of the 
variables used in the estimation output. 
 
3.3 Estimation method 
 
The estimation method is selected to fulfill the aims and objectives 
outlined in section 3.1 and to enable us to empirically test if the theoretical 
expectations derived in the previous section hold for the Macedonian banking 
sector. We have also taken into account the specific nature of the cross-sectional 
units and the data series used. Unit root tests have been conducted (Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) on the data series used in model 3.1, utilising the Akaike 
(AIC) and Schwarz (SIC) lag length selection criteria, Phillips-Perron (PP) and 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) presented in appendix 3.3. Regarding 
the interaction terms that we use in model 3.1 (see appendix 3.3.a), the ADF and 
PP unit root tests reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for all variables that enter 
in model 3.1 in nearly all cases at the 1% level. In all other cases but two, there is 
rejection at the 5% level. For the variables dmbksmatmisub3 and 
dmbksrellenging3 there is rejection at the only 10% level in the ADF tests, but 
rejection is at the 1% level in the PP test for these variables. The KPSS tests do 
not give sufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no unit root at 10% 
level. Regarding the unit root tests for the first differences of the interest rate 
series, i.e. banks‟ lending rates and money market rate (see appendix 3.3b), we 
have also conducted the ADF, PP and KPSS tests. In selecting the lag length for 
the ADF test, we chose the number of lags by the information criteria (AIC and 
Variable: Expected Sign Variable: Expected Sign
 'Cost of funds' rate (dmbks) + Operational efficiency * MBKS (dmbksoperef)  -
Bank size * MBKS (dmbkslassets)  + / - Portfolio diversification * MBKS (dmbksportdiv)  -
Liquidity * MBKS (dmbksliquidity)  - Inflation * MBKS (dmbksinfl) +
Capital * MBKS (dmbkscapital)  - Economic growth * MBKS (dmbksipi)  + / −
NPL ratio * MBKS (dmbksNPLratio)  + / - HHI * MBKS (dmbkslhhi)  - /+
Maturity-mismatch * MBKS (dmbksmatmisub) +
Relationship lending * MBKS (dmbksrellending)  -
(HHI)
2 
* MBKS (dmbkshhi2) +
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SIC) that indicated less lags due to the relatively short time span of the data. In the 
majority of the cases we have selected the number of lags indicated by the AIC 
criteria because it pointed to less lags compared to the SIC criteria. For only two 
interest rate series (dlendrateden16 and dlendrateden27), do AIC and SIC suggest 
the same number of lags. Hence, the number of lags indicated by the information 
criteria ranges from four lags for the money market rate (dmbks) up to ten lags for 
the lending rate for bank 5 (dlendrateden5) from a total of ninety-five available 
observations for each interest rate series. The ADF test results suggest the 
rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at 5% for all interest rate series, 
whereas the PP test indicates to rejection of the null hypothesis of a unit root at 
1% level. The KPSS test does not give sufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of no unit root at the 10% level for all interest rate series. These test 
results suggest that all variables used in model 3.1 can be treated as stationary. 
Moreover, given the requirement for the error term to be white noise in the ADF 
test for the first differences of the interest rate series, we additionally check the 
diagnostic statistics (see appendix 3.3.b), in particular that for serial correlation. 
Namely, we have checked the diagnostic tests of the ADF such as Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test for autocorrelation, Ramsey RESET for the functional form and 
Koenker-Bassett test for heteroscedasticity of the first differences of the interest 
rate series (see appendix 3.3.b). The diagnostic tests conducted give non-rejection 
of the null hypotheses of no autocorrelation, correct functional form and 
homoskedasticity at the 10% level (see appendix 3.3.b). Thus it is reasonable to 
proceed on the basis that the errors are white noise. Consequently, given the aims 
and objectives of this chapter, we needed to select a method that is able to 
estimate the determinants of banks‟ short-run lending rate adjustment to changes 
in the „cost of funds‟ rate. We also had to select a method that enables different 
slope coefficient estimates for each cross-sectional unit that will allow us to test if 
those coefficients statistically differ between the units. We aim to test for this 
since the existing literature does not currently provide a clear answer on this issue 
and because, as mentioned in section 3.2, we have some arguments on a priori 
basis why the slope coefficients might be statistically different among the units.  
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Regarding the specific nature of the data and the cross-sectional units 
(banks), we have considered the number of observations for each bank, the time 
span of the data as well as their interrelatedness that may cause contemporaneous 
cross-sectional dependence among the disturbances. Banks in Macedonia are 
interrelated because they borrow between each other in the same money market 
and the same macroeconomic and financial factors and the same regulatory 
requirements affect all of the banks. Although we include variables, such as 
inflation and the industrial production index to account for some of these factors, 
these are not expected to fully do so. In selecting the estimation method we were 
also bounded by the limitations of the data such as, with relatively small cross-
sectional sample (only 18 banks), methodological changes in data collection 
giving a relatively short-time span of 8 years and the limited interest rate series 
available. 
Various estimation techniques were critically assessed in section 2.3, such 
as the two-stage and one-stage estimation methods that estimate the determinants 
of size and speed of adjustment coefficients (see section 2.3.1), and the single 
equation approach based on static panel data models estimated with FE, RE 
and/or GLS (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).  
Some weaknesses and limitations were identified in the two-stage 
estimation methods and thus this option is not pursued. More precisely, regarding 
the first stage of the estimation process, i.e. when the size and speed of pass-
through coefficients are estimated with time series methods for each cross-
sectional unit separately or by panel methods, we identified difficulties in 
applying these methods. For example, majority of the studies in the first stage of 
the estimation process attempt to estimate the size of the pass-through by 
employing an ECM, but do not conduct unit root test(s) for the stationarity of the 
variables employed and the residuals from the long-run relationship in order to 
investigate if the variables are cointegrated. They only assume that there may 
exist a cointegrating relationship (see sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.5), although the 
theory is not clear on this (see section 2.2.5). Moreover, the majority of the 
empirical studies that have conducted a unit root tests for the stationarity of the 
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residuals from the long-run relationship failed to find a cointegrating relationship. 
Hence, they proceed to estimate the pass-through coefficients by using first 
differences of the variables (Sander and Kleimer, 2004a, b; de Graeve et al., 2004 
and Egert et al., 2007). Nonetheless, regardless whether the pass-through 
coefficients are estimated with or without an ECM for each cross-sectional unit 
separately, the results in majority of those studies may be inefficient because of 
the contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation between the units, which is 
expected in this case, and is not controlled for. Moreover, regarding our model 
specification, another technical reason that may complicate the possibility of 
employing an ECM is that we have interaction terms composed of two continuous 
variables. The time-series cointegration methods are not designed for inclusion of 
interaction terms of two continuous variables due to statistical reasons. More 
precisely by multiplying two I(1) variables, I(1) and I(0) or I(2) and I(1) or I(0); 
what will be the order of integration of the newly constructed interaction term is 
unclear. Due to the all of the afore-mentioned reasons in this paragraph we 
preclude the possibility of using cointegration and ECM methods.   
Regarding the second stage of the estimation process, things may become 
even more „complicated‟. Usually in the empirical literature (as considered in 
section 2.3.1), the procedure is to regress the estimated pass-through coefficients 
on a set of structural variables in a cross-sectional regression (Cottarelli and 
Kourelis, 1994; Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a, b; Sorensen and Werner, 2006 and 
de Graeve et al., 2004) or in a panel data model by dividing the sample into 
separate time-periods, i.e. sub-periods of 3 to 5 years (Mojon, 2000). In order to 
conduct the second stage of the estimation process with both, cross-sectional 
regression and panel data models, the authors use the average values of the 
independent structural variables over the years. By averaging the values of the 
variables over the whole or part of the time span, the fluctuations in the variables 
are reduced and hence, the time dimension of the data is omitted. In this way the 
changes that may have occurred during the analysed period may be disregarded. 
This method may be more appropriate for the developed economies that many of 
which have had, until recently, a more stable macroeconomic and financial 
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environment over the last 10 years than transition economies, and thus we argue 
that this method may be inappropriate for our investigation. Moreover, even if this 
method is deemed suitable, it is still not applicable in our case because we have a 
small cross-sectional sample of only 18 units. Some authors such as Sorensen and 
Werner (2006) have attempted to solve this problem by applying “….. a wild-
bootstrap method for the computation of p-values….” (p.26), but applying this 
method on a cross-sectional sample of only 18 observations would seem 
problematic.  
One stage estimation methods based on dynamic panel data models that 
use either “difference” GMM estimator or panel ECM method are also 
problematic to use here. Dynamic panel data models that use the “difference” 
and/or “system” GMM estimator are ruled out in our case, given data limitations. 
Namely, as explained in section 5.4, they are designed for “large N and small T” 
samples. This assumption is not satisfied with our data because T is substantially 
greater than N (see section 3.4), and if we had proceeded with this estimation 
method, we expect to have the problem of the creation of „too many‟ instruments 
and therefore, a low power of the diagnostic tests (see sections 5.4 and 5.5). 
Carrying out the same procedure as in chapter 5, i.e. using annual data in order to 
reduce the number of T observations, would mean in this case that the time 
variation in the data could not be investigated appropriately. Namely, the main 
area of interest here is to model the time variations in interest rate series and not 
the adjustment in stocks, as is the case with the model in chapter 5. Regarding the 
use of a panel ECM method, we also reject it because it requires an even larger 
cross-sectional sample than the GMM estimator. The authors that use these 
methods (see section 2.3.1) first group the banks according to their specific 
characteristics and then, for each group of banks, they estimate the pass-through 
coefficients and thus, compare the differences between the estimates. With a 
cross-sectional sample of 18 banks we argue that this option is not feasible. 
Another reason for precluding the possibility of using panel ECM and panel 
cointegration methods is that they do not control for the cross-sectional 
correlation among the units. Namely, panel cointegration tests “…..are based on 
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the assumption that there is no correlation and no cointegration between the 
sections.” (Sorensen and Werner, 2006, p.18). Moreover, in using panel 
cointegration method, as discussed previously, we have interaction terms 
composed of two continuous variables that may additionally complicate the whole 
estimation process. 
Regarding the single equation approach based on static panel data models 
estimated with FE, RE and/or GLS, we argue that there are problems in using 
these estimators because they provide average estimates for the level of interest 
rates set by banks and their size of adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate. Additionally, these models assume equal slope coefficients for each cross-
sectional unit on a priori grounds and do not allow for the possibility of testing if 
the slope coefficients statistically differ among the units, which we have argued 
should be examined with our model. Moreover, FE and RE estimators by de-fault, 
do not control for the possible cross-sectional contemporaneous correlation 
among the disturbances, unless you additionally do take care of it. 
Thus, given to the assessment of the applicability of the various estimation 
methods, the specific nature of the data series and the possible phenomenon of 
contemporaneous correlation among the banks, we have selected Zellner‟s (1962 
and 1963) Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) model. The rationale for 
selecting this model is based upon several reasons. Firstly, in the case when there 
is contemporaneous correlation among the disturbances that are by nature 
heteroskedastic, then the SUR model based on a Feasible Generalised Least 
Squares (FGLS) estimator provides more efficient estimates compared to OLS, by 
using the information of the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms. Thus, 
when the correlation among the error terms of each cross-sectional unit is higher, 
then FGLS estimator is able to use more information from the variance-
covariance matrix of the error terms and hence, the efficiency gain by employing 
the SUR model will be higher (Baum 2006, Greene 2008 and Vogelvang 2005). 
Secondly,  it is designed for samples with large time dimension (T) and small or 
finite cross sectional dimension (N) where one of the major requirements is T to 
be substantially greater than N, which is the case with our data (T=96; N=15). 
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Thirdly, it may estimate different slope coefficients for each cross-sectional unit 
that allows testing for their cross-sectional equality. This then enables us to 
investigate whether there is a heterogeneous size of adjustment among banks in 
Macedonia and what the major determinants are. This option will actually enable 
us to test if the slope coefficients statistically differ among the cross-sectional 
units. Fourthly, as another advantage of employing the SUR model is that in the 
case when the repeated iterations in calculating the coefficients and their 
variances for each cross-sectional unit converge, then the FGLS estimator 
becomes equal to the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). This may provide 
some additional efficiency gains, under the condition that the normality 
assumption about error terms is fulfilled (Greene, 2008 and Moon and Perron, 
2006). However, as discussed in Greene (2008), whether MLE provides some 
efficiency gains in small samples is uncertain.  
The general form of the SUR model can be presented with the following 
system of equations:          
Y1t = β
’
1x1t + u1t 
Y2t = β
’
2x2t + u2t 
 . 
 . 
Ynt = β
’
nxnt + unt (3.3) 
Where: Y is the dependent variable, β’ is a vector of coefficients; X is a matrix of independent 
variables, u are the error terms and n and t are cross-sectional and time specific subscripts. 
 
The above equations can be stacked as a system and can be presented more 
compactly as follows: 
Yt = Xt
’β + ut (3.4) 
Where: Yt is TN x 1 matrix of dependent variables; x
’
 is a TN x K matrix of independent 
variables; β is a K x 1 matrix of coefficients; u is TN x 1 matrix of error terms; T and N are the 
number of time and cross-sectional observations, respectively and K is the number of 
independent variables. 
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Nonetheless, the SUR model has some limitations and requires certain 
assumptions to be fulfilled. The main assumptions are the exogeneity of the 
regressors and a normal distribution of the residuals; the latter assumption is 
mainly for MLE but not for FGLS. As Zellner (1963) argues: “….even when 
normality is not present, the estimation procedure is applicable and will yield 
consistent coefficient estimators which are asymptotically normally distributed.” 
(p.988). In respect of the exogeneity assumption, the strongest form is the strict 
exogeneity assumption where all regressors from each equation are uncorrelated 
with the respective equation‟s error terms for all time periods:  
    E = (ut | x1, x2, x3, ……, xt) = 0                                                                     (3.5) 
However, Wooldridge (2002) argues that this assumption may be relaxed by 
assuming a contemporaneous exogeneity, i.e. no correlation between the 
regressors and the error terms in the same time period, presented below: 
E = (ut | xt) = 0                                                   (3.6) 
The major limitation of the SUR model is that it does not properly deal 
with non-stationary variables because cointegration methods are not developed 
within the framework, while dynamic specifications are still in the process of 
development. Another limitation is that if any of the system equations is miss-
specified, then all coefficients in each equation will be inconsistently estimated. 
Therefore, for a consistency check, it is argued that the results should be 
compared with the ones estimated with the OLS conducted on equation-by-
equation basis (Moon and Perron 2006). 
Regarding the issue whether the SUR model provides an appropriate 
estimator for dynamic models, we have considered if the recent work in the field 
of dynamic SUR is applicable in our case. More precisely, we have assessed the 
estimation method applied in Sorensen and Werner (2006) who employ Dynamic 
SUR (DSUR) for estimating the long-run relationship among the variables and the 
ECM for SUR (SURECM) for estimating the short-run dynamics. The recently 
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developed DSUR method by Mark et al. (2005) and Moon and Perron (2005) is 
based on the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) method by Stock and 
Watson (1993) that controls for the possible endogeneity of the regressors. 
Namely, “System DOLS is distinguished from ordinary DOLS in that endogeneity 
in equation i is corrected by introducing leads and lags of the first difference not 
only of the regressors of equation i but also of the regressors from all other 
equations in the system.” (Mark et al., 2005, p.798). However, one of the 
weaknesses of the DSUR method is that it is designed for samples that have 
substantially larger T than N, or as it is discussed in Mark et al. (2005) it is works 
well for data series with T larger than 100 and N smaller than 8. Estimating 
DSUR on a system with greater N than 8 will absorb too many degrees of 
freedom due to the large number of leads and lags that have to be included in each 
equation, which suggests that this method is not applicable given our data set. 
Another weakness of this method is that it does not test for a co-integrating 
relationship among the variables, but cointegration is assumed according to the 
empirically tested theory. For instance, Moon and Perron (2005) empirically test 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) theory, by assuming that the PPP theory in the 
long-run holds and thus, assume that the residuals from the DSUR model are 
stationary and variables cointegrated. Regarding the interest rate pass-through, the 
assumption that banks‟ lending rate and „cost of funds‟ rate are in a long-run 
equilibrium relationship (cointegrated), cannot be justified on a priori ground (see 
section 2.2.5). There are various theoretical reasons for expecting why the interest 
rate series may not be in a long-run equilibrium (section 2.2).   
Regarding the SURECM method for estimating the short-run dynamics, 
we argue that it also has some severe weaknesses and therefore, is not appropriate 
in our case. This method is based on the Eagle-Granger error correction model, 
but again does not test for the stationarity of the residuals from the long-run 
relationship equation. The authors that employ this method (Thomson et al., 2002; 
Kim, 2004 and Sorensen and Werner, 2006), make a simple assumption that the 
residuals from the long-run relationship equation are stationary and thus, the 
variables are cointegrated as suggested by the economic theory, and proceed by 
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estimating the short-run dynamics of the model. However, as considered above 
we think that the stationarity assumption is dubious for the theories that explain 
the determinants of interest rate pass-through, so we preclude the application of 
the SURECM method.  
 
3.4 Data issues 
 
The data period ranges from 2001:M1 to 2008:M12 and we have 96 
available observations per bank. The reason for restricting the time period is 
because before 2001 the interest rate series for each bank were not available while 
at the beginning of 2009 a new accounting methodology was applied which 
distorts comparisons with the rest of the data series used in this analysis. 
Throughout the sample period we work with a balanced panel comprising 15 
banks that have been operating continuously over the sample period. The SUR 
model is conducted on balanced panel data; although there are some recent 
developments in SUR methods for unbalanced data, these are still in the process 
of development. 
The sample has been adjusted for mergers and acquisitions. The 
adjustment of banks‟ balance sheet items has been done by backward aggregation 
of the data series before the merger or acquisition occurred (for more details see 
section 5.3). Although this is the most commonly used approach in the literature 
(Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 2003; Farinha and Marques, 2003; de Haan, 2003; 
Gambacorta, 2005; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005; Prutenau-Podpiera, 2007; Juks, 
2004 and Benkovskis, 2008) and no other approach appears preferable, we have to 
be aware that this may give errors in the data because changes in the management 
of the merged bank and any gained know-how are not controlled for. In the case 
of merger we aggregate the data backwards as a weighted average of the value of 
the stock of loans and the respective interest rate of both entities. In doing this we 
have assumed, in the case of merger, that the management of both entities has also 
been merged and no single entity‟s retail rate setting strategy is taken as a 
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dominant one. This may be problematic in that after the merger the new entity 
may apply a completely different price setting strategy. Nevertheless, due to the 
relatively small cross-sectional sample and the need to work with balanced panel 
data, we think that this is the „second‟ best solution. In the case of acquisition, we 
have kept the lending rates of the acquiring bank before the acquisition has 
occurred, instead of backward aggregating the series as in the case of mergers. We 
argue that after the acquisition has occurred, the acquiring bank is likely to have 
maintained its previous retail rate setting strategy and has not changed or adopted 
the strategy of the acquired bank.  
All variables in the model are expressed in nominal terms, except for the 
industrial production index which is in real terms. The balance sheet items such as 
total loans, long-term loans and long-term deposits are those of the non-financial 
private sector. Some of the balance sheet items
15
 such as total assets, total loans, 
long-term loans, gross deposits and liquidity have been seasonally adjusted by 
using the census X-12 additive method, which is the most commonly used 
seasonal adjustment method in the literature. The other available option was to 
include monthly dummies in each equation in order to control for the seasonality 
in the data. However, this method will reduce the degrees of freedom substantially 
and thus, we refrained from using this method.   
In examining the determinants of banks‟ lending rate rigidity, we use the 
interest rate series on banks‟ outstanding loans for each bank separately. Interest 
rates on newly issued loans are likely to be much more responsive to changes in 
the „cost of funds‟ rate, but those data series are unavailable. However, in 
examining the effect of monetary policy changes, the retail rates of banks‟ 
outstanding loans are arguably preferable because they provide a more 
comprehensive picture about the cash flows of firms and households. If we had 
worked only with the interest rates of newly issued loans, then the pass-through 
coefficient would have been overestimated.  
                                                 
15
 We have seasonally adjusted some but not all of the balance sheet items because a priori we do 
not expect a seasonal pattern in all balance sheet items such as: capital, NPL ratio etc. 
Additionally, we have checked whether there is a seasonal pattern in these balance sheet items 
where we might not expect seasonality and we did not find any.  
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Regarding the currency structure, we use an interest rate series of loans 
denominated in denars for the reasons explained in section 2.3.5. An additional 
reason for selecting the lending rates of loans denominated in domestic currency 
is because their reaction to changes in the domestic reference rate is the main 
focus of the monetary policy makers. Nevertheless, the interest rate series in 
denars also include the interest rates of foreign currency indexed loans and due to 
data unavailability we were unable to disaggregate them. Nonetheless, as can be 
seen on figure 1.22, these two interest rate series on aggregate level (the ones in 
domestic currency and the ones indexed to a foreign currency) have almost the 
same dynamics, except that latter have on average a lower level.     
Concerning the frequency of the data, the interest rate series were 
available in both quarterly and monthly frequencies. However, due to the 
estimation method used (see section 3.3), as well as from the monetary policy 
makers perspective (see section 3.2), using higher frequency data is preferable. 
Therefore, we use monthly frequency data. 
Regarding the construction of the interest rate series, the loan interest rates 
in denars from 2001 to 2003 include short-term loans with maturity up to 1 year 
for the corporate sector only, while for 2004 they include short-term loans with 
maturity up to 1 year of both corporate and household sector of all loan types by 
purpose. From 2005 to 2008, loan rates are constructed as weighted average of all 
maturities (short- and long-term) of both sectors (household and corporate). This 
methodological change in constructing the data series that occurred in 2005 is a 
limitation with the interest rate series. The chosen interest rate series includes the 
interest rates of loans on both a fixed and variable basis. 
Investigating the interest rate adjustment separately for the household and 
corporate sectors, as well as the adjustment of different types of loans by purpose 
may be more appropriate because, according to the empirical literature presented 
in section 2.3, not all loan interest rates adjust equally to changes in the „cost of 
funds‟ rate (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004a, b; Lago-Gonzalez and Salas-Fumas, 
2005; Egert et al., 2007; Sorensen and Werner, 2006). For example, loan rates on 
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household sector are typically found to adjust more sluggishly then the ones in the 
corporate sector, while interest rates on mortgage loans are found to adjust more 
sluggishly to changes in the referent rate compared to interest rates on consumer 
loans. Nonetheless, such disaggregated interest rate series are not available. 
Apart from the interest rate series, there are also some limitations of the 
rest of the data series, i.e. banks‟ balance sheet items in terms of their reliability, 
methodological consistence and the way they have been collected and backward 
revised (see section 5.3). However, these are perceived as minor and unlikely to 
significantly affect the results. 
A detailed description of each data series is presented in table 3.2.          
Table 3.2: Data description 
 
Source: NBRM and SSO. 
Variable: Description: Value: Source:
Lending rate Weighted average monthly loan rates for each bank separately %, annualised NBRM
 'Cost of funds' rate Weighted average MBKS rate %, annualised NBRM
Bank size Log of total assets Nominal NBRM
Liquidity
Ratio of liquid over total assets. Liquid assets include: cash in 
vault at the NBRM + short term deposits in accounts in banks 
abroad + CB Bills and treasury bills with maturity up to 1 year + 
cash in vaults in domestic banks + short term restricted deposits 
in accounts in domestic banks + short term loans granted to 
domestic financial institutions (banks and saving houses).
Nominal NBRM
Capital Ratio of equity plus reserves to total assets. Nominal NBRM
Credit risk exposure Ratio of NPL to total loans. Nominal NBRM
Maturity-mismatch
Ratio of long-term loans to long-term deposits and long-term 
borrowings from abroad.
Nominal NBRM
Relationship lending Ratio of long-term loans to total loans. Nominal NBRM
Operational efficiency Ratio of administrative costs to total costs. Nominal NBRM
Portfolio diversification Ratio of non-interest income to gross income. Nominal NBRM
Price changes Annual rate of inflation, measured by  CPI. % SSO
Economic growth Annual rate of growth of IPI. % SSO
Market concentration Log of HHI and (HHI)
2 Index
Author's own 
calculations upon the 
data from NBRM
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The summary statistics of each variable as described in table 3.2 is 
presented in table below. 
Table 3.3: Summary statistics 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations performed in EViews 6. 
3.5 Results 
 
The estimation strategy goes from a general (unrestricted) model as 
presented with equation 3.1, to a more specific version in order to select the most 
parsimonious model. In order to select the most parsimonious model we have 
performed a number of preliminary regressions. Starting from the most general 
model, given the theoretical arguments previously discussed as well their possible 
practical implications for the case of the Macedonian banking sector, we have 
obtained the following results.  
Having in mind the ambiguous economic arguments presented in section 
3.2 for the inclusion of the squared concentration index variable over the size of 
lending rate adjustment, we decided to assess its statistical significance in the 
model. An F-test for the joint significance of this variable in all bank specific 
equations indicated that it is jointly insignificant at 5% level of significance
16
. It 
was also statistically insignificant in the majority (12 out of 15 at the 5% level of 
significance) of the individual bank specific regressions. One of the three banks 
                                                 
16
 The results are available from the author upon request. 
Variable:  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum  Standard Dev.  Observations
Lending rate 0.15 0.14 0.06 0.30 0.04 1440
MBKS 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.19 0.04 96
CB Bills rate 28 days 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.20 0.04 96
Assets 8423912 7438828 463137 7.E+07 3505318 1440
Liquidity 0.36 0.34 0.03 0.95 0.11 1440
Capital 0.33 0.33 0.06 1.11 0.09 1440
NPLratio 0.17 0.15 2E-06 0.91 0.09 1440
Maturiy mismatch 3.64 3.25 2E-05 58.89 2.28 1440
Relationship lending 0.44 0.46 3E-06 0.99 0.14 1440
Operational efficiency 0.31 0.32 0.01 0.78 0.08 1440
Portfolio diversification 0.63 0.62 -2.48 14.23 0.18 1440
Inflation 0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.03 96
Industrial prod. Index 0.01 0.01 -0.23 0.34 0.10 96
HHI 1640 1651 1394 1813 118 96
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where this variable was statistically significant was a large bank, but the other two 
were small banks, for which the economic arguments presented in section 3.2 
would not seem to apply.  
Given the theoretical arguments for inclusion of this variable (explained in 
section 3.2), and the fact that the average loan market share of the three largest 
banks during the sample period was around 65%; we decided to include it only for 
the three largest banks in the sample. This is because those banks may be price 
leaders. Thus, in order to maintain their market power due to the possible threat of 
entry of outside competitors, these banks may start setting their lending rates on a 
more competitive basis. However, this variable was again individually 
insignificant for the two out of the three largest banks and jointly insignificant for 
all the three of them at the 5% level of significance
17
. Consequently, the results 
imply that this variable may not have significant explanatory power over the size 
of lending rate adjustment behaviour, even of the three largest banks and 
consequently, we excluded it from the model. These results are consistent with the 
findings of Berger and Hannan (1989).  
Another variable with a questionable theoretical rationale for inclusion in 
the model, given the specific nature of the Macedonian banking system, is the 
operational efficiency variable (see section 3.2). From the statistical point of view, 
the results indicate that the operational efficiency variable is individually 
statistically insignificant for 13 out of 15 banks at 5% level. The F-test for the 
joint significance of this variable implies that it is insignificant at the 5% level
18
. 
We used another narrower indicator for operational efficiency by substituting the 
administrative costs with gross wages of the employees, which constitute 
substantial part of banks‟ administrative costs, as this has been employed in the 
empirical literature (Mojon, 2000). This variable again was jointly insignificant at 
5% level of significance
19
. These results are in line with the findings of Vaskov et 
al. (2010) for the average level of lending rate setting and the interest rate spread 
                                                 
17
 The results are available from the author upon request. 
18
 The results are available from the author upon request. 
19 
The results are available from the author upon request. 
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among Macedonian banks (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), Gambacorta (2008) for 
the case of Italy, but contrary to the results of Mojon (2000) for the case of EMU 
(see section 2.3.1). Thus, we decided to exclude this variable from the model and 
proceed with a more parsimonious specification. This decision was based on two 
arguments. Firstly, the economic rationale presented in section 3.2, which suggest 
this variable may represent different transformation processes among various 
types of banks which may complicate the relationship. Secondly, the joint 
insignificance of this variable. 
The results from the final model specification (presented in table 3.4 and 
in appendix 3.4) indicate that the model can significantly explain the variations in 
the pass-through multipliers in lending rates for almost all 15 banks in the sample. 
The results for the overall significance of the bank-specific equations, apart from 
the equations for banks 7 and 10, indicate that they are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level of significance and in the case of ten banks are significant at 
the 1% level (see table 3.4 and appendix 3.4). Moreover, to check the joint 
statistical significance over all the banks of the remaining variables in the model, 
we have performed an F-test for their joint significance. The F-test results 
indicated that all regressors in the model are jointly significant at 5% level of 
significance (see table 3.6 and appendix 3.4).  
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Table 3.4: Estimation results of the final model specification for the adjustment of lending rates 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations performed in STATA 10. 
VARIABLE: Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 Bank 5 Bank 6 Bank 7 Bank 8 Bank 9 Bank 10 Bank 11 Bank 12 Bank 13 Bank 14 Bank 16 Bank 27
L.dmbks 92.34* 91.40* -52.48*** 456.8*** -10.23 41.42* 34.21 -93.84** 8.096 -18.68 -55.96 -5.162 652.7*** -71.39** -9.91
(49.77) (50.75) (20.01) (68.98) (19.33) (23.98) (104.8) (41.64) (16.95) (20.97) (34.01) (25.39) (147.5) (34.82) (38.93)
L.dmbkslassets -10.06*** -2.95 1.02* -26.13*** -0.96  -2.05* -5.48  5.03*** 0.53 0.64 2.63 0.86 -32.39***  6.17* -0.59
(2.83) (2.92) (0.57) (4.07) (0.84) (1.23) (7.29) (1.52) (0.95) (1.17) (2.44) (1.64) (7.72) (-3.28) (-2.07)
L.dmbksliquidity 33.73*** -3.82 0.03 -14.65*** -2.56* -0.41 17.19*** 0.15 -2.57 -2.09 -4.06 -0.72 1.11 2.36 -2.17
(5.71) (3.24) (1.34) (4.46) (1.41) (1.57) (6.34) (2.63) (1.81) (1.77) (2.79) (1.55) (1.73) (2.34) (2.33)
L.dmbkscapital 27.59 -36.34** 0.92 -139.7*** 3.19 -5.59* 9.50 22.37*** -2.9 2.44 4.62 7.17 -2.35 9.43 1.02
(24.23) (17.37) (1.98) (21.78) (3.13) (3.37) (9.93) (4.67) (6.27) (9.63) (11.17) (5.25) (2.98) (6.24) (4.12)
L.dmbksNPLratio -26.20*** 1.00 -1.90* 43.20*** -5.12* 0.92 -1.51 -9.2*** -5.89 -6.64 5.28 -4.29** -9.18*** -3.34 2.19
(5.05) (2.67) (1.04) (8.54) (2.62) (2.19) (2.41) (2.20) (8.44) (8.81) (4.99) (2.05) (2.74) (5.61) (2.39)
L.dmbksmatmisub -0.12 -0.38 -0.22 5.88*** -1.96*** -0.003 -0.3 -0.01 -0.36 -0.05 0.17 -2.83*** -0.73 0.19 -0.51**
(0.16) (0.29) (0.95) (1.30) (0.46) (0.01) (0.26) (0.03) (0.27) (0.57) (1.08) (1.02) (0.55) (1.17) (0.20)
L.dmbksrellending -11.43** 15.80*** -8.63 3.62 1.17 1.86 6.29 -4.71* -2.88 -3.56** -6.14 3.69 -4.06 1.59 4.22
(5.05) (5.15) (9.86) (2.77) (1.31) (1.67) (5.26) (2.70) (3.33) (1.8) (3.83) (2.47) (3.09) (1.64) (2.92)
L.dmbksportdiv -9.66*** 3.60 2.02 2.48 1.66 -0.13 2.01 1.82 -0.34 0.46 -0.04 0.004 14.35** -2.27 -0.41
(3.3) (2.39) (1.36) (3.6) (1.46) (3.65) (1.79) (1.78) (2.38) (2.06) (2.16) (0.02) (5.87) (2.92) (0.56)
L.dmbksinfl 48.03*** 6.64 13.60 13.14 -4.14 4.13 -13.23 5.66 -4.71 7.35 5.09 1.62 -49.04*** 9.87 5.19
(10.47) (6.35) (11.49) (11.75) (3.98) (6.03) (8.72) (9.36) (5.04) (5.27) (4.81) (6.03) (17.75) (7.75) (6.47)
L.dmbksipi 2.59* 1.91*** 0.38 5.99*** 0.06 0.09 1.33 0.39 -0.4 0.29 -1.85*** -2.01** -1.67 -0.99 -0.62
(1.35) (0.72) (1.49) (1.75) (0.67) (0.83) (1.23) (1.84) (0.68) (0.74) (0.71) (0.99) (2.1) (1.36) (0.97)
L.dmbkslhhi 12.07** -5.70*** 5.18** -6.07 3.61** -1.28 4.06 1.87 -1.64 1.43 2.24 -1.00 -30.66*** -3.22 2.47
(4.72) (1.91) (2.34) (4.61) (1.77) (2.74) (3.53) (5.02) (2.46) (1.92) (1.85) (1.85) (7.28) (4.39) (2.94)
Const -0.002** -0.0009* 0.0003 -0.002* 0.0001 -0.001* -0.002* -0.002 -0.001* -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 -0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.51 0.21 0.11 0.51 0.23 0.05 0.29 0.13 0.05 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.20 0.19
RMSE 0.0098 0.0052 0.0099 0.0122 0.0045 0.0060 0.0092 0.0127 0.0048 0.0055 0.0052 0.0074 0.0135 0.0095 0.0071
F-stat for joint 
significance of the bank 
specific eqution
9.84*** 3.32*** 1.59* 10.45*** 3.53*** 0.64 3.75*** 2.86*** 0.62 1.63* 2.86*** 1.58* 2.29*** 2.41*** 2.33***
Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan test for the contemporaneous covariance independence between the error terms chi2 (105) = 305.253; p-value = 0.000
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In order to examine if there is some efficiency gain from employing the 
SUR method, we performed the Breusch-Pagan test that tests the 
contemporaneous covariance independence between the error terms. At 1% level 
of significance we can reject the null hypothesis of zero contemporaneous 
covariance dependence between the errors from each equation (see table 3.4 and 
appendix 3.4). Thus there is evidence in support of contemporaneous cross-
sectional correlation among the error terms and hence some efficiency gain from 
employing the SUR method.  
 
3.5.1 Interpretation of the results 
To assess the size of the adjustment of lending rates to changes in the 
money market rate we have carried out first order differentiation in respect of the 
change in the money market rate as in equation 3.2, and evaluated at the mean 
value of the rest of the variables over the sample period. As presented in table 3.5, 
there are large differences in the estimated size of adjustment of lending rates to 
changes in the money market rate between banks.  
Table 3.5: Size of the adjustment of lending rates estimated for each bank separately. 
 
***/**/* denotes joint significance by the overall F-test in the bank specific regression at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
Source: Author‟s own calculations. 
      DMBKS
Bank 1        0.02***
Bank 2        0.10***
Bank 3        0.11*
Bank 5        0.33***
Bank 6        0.13***
Bank 7 qqq-0.15
Bank 8        0.19***
Bank 9        0.39***
Bank 10 qqqq0.03
Bank 11     q  0.07*
Bank 12        0.17***
Bank 13        0.09*
Bank 14       -0.35***
Bank 16        0.20***
Bank 27        0.09***
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As expected, except for banks 7 and 14, the pass-through coefficient is 
positive and below 1. The pass-through coefficient is negative but statistically 
insignificant for bank 7, implying that the current model specification cannot 
explain the lending rate adjustment of this bank. For bank 14, the pass-through 
coefficient is negative but statistically significant, which may be partially 
explained by the specific history of this bank. Its main activity was related to the 
national payment card through which it administered the wages of the employees 
in the public administration and not the lending activities in the loan market. For 
the rest of the banks, the size of the pass-through coefficient ranges from 0.02 
(bank 1) to 0.39 (bank 9). The pass-through coefficient can be interpreted as a one 
percentage point increase in the money market rate in the previous month, leads 
on average from 2 up to 39 basis points increase in the lending rates in the current 
month on a ceteris paribus basis, given the mean value of the rest of the variables. 
Additionally, as argued in section 3.2, for the monetary policy makers it is 
important whether the size of the lending rate adjustment is predictable over time 
and whether that predictability varies among banks. Thus, if we assess the           
in-sample root mean squared error (RMSE, explained in section 3.2, while 
acknowledging the limitations in its usefulness discussed on page 116) for each 
bank specific equation separately where the measurement units are the same as 
those of the dependent variable; we can observe that these differ considerably 
among banks. For example, it ranges from 45 basis points (bank 6) up to 1.35 
percentage points (bank 14) (see table 3.5 and appendix 3.4). 
Comparing the estimated size of the lending rate adjustment among banks, 
some similarities in the pass-through coefficients can be noticed between banks 
that are in some respects alike. For instance, they are the lowest for banks 1 and 
10 (0.02 and 0.03, respectively). These two banks have some similarities in their 
assets size, market share and type of the ownership, in that these two banks are 
among the three largest banks in the country and both of them are de facto foreign 
owned, as explained in sections 1.4 and 5.2. The pass-through coefficients for 
banks 2, 3, 6, 11, 13 and 27 are within a range of 0.07 (bank 11) to 0.13 (bank 6). 
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The major similarity among these banks is that most of them during the sample 
period were de facto domestically owned during the whole period, with the other 
two domestically owned for most of the period. Those two, banks 11 and 6, were 
domestically owned until the middle of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008 
respectively, when they were taken over by foreign banks and became de facto 
foreign owned. In the middle range, according to the size of the pass-through 
coefficient, are banks 8, 12 and 16, whose coefficients are estimated between 0.17 
and 0.20. The main similarity between banks 8 and 12 is that during most the 
sample period they were domestically owned (bank 8 was taken over by a foreign 
bank in the beginning of 2008). However, this is not the case with bank 16, that 
was established as a greenfield foreign-owned bank. The highest pass-through 
coefficients of 0.33 and 0.39 were estimated for banks 5 and 9 respectively. The 
major similarity between these two banks is that from 2006 their market share on 
the loan market has increased and since 2006 both of them, according to the 
classification of the NBRM, became medium-sized banks (see table 1.4). 
 
Box 1: explaining the calculation of the results presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
This text box provides an example of how the results in tables 3.5 and 3.6 have been 
calculated. The model 3.1 contains interaction terms between the change in the money 
market rate and banks‟ balance sheet items, macroeconomic control variable and banking 
concentration index variable. As explained in section 3.2, in order to calculate the impact 
of the change in the „cost of funds‟ rate on the banks‟ lending rate, we undertake a first 
order differentiation of model 3.1 in respect of the „cost of funds‟ rate, conditional on the 
mean value of the rest of the independent variables in the model that enter into the 
interaction term.  
For example, for bank 1 a first order differentiation of model 3.1 in respect of the 
„cost of funds‟ rate, as presented with equation 3.2, provides the following result: 
)(
)(
1t
jt
m
i
 = β1 + (Χjt-1) 'β2j + (Φt-1) 'β3j + (Πt-1)'β4j  ;           (3.7) 
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If we substitute the estimated coefficients (β1, β2, β3 and β4) for bank 1 (see table 3.4), we 
get the following expression: 
)(
)(
1t
jt
m
i
 = 92.34 - 10.06*(mean value of asset size) + 33.73*(mean value of liquidity) 
+ 27.59*(mean value of capital) - 26.20*(mean value of NPL ratio) - 0.12*(mean value 
of maturity mismatch variable) - 11.43*(mean value of relationship lending variable)  - 
9.67*(mean value of portfolio diversification variable) + 48.03*(mean value of inflation) 
+ 2.59*(mean value of industrial production variable) + 12.07*(mean value of banking 
concentration index variable);               (3.8) 
If we substitute the mean values of the variables in parenthesis in expression 3.8 
above, we get the following expression: 
)(
)(
1t
jt
m
i
 = 92.34 - 10.06*(17.32) + 33.73*(0.28) + 27.59*(0.11) - 26.20*(0.34) - 
0.12*(4.50) - 11.43*(0.40) - 9.67*(0.75) + 48.03*(0.03) + 2.59*(0.001) + 12.07*(7.4);     
                                                                                                                                        (3.9)                                  
By multiplying the estimated coefficients in expression 3.9 with the mean values 
of the variables that are in the parenthesis, we get the size of adjustment coefficient of 
lending rate of bank 1 to change in the „cost of funds‟ that equals 0.02 (see Table 3.5). 
The same calculations in estimating the size of adjustment coefficient of lending 
rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ apply for all the other banks in the sample. 
In order to calculate the impact of the rest of the independent variables that enter 
in model 3.1, conditional on the mean value of the change in the „cost of funds‟ rate, we 
undertake a first order differentiation of model 3.1 in respect of the independent variable 
that is of our interest. For example, in order to calculate the impact of asset size on the 
size of adjustment of lending rate of bank 1, conditional on the mean value of the change 
in the money market rate, we do a first order differentiation of model 3.1 in respect of 
asset size as follows: 
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)_(
)(
sizeasset
ijt
 = β2*(mean value of change in the money market rate);       (3.10) 
If we substitute the estimated coefficient of β2 for bank 1 (see table 3.4), we get 
the following expression: 
)_(
)(
sizeasset
ijt
 = -10.06*( mean value of change in the money market rate)          (3.11) 
By multiplying the estimated coefficient in expression 3.11 with the mean value 
of the change in the money market rate (the variable in the parenthesis, which is -0.002), 
we get the impact of asset size on the size of adjustment of lending rate for bank 1 
conditional on the mean value of change in the „cost of funds‟ rate. In the case of bank 1 
we get positive value of the impact of asset size (see Table 3.6). 
The same calculations apply for the rest of the independent variables in model 3.1 
for all the banks in the sample. 
Regarding the rest of the variables included, i.e. the balance sheet items, 
macroeconomic control variables and the banking concentration index variable, as 
already discussed in section 3.2, we can only additionally interpret their sign and 
statistical significance, given that these are interaction terms (the effect on the 
pass-through at the mean of these variables already being included in the above 
discussion). From tables 3.4 and 3.6, it can be noticed that there is a huge 
variation of the significance and sign and of the same variables among the banks. 
This implies that the same variables do not have equal importance or even the 
same direction of impact on the size of the pass-through multipliers of the lending 
rates among banks. In other words, these results support our hypothesis of 
aggregation bias in the literature (see section 2.3.5), which has mainly used 
aggregated data (see section 2.3.1 and 2.3.5).  
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Table 3.6: Estimated signs of the rest of the independent variables in the model presented 
for each bank separately and the F-test for their joint significance 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations. 
The results in table 3.5 imply to a lack of synchronisation of the pass-
through behaviour among banks in the Macedonian economy. The results in table 
3.6 indicate that the relationship between the pass-through behaviour and the rest 
of the coefficients in the model differs considerably to the extent that their sign in 
the bank specific regressions (considering where the variable is statistically 
significant); is not consistent among the cross-sectional units. Consequently, 
results presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that the hypothesis of parameter 
equality across the units presented with equations 2.14 and 2.15 is rejected and 
thus, banks in Macedonia exhibit heterogeneous behaviour
20
. This suggests there 
may be a problem with the results of most of the literature that explores the 
determinants of the size of pass-through multipliers in various economies around 
the world by using aggregated data set (see section 2.3.1). This includes the 
studies that explore the size and speed of adjustment of lending rates in 
Macedonia (see section 2.3.4) that are again based on aggregate data and may 
                                                 
20
 Here we are interested in the combined effect of the money market rate conditional on the mean 
value of the rest of the variables in the model. However, if we test the individual coefficients, in 
each case the hypothesis of parameter equality is rejected at 5% level of significance. 
VARIABLE: Assets Liquidity Capital NPLratio Mat-mismatch Rel. lending Portdiv. Inflation IPI HHI
Bank 1        + ***        – *** –       + *** +     + **        + ***       – ***    – *     – **
Bank 2 + +     + ** – +       – *** – –        – ***       + ***
Bank 3   – * – –   + * + + – – –      – **
Bank 5       + ***       + ***       + ***       – ***       – *** – – –       – *** +
Bank 6 +   + * –   + *        + *** – – + –      – **
Bank 7   + * +   + * – + – + – – +
Bank 8 +        – *** – + + – – + – –
Bank 9      – *** –       – ***        + *** +    + * – – – –
Bank 10 – + + + + + + + + +
Bank 11 – + – + +      + ** – – – –
Bank 12 – + – – – + + –       + *** –
Bank 13 – + –     + **        + *** – – –     + ** +
Bank 14       + *** – +       + *** + +      – **        + *** +       + ***
Bank 16  – * – – + – – + – + +
Bank 27 + + – –      + ** – + – + –
F-stat for joint 
signiicance of the 
variable in all 
bank specific 
regressions.
6.46*** 4.69*** 5.05*** 6.11*** 4.19*** 2.85*** 1.75** 3.76*** 2.61*** 3.55***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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suffer from aggregation bias by not taking into account banks‟ heterogeneous 
behaviour. These above results, indicating aggregation bias, are in line with the 
results of de Graeve et al. (2004) for the case of Belgium (see section 2.3.1).  
One of the possible reasons for banks‟ heterogeneous pass-through 
behaviour in the case of Macedonia may be due to the transition process not 
affecting all banks equally. The bank balance sheet structure of various banks may 
have undergone a long-run adjustment process in order to reach some optimum 
level and/or structure in order to maximise their utility. For instance, those banks 
that were formerly state owned and were privatised, had different starting grounds 
compared to greenfield banks both domestically and foreign owned (Poghosyan 
and Poghosyan, 2010). The state owned banks may have been overcapitalised, had 
relatively high NPL ratio and/or had insufficient liquid assets due to the policy of 
soft budget constraints. Hence, with the process of privatisation, those banks may 
have had to adjust their balance sheet items in order to maximise their rate of 
return. Another possible explanation for their heterogeneous behaviour, as 
mentioned in section 3.2, is that their balance sheet structures may have been 
affected differently by changes in the regulatory requirements.  
This heterogeneity among banks‟ behaviour can be examined in more 
detail if we analyse the significance and the sign of each variable where it enters 
significantly in the bank specific equations (see table 3.6). For example, asset size 
is estimated as statistically significant at 7 out of 15 banks and where significant, 
it has a positive impact on the size of the pass-through multiplier at 4 banks, 
consistent with the “menu costs” theory and the “efficient-market” hypothesis (see 
section 3.2) as well as the findings of Vaskov et al. (2010) for the average level of 
lending rate setting and interest rate spread (see sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3). In 
contrast, for the other three banks where the asset size variable enters 
significantly, it has a negative sign which is in line the bank lending channel 
theory and the results for the foreign currency loans for the case of Macedonia 
(see section 5.5.3).  
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A similar difference in estimated significance and sign between banks 
applies to the the rest of the balance sheet items. For example, the NPL ratio is 
estimated as statistically significant at 7 out of 15 banks and where significant, it 
has a positive impact on the size of the pass-through coefficient in 6 banks in the 
sample, which is consistent with the mark-up pricing theory. These banks may 
have attempted to compensate for the lost income due to the borrowers‟ default by 
adjusting their lending rates more closely to the „cost of funds‟ rate. However, for 
the other bank where the NPL ratio is statistically significant, it has a negative 
impact on the size of adjustment (bank 5), which is line with the theory of 
asymmetric information and lending rate stickiness. 
The maturity-mismatch variable, indicating the interest rate risk that banks 
face, is estimated as statistically significant for 4 banks and affects positively the 
size of the pass-through coefficient at 3 banks, which supports the theoretical 
expectations. More precisely, those banks that have lower coverage of their long-
term loans with long-term deposits, are forced to borrow more frequently on the 
money market and thus, to adjust their lending rates more fully to changes in the 
„cost of funds‟ rate. However, for bank 5 it is estimated with a negative sign.  
Similar conclusions for the banks‟ heterogeneous behaviour can be drawn 
if we assess the impact of the two macroeconomic control variables and the 
concentration index variable. The inflation is estimated as statistically significant 
for 2 banks but the coefficient has a different sign. The concentration index 
variable (HHI), is estimated as statistically significant in 5 bank specific equations 
and in these cases it has a negative impact on the size of the pass-through 
adjustment for 2 banks, which is consistent with the predictions of the mark-up 
pricing model for the non-perfect competitive pricing environment. Namely, these 
banks use their market power and hence, by not adjusting fully their lending rates 
to changes in the money market rate they extract higher monopoly profits. 
However, for the rest of these banks it has the opposite sign, which may imply 
that those banks are adjusting their lending rates more fully to changes in the 
money market rate in order to get higher market share. These results for the 
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different impact of banking concentration over various banks are in line with the 
findings of (Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010) in estimating the determinants of 
banking efficiency among CSEE economies. 
 
3.5.2 Robustness check 
A robustness check of the existing model has been undertaken in the 
following two ways. First, as mentioned in section 3.3, when after a sufficient 
number of iterations in estimating the coefficients and their variances for each 
cross-sectional unit converge; then the FGLS estimator equals the MLE. Hence, in 
this way we compare if the estimates already reported in section 3.5 estimated by 
FGLS estimator are in line with the ones calculated by MLE. However, as 
mentioned in section 3.3, whether the MLE provides additional efficiency gain 
over the FGLS and which estimator has better asymptotic properties is an open 
issue. Second, we have estimated the same model with OLS equation-by-equation 
in order to compare the size of the coefficients between the two methods that 
according to Moon and Perron (2006), are expected to be quite similar (see 
section 3.3). Additionally, in order to empirically support our arguments presented 
in section 3.2 that representative „cost of funds‟ rate in the case of Macedonian 
banking sector may be the money market (MBKS) rate instead of the key policy 
(CB Bills) rate; we compare the estimates from the model by substituting for the 
money market rate with the reference policy rate. A priori, as mentioned in 
section 3.2, we do not expect the CB Bills rate to significantly explain the 
variations in lending rates. Although it has been estimated that CB Bills rate has 
direct impact on the money market interest rate (see section 2.3.4), nonetheless 
this interest rate serves more as an alternative investment for the banks and not as 
a cost of financing their lending activities (see sections 1.4, 1.7 and 3.2). 
For the first type of robustness check, i.e. estimating the model with MLE 
(see appendix 3.5), the estimates are comparable to the ones obtained by FGLS 
estimator. The overall significance of the bank specific equations and the joint 
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significance of each regressor in all bank specific equations in the SUR model 
estimated by MLE estimator are the same as the ones estimated by FGLS 
estimator, as discussed in sections 3.5 and 3.5.1. The estimated size of the pass-
through coefficients (see appendix 3.5.b) are very similar to the ones reported in 
table 3.5, apart from some variations to the second decimal place for some banks. 
The main difference appears with the equation for bank 9 where the size of the 
pass-through multiplier is now estimated to be higher, i.e. 0.48 compared to 0.39 
using the FGLS estimator. Regarding the significance of the coefficients in the 
bank specific equations in the SUR model estimated with MLE (see appendix 
3.5.c), the major difference is that now the asset size variable is estimated as 
statistically significant for banks 2 and 13 as well as capital for banks 13 and 16, 
unlike before when these variables were estimated as statistically insignificant for 
these banks. Moreover, the liquidity variable is now estimated as statistically 
significant for banks 2 and 10 as well as the NPL ratio for banks 10, 16 and 27. 
Regarding the signs of the rest of the significant coefficients of the SUR model 
estimated with MLE, they are in line with the estimates obtained by FGLS 
estimator 
According to the second type of robustness check, i.e. OLS equation-by-
equation (see appendix 3.6) the results have indicated that the standard errors 
estimated by OLS equation-by-equation (see appendix 3.6.a and 3.6.d) are quite 
higher as expected, than the ones estimated by the SUR model (see table 3.4 and 
appendix 3.4). This directly affects the significance of the variables as well as the 
overall significance of the regressions for each cross-sectional unit. In the 
estimates obtained by SUR model, the overall regressions were statistically 
insignificant only for 2 out of 15 banks, whereas in employing OLS equation-by-
equation the regressions for 7 out of 15 banks are overall statistically 
insignificant. This may suggest that there is indeed some efficiency gain by 
employing the SUR model. Regarding the estimated size of the pass-through 
coefficients for each bank individually (see appendix 3.6.b), they are similar to the 
ones obtained by SUR model with FGLS estimator (see table 3.5) with some 
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variations to the second decimal place. The only exceptions are the estimates for 
banks 3 and 9 where the size of the pass-through coefficients (although 
insignificant) are estimated to be at 0.24 and 0.29, compared to 0.11 and 0.39 
estimated with the SUR model estimated with the FGLS estimator. Regarding the 
estimated sign and size of the rest of the coefficients of the structural variables 
(see appendix 3.6.c), they in line with the ones previously discussed in section 
3.5.1.  
Finally, comparing the results of the model in which we have substituted 
the money market rate (mbks) with the reference policy rate (CB Bills rate), there 
are substantial differences in the results (see appendix 3.7). Considering the 
overall statistical significance of the regressions for each individual bank, the 
overall regressions for 7 out of 15 banks are now statistically insignificant. The 
root mean squared error has also increased in 11 out of 15 bank specific equations 
(see appendix 3.7.a), compared to the the estimates discussed in section 3.5.1. 
Moreover, by assessing the joint significance of each independent variable in the 
model, the industrial production index (IPI; see appendix 3.7.c and 3.7.d), is 
jointly insignificant at even the 10% level of significance. Regarding the pass-
through coefficients, where significant, they are now estimated to be negative in 4 
banks, unlike before where they were estimated to be negative and statistically 
significant in only 1 bank. Analysing the estimated sign of the rest of the 
coefficients (see appendix 3.7.c), there is a substantial variation between the two 
models in their significance and sign. Similar results with a negative short-run 
association between the lending rates and CB Bills rate, at the aggregate level, 
was also estimated in the study by Jovanovski et al. (2005), see section 2.3.4. The 
discussed results of the general insignificant and negative impact of the CB Bills 
rate on the size of the short-run pass-through coefficients of lending rates are in 
line with the argument presented in section 3.2 that the CB Bills rate may actually 
serves as an alternative investment rate for the banks in Macedonia and not as 
their „cost of funds‟ rate. Overall, the presented arguments indicate that CB Bills 
rate cannot significantly explain the short-run variations in lending rates.    
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3.6 Conclusions 
 
The critically assessed theories that define how banks set their retail rates 
and what determines the pass-through behaviour, as well as the assessment of the 
various models and estimation methods used in the empirical studies, as discussed 
in the previous chapter; provided the background to the conduct of the empirical 
analysis in this chapter. Accordingly, the main aims of this chapter were to 
explore the short-run variations in the size of adjustment of the lending rates to 
changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate among banks in Macedonia as well as to 
investigate what factors affect their different pass-through behaviour. For this 
purpose, we have used a set of up to eight bank balance sheet items, two 
macroeconomic control factors and a banking concentration index variable.  
We endeavored to improve on some of the weaknesses found in the 
existing empirical literature for Macedonia as well as part of the literature for the 
developed economies and CSEE. In particular, all of the studies conducted for the 
Macedonian banking system (see section 2.3.4) as well as part of the studies for 
CSEE and developed economies (see section 2.3.1) are based on aggregate data 
and the estimates may suffer from aggregation bias. Another drawback in the 
empirical literature is that majority of the studies conducted for both, for the 
CSEE and developed economies that do use bank-level data (see section 2.3.1), do 
not control for contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation among the 
disturbances. An additional weakness of the studies for the case of Macedonia as 
well as CSEE (see section 2.3.5), is that they use an interest rate series composed 
of loans or deposit rates denominated in both domestic and foreign currency. 
Consequently, we argue that this may result in biased estimates of the size of the 
pass-through coefficient for the reasons explained in section 2.3.5.  
Accordingly, in this chapter we attempted to deal with the problem of 
aggregation bias by using disaggregated (bank-level) data set. In order to consider 
the contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation among the disturbances we have 
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applied the SUR model. Furthermore, we have used disaggregated bank-level 
lending rates denominated in domestic currency only.  
The main findings of this chapter are that in the short-run, various banks 
adjust their lending rates differently to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. This 
can be concluded from the estimated size of the pass-through coefficients that 
vary considerably between the banks. Another finding of this chapter is that 
various factors including bank-specific characteristics, macroeconomic control 
variables and the banking concentration index variable, affect the size of lending 
rate adjustment behaviour of banks differently. Both of these findings support the 
hypothesis of aggregation bias in the literature (see section 2.3.5). The robustness 
of these results has been checked by using different estimation methods: SUR 
estimated with MLE and simple OLS equation-by-equation.  
The results of this chapter also indicate that CB Bills rate does not 
significantly determine banks‟ short-run pass-through behaviour. This may be due 
to Central Bank‟s role in controlling the liquidity of the banking system in order 
to maintain the fixed exchange rate regime. In this case, the reference policy rate 
may be acting more as a rate of alternative return for the banks that have available 
liquid assets to place them on the CB Bills auctions, a finding which is line with 
Jovanovski et al. (2005). 
Overall, the presented empirical findings in this chapter indicate that the 
size of the short-run adjustment of lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate is incomplete and heterogeneous among the Macedonian banks. Additionally, 
it is estimated that various factors may affect differently banks‟ lending rate pass-
through decisions. These findings indicate that the short-run pass-through 
behaviour among banks in Macedonia lacks synchronisation. This may imply that 
the interest rate pass-through as a part of the monetary transmission may not be as 
effective and may not play as important role because of its difficulty to predict 
banks‟ reaction to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate; as it is the case in other 
CSEE economies that have an inflation targeting regime, i.e. the Czech Republic, 
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Hungary and Poland. Thus, in order to fulfill the overall aims of the thesis, 
another area of interest is to explore whether the interest rate pass-through is 
complemented by the bank lending channel and whether the same determinants, 
i.e. macroeconomic and bank balance sheet factors, affect both the interest rate 
and the bank lending channel. This can be inferred from the analysis of the role of 
the bank lending channel in Macedonia, which is a subject of detailed 
investigation in the next two chapters. 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter is related to the third and fourth research questions: whether 
the bank lending channel is operational in the Macedonian banking system and 
what are the major determinants of the variations in the stock of loans. 
Accordingly, the major research aims of this chapter are to analyse and critically 
assess the theoretical basis of the bank lending channel and to examine the 
empirical evidence of its existence in different economies, predominantly the 
USA, EU and transition economies of CSEE.  
 The main underlying theoretical model that describes the bank lending 
channel is that of Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b). This was one of the first 
formal models to modify the „traditional‟ IS-LM model by analysing not only the 
role of money in the monetary transmission mechanism and income 
determination, but also the role of loans in the economy. Thus, this chapter 
critically assesses some of the weaknesses of this model and reviews some 
additional explanations and modifications found in the literature. 
 In relation to the empirical analyses, this chapter examines the applied 
model put forward by Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003), which is a simplified and 
modified version of Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b) model. This is the most 
frequently used model in empirical studies and it is also used as a basis in the next 
chapter of the thesis, which provides an empirical investigation of the bank 
lending channel in Macedonia. Additionally, a comprehensive critical appraisal of 
empirical studies that examine the bank lending channel in different economies is 
provided. This is accompanied by assessment of various econometric methods 
employed in the empirical analyses and how the basic empirical specification of 
Ehrmann et al. has been modified. This will inform our own empirical 
investigation in the next chapter. 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 4.2 explains Bernanke and 
Blinder (1988a, b) model. Section 4.3 provides a critical appraisal and examines 
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some amendments made to that model. Section 4.4 describes and criticises the 
applied model designed by Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003). Section 4.5 surveys 
various empirical studies and methods employed that investigate the bank lending 
channel. The conclusions of this chapter are presented in the final section.  
     
4.2 The theoretical basis of the bank lending channel 
 
 The theoretical background of the bank lending channel was initially 
developed by Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b)
21
. They modify the traditional IS-
LM model by relaxing some of its basic assumptions. Their starting argument is 
that although the traditional IS-LM model can explain the money and interest rate 
channel of monetary transmission quite well, one of its main pitfalls is that it 
analyses the influence of various shocks in the economy only through the money 
function, giving a negligible role to the other financial instruments, i.e. loans. 
More precisely, the IS-LM model treats asymmetrically banks‟ assets and 
liabilities, by assigning a special role to money as a bank liability in determining 
aggregate demand. On the other hand, it treats loans and bonds as perfect 
substitutes for each other, where both markets are suppressed by Walras‟s Law 
and assumes that financial markets clear only by price changes. 
 The main innovation of the Bernanke and Blinder model is the 
abandonment of the assumption of perfect substitutability of loans and bonds. 
Bernanke and Blinder argue that loans should have a different treatment in the 
economy from other financial instruments because they are provided by 
intermediary institutions, which are specialised in screening and monitoring the 
borrowers in the presence of asymmetric information. These institutions can have 
an important impact on the monetary transmission mechanism in the economy 
where market clearance can be achieved not only by changes in the interest rates, 
                                                 
21
 There are previous attempts in the literature that tackle the issue of existence of bank lending 
channel, but the first formal model that depicts the lending channel is that of Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988a, b).  
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but also by the quantity of loans supplied. Another argument why loans should 
have a different treatment from the other financial assets is associated with the 
periods of financial deregulation and integration of financial systems that induce 
higher capital mobility. Both of these factors, accompanied by financial 
innovations that can create similar instruments to money, may destabilise the 
money demand function.  
 Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b) amend the IS-LM model by augmenting 
the IS curve with the so-called credit-commodity curve (CC)
22
. The model is 
based on three basic equations. The first one is the LM curve, representing 
equilibrium in the money market. The second one is the so-called credit market 
curve (CM), representing equilibrium in the credit market and the third one is the 
IS curve, representing equilibrium in the goods market. The model is based on the 
assumption that the monetary authority controls the monetary base (banks‟ 
reserves). Hence, banks cannot create their own reserves. The monetary policy 
instruments are changes the monetary base or changes in the reserve requirement 
ratio. The derivation of the model, under the assumption of given prices, inflation 
and constant expected inflation, and given information asymmetry, is presented 
below. In doing this we follow the practice in this literature and include the 
theoretically expected signs directly in the equations.  
A simplified bank balance sheet that ignores net worth is presented below:  
 R + B + L = D                           (4.1) 
where banks‟ total assets are composed of reserves (R), bonds (B) and loans (L), 
whereas banks‟ total liabilities, for simplicity, are assumed to consist only of 
deposits (D). Total banks‟ reserves are composed of required reserves which are a 
given proportion of deposits (τD) plus excess reserves (E), where τ is the reserve 
requirement coefficient. Based on the assumption that R is exogenous for the 
banks and fixed (as considered in the previous paragraph), then change in the 
                                                 
22
 Henceforth, we will also refer to the Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b) model as the CC-LM 
model.  
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reserve requirement coefficient does not change total banks‟ reserves - R. Thus, 
banks‟ adding up constraint is:  
 E + B + L = D(1-τ)                            (4.2)   
Cash is ignored in the model and it is assumed that the loan interest rate does not 
have any impact on the excess reserves function. Banks excess reserves are, given 
equation 4.2, a fraction of D(1-τ) that is assumed to depend negatively on the 
bond rate (i), due to the opportunity costs of holding excess reserves, and thus 
they are modelled with the following function: 
 E = f (i) D(1-τ)                                               (4.3) 
where (1-τ) is a positive fraction and f(i) is also a positive fraction, though 
variable with i.  
The money multiplier, m(i), is by definition D/R, where R are banks‟ 
reserves (required reserves (τD) plus excess reserves E given by equation 4.3). 
Substituting these into the money multiplier formula gives: 
m(i) = D / [ τD+ f (i) D(1-τ)] ; and cancelling out D gives: 
m(i) = [f (i)(1-τ) + τ]-1                           (4.4) 
That is the money multiplier that is expressed as the reciprocal of the proportion 
of banks‟ reserves kept from deposits, including both the required reserves and 
excess reserves of the banks. If, for instance, the reserve ratio τ increases, the total 
effect is to decrease the money multiplier. This is because in 4.4 the second term 
in the square brackets increases and although the first term decreases (as it is -τ in 
the brackets) it does so by less than the second term, since the -τ is multiplied by 
f(i) which is itself constrained to be greater than or equal to 0, but less than 1 
(indeed since we would expect a banks‟ holdings of excess reserves to be a small 
relative to loans and bond holdings, this fraction is expected to take a small 
positive value).   
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In the model, the money market equation (the LM curve) is derived as 
follows:  
The deposit supply function (D
s
) equals bank reserves times the money multiplier 
(m(i)): 
 D
s
 = R m(i)                                                   (4.5)  
Henceforth, by following the approach of Kierzenkowski (2005 and 2007) all 
variables in the model are expressed in natural logarithms. Hence, the sign in front 
of each parameter in the following equations equals the expected sign of the 
parameter. A summary table of each parameter used in the following equations 
together with their expected sign is presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Summary of the names of the parameters used in the equations of Bernanke 
and Blinder model and their expected sign 
Parameter: Name of the parameter: 
Equations in which the 
parameter enters 
(the numeration in parenthesis 
refers to the number of the 
equation in the text) 
Expected 
sign*: 
βb 
Bond interest rate elasticity 
of deposit demand 
Deposit demand equation (4.7) – 
βy 
Income elasticity of deposit 
demand 
Deposit demand equation (4.7) + 
γb 
Bond interest rate elasticity 
of loan supply 
Loan supply equation 
(4.9) 
– 
γl 
Loan interest rate elasticity 
of loan supply 
Loan supply equation 
(4.9) 
+ 
λb 
Bond interest rate elasticity 
of loan demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.10) 
+ 
λl 
Loan interest rate elasticity 
of loan demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.10) 
– 
λy 
Income elasticity of loan 
demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.10) 
+ 
θl 
Loan interest rate elasticity 
of output demand 
IS curve 
(4.12) 
– 
θb 
Bond interest rate elasticity 
of output demand 
IS curve 
(4.12) 
– 
* In presenting the model in the text of this thesis the expected sign of each parameter is included 
directly in each equation in front of the parameter. 
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Consequently, equation 4.4 expressed in natural logarithms, can be rewritten as: 
D
s
 = R + m(i)                         (4.6) 
The deposit demand function (D
d
) is negatively related to the interest rate on 
bonds (i), due to the opportunity costs of holding money and positively related to 
income (y) that represents the transactions motive and the total wealth: 
 D
d
 = –βbi + βyy                                    (4.7) 
where coefficients βb and βy represent the bond interest rate and income elasticities 
of deposit demand, respectively. However, in Bernanke and Blinder‟s model, total 
wealth is assumed to be constant and therefore it is suppressed throughout the 
model. However this assumption may be too strong and may not apply in the 
medium and long run given the likely significant fluctuations in net wealth. 
Following equations 4.7 and 4.6, the equilibrium on the money market, 
representing the LM curve, is shown below: 
 –βbi + βyy = m(i) + R                                  (4.8) 
In the model, the CM curve is derived on the following basis: assuming 
that the desired portfolio structure of banks is determined by the interest rates on 
loans and bonds, banks‟ loan supply function (Ls) is modelled as follows:  
 L
s 
= –γbi + γlρ + D                       (4.9) 
Hence, the loan supply is negatively related to interest rates on bonds (i) as an 
alternative rate of return and positively to interest rates on loans (ρ) and the 
amount of deposits. Namely, the higher the amount of deposits, then the greater 
will be the quantity of loan supply. Coefficients γl and γb refer to the loan and 
bond interest rate elasticities of loan supply, respectively. 
The loan demand function of the private sector (L
d
):  
 L
d
 = λbi + λyy – λlρ                                    (4.10) 
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is determined positively by the interest rate on bonds (i), income (y) that captures 
the transactions demand for loans, which according to Bernanke and Blinder may 
arise from working capital or liquidity considerations, and negatively by the 
interest rate on loans (ρ). The coefficients λl and λb indicate the bond and loan 
interest rate elasticities of loan demand respectively, while λy refers to income 
elasticity of loan demand. Accordingly, from equations 4.10 and 4.9, the 
equilibrium in the loan market (the CM curve), is presented as follows: 
 λbi + λyy – λlρ = –γbi + γlρ + D                   (4.11) 
The IS curve, indicating equilibrium in the goods market, is a negative 
function of both bond (θb) and loan (θl) interest rate elasticities of output demand, 
which is shown below:  
 y = –θlρ – θbi                       (4.12)  
 Regarding the equations presented so far, the „traditional‟ IS-LM model 
can be expressed with the following two equations, referring to the IS and LM 
curves respectively:  
 (IS curve):      y = –θlρ – θbi   
 (LM curve):   –βbi + βyy = m(i) + R                   (4.13) 
 The major contribution of Bernanke and Blinder‟s model is that it amends 
the IS-LM model by adding another equation that represents the credit market 
(CM curve), which is presented below:  
 (IS curve):      y = –θlρ – θbi     
 (LM curve):   –βbi + βyy = m(i) + R  
 (CM curve):   λbi + λyy – λlρ = –γbi + γlρ + D
                         
(4.14) 
By substituting the deposit (D) variable, as it defined by equation 4.6, in the CM 
equation 4.14; we derive the following CM curve: 
 λbi + λyy – λlρ = –γbi + γlρ + m(i) + R                            (4.15) 
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Solving the equation 4.15 for interest rate on loans (ρ), expressed as a function of 
interest rate of bonds, income and bank reserves (i, y, R, respectively); we get the 
following equation: 
 ρ =                                                       (4.16) 
By substituting the loan interest rate (ρ), as defined by equation 4.16, in the IS 
curve (equation 4.12)  we get the following equilibrium relationship: 
 y = 
lyll
lllllbbl Rimi )()]()([                      (4.17) 
Equation 4.17 refers to, as termed by Bernanke and Blinder, the credit commodity 
curve (CC) that shows simultaneous equilibrium in both credit and commodities 
markets. The CC curve is downward sloped, since the signs of all the terms in the 
square brackets in 4.17 are positive; the relationship between income (y) and the 
interest rate on bonds (i) is determined by the negative sign outside the brackets.  
It is positive function of money multiplier (m(i)) and banks‟ reserves (R) given 
their respective signs in 4.17. A graphical representation of the model is shown in 
figure 4.1:    
Figure 4.1: The CC-LM model 
 
Source: Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b). 
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As can be seen in figure 4.1, the CC-LM model is similar to the IS-LM 
model (see the upper part from figure 4.2), with the CC curve being negatively 
sloped as is the IS curve. The CC-LM model will become equivalent to the IS-LM 
model if I) loans and bonds are perceived as perfect substitutes either by lenders 
or borrowers, i.e. when the interest rate elasticities of loan supply or demand 
converge to plus and minus infinity respectively, (γl → ~; or λl → – ~); and II) 
when the income elasticity of loan demand equals zero (λy = 0). The point where 
both curves intersect indicates equilibrium in the money, credit and commodity 
markets. 
 The main difference from the IS-LM model is that now changes in the 
monetary policy stance do not only affect the LM curve, but also the CC curve 
through the banks‟ reserves and money multiplier (equation 4.17), which 
ultimately makes monetary policy more effective. A comparison between the IS-
LM and CC-LM model in the case of monetary policy tightening is provided in 
figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: Comparison between IS-LM model (upper figure) and the CC-LM model 
(lower figure) in the case of monetary policy tightening 
 
We start with an initial condition where both models are in equilibrium (point A 
in both figures on figure 4.2). In the case of monetary policy tightening (increase 
of the reserve requirement coefficient), in the IS-LM model this will affect the 
LM curve by a reduction of the quantity of deposit (money) supply by the banks 
through the lower value of the money multiplier m(i) (see equation 4.4 for the 
money multiplier and the accompanying discussion above). In equation 4.6, R is 
constant, but m(i) (which enters with a positive sign) is reduced, giving a fall in 
D
s
. In equation 4.13 representing the LM curve, the right hand side is reduced in 
value since m(i) enters with a positive sign. This will shift the LM curve to the 
left, whereas the IS curve will stay unchanged (as in upper figure in figure 4.2). 
The new equilibrium point will be B and the result will be a higher bond interest 
rate (i2) and lower level of income (y2). In the case of the CC-LM model, the same 
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level of monetary policy tightening will also shift the LM curve to the left through 
the same mechanism as it was the case with the IS-LM model. However, the 
major difference between the IS-LM and CC-LM models is that in the latter, 
monetary policy has a direct impact on the income through the money multiplier 
(see equation 4.17). In this case, the money multiplier, m(i) which enters with a 
positive sign, is reduced and hence, monetary tightening will simultaneously shift 
the CC curve to the left (see the lower figure in figure 4.2). In contrast, in the IS-
LM model the IS curve will stay unchanged because, as the IS curve is modelled 
(see equation 4.12) the change in the monetary policy does not have a direct 
impact on income through any of the right-hand side variables in the equation.  
The underlying mechanism through which monetary policy will shift the 
CC curve through the left is by the change in the money multiplier that will 
decrease, which is also part of the CC curve (see equation 4.17). More precisely, a 
reduction of money multiplier will result in reduction of the quantity of loans that 
will limit the possibility of external financing of the private sector through banks‟ 
loans. Hence, personal consumption and investment may decline that may cause a 
decline in the overall income. Consequently, the new equilibrium will be achieved 
at point C (see the lower figure on figure 4.2), where the bond interest rate may 
increase slightly to point (i3), depending on the extent of the shift in the CC curve, 
and the level of income will decline to point (y3). By comparing the new 
equilibrium values in both models (points B and C, respectively), the same level 
of monetary policy tightening makes the monetary policy more effective in the 
case of the CC-LM model because the same increase of the reserve requirement 
coefficient results in greater reduction of income and at the same time to a lower 
increase of the bond interest rate, compared to the case of the IS-LM model. A 
similar effect to the above is the case when the authorities directly reduce the level 
of reserves in the system R (i.e. adjust the monetary base for example through 
open market operations), rather than increasing the reserve requirement as in the 
example above. The same conclusion, that the monetary policy is more effective 
in the CC-LM model, also holds in the case of monetary policy easing.  
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An additional difference between IS-LM and CC-LM models is that in the 
latter changes in banks‟ reserves through open market operations will have greater 
impact over the loan interest rate than the bond interest rate. Consequently, 
changes in the monetary policy stance will also have an impact on the size of the 
interest rate spread between the public bonds and loans. For example, monetary 
policy tightening should increase the interest rate spread between loan and bond 
interest rates and vice versa. However, the derivation of the interest rate spread 
between the bond and loan interest rates is quite complex and is not pursued here 
because it is not of primary concern to the aims and objectives of the thesis and 
the development of the empirical part of this research. A detailed explanation and 
calculus of how this works in terms of Bernanke and Blinder model can be found 
in Kierzenkowski (2007), pp. 9-12. 
 One other noteworthy difference between the CC-LM and IS-LM models 
is that shocks to credit supply or demand may affect the CC curve, which is not 
the case with the IS curve. These shocks affect the CC curve through the money 
multiplier (see equation 4.17). However, in practice it is difficult to identify the 
demand side shocks because it is complicated to disentangle whether the loan 
demand is affected by purely demand side shocks or by other macroeconomic 
and/or financial factors. Therefore, usually in the empirical literature, the 
functioning of the bank lending channel is examined mainly through the loan 
supply side factors. For example, a perceived lower riskiness of loans by the 
intermediary institutions may increase the loan supply through for example, lower 
loan loss provisions. This will in turn shift the CC curve to the right, given that 
reserves have a positive effect in equation 4.17. The aforementioned factors that 
may induce shifts in the CC curve constitute the bank lending channel that, 
according to Bernanke and Blinder, enhances the effectiveness of the monetary 
policy.  
 These predictions of the Bernanke and Blinder model on the bank lending 
channel are supported by empirical evidence in their work. For instance, 
estimations of the correlation between the growth rates of Gross National Product 
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(GNP) and money and credit aggregates in the USA for the period 1953-1985, 
have indicated a higher correlation between the growth of GNP and credit after 
1980 than the correlation between the growth of GNP and money
23
. Furthermore, 
the estimates of money and credit demand functions have suggested a higher 
parameter stability of the credit demand function from the 1980s, implying that 
the latter may be a better predictor of the movements of GNP
24
. Another empirical 
finding is that the lending channel can significantly affect the size of the interest 
rate spread between bond and loan interest rates. This argument of Bernanke and 
Blinder is based on the results from the credit demand function where credit 
aggregates are regressed on GNP, bonds and loans interest rates and the GNP 
deflator. According to the results, in periods of monetary policy tightening when 
bank reserves are reduced; the size of the interest rate spread between loans and 
bonds increases and vice versa. However, the aforementioned results should be 
taken with caution because the significance level of the correlation coefficients 
are not provided, while the regression results may be unreliable due to the 
relatively short time span of the data. Furthermore, the authors do not discuss the 
stability of the model or provide diagnostic tests. Additionally, considering their 
use of time series data, current practice would suggest the need to consider the 
stationarity of the data and the application of cointegration methods.    
 Bernanke and Blinder (1992) argue that if the bank lending channel exists, 
then bank balance sheet items should exhibit systematic movements after a 
monetary policy shock. More precisely, monetary policy tightening is expected to 
affect both banks‟ assets and liabilities in such a way that the reduction of deposits 
should be offset by a reduction in loan supply. In the context of the Bernanke and 
Blinder model this can be seen through loan supply equation 4.9 where the 
quantity of loan supply depends positively of the quantity of deposits. In the CC 
curve (equation 4.17) this works through the money multiplier and banks‟ 
reserves;. as can be seen from equation 4.6, deposits are expressed as a function of 
                                                 
23
 Even though the Bernanke and Blinder model is based on real terms, the correlation coefficients 
are estimated in both real and nominal terms and provide consistent findings. 
24
 The GNP is in real terms, while the rest of the regressors are in nominal terms. However, the 
price level is controlled for in the regression model by the inclusion of the GDP deflator.  
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the money multiplier and banks‟ reserves. Accordingly, results from an impulse 
response analysis conducted for the US economy for the period 1959-1978 using 
aggregate data, indicated that a monetary policy tightening (an increase in Federal 
Funds Rate
25
) led to an immediate decline in bank deposits. Bank securities 
decline in the first six months after the shock and afterwards they start to rise. In 
contrast, bank loans remain unaffected immediately after the shock and begin to 
decline with a delay of 6 to 8 months. Consequently, the authors argue that these 
changes in bank portfolio structure show systematic movements because banks, in 
order to maintain their level of loan supply after the policy shock, offset the 
decline of deposits by the sale of securities. Later on, banks do not continue to 
offset the decline in deposits by selling securities and therefore they start to 
reduce the level of loan supply by lowering the quantity of new loans and/or by 
terminating old ones and begin to rebuild their level of securities. According to 
the authors this is a further indication of the existence of the bank lending 
channel.   
 Nevertheless, this interpretation of this empirical finding, based on 
aggregate data, should be taken with caution as there may be an identification 
problem. More specifically, the decline in loans may not only arise from supply 
side factors (reduced loan supply, resulting from decline in deposits), but also 
from demand side factors because an increase in the interest rate may lead to 
lower investment and consumption by firms and households that may result in a 
reduced loan demand (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). Furthermore, confidence 
intervals from the impulse response analysis are not provided and thus the 
significance of the findings is unclear.  
 Overall, the main contribution of the Bernanke and Blinder model is that it 
indicates that banks‟ loans can have an important role in monetary transmission in 
an economy. By abandoning the assumption of perfect substitutability between 
loans and bonds of the „traditional‟ IS-LM model, they argue that loans as a 
                                                 
25
 In this example, a tightening of monetary policy refers to sale of bills by the Federal Reserve 
System (FED) that drains banks‟ reserves and increases the Federal Funds Rate.  
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financial instrument should have a different treatment in the economy to that of 
bonds. Accordingly, the authors argue that changes in monetary policy do not 
affect only the money market but also the credit and commodity markets, 
ultimately making monetary policy more effective. 
 
4.3 Critical assessment and further modifications of the model  
 
 Bernanke and Blinder‟s model has been criticised in the literature mainly 
in relation to weaknesses arising from its basic assumptions. As a consequence, 
this model has undergone through several refinements that attempt to alleviate 
some of its problems. The criticisms of the model and its main amendments are 
examined in this section.    
One of the major shortcomings of the original Bernanke and Blinder 
model is that it lacks clear microeconomic foundations. Kashyap and Stein (1993) 
provide microfoundations for the two basic assumptions of the CC-LM model: I) 
imperfect substitutability between loans and bonds and II) changes in bank 
reserves affect the quantity of loans supplied by the banks. Their microeconomic 
rationale for the first assumption is that loans provided by intermediary 
institutions have a special role in the economy because they are specialised in 
screening and monitoring borrowers which reduces the asymmetric information in 
financial markets between lenders and borrowers
26
. This is not the case in the 
bond market because here lenders are not so specialised in monitoring borrowers. 
Accordingly, borrowers in the bond market may exhibit moral hazard and may 
cause high deadweight costs for lenders, which is one of the major differences 
between these two financial instruments. An additional argument explaining why 
bank loans are different from bonds is that the costs of raising a loan (the loan 
interest rates) are associated with the reference rate (mark-up pricing theory, see 
                                                 
26
 Traditionally it has been assumed that banks are generally effective in assessing the risks 
associated with financial intermediation, nonetheless the current economic crisis may question the 
appropriateness of this assumption.  
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section 2.2.1) and are usually lower compared to the costs (interest rate set) on 
bonds issuance. Furthermore, repeated transactions between the borrowers and 
lenders may result in the so-called “locked-in” effect, implying that after 
establishing a relationship between the borrowers and lenders, it may become 
„costly‟ for the borrowers to change lenders or the financial instrument (see 
relationship lending theory, section 2.2.3) . 
 Related to the second assumption of the Bernanke and Blinder model, 
Kashyap and Stein (1993) argue that only in the case when banks dominate the 
loan market can, then the central bank can affect the quantity of loans by 
controlling the level of bank reserves. This may not always be the case, especially 
in those economies with a developed financial system. An additional rationale for 
the second assumption of the CC-LM model, according to Kashyap and Stein 
(1993), is that banks are not indifferent to their portfolio structure. When their 
reserves are reduced, they respond by cutting the loan supply instead of selling 
some of their security holdings or issuing new certificate of deposits (CDs). The 
argument as to why banks do not fully compensate for the withdrawal of deposits 
by selling their security holdings is that securities are seen as liquid assets in the 
banks‟ portfolio structure that act as a shield in case of any unexpected 
withdrawal of deposits. Similarly, banks do not fully compensate for the reduction 
in their reserves by issuing CDs as a tradable instrument because the marginal 
costs of additional issuance may rise substantially. More precisely, due to 
asymmetric information, investors in CDs may suspect the quality of a bank that 
issues a high amount of CDs, particularly if it is a small bank, and may therefore 
require a high rate of return. Ultimately, this reduces the spread between the 
interest rates on loans and CDs and subsequently loan profitability. This argument 
was developed for the US economy where CDs are a tradable financial 
instrument, whereas in other economies, especially with still relatively 
underdeveloped financial systems (transition economies), time deposits, as an 
alternative instrument to CDs, may not be tradable at all. This may make the bank 
lending channel even more pronounced.                
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 Further microeconomic foundations for the bank lending channel are 
provided by Bernanke and Gertler (1995), where the functioning of the lending 
channel is related to changes in the external finance premium that borrowers face. 
The external finance premium is defined as the spread between the costs of 
external funds that have to be raised for financing their investment activities 
(loans or issuing equity) and the opportunity costs of their internal funds for 
financing (retained earnings). The authors argue that during a monetary policy 
tightening, asymmetric information in the credit market worsens. Therefore, the 
costs of intermediary loan supply institutions rise because banks have to do more 
intensive screening, evaluation and monitoring of borrowers, as well as additional 
activities related to contract enforcement and repayment of loans. Consequently, 
these activities result in an increase in costs (interest rates) of loans that lead to an 
increase in the external finance premium for the borrowers, which eventually may 
reduce the level of their borrowing. Another explanation is that in a period of 
restrictive monetary policy, when bank reserves decline and subsequently banks 
reduce the quantity of loans, borrowers may be forced to find another lender 
(bank), which incurs additional costs, i.e. switching costs (see section 2.2.3); that 
will also affect their external finance premium.  
 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) do not make a clear distinction between the 
functioning of the bank lending channel and the balance sheet channel, which are 
related and may both affect the external finance premium. More precisely, the 
balance sheet channel represents the effects of changes in the net worth of 
borrowers, defined as the value of assets minus liabilities, which are induced by 
the changes in monetary policy. For example, these authors explain that an 
increase in interest rates induced by monetary policy tightening may worsen the 
financial position of borrowers. Namely, an increase in interest rates will increase 
the interest expenses of borrowers and therefore, will reduce their cash flow. 
Moreover, an increase in interest rates may also affect the value of borrowers‟ 
collateral provided because an increase in interest rates is usually associated with 
a decline in asset prices. Consequently, due to the worsening of the financial 
position of borrowers, banks may perceive greater possibility of borrowers‟ 
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default and thus, may increase the rates on loans in order to compensate for 
potential default or cut back their loan supply. However, according to the theory 
of asymmetric information and lending rate stickiness, in periods of monetary 
tightening; banks may not fully increase their lending rates due to the worsening 
of the asymmetric information in the loan market and thus, may ration credit (see 
section 2.2.2). Overall, both cases suggest that monetary policy tightening may 
affect the external finance premium of borrowers, either through the reduced cash 
flow of borrowers caused by the increase in the lending rates and/or by reduction 
of their collateral value, which may result in a reduced quantity of loan supply by 
the banks.      
 Kierzenkowski (2007) further amends the CC-LM model by assessing the 
possibility that the bank lending channel may not always enhance the 
effectiveness of monetary policy. Kierzenkowski argues that the bank lending 
channel may in some circumstances even reduce it. This depends on the factors 
that determine the slope and the scale of shifts of the CC curve. For example, the 
slope of the CC curve is mainly determined by the loan and bond interest rate 
elasticities of loan supply (γl and γb respectively, see equation 4.9) as well as the 
loan, bond and income elasticities of loan demand (λl, λb and λy  respectively, see 
equation 4.10). Consequently, when the loan supply is more responsive to changes 
in loan interest rates than bond rates (γl > γb) and/or when loan demand is more 
responsive to changes in loan rates than bond rates (λl > λb) and when income 
elasticity of loan demand is relatively high (λy); then the loan interest rate 
adjustment to changes in monetary policy will be lower compared to the bond 
interest rate adjustment. In this case, the slope of the CC curve is steeper than the 
IS curve, implying that the bank lending channel may reduce the strength of the 
interest rate channel, which ultimately may weaken the strength of monetary 
policy.  
These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 4.3, we start at point A by 
considering the effects of monetary policy tightening. When the CC curve is 
steeper than the IS curve, which implies that the absolute slope of the CC curve is 
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greater (the lower figure of 4.3, i.e. CC) than that of the IS curve (the upper 
figure), then in a case of monetary policy tightening, the bank lending channel 
may reduce the strength of monetary policy. However, this depends on the scale 
of shift of the CC curve. For example, if the scale of shift of the CC curve is up to 
the point C on the lower figure of 4.3, then the bank lending channel will reduce 
the strength of the monetary policy. This implies a lower or the same decline of 
output between IS-LM and CC-LM models, but in the case of the CC-LM model 
this is achieved by a greater increase in the bond interest rate (i3), the lower figure 
on figure 4.3) compared to the IS-LM model (i2, the upper figure on figure 4.3), 
which is contrary to Bernanke and Blinder‟s interpretation assessed in section 4.2 
and figure 4.2. In the other case, when the scale of shift of CC is greater than point 
C, then even though the CC curve has a steeper slope than IS curve, the bank 
lending channel will enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy.   
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of IS-LM and CC-LM models 
 
Source: Kierzenkowski (2007), p. 8. 
  
 The argument of Kierzenkowski (2007) that the bank lending channel may 
weaken the effectiveness of monetary policy, which depends not only on the slope 
of the CC curve compared to the IS curve, but also on the scale of the shift of the 
CC curve; is the major value added of the author. Nevertheless, the factors that 
affect the slope and scale of shift the CC curve have not been specified in more 
detail. Additionally, the possibilities that bank lending channel may reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy are assessed through loan and bond interest rate 
elasticities of loan supply as well as the loan, bond and income elasticities of loan 
demand. Hence, Kierzenkowski refers to equations 4.9 and 4.10 and not to 
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equation 4.17 that actually represents the CC curve and thus, his arguments should 
be treated with caution. 
The possibility that the bank lending channel may in some circumstances 
reduce the effectiveness of the interest rate channel is also discussed by Milne and 
Wood (2009). Their model is built upon changes in the quantities of inflows and 
outflows of funds (received deposits and granted loans, respectively) in periods of 
monetary policy tightening. One hypothesis of their model is that if in the periods 
of monetary policy tightening, the reduction in the inflow of funds (received 
deposits) is greater than the fall in the outflow of funds (granted loans); then the 
bank lending channel may increase the effectiveness of the interest rate channel. 
Namely, when banks are faced with a net outflow of funds, imposing funding 
constraints, then they will react by reducing the quantity loan supply, which is in 
line with the predictions of Bernanke and Blinder‟s model. The alternative 
hypothesis of Milne and Wood is that if in periods of monetary policy tightening, 
the reduction in the quantity of deposit inflow is lower than the reduction in the 
outflow of funds (granted loans); then the ultimate result is a net inflow of funds 
to the banks. In this case, the banks will still be able to meet the loan demand and 
this will reduce the effectiveness of the interest rate channel. The outcome of 
these two hypotheses of Milne and Wood might be analysed through the changes 
in the interest rate spreads between the money market rate and lending and deposit 
rates. In the first case, when banks are faced with a higher reduction in the inflow 
of funds than the reduction of the outflow, then the interest rate spread between 
the lending rates and money market rate will increase, which is consistent with the 
CC-LM model of Bernanke and Blinder. More precisely, banks will tend to 
increase their lending rates proportionately more than the increases in the money 
market rates in order to reduce the loan demand. However, in the opposite case, 
when the reduction in the inflow of funds is lower than the reduction in the 
outflow of funds; then banks have a net inflow of funds. Thus, banks in order to 
place those funds in the loan market will increase their lending rates 
proportionally less than the money market rate, which will result in the narrowing 
of the spread between the two rates. This finding is in contrast to Bernanke and 
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Blinder predictions, but consistent with the arguments of Kierzenkowski (2007). 
Based on a VAR model and impulse response analyses, Milne and Wood (2009) 
investigate responses in banks‟ deposits and loans to changes in the money market 
rate for the G8 economies. According to the presented results, no clear conclusion 
could be drawn on whether the bank lending channel amplifies or attenuates the 
interest rate channel: “The overall picture is mixed.....” (Milne and Wood 2009, 
p.35). The main shortcoming of Milne and Wood‟s model is that the effectiveness 
of the bank lending channel is based on the analysis of interest rate spreads 
between money market rate and banks‟ retail rates. Nonetheless, the variations in 
the interest rate spreads may not only be a result of the changes in the net inflows 
and outflow of funds but also to changes in the interest rates risks that banks face 
on the financial market (Ho and Saunders, 1981; see section 2.2.1).  
 Kashyap and Stein (1993) also argue that in some cases, the bank lending 
channel may reduce the strength of monetary policy. This may occur during an 
expansionary monetary policy when some banks cannot further extend the 
quantity of loan supply due to a binding capital constraint of the legal capital 
requirement provisions regulating the banking sector. 
 A further amendment of the Bernanke and Blinder model is proposed by 
Kierzenkowski (2005). He amends the CC-LM model by substituting the main 
monetary policy instrument of the model, i.e. control over the bank reserves 
through open market operations; with control over the key central bank interest 
rate. The same conditions for amplification and attenuation regime of the bank 
lending channel apply as in Kierzenkowski (2007), except that now the direction 
of interest rate spread is analysed between the loan rate and key policy rate. This 
model modification is empirically tested for the case of Poland. The results 
pointed to an attenuation effect of the lending channel under the fixed exchange 
rate regime during the period 1996-1998. After 1998 when the exchange rate has 
become flexible, the results suggest a neutral effect of the bank lending channel 
over the monetary transmission. The main shortcoming of this analysis is that it 
lacks a more comprehensive investigation of the monetary transmission channels 
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in Poland, i.e. the reasons why the functioning of the bank lending channel has 
changed over time are not explained in detail. It is only stressed that it coincides 
with the switch in the exchange rate regime from a fixed to flexible one, without 
examining the inter-connection between the bank lending channel and exchange 
rate channel.  
Disyatat (2010) attempts to „reformulate‟ the factors that drive the bank 
lending channel by designing a model under the assumption of developed 
financial markets where banks are to a great extent dependent on non-deposit 
funding from the financial market. Disyatat argues that when monetary policy 
tightens, then (unlike the explanation of Bernanke and Blinder), changes in the 
quantity of loan supply by the banks are not actually driven by the changes in 
their deposit base. The alternative explanation is they are mainly driven by the 
anticipated changes in banks‟ balance sheet strength and thus, changes in their 
external finance premium. The logic behind this explanation is that in the case 
when banks are dependent on non-deposit funding, an increase of the reference 
interest rate may lead to increased external finance premium for banks‟ non-
deposit funding. Namely, the financial institutions that provide non-deposit funds 
to the banks may perceive that banks are faced with a higher risk of borrowers‟ 
default when the reference rate increases, which may ultimately deteriorate banks‟ 
balance sheet strength. Thus, the financial institutions that provide non-deposit 
funds will react by increasing their external finance premium. Consequently, 
banks‟ reaction to the increased external finance premium will be to pass on these 
costs to their borrowers by increasing their lending rates. This in turn is seen to 
discourage some of the borrowers from taking new loans, resulting in lower 
quantity of newly issued loans. Overall, although the model provided by Disyatat 
(2010) offers an alternative way of interpreting the bank lending channel, it has 
some weaknesses. For example, his model is based on the assumption of 
developed financial markets and financial institutions that may not be relevant for 
majority of the transition and developing economies where banks still heavily rely 
on deposit funding. Moreover, the model is based on the assumption that “Banks 
are risk neutral and operate in a competitive market.” (p.11). This assumption may 
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not hold even in the case of developed economies because according to mark-up 
pricing theory, banks operate in a non-perfect competitive loan market (see 
section 2.2.1). Additionally, the Disyatat‟s model is not empirically tested. 
Another criticism of the Bernanke and Blinder model is that it does not 
take into account the impact of foreign ownership of firms, foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and foreign bank ownership, which may reduce the strength of 
the lending channel. For instance, in the case of monetary tightening it may 
become „cheaper‟ for the foreign-owned firms to use trade credit from their 
„parent‟ company as a source of finance and that may reduce firms‟ dependency 
on domestic banks‟ loans (Corricelli et al., 2006 and Juks, 2004). This may be 
especially important in some transition economies with large FDI inflows and a 
large presence of foreign-owned firms. Regarding foreign-owned banks, there is 
empirical evidence indicating that they may respond less strongly to changes in 
the domestic reference interest rate than domestically owned banks (Schmitz, 
2004 and Arena et al., 2007, see section 4.5.2). Furthermore, the study by de Haas 
and Lelyveld (2006) conducted for a sample of CSEE economies indicated that 
foreign-owned banks, especially greenfield banks, reduce the quantity of loans 
less during crisis periods. One of the reasons for such a response by foreign-
owned banks is that they may use internal capital markets in order to get financial 
resources from their „parent‟ bank (de Haas and Naaborg 2005). 
An additional factor that may also reduce the strength of the bank lending 
channel, which is not considered in the model, may be close interbank 
relationships. For instance, depending on the structure of the banking system, 
some small banks may use their interbank relationship in order to get funds 
(interbank deposits) from some larger banks in periods of monetary tightening, as 
is the case in Germany and Italy (Worms, 2003 and Gambacorta, 2005). Another 
factor that may reduce the effectiveness of the bank lending channel in periods of 
monetary tightening may be the presence of relationship lending between the bank 
and some of its borrowers (see section 2.2.3). Moreover, government involvement 
in the banking sector through ownership and the policy of soft budget constraints 
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and/or state loan guarantees may additionally reduce the strength of the lending 
channel (Ehrmann et al., 2003 and Corricelli et al., 2006). However, this may not 
be the case in Macedonia because a dominant proportion (over 87% of total 
banking capital since 1999) is privately owned (see table 1.6). 
 In conclusion, the main criticisms of Bernanke and Blinder‟s (1988a, b) 
model are the following: first, it lacks microeconomic foundations. Second, the 
claim that bank lending channel makes the monetary policy more effective 
neglects some factors that may work in the reverse direction. Third, the 
postulation that the main monetary policy of the central bank is control over the 
base money; and fourth, it does not take into account banks‟ financial 
characteristics as loan supply side factors . Consequently, the main modifications 
of Bernanke and Blinder‟s model are: related to the first criticism, Kashyap and 
Stein (1993) provide microeconomic foundations. Regarding the second 
weakness, Kierzenkowski (2007), Milne and Wood (2009) and Kashyap and Stein 
(1993) argue that the bank lending channel in some circumstances may reduce the 
strength of the monetary policy. Related to the third shortcoming, Kierzenkowski 
(2005) amends the model by substituting the policy instrument – control over the 
base money; with instrument – control over the key policy interest rate. Finally, in 
response to the fourth criticism Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003) amend the model 
by including bank specific characteristics  as loan supply side factors. The latter is 
the subject of a more detailed analysis in the next section.     
4.4 Examination of the „conventional‟ model used in empirical 
work 
 
 The model that is most frequently used for examining the bank lending 
channel in empirical studies is that of Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003). This model 
attempts to correct a weakness of the Bernanke and Blinder model, which does 
not include banks‟ financial characteristics as additional factors from the supply 
side of the loan market. Ehrmann et al.‟s model is based on simplified version of 
Bernanke and Blinder model.  
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Its derivation expressed with the variables in natural logarithms is as follows. As 
before in doing this we follow the practice in the literature and include the 
expected signs directly in the equations.  
Table 4.2: Summary of the names of the parameters used in the equations of Ehrmann et 
al. (2001 and 2003) model and their expected sign 
Parameter: Name of the parameter: 
Equations in which the 
parameter enters 
(the numeration in parenthesis 
refers to the number of the 
equation in the text) 
Expected 
sign*: 
ψ 
Elasticity of banks‟ 
deposits to reference 
interest rate 
Deposit market equation (4.18) – 
β Constant Deposit market equation (4.18) / 
φ1 
Income elasticity of loan 
demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.19) 
+ 
φ2 
Price level elasticity of loan 
demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.19) 
+ 
φ3 
Loan interest rate elasticity 
of loan demand 
Loan demand equation 
(4.19) 
- 
μ 
Elasticity of loan supply to 
variations in banks‟ 
deposits  
Loan supply equation 
(4.20) 
+ 
φ4 
Loan interest rate elasticity 
of loan supply 
Loan demand equation 
(4.20) 
+ 
φ5 
Elasticity of loan supply to 
reference interest rate 
Loan demand equation 
(4.20) 
– 
μ0 
Constant in equation 4.21 
for the impact of banks‟ 
specific characteristics 
Equation (4.21) / 
μ1 
Elasticity of banks‟ 
deposits to banks‟ specific 
characteristics (size, 
liquidity or capital)  
Equation (4.21) - 
* In presenting the model in the text of this thesis the expected sign of each parameter is included 
directly in each equation in front of the parameter. 
In a simplified framework for the deposit market it is assumed that 
deposits (D) equal money (M), which is negatively determined by the reference 
interest rate (r) plus a constant (β), presented below: 
 M = D = –ψr + β                      (4.18) 
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The loan demand function expressed in nominal terms (shown below), depends 
negatively on the loan interest rate (ρ) and positively on real income (y) and the 
price level (P). 
 L
d
 = φ1y + φ2P – φ3ρ                      (4.19) 
The loan supply function, expression 4.20, is positively associated with the 
amount of deposits (D) that banks have as a source for financing their lending 
activities and the interest rate on loans (ρ), while negatively with the reference 
interest rate (r). The rationale why loan supply is a negative function of the 
reference interest rate is because the latter refers to banks‟ costs of financing their 
lending activities when they borrow in the money market (consistent with the 
mark-up pricing theory, section 2.2.1). 
L
s
 = μD + φ4ρ − φ5r                     (4.20) 
 The main contribution of the Ehrmann et al. model is that it introduces 
banks‟ specific characteristics as determinants of loan supply function. More 
precisely, the model takes account of the possibility that not all banks are equally 
dependent on the amount of deposits for financing their lending activities. 
Namely, bigger, more liquid or more capitalised banks are perceived as less risky 
in the financial market and hence, those banks may more easily raise external non-
deposit funding and/or pay a lower finance premium for it, regardless of the 
changes in the reference rate. Consequently, variations in the level of banks‟ 
deposits will be negatively related to the banks‟ financial characteristics such as 
either asset size, level of liquidity or capital because the greater they are the lower 
will be banks‟ dependence on deposit funding. Moreover, bigger, more liquid or 
more capitalised banks are seen to be less dependent on deposits because they 
may use some of their balance sheet items as a substitute for deposits in order to 
finance their lending activities. Thus, the model indicates that each of one these 
three banks‟ specific characteristics may serve as a proxy for the same thing, i.e. 
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banks‟ standing in financial market27. As presented with equation 4.21, only one 
at a time of these three characteristics is included in the model. The impact of the 
banks‟ specific characteristics is incorporated in the model through the following 
equation:  
 μ = μ0 − μ1x                        (4.21) 
where, (μ) refers to variations in deposits by banks (see equation 4.20) and (x) 
represents one of the aforementioned bank specific characteristics as a proxy for 
the bank‟s ability to raise funding in the financial markets.  
 By substituting for equations 4.18 and 4.21 in equation 4.20, the clearing 
of the loan market, calculated as a reduced form of the model, is as follows: 
L =               (4.22) 
where the expected signs of the relationships to the respective right hand side 
variables are given in the equation, i.e. positive for y, P, x and rx, and negative for 
r.  If we substitute the coefficients in equation 4.22 as follows: 
43
30  = β0 (the constant); 
43
41  = β1 (the coefficient in front of the output)  
43
42  =  β2  (the coefficient in front of the price level)  
43
305 )(   =  β3  (the coefficient in front of the money market rate)  
                                                 
27
 As an alternative phrases that will be used throughout this thesis will be banks‟ possibility to 
raise non-deposit funding or banks‟ access to non-deposit funding or banks‟ dependence on 
deposit funding. 
43
3131305424130 )( rxxrPy
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43
31   =  β4  (the coefficient in front of the single term of the banks‟ specific 
characteristic such as asset size, liquidity or capital)  
43
31   =  β5  (the coefficient in front of the interaction term between the money 
market rate and the banks‟ specific characteristics such as asset size, liquidity or 
capital); 
equation 4.22 can be presented in simplified version: 
L = β0 + β1y + β2P − β3r + β4x + β5rx;                          (4.23) 
The coefficient β3 indicates the extent to which banks react to changes in 
the reference rate in adjusting the quantity of loans. This determines the 
effectiveness of the bank lending channel. Namely, the greater the size of β3, the 
more effective will be the bank lending channel. The coefficient β4 indicates the 
impact of different bank characteristics on the quantity of loans, as supply side 
factors affect the loan market outcomes, regardless of the impact of the reference 
rate. More precisely, bigger, more liquid or more capitalised banks are expected to 
make a greater quantity of loans than smaller, less liquid or less capitalised banks. 
The coefficient β5 is the coefficient of the interaction term between the reference 
interest rate and banks‟ specific characteristics. This coefficient indicates whether 
different banks with different financial characteristics react differently in 
adjusting the quantity of loans when the reference interest rate changes. As 
explained previously, larger, more liquid or more capitalised banks are less 
dependent on deposits as a source of financing their lending activities and thus, 
when the reference rate increases these banks are expected to reduce the quantity 
of loans proportionately less than smaller, less liquid or less capitalised banks. 
Hence, the coefficients β4 and β5 are expected to be positive. 
 However, a possible weakness of Ehrmann et al. model arises from its 
assumption of equal interest rate elasticity of loan demand among the borrowers 
in the loan demand equation 4.19 (Worms, 2003 and Hernando and Martinez-
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Pegas, 2003). According to Worms and Hernando and Martinez-Pegas this 
assumption might not always hold in practice because various borrowers may 
respond differently to changes in the interest rate on loans. Additionally, this 
assumption excludes the impact of the switching costs and relationship lending 
activities that might alter the elasticity of loan demand of borrowers (see section 
2.2.3). Thus, the empirical studies of Worms and Hernando and Martinez-Pegas 
attempt to control for the different loan demand elasticities among borrowers by 
including proxy variables for the borrowers‟ specific characteristics. Nonetheless 
the estimated results were in line as with the assumption of homogenous loan 
demand function among borrowers.      
 The econometric specification of the Ehrmann et al. model, based on 
equation 4.23, is as follows: 
log(Lit) =  β0 + β1log(Lit-j) + β2rt-j + β3log(GDPt-j) + β4Pt-j  +        
 β5Xit-j + β6Xit-jrt-j + εit                   (4.24) 
where: β0 is the intercept term; L is the quantity of outstanding loans supplied by banks to 
non-financial private sector; r is the reference interest rate; GDP is the Gross Domestic 
Product; P is the price level; X represents the bank specific financial characteristics; Xr is 
the interaction term between the bank specific characteristic and the reference rate; i and t 
are cross section and time specific subscripts, respectively; l indicates the number of lags.   
The empirical model, which is a stock adjustment model, is designed as a 
dynamic panel data model where the quantity of loans depends on its past 
value(s), the macroeconomic control variables (GDP and price level), changes in 
the reference rate, banks specific characteristic(s) as a proxy for the banks‟ 
standing in the financial markets and their interaction term with the reference rate. 
Hence, parameter β2 from the above equation corresponds to parameter β3 from 
equation 4.23 and as previously explained, its statistical significance and negative 
sign indicate the existence of a bank lending channel. The parameter β6 in 
equation 4.24 corresponds to parameter β5 in equation 4.23 and its statistical 
significance implies that different banks with different characteristics react 
differently in adjusting the quantity of loans to changes in the reference rate. 
l
j 1
l
j 0
l
j 0
l
j 0
l
j 0
l
j 0
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 Overall, the main originality of the model by Ehrmann et al. is that it 
incorporates bank specific characteristics as an influential factor in determining 
banks‟ loan supply reaction function to changes in reference rate. Consequently, 
investigating how banks‟ specific characteristics may affect the loan supply 
function may provide useful information of how different banks react in adjusting 
their quantity of loans when the reference rate changes. 
 
4.5 Critical assessment of the empirical research 
 
 This section critically surveys the empirical studies that examine the 
existence of a bank lending channel and which banks‟ specific characteristics, as 
supply side factors, affect the quantity of loans. Consequently, this section 
critically surveys studies that investigate the functioning of the bank landing 
channel in: I) developed economies mainly: USA, Euro-area (EMU) and 
individual economies from the EU and II) the transition economies from CSEE. 
 The common characteristic of all surveyed studies in the next two 
subsections is that they are based on microeconomic (bank-level) data. The 
rationale for the use of bank-level data is that, as explained in section 4.2, the 
factors that affect the loan supply side can be identified more clearly. Otherwise, 
if aggregated data are used, then the model will have an identification problem 
because changes in the quantity of loans could arise not only from supply side 
factors, but also from the demand side factors (Kashyap and Stein, 1995). An 
additional reason for the use of bank-level data is because of the aggregation bias 
problem explained in section 2.3.5,   
The empirical evidence on the existence of the bank lending channel is 
now assessed. The main criterion for selecting empirical studies to be critically 
assessed in more detail was according to the „originality‟ of the studies and the 
importance of their influence on the other empirical studies. We have assessed in 
more depth the studies conducted for the transition economies because their 
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macroeconomic and financial environment is more similar to one in the Republic 
of Macedonia. Regarding empirical studies for the developed economies, we have 
considered mainly the „original‟ research articles conducted on the US economy, 
the Euro-zone economy.  
  
4.5.1 Assessment of the empirical evidence for the developed economies 
This subsection critically surveys the empirical studies for the developed 
economies, primarily the USA and EU. Table 4.3 provides a summary of the 
empirical studies analysed in this subsection ordered in the same way as they are 
discussed below. It also provides a summary of the other studies conducted on the 
individual country level from the EU that use similar estimation method(s) and 
provide similar findings as the ones that will be discussed in this section. 
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Table 4.3: Summary of the empirical studies for the developed economies (USA, EMU and EU) 
 
Continued on next page. 
Country / Area: Study by: Time period: 
Frequency of the 
data:
Data source: Method of estimation: Size of N and T:
Balanced / unbalanced 
panel:
Macroeconomic control 
variables used:
Evidence of the existence 
of bank lending channel:
Significant determinants of 
bank lending channel:
Kashyap and Stein (1995) 1976 Q1 - 1992 Q2 Quarterly Call Reports, FED Static Panel data, OLS and IV N=14280; T=1976-1992 Unbalanced Nominal GDP and CPI YES Size
Kashyap and Stein (2000) 1976 Q1 - 1993 Q2 Quarterly Call Reports, FED
Panel data, Two Step and One Step 
regression approach
N=13736; N=1976Q1-
1993Q2
Unbalanced Real GDP, time trend YES Size, liquidity
Kishan and Opiela (2000) 1980 Q1 - 1995 Q4 Quarterly Call Reports, FED
Panel data, Two Stage Regression 
Process
N=13042; T=1980-1995 / Real GDP YES Size, capital
Kishan and Opiela (2006) 1980 Q1 - 1999 Q4 Quarterly Call Reports, FED
Panel data, Two Stage Regression 
Process
N=N/A; T=1980-1999 / Real GDP, time trend YES Size, capital
Peek and Rosengren (1995) 1976Q2 - 1994Q4 Quarterly Call Reports, FED Panel Data, Two-stage least squares N=N/A; T=1976-1994 / CPI, unemployment "YES" "Capital"
Ashcraft (2006) 1986-1999 Annual Call Reports, FED
Panel Data with generalised 
difference in difference strategy
N=N/A; T=1986-1999 / / YES Size, capital, liquidity
Chowdhury (2010) 1992-2007 Annual Call Reports, FED
Dynamic Panel data by "system" 
GMM estimator
N=5820; T=1992-2007 Balanced GDP, CPI YES Size, liquidity
Brissimis and Deli (2010) 1994-2007 Annual BankScope Panel data by LGMM estimator N=5873; T=1994-2007 Unbalanced
Real GDP and stock-market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio
YES Size, capital and liquidity
Ehrmann et al. (2003) 1993 - 1999 Annual BankScope
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=4425; T=1992-1999 / Real GDP, CPI YES Size
Altunbas et al. (2002) 1991 - 1999 Annual BankScope Dynamic Panel data, RE N=N/A; T=1991-1999 / GDP YES Capital
Brissimis and Deli (2010) 1994-2007 Annual BankScope Panel data by LGMM estimator N=6133; T=1994-2007 Unbalanced
Real GDP and stock-market 
capitalisation to GDP ratio
YES Size, capital and liquidity
Ehrmann et al. (2003) 1994 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=3281; T=1993-1998 / Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity
Worms (2003) 1992 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=3207; T=1992-1998 /
Real sector output, interbank 
deposits
YES
Liquidity, capitalisation and 
"size"
Altunbas et al. (2002) 1991 - 1999 Annual BankScope Dynamic Panel data, RE N=N/A; T=1991-1999 / GDP NO NONE
Merkl and Stolz (2006) 1999Q1 - 2004Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "system" 
GMM estimator
N=N/A; T=1999-2004 Unbalanced GDP NO "Capital"
EMU
USA
Germany
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Continued from previous page. 
Country / Area: Study by: Time period: 
Frequency of the 
data:
Data source: Method of estimation: Size of N and T:
Balanced / unbalanced 
panel:
Macroeconomic control 
variables used:
Evidence of the existence 
of bank lending channel:
Significant determinants of 
bank lending channel:
Ehrmann et al. (2003) 1988 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=785; T=1986Q4-
1998Q4
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity
Gambacorta (2005) 1986 Q1 - 2001 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=759; T=1986-2001 / Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity, capitalisation
Ehrmann et al. (2003) 1991 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=264; T=1991-1998 / Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity
Hernando and Martinez-
Pegas (2003)
1991 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=299; T=1991-1998 Unbalanced Real GDP, CPI Weak evidence Liquidity
Altunbas et al. (2002) 1991 - 1999 Annual BankScope Dynamic Panel data, RE N=N/A; T=1991-1999 / GDP YES Capitalisation
Netherlands De Haan (2003) 1990 Q4 -1997 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=99; T=1990Q4-
1997Q4
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Size, liquidity, capitalisation
Ehrmann et al. (2003) 1994 Q3 - 2000 Q3 Quarterly
National Bank 
supervisory reports
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=496; T=1993Q1-
2000Q3
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity
Loupias et al. (2003) 1993 Q1 - 2000 Q4 Quarterly /
Panel data by "difference" GMM 
estimator
N=312; T=1993-2000 Unbalanced Real GDP, CPI YES Liquidity
Altunbas et al. (2002) 1991 - 1999 Annual BankScope Dynamic Panel data, RE N=N/A; T=1991-1999 / GDP NO NONE
Kaufmann (2003) 1990Q1 - 1998Q2 Quarterly Central bank
Markov chain Monte Carlo 
simulation  
N=665; T=1990-1998 Balanced GDP, CPI NO "Liquidity"
Engler et al. (2005) 1997Q1 - 2003Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=760; T=1997-2003 Unbalanced GDP, REER NO "Capital"
Portugal Farinha and Marques (2003) 1990 Q1 - 1998 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Panel cointegration with PFMOLS 
estimators
N=18; T=1990-1998 Balanced Real GDP, CPI YES Capitalisation
Finland Topi and Vilmunen (2003) 1995 Q1 - 2000 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=343; T=1995Q1-
200Q4
Unbalanced Real GDP, CPI Weak evidence (ambiguous) None
Greece Brissimis et al. (2003) 1995 M1 - 1999 M12 Monthly Central bank
Panel data with SUR (for the first 
model) and SUR for panel 
cointegration (the second model)
N=12; T=1995-1999, 
p.12
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Size, liquidity
Sweden Westerlund (2003) 1998 M1 - 2003 M6 Monthly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=12; T=1998M1-
2003M6
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Size, liquidity
France
Italy
Spain
Austria
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The first empirical study based on US bank-level data that explored the 
existence of the bank lending channel was conducted by Kashyap and Stein 
(1995). These authors examine how different asset sizes among banks affect the 
loans. Their results indicated a significant impact of the reference rate on the 
quantity of loans, implying the existence of a bank lending channel. Regarding the 
asset size of the banks, their results suggested that smaller banks are more 
sensitive in adjusting the quantity of loans to changes in reference interest rate 
compared to bigger banks. This finding is explained by the argument that bigger 
banks are perceived as less risky banks in the financial markets. Thus, they may 
find it easier to offset a decline in deposits by raising non-deposit funds, such as 
commercial papers. Additionally, Kashyap and Stein (2000) examine other 
alternative financial characteristics. Their estimates implied that an alternative 
significant determinant of the quantity of loans from the supply side is the level of 
liquidity. For instance, banks with less liquid assets reduce the quantity of loans 
proportionally more than more liquid banks. This finding is explained by the 
argument that more liquid banks are perceived as less risky in the financial 
markets and may more easily raise non-deposit funding. Moreover, more liquid 
banks may also use their liquid assets as a buffer in the face of deposit reduction 
when the monetary policy tightens, limiting their reduction in the quantity of 
loans. 
 Kishan and Opiela (2000 and 2006) also test for the existence of a bank 
lending channel in the US economy by considering another alternative bank 
financial characteristic: capitalisation ratio. Their results indicated that the bank 
lending channel exists, which is consistent with the findings of previous studies. 
Additionally, their results implied that not only the size of the banks may play a 
significant role over banks‟ lending decisions, but also the level of capitalisation. 
The results have indicated that less capitalised banks reduce their quantity of loans 
proportionately more than more capitalised banks. The authors‟ explanation for 
this finding is that more capitalised banks have greater access to non-deposit 
funding and therefore, can more easily compensate for deposit reduction when the 
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reference rate tightens. In contrast, although the results of Peek and Rosengren 
(1995) provide statistical evidence that the bank lending channel is „working‟ in 
the US (New England), their results in respect of the bank capital were mixed.   
The findings of Ashcraft (2006) also suggest that the bank lending channel 
is functional in the US economy. In this study, the significant bank specific 
characteristics on the loan function are estimated to be banks‟ asset size, capital 
and liquidity. These findings are consistent with some of the previous studies 
(Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and 2000 and Kishan and Opiela, 2000 and 2006). A 
more recent analysis conducted by Chowdhury (2010) again suggests that the 
bank lending channel exists in the US economy, with size and liquidity but not 
capital being significant determinants on the loan function. 
 Several studies that analyse the functioning of the bank lending channel in 
the Euro zone have been conducted. For example, the researches undertaken by 
Ehrmann et al. (2003) and Altunbas et al. (2002) pointed to the existence of a 
bank lending channel. Regarding banks‟ financial characteristics (size, liquidity or 
capital) as determinants of different (heterogeneous) loan functions among EMU 
banks, the findings of Ehrmann et al. (2003) indicate that only the size of the 
banks is a significant factor. More specifically, the estimates based on model 
specification 4.24 suggest that smaller banks react more strongly in adjusting the 
quantity of loans when the reference rate changes than bigger banks do, which is 
similar to the results of the US studies conducted. However, the interaction term 
of the liquidity variable is estimated with a sign contrary to the theoretical 
prediction for which no detailed discussion is provided. Regarding the 
capitalisation of the banks, the results suggested that it does not have any 
significant impact over the loan function, which is contrary to the US results. 
Somewhat different findings are presented in Altunbas et al. (2002). The 
estimated results with a different model specification imply that only the level of 
capitalisation has a significant influence over the banks‟ lending decisions in the 
EMU, while size does not. 
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A more recent study that investigates the functioning of the bank lending 
channel in both the US and Euro-zone economies is by Brissimis and Delis 
(2010). By employing the “Local Generalised Method of Moments” (LGMM) 
estimator, the results suggest that the bank lending channel works in both 
economies, which is consistent with the findings of the previously assessed 
studies. Moreover, the results implied that banks in the Euro-zone react more 
strongly in adjusting the quantity of loans to changes in the reference rate 
compared to the US economy. This is explained by the higher dependence of the 
private sector on loans as a source of external financing in the Euro-zone than the 
US economy, although it is not supported by any additional empirical evidence. 
Additionally, the results indicate that the bank lending channel in both economies 
weakens through time. According to Brissimis and Delis, this might be due to the 
overall development of the financial system in both economies that makes the 
private sector less dependent on banks‟ loans as a source of external financing. 
Again this explanation is not supported by any additional empirical examination. 
Regarding the bank specific characteristics, the results suggest that either size, 
capital or liquidity may play a significant role in determining the loan function in 
both economies, which is in line with some of the previous findings for these 
economies. 
 Summarising the findings for EU counties, the majority of the analyses are 
based on model specification 4.24 and provide empirical evidence for the 
existence of a bank lending channel (see table 4.3). The only exceptions are the 
two studies for Austria and one for Finland where the results of Topi and 
Vilmunen (2003) for the existence of the bank lending channel are not robust. 
Regarding the bank-specific characteristics as possible determinants of the loan 
function, various studies provide different findings even for the same economy. 
One reason why this may be the case, apart from the different data series used and 
different time samples, may be differences in model specification (discussed in 
section 4.5.3).    
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In brief, according to the empirical studies reviewed above, there is 
evidence suggesting that the bank lending channel is functional in the US, the 
Euro-zone economies as well as the majority of the EU economies. Furthermore, 
some studies have found that bank-specific characteristics, i.e. size, liquidity or 
capital, may be significant determinant(s) of a loan function, although findings 
differ from study to study for the same economy. Even though the majority of the 
assessed studies in this subsection may suffer from some weaknesses to be 
discussed in section 4.5.3, overall they provide findings consistent with the bank 
lending channel theory. 
 
4.5.2 Assessment of the empirical evidence for transition economies 
This subsection critically assesses the empirical studies that investigate the 
functioning of the bank lending channel in transition economies, focusing on the 
CSEE countries. There are various studies that examine the bank lending channel 
at aggregate level for the eight (ten) new EU member states from CSEE
28
 as well 
as various studies conducted at the individual country level. The criteria for 
selecting studies to be discussed in more depth was already mentioned in section 
4.5, though we will also assess in more depth those studies of the Baltic States due 
to their monetary policy regime being similar to that in Macedonia, i.e. the 
exchange rate peg. 
 Most of the studies of transition economies augment model specification 
4.24 with some specific variables that are of special interest to these economies. 
More precisely, some studies (Schmitz, 2004; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005; 
Chmielewski, 2006; Golodniuk, 2006; de Souza, 2006), include in the model the 
real effective exchange rate (REER) as an important macroeconomic control 
variable. The rationale for inclusion of the REER variable, according to Schmitz 
(2004), is to capture the effect of changes in the price competitiveness of the 
                                                 
28
 The economies considered under the eight (ten) new EU member states are: Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
The additional two new EU member states are Bulgaria and Romania.    
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CSEE economies on banks‟ assets and their lending potential. More precisely, a 
change in price competitiveness may affect the trade balance and the inflow and 
outflow of funds through the capital account. The latter may in turn directly affect 
banks‟ assets and increase/decrease their lending potential. 
Other studies (Schmitz, 2004; Kohler et al., 2006; Horvath et al., 2006; 
Juks, 2004 and Benkovskis, 2008) investigate the effect of changes not only in the 
domestic reference rate but also of the foreign one, e.g. the 3-month EURIBOR 
rate. Moreover, the majority of the studies additionally augment the model with a 
foreign ownership dummy variable and its interaction term with the reference rate 
(Schmitz, 2004; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009; Jimborean, 2009; Kohler et al., 
2006; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005; Chmielewski, 2006; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 
2007; Horvath et al., 2006; Benkovskis, 2008; Juurikkala et al., 2009; Brooks, 
2007 and Arena et al., 2007). The reason for including the EURIBOR rate as a 
reference rate is explained by the relatively high proportion of foreign currency 
loans and foreign currency indexed loans relative to total loans. An additional 
reason for using the foreign reference rate (the EURIBOR rate) is the relatively 
high dependence on foreign financing of the banks in transition economies that 
may borrow funds in the international financial markets, mainly the Euro-zone 
from where the majority of the foreign owned banks originate. Consequently, due 
to these reasons it is expected the banks in the transition economies react more 
strongly to changes in the EURIBOR rate than to changes in the domestic 
reference rate. The rationale for controlling for the foreign ownership in the model 
is that foreign-owned banks are perceived to react differently to changes in 
domestic reference rate compared to domestically owned banks because of their 
use of their internal capital market and access to funds from their „parent‟ 
institution (see section 4.3).     
Another variable that is added in the model specification 4.24 is the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans (the NPL ratio) and its interaction term 
with the reference rate (Chmielewski, 2006 and Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007). The 
rationale for including this variable is that a higher level of NPL incurs additional 
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costs for banks, alters their risk preferences and worsens their asset portfolio 
structure (for details see section 5.2) which may affect banks‟ lending preferences. 
A summary table of the studies selected on the criteria mentioned in 
section 4.5, ordered in the same way as they are discussed in the text is presented 
in table 4.4. A summary of other empirical studies conducted for transition 
economies, as well as studies conducted for other non-transition emerging 
economies such Turkey and economies from Latin America and Asia, are 
presented in table 4.4. 
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Table 4.4: Summary of the empirical studies for the transition economies from SCEE and some other emerging economies 
 
Continued on next page. 
 
 
 
 
Country / Area: Study by: Time period: 
Frequency of the 
data:
Data source: Method of estimation: Size of N and T:
Balanced / unbalanced 
panel:
Macroeconomic control 
variables used:
Evidence of the existence of 
bank lending channel:
Significant determinants of 
bank lending channel:
Schmitz (2004) 1990 - 2001 Annual BankScope Static Panel data with fixed effects N=261; T=1990-2001 Unbalanced
Real GDP, CPI, REER, 
foreign ownership
"YES", through EURIBOR Ownership, size weakly
Matousek and Sarantis 
(2009)
1994 - 2003 Annual BankScope
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N depends from the 
economy; T=1994-2003
/ Real GDP, CPI
Weak evidence, only for 
Slovenia and Poland
Size, liquidity
Jimborean (2009) 1998-2006 Annual BankScope
Dynamic Panel data by "system" 
GMM estimator
N=68-203; T=1998-2006 / Real GDP, CPI Ambigious Size, Liquidity
Baltic States Kohler et al. (2006) 1997 - 2004 Annual BankScope Static Panel data by OLS N=36; T=1997-2004 Unbalanced Nominal GDP "YES", through EURIBOR
Liquidity, capitalisation, 
ownership
Wrobel and Pawlowska 
(2002)
1997 Q1 - 2001 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data with fixed 
effects, estimated with GLS method
N=648; T=1997Q1-
2001Q4
/ Real GDP, CPI YES Size, liquidity and capital
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk 
(2005)
1995 Q1 - 2002 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=67; T=1995-2004 Unbalanced
Real GDP, CPI, REER, 
foreign ownership
YES, weak evidence Liquidity and foreign ownership
Chmielewski (2006) 1997 Q1 - 2004 Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=N/A; T=1997-2004 /
Real GDP, CPI, REER, 
foreign ownership
YES
Liquidity, foreign ownership and 
NPL ratio
Czech Republic Prutenau-Podpiera (2007)
1996 Q1 - 1998 Q4; 
1999 Q1 - 2001 Q4
Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=33; T=1996-2001 /
Real GDP, CPI, foreign 
ownership
YES Capitalisation, liquidity
Eight/ten new EU 
member states
Poland
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Continued from previous page. 
Country / Area: Study by: Time period: 
Frequency of the 
data:
Data source: Method of estimation: Size of N and T:
Balanced / unbalanced 
panel:
Macroeconomic control 
variables used:
Evidence of the existence 
of bank lending channel:
Significant determinants of 
bank lending channel:
Estonia Juks (2004) 1996 Q4 - 2004 Q1 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=5; T=1997-2004 / Real GDP, CPI NO "Liquidity", "capitalisation"
Latvia Benkovskis (2008) 1995 Q2 - 2006Q4 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=23; T=1995-2006 Unbalanced Real GDP, CPI NO "Capitalisation"
de Souza (2006) 1995-2003 Annual BankScope
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=232; T=1995-2003 / GDP, CPI, REER NO "Size", "capital"
Juurikkala et al. (2009) 1999Q1 - 2007Q1 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=1475; T=1999-2007 Unbalanced GDP, CPI
"YES" through monetary 
aggregates only
Capitalisation
Hungary Horvath et al. (2006) 1995 Q1 - 2004 Q3 Quarterly Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=25; 1995-2004 /
GDP, CPI, nominal 
exchange rate, foreign 
ownership
YES
Size, capitalisation, foreign 
ownership
Ukraine Golodniuk (2006) 1998 - 2003 Annual Central bank
Dynamic Panel data by "difference" 
GMM estimator
N=149; T=1998-2003 / Real GDP, CPI, REER YES Capitalisation
Turkey Brooks (2007) June 2006 - March 2007 Quarterly
Bank Association of 
Turkey
Static Panel data model with 
"difference to difference" approach 
by using least absolute deviations 
method 
N=33; T=2006Q2-
2007Q1
/ / YES Liquidity
Emerging economies 
from Latin America 
and Asia
Arena et al. (2007) 1989 - 2001 Annual BankScope
Static Panel data with fixed effects, 
estimated with GLS method
N=1565; T=1989-2001 Unbalanced Foreign ownership YES
Liquidity, capitalisation, foreign 
ownership
Russia
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One of the first studies exploring the functioning of the bank lending 
channel jointly for the eight new EU member states from CSEE was by Schmitz 
(2004). The results based on augmented model specification 4.24 for the REER, 
foreign ownership and EURIBOR rate variables; indicate that the bank lending 
channel is not functional through the domestic reference rate. However, the results 
imply that banks‟ loans significantly react to changes in the EURIBOR rate. This 
indicates that the lending channel works through the foreign reference rate which 
is outside of the control of the domestic monetary policy makers. Related to the 
banks‟ specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capitalisation and ownership 
structure), the ownership structure turns out to be the most significant determinant 
of the loan function. More precisely, foreign-owned banks are more sensitive in 
adjusting the quantity of loans to changes in the EURIBOR rate than 
domestically-owned banks. Regarding the rest of the bank specific characteristics, 
none of them turned out to have a significant influence on the bank lending 
channel. There is „weak‟ evidence that the size of the banks may have an impact 
on the quantity of loans, but the results are sensitive to different model 
specifications and different sample periods. The main shortcoming of this 
research is that during the sample period some of these economies have 
undergone a change in their monetary policy regime, i.e. from fixed exchange rate 
to inflation targeting (Czech Republic), but this was not controlled for in the 
regressions.  
In a similar vein, Matousek and Sarantis (2009) explore the bank lending 
channel for the same group of transition economies, but on an individual basis. 
The results based on the augmented model specification 4.24 for the ownership 
structure indicated that, apart from Slovenia and partially in Poland, changes in 
domestic reference rates do not have any significant impact on the quantity of 
loans . This is consistent with Schmitz‟s (2004) findings, indicating that in a 
majority of the CSEE economies the „domestic‟ lending channel does not exist. 
The main pitfall of this analysis is that it does not take into account the influence 
of the foreign reference rate, which according to Schmitz is the key variable in 
determining the bank lending channel. Another drawback of Matousek and 
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Sarantis‟s study is that the model again does not control for changes in monetary 
policy regime. 
Similarly, Jimborean (2009) explores the functioning of the bank lending 
channel jointly for the ten new EU member states. The major value added of this 
study is that banks in the sample are divided into three subcategories according to 
their loans-to-deposit ratio, a proxy measure for banks‟ dependency on external 
funding. The results from various model specifications indicate that the respective 
domestic reference rate is either statistically insignificant or it is statistically 
significant, but with a contrary (positive) sign from what was expected. This is 
interpreted that that bank lending channel is not functional at this group of 
economies, which is in line with Matousek and Sarantis (2009) findings. 
Regarding the bank specific characteristics (size, liquidity, capital and foreign 
ownership), only the interaction terms in respect of the size and liquidity variables 
turned out to have a significant impact on the quantity of loans, but only for the 
second (middle) group of banks according to the loans-to-deposit ratio. 
Accordingly, the author argues that the bank lending channel works mainly 
through those banks. However, considering that the impact of the reference rate is 
insignificant and/or where significant it has a contrary sign than the predictions of 
the Bernanke and Blinder model, it cannot be argued that the bank lending 
channel is functional in this group of economies. Moreover, the liquidity variable 
enters with contrary sign from what was expected. According to Jimborean 
(2009), this is explained by the excess liquidity of the banking systems in these 
economies, though no detailed explanation is provided. An additional weakness of 
this study is that the author only tests the sensitivity of loans to changes in 
domestic reference rates and, unlike Schmitz (2004), does not investigate the 
impact of the changes in the foreign reference rate. 
Kohler et al. (2006) investigate the bank lending channel jointly for the 
three Baltic States. The rationale for this is similarities in the monetary policy 
regimes and the financial structure among these economies. Accordingly, by 
amending the model specification 4.24 for the EURIBOR rate as a reference rate 
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and with a foreign ownership variable, the estimated results suggested again that 
„domestic‟ lending channel through domestic reference rate does not exist. Hence, 
consistent with Schmitz‟s (2004) findings, the results have indicated that the 
lending channel „works‟ through the changes in the EURIBOR rate. Hence this 
channel cannot be „utilised‟ by domestic monetary policy makers. Regarding the 
banks‟ characteristics, significant determinants of the loan function are estimated 
to be capitalisation, foreign-ownership and liquidity. However, the coefficient on 
the liquidity variable has the contrary (negative) sign from the theoretical 
predictions, which is again explained by the excess liquidity of the banks in these 
countries (for more details see section 5.2).  
Analysing the bank lending channel at individual country level, several 
studies provide some evidence for Poland. For example, the results of Wrobel and 
Pawlowska (2002), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005) and Chmielewski (2006) based 
on model specification 4.24 imply that the bank lending channel operates in 
Poland through changes in domestic reference rate, which is in contrast to the 
findings of Schmitz (2004). Regarding the bank specific characteristics, all three 
studies provide evidence that liquidity has a significant impact on the bank 
lending channel, but with the opposite sign from what is predicted by economic 
theory. This is explained by the structural excess liquidity of the Polish banking 
system that may bias the results (for more details see section 5.2). Related to the 
other bank specific characteristics, the results of Wrobel and Pawlowska (2002) 
suggest that banks‟ loans are affected by the asset size and capitalisation ratio. 
The estimates of Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005) and Chmielewski (2006) indicate 
that an additional significant bank specific characteristic affecting banks‟ loans in 
Poland is foreign ownership. Furthermore, the results of Chmielewski (2006) 
based on augmented model specification 4.24, implied that the NPL ratio is also 
another significant determinant of banks‟ loans. Nonetheless, the main 
shortcoming of these analyses is that they do not test for the sensitivity of loans to 
changes in the foreign reference rate, which may be an important determinant of 
the lending channel in Poland. 
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In the Czech Republic, Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007) investigates the bank 
lending channel for the two subperiods 1996-1998 and 1999-2001
29
. The results 
point to a significant loans supply adjustment by banks to changes in domestic 
reference rate in the two subperiods, being stronger for the second subperiod. 
These results are contrary to the findings of Schmitz (2004), Matousek and 
Sarantis (2009) and Jimborean (2009). Analysing the role of banks‟ specific 
characteristics, liquidity and capitalisation were seen to be the major determinants 
of the banks‟ loans in the first subperiod, but not in the second. Size and foreign 
ownership variables also had a significant impact over the banks‟ loans, but with 
contrary signs from what is expected from economic theory, for which no detailed 
explanation is provided. The interaction term in respect of the NPL ratio entered 
with a contrary (positive) sign from the prior expectations in the two subperiods. 
The reason for this, according to the author, may be due to the domestically-
owned banks granting loans to risky borrowers because of their „close relations‟ 
with those borrowers. This was especially the case in the initial period of 
transition when state ownership of banks was present to greater extent. However, 
this is not supported by any additional explanation or empirical evidence. In 
summary, this analysis provides some evidence for the existence of the bank 
lending channel in Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the main limitation of this study 
is that the foreign reference rate and the REER variables are not included in the 
model. 
Juks (2004) investigates the impact of the EURIBOR rate, taken as the 
reference rate due to the currency board regime, over Estonian banks‟ loans . The 
estimates indicate that banks‟ loans do not react significantly to changes in the 
EURIBOR rate, which is contrary to Kohler et al.‟s (2006) findings. The reasons 
for this, according to the author, are related to many non-modelled non-monetary 
and non-economic factors associated with the transition process, though no 
specific factors are identified and no detailed explanation is provided. The main 
                                                 
29
 The reason for dividing the sample into two subperiods is the rapid changes in monetary policy 
during the second subperiod, characterised by a continual reduction in the monetary policy rate 
and reserve requirement. 
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weakness of this analysis is that it does not take into account other factors that 
may have an impact over the lending channel in Estonia such as, the REER and 
foreign ownership variable, as it is done by other studies.  
The investigation by Benkovskis (2008) provides mixed evidence for the 
existence of a bank lending channel in Latvia. By using the quantity of total loans 
as well as their sectoral and currency disaggregation, the author investigates 
whether the bank lending channel is functional in respect of domestic and foreign 
reference interest rates. The results indicate that banks‟ loans (total loans as well 
as their currency and sectoral disaggregation) are unresponsive to changes in both 
the domestic and foreign reference interest rates. This suggests that the bank 
lending channel is not operational in Latvia, a finding contrary to that of Kohler et 
al. (2006). 
In brief, the results of these empirical studies suggest that a bank lending 
channel exists in some European transition economies and in some other non-
transition emerging economies. However, the bank lending channel in many of 
the transition economies does not „work‟ through the domestic reference rate. It 
„works‟ through changes in the foreign reference rate, which is outside the control 
of domestic monetary policy makers. This may be due to banks‟ dependence on 
foreign financing, the relatively high level of currency substitution and the 
relatively high level of foreign ownership in the banking sector. Regarding the 
impact of the bank-specific characteristics as supply side determinants, the 
evidence is mixed. Namely, various studies point to different characteristics in 
different economies having a significant impact. Possible reasons for the lack of 
consistent findings, together with a consideration of some generics weaknesses in 
such analyses, are considered in the following subsection. 
 
CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE BANK LENCHANNEL 
 
213 
 
4.5.3 General criticism of previous empirical studies 
A common weakness of the empirical analyses assessed in sections 4.5.1 
and 4.5.2 is that they investigate the existence of a bank lending channel by 
assessing the impact of the domestic reference rate on the quantity of loans, 
without directly considering whether it is operational and to what extent. 
Investigating the latter is of great importance for the monetary policy makers in 
choosing their policy instruments to achieve their objectives. In considering 
whether the bank lending channel is operational, the orthodox theory typically 
predicts that there is sizeable, homogeneous and predictable reaction of banks to 
changes in the domestic reference rate. Both, sizeable and predictable response of 
loans to a change in the reference rate is required for the bank lending channel to 
be „operational‟. However, where there are differences between banks‟ 
responsiveness, then if these are stable over time, then the bank lending channel 
may still be used as a basis for monetary policy; although the implementation of 
the monetary policy will be more difficult.  
Another general shortcoming of most empirical studies is related to their 
model specification. More precisely, there is inconsistency with the „basic‟ 
empirical model specification 4.24 designed by Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003), 
regarding the use of the three commonly used bank-specific characteristics (asset 
size, liquidity and capital). The theoretical basis and the applied model 
specification by Ehrmann et al. suggest that these three bank specific 
characteristics serve as a proxy for the same thing, i.e. a banks‟ dependence on 
deposit funding in financing its lending activities (see section 4.4). Consequently, 
Ehrmann et al. suggest including only one single and one interaction term of one 
of these three bank balance sheet items at a time. Nonetheless, many of the 
empirical studies such as: Chowdhury (2010), Ehrmann et al. (2003), Loupias et 
al. (2003), Gambacorta (2005), Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Jimborean (2009), 
Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005), Horvath et al. (2006), Benkovskis (2008), 
Golodniuk (2006), de Souza (2006), Juurikkala et al. (2009); include more than 
one of these bank specific characteristic and their interaction terms. Some of the 
CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE BANK LENCHANNEL 
 
214 
 
empirical studies like Ehrmann et al. (2003), Matousek and Sarantis (2009), 
Horvath et al. (2006); include even a double interaction terms composed of two 
bank specific characteristics times the reference rate or one of the macroeconomic 
control variables (CPI or GDP), for which no detailed explanation is given. These 
empirical studies are not explicitly clear whether they include these variables as a 
proxy for the same thing (banks‟ ability to raise non-deposit funding in financial 
markets), or to capture slightly different aspect of the banks‟ reputation. This 
confusion may be one of the reasons for the different results among the studies 
that are conducted even for the same economy or same group of economies.  
An additional weakness of these studies again relates to the model 
specification, especially those conducted on individual EMU economies. Apart 
from Engler et al. (2005), they do not include a REER variable; as many empirical 
analyses conducted for other transition economies do. This may be an important 
determinant of the lending channel in the EMU economies, having in mind the 
importance of the exchange rate during the pre-accession period in the Euro-zone 
and the fluctuation margins defined by the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) II. 
Another possible problem associated with model specification is whether 
the model should be estimated in real or nominal terms. The theoretical model by 
Bernanke and Blinder assumes constant inflation and inflation expectations are 
suppressed throughout the model. However, the empirical model of Ehrmann et 
al. (2001 and 2003) is specified in nominal terms, apart from GDP which is in real 
terms. In the empirical studies analysed in the previous two subsections there is 
inconsistency on this issue and no clear cut preferred specification is evident. For 
example, Westerlund (2003) and Schmitz (2004) estimate the model with some 
variables in real terms (loans, deposits and GDP) and some variables in nominal 
terms (reference interest rate and bank financial characteristics). Altunbas et al. 
(2002) and Kohler et al. (2006) estimate the model in nominal terms without 
considering the effect of inflation. Other studies, Matousek and Sarantis (2009), 
Chmielewski (2006) and Horvath et al. (2006), estimate the model in nominal 
terms, controlling for the effect of inflation, but nevertheless fail to state if GDP is 
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in real or nominal terms. Kashyap and Stein (1995) and Golodniuk (2006) 
estimate the model both in nominal terms (where the former study includes 
inflation as a variable but not the latter study) and in real terms, though they find 
no significant difference in the results.  
A further issue related to model specification is whether the 
macroeconomic variables (GDP and CPI) and the reference rate should be treated 
as exogenous, predetermined or endogenous. In some studies this issue is not 
discussed (Chowdhury, 2010; Brissimis and Delis, 2010; Merkl and Stolz, 2006; 
Engler et al., 2005; de Haan, 2003; Jimborean, 2009; Horvath et al., 2006; 
Golodniuk, 2006; Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007; Matousek and Sarantis, 2009, de 
Souza, 2006 and Juurikkala et al., 2009). Other studies such as, Juks (2004) and 
Topi and Vilmunen (2003) treat them as endogenous. In contrast, Ehrmann et al. 
(2003), Hernando and Martinez-Pages (2003), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005), 
Chmielewski (2006) and Gambacorta (2005) and Benkovskis (2008) treat them as 
strictly exogenous, whereas Loupias et al. (2003) assume that CPI and GDP are 
strictly exogenous, while the reference interest rate is taken as predetermined. 
However, all of these studies lack an explanation as to why they made their 
particular decisions. 
A further weakness of some of these studies arises from the estimation 
method applied, given the endogenous nature of the model. Some studies, such as 
Schmitz (2004) and Kohler et al. (2006) estimated a static panel data model with 
fixed effects or random effects. However, they have used a technique that does 
not account for endogeneity of some of the independent variables such as banks‟ 
specific characteristics. Moreover, the studies by Wrobel and Pawlowska (2002) 
and Altunbas et al. (2002) are specified as dynamic panel data models estimated 
with fixed effects, GLS or ML estimators. The employed estimation methods in 
this case may be inconsistent and biased. Namely, the lagged dependent variable 
is correlated with the error term and this gives rise to an endogeneity problem. 
Moreover, these two studies as well as the ones by Schmitz (2004) and Kohler et 
al. (2006) have other potentially endogenous independent variables, like bank 
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specific characteristics. Consequently, due to the dynamic nature of the model and 
the endogeneity issue, dynamic panel estimation by GMM estimator is a method 
that appropriately deals with these problems and this is the most frequently used 
method in majority of the assessed studies (see tables 4.1 and 4.2).   
There has been a rapid development of understanding and techniques in 
dynamic panel analysis in recent years (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998 and Roodman, 2009a). Given these developments, the use of 
“difference” GMM by the majority of these studies does not now seem to be the 
most appropriate estimator. “System” GMM may be more appropriate in the 
presence of a near unit root process. Better properties when estimating with such 
data series is a major advantage of using “system” GMM over “difference” 
GMM. This would seem to be applicable to the estimations of models of loans 
because the data series are seen to exhibit a high persistence, i.e. data that contain 
near unit root process; which is going to be discussed in more detail in section 5.4. 
 GMM estimators are designed for samples with short time series data 
(small T) and large cross sectional units (large N).  However, some studies like 
Westerlund (2003), Horvath et al. (2006), Benkovskis (2008) and especially Juks 
(2004) have a much greater T than N (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). This creates the 
problem of „too many‟ instruments for predetermined and/or endogenous 
variables and as the literature on dynamic panel analysis has developed, it has 
become clear that this that may weaken the power of the Sargan and/or Hansen 
test for validity of the instruments (see section 5.4). In particular it may lead to a 
value of one or close to one and lead inappropriately to the non-rejection of the 
null that all the instruments are valid. Regarding the p-value of Sargan/Hansen 
test, many of the studies, Worms (2003), Merkl and Stolz (2006), de Haan (2003), 
Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005), Chmielewski 
(2006), Juks (2004) and Benkovskis (2008), report a p-value of Sargan/Hansen 
test in majority of the regressions that equals 1 or is close to 1. What is surprising 
is that in some studies, the p-value of Sargan/Hansen test equals 1 or close to 1 
even though they are conducted for a sample with much greater N than T. For 
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instance, the sample for Netherlands comprises 99 banks (de Haan, 2003), more 
than 2200 banks in Germany (Ehrmann et al., 2003 and Worms, 2003), more than 
200 banks in Spain (Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2003) and 67 banks in Poland 
(Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005) and the p-value of Sargan/Hansen test in these 
studies is close to 1. In other studies, Westerlund (2003), Golodniuk (2006) and de 
Souza (2006), the results of Sargan/Hansen test are not reported. In Chowdhury 
(2010) and in Pruteanu-Podpiera (2007) the p-value of Hansen/Sargan test in 
some of the regressions reported is less than 0.10, leading to rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the validity of all the instruments at 10% level. 
Another possible pitfall in the majority of the studies conducted for the 
transition economies from CSEE like: Matousek and Sarantis (2009), Jimborean 
(2009), Wrobel and Pawlowska (2002), Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2005), Prutenau-
Podpiera (2007), Golodniuk (2006) and de Souza (2006); arises from the data 
series used for outstanding loans. These studies use an outstanding loan series 
composed as a sum of all currency denominations. Namely, they use loans 
denominated in foreign as well as domestic currency, including the foreign 
currency indexed loans. However, as the reference rate they use either the 
domestic official policy interest rate and/or the domestic money market rate. This 
may be inappropriate having in mind the relatively high level of currency 
substitution in these CSEE economies as indicated by the relatively high presence 
of foreign currency and foreign currency indexed loans (see figure 1.15) and the 
relatively high dependence of the banking sector on foreign financing. More 
precisely, by estimating the loan function using the currency-aggregated stock of 
loans, it is not clear what proportion of the total loans is adjusted to changes in the 
domestic reference interest rate and what proportion to the foreign reference 
interest rate. For instance, banks may adjust their foreign currency loans to 
changes in foreign reference interest rates rather than domestic rates due to their 
foreign currency borrowings from aboard. In contrast, the loan adjustment of the 
domestic currency loans may be more sensitive to changes in the domestic 
reference rate. Accordingly, investigating the loan function in the transition 
CHAPTER 4: CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE THEORY AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF THE BANK LENCHANNEL 
 
218 
 
economies from CSEE according to the currency disaggregated loans may be 
much more relevant and may provide more pertinent results for policy.  
In respect of the reported results, there is large variation in the estimated 
coefficients in respect to their signs and magnitude in different model 
specifications, even within individual papers. This is especially the case with 
studies conducted for CSEE economies. For instance, in Pruteanu-Podpiera 
(2007) there is variation in the sign of the estimates for CPI and considerable 
variation in magnitude of the estimates for GDP. In Chmielewski (2006) and 
Matousek and Sarantis (2009), there is variation in both sign and magnitude of the 
estimates for inflation, GDP and the reference rate. However, in many of the 
studies reviewed in sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2 there is no discussion of the 
robustness of the models and their sensitivity to different sample periods, 
variables included and to different estimation methods.  
Overall, these assessed studies in the previous two subsections provide 
interesting investigations of the existence of bank lending channel and its 
determinants. However, their major weakness is related to the use of “difference” 
GMM instead of “system” GMM estimator. It should be borne in mind that at the 
time when these studies were conducted, the tools and econometric software for 
applying “system” GMM estimator in practise were not as developed as today. 
This may be one of the reasons for not using this method in the empirical 
investigation. 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this chapter was to explain in detail and to critically assess the 
underlying theoretical model of the bank lending channel formally designed by 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b). Furthermore, this chapter has investigated the 
main modifications of the model found in the literature and has explained the 
simplified empirical model that is commonly used in the empirical studies. 
Additionally, this chapter has critically surveyed the empirical studies that explore 
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the major determinants of the bank lending channel in developed economies and 
transition economies. 
The main innovation of Bernanke and Blinder model is that it abandoned 
the assumption of perfect substitutability between loans and bonds of the IS-LM 
model. Accordingly, changes in monetary policy rate have an impact not only on 
the money market but also on the credit and commodities markets, making 
monetary policy more effective. However, this chapter has discussed several 
weaknesses of the model. Related to the empirical model, the most commonly 
used specification in empirical studies is a simplified version of the Bernanke and 
Blinder model developed by Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003).  
Regarding the empirical evidence that examines the existence of the bank 
lending channel, the studies find evidence that the bank lending channel is 
functional in the US and Euro-zone economies, many economies from the EU and 
some of the transition economies from CSEE. Even though some of the surveyed 
empirical studies have some shortcomings related to the estimation method used 
and model specification, overall they provide results consistent with the bank 
lending channel theory. An important gap in the empirical research is that there is 
no study that investigates the bank lending channel in Macedonia, which is the 
core aim of the next chapter.     
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5.1 Introduction 
 
 This chapter directly tackles the third and fourth research questions of the 
thesis. The main research aims of this chapter are to empirically examine to what 
extent is the bank lending channel operational in the Macedonian banking system 
and what bank-specific characteristics affect the loan market.. The majority of 
empirical studies conducted for the transition economies on this issue do not use 
currency disaggregated data, which we argue may bias their estimates (see section 
4.5.3). Below we investigate two different loan functions by disaggregating loans 
by their currency. The rationale for examining separately two loan functions is 
due to the relatively high share of foreign currency loans in the total loans of the 
Macedonian banking sector (see section 1.5), which is typical of many transition 
economies, and the belief that these may respond to different influences from 
those affecting loans in domestic currency. For example, as already discussed in 
section 4.5.2, in some transition economies, especially those with fixed exchange 
and/or currency boards as in the Baltic States, it is commonly found that the 
quantity of loans is affected by the changes in the foreign reference interest rate 
instead of the domestic one (Kohler et al., 2006). There may be a similar situation 
in the Republic of Macedonia, where the de facto fixed exchange regime is 
pegged to the Euro. Moreover, Macedonian banks‟ dependence on foreign 
financing by borrowing financial resources from abroad (see section 1.5) may 
weaken the impact of the domestic reference rate on the stock of loans. Namely, 
banks may borrow funds from abroad at a relatively „cheaper‟ price and place 
those funds in the domestic loan market and get a relatively high return. This can 
be seen by the interest rate movements between foreign money market rate and 
domestic rates where the 3-month EURIBOR rate has been substantially below 
the domestic money market rate and banks‟ lending rate (see section 1.7 and 
figure 1.26). Consequently, by exploring two different loan functions we attempt 
to investigate if the regime of de facto fixed exchange rate and the possibility that 
banks may get involved in „arbitrage‟ give a weak impact of the domestic 
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reference rate on the overall quantity of loans. In that way we can draw a 
conclusion regarding whether changes in the domestic reference rate really matter 
for banks in Macedonia and significantly affect the quantity of loans or whether 
changes in the foreign reference rate are more important. 
 The main theoretical model on which this empirical research is based is 
that of Bernanke and Blinder (1988a, b) presented in chapter 4, section 4.2. The 
reason for this choice is that these authors assign a special role to loans in the 
monetary transmission mechanism. Following from this, the underlying applied 
model specification that is used in this chapter is the one designed by Ehrmann et 
al. (2001 and 2003), see section 4.4 and model 4.24 for details. This is a panel 
data model designed as a simplified reduced form version of the Bernanke and 
Blinder model. It is the most commonly used model in empirical work (see 
section 4.5). The empirical examination of the bank lending channel and its 
determinants in Macedonia is based mainly on bank-level data. The reasons for 
this are explained in section 4.5. 
According to the empirical literature that explores the determinants of the 
bank lending channel in transition economies, the most influential financial 
characteristics, used as proxies for the banks‟ standing in financial markets, are: 
asset size, liquidity, capitalisation ratio (see sections 4.4 and 4.5). Additionally, 
the model is augmented by two other bank specific characteristics: the ratio of 
non-performing loans (NPL) to total loans as a proxy for banks‟ risk preferences 
and a variable for the foreign ownership, given the possible existence of internal 
capital markets for the foreign-owned banks (see section 4.5.2). 
The value added of this chapter to the existing empirical literature is: first, 
it is the first analysis that investigates the bank lending channel in Macedonia. 
Second, it uses a different estimation method, “system” GMM, which may have 
some advantages, compared to other empirical studies that commonly used 
“difference” GMM (see tables 4.1 and 4.2). Third, unlike the majority of studies 
conducted for the transition economies (see section 4.5.3), it uses a loan series 
disaggregated by currency. Fourth, unlike most studies for both developed and 
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transition economies (see sections 4.5.1 and 4.5.2), it augments the model by 
adding an additional bank specific characteristic to the model, the NPL ratio. 
This chapter is organised as follows: section 5.2 explains the model in 
detail. Section 5.3 describes the data used. Section 5.4 discusses the estimation 
method and strategy. Section 5.5 presents the results. The final section concludes. 
 
5.2 The model 
 
 In examining the bank lending channel, variations in banks‟ outstanding 
loans to changes in the reference interest rate will be investigated. The rationale 
for this, according to the Bernanke and Blinder model, is that a restrictive 
monetary policy (an increase of the reference rate) will reduce banks‟ deposit base 
and will make money market borrowing more costly. Consequently, this will 
affect banks‟ loan supply because they cannot completely offset the reduction in 
deposits with other sources of finance, either because it may be too costly for 
them to raise uninsured funds of finance or they have restricted access to non-
deposit funding (for details see sections 4.2 and 4.3).   
 Throughout this chapter, a dynamic panel model will be used. This is 
because the Bernanke and Blinder model is designed as a stock adjustment model, 
with the stock of loans as the dependent variable. Therefore, it is expected that the 
stock of loans is dependent on its own past value(s) due to the inertia in the 
adjustment process caused largely by the presence of long-term loans. More 
precisely, the stock of loans consists of short-term loans (with maturity up to 1 
year) and long-term loans (with maturity more than 1 year). Thus, in the short run 
when the monetary policy changes, banks will react mainly by adjusting the stock 
of short-term loans that is affected by both, the repayment of already granted 
short-term loans and the banks‟ decision on their additional reduction or 
expansion. Although the stock of short-term loans is more flexible than the stock 
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of long-term loans, some short-term loans may normally be expected to be rolled-
over, thus also causing inertia in the adjustment process.  
 The equations in the Bernanke and Blinder model are expressed as a non-
linear relationship. In order to estimate the linear relationships between the 
variables, the empirical model for bank lending channel is typically estimated in 
natural logarithms (see sections 4.2 and 4.4). This enables us to investigate the 
proportional changes in the dependent variable (the stock of loans). Another 
reason for transforming the variables into natural logarithms is to bring them to a 
comparable scale (in %) because they are in different measurement units (see 
table 5.2), which eases the interpretation of the results.  
 The basic model used in this chapter is based on an augmented model 
specification 4.24 (see sections 4.4). The stock of loans is regressed on its own 
lagged value(s), the reference interest rate, real GDP, CPI, REER, normalised 
values of each of the bank specific characteristics (explained in section 5.3) and 
their interaction terms with the reference interest rate. The bank specific 
characteristics are one of the following three proxies for banks‟ dependence on 
deposit funding (liquidity, size, and capitalisation ratio), a foreign ownership 
dummy variable and the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. 
 The general (unrestricted) model that has the following specification: 
log(Loansit) = β0 + β1log(Loansit-1) + β2MPIt + β3log(GDPt) + β4logCPIt + β5logREERt + 
β6Xit + β7XitMPIt + β8ForOwnDumit + β9MPItForOwnDumit + β10NPLit/Lit + 
β11MPIt(NPLit/Lit) + εit                (5.1)                     
                        
Where: 
 β0 is the intercept term; 
 Loans is a bank‟s outstanding loans, in domestic currency or foreign 
currency, respectively; 
 MPI is the reference interest rate (domestic or the foreign one, depending on 
the currency denomination of the loans); 
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 GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product; 
 CPI is the consumer price index; 
 REER is real effective exchange rate of Macedonian denar; 
 X refers to each bank-specific characteristic such as: liquidity, size and 
capitalisation ratio; 
 XitMPIt is the interaction term between each of the aforementioned bank-
specific characteristic and the reference rate; 
 ForOwnDumit and MPItForOwnDumit are foreign ownership dummy 
variable and its interaction term with the reference rate, respectively. 
 NPLit/Lit and MPIt(NPLit/Lit) are the non-performing loans ratio and its 
interaction term between with the reference rate, respectively; 
 εit is the error term, the specification of which depends on the econometric 
model which will be discussed in section 5.4; 
 i and t refer to bank and time specific subscripts; 
 β1, β2, β3, β4, β5, β6, β7, β8, β9, β10 and β11 are the parameters to be estimated.  
 
 The parameters of greatest interest are β2, β7, β9 and β11. Their statistical 
significance provides evidence in support of the bank lending channel and 
whether the bank reaction function differs among banks to changes in the 
reference rate. More specifically, parameter β2 indicates whether and to what 
extent bank loans are responsive to changes in the reference rate, while 
parameters β7, β9 and β11 indicate whether the size of the adjustment of the 
quantity of loans differs among banks, conditional on their specific characteristics. 
 The Bernanke and Blinder model assumes that inflation and inflationary 
expectations are constant. However, in the empirical studies this assumption 
cannot be made and several approaches have been taken, though none with a clear 
theoretical base (see section 4.5.3). In our model we include all variables, except 
GDP and REER, in nominal terms. The argument for including the GDP in real 
terms is that we are interested in examining how aggregate demand (GDP) affects 
credit growth. Accordingly, if we include the nominal GDP we cannot establish if 
changes in loan growth are caused by the real output changes or inflation. 
Moreover, the empirical model put forward by Ehrmann et al. (see section 4.4) 
utilises this approach. 
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  The economic argument for each regressor and the expected a priori sign 
of the parameters (see table 5.1) is discussed in what follows. We also make a 
reference to the previous empirical work in this area to support the inclusion of 
some variables, as well as in discussing their expected sign. Whether the variable 
is considered to be endogenous or exogenous is also considered as this is 
important in the econometric specification.  
Table 5.1: Expected sign of each of the parameters of the model 5.1 
 
 The reason for the lagged dependent variable in the model has been 
discussed earlier in this section. Its coefficient is expected to be positive. The 
reference interest rate is included to indicate if there is response of loans to 
changes in the reference rate. The expected sign is negative. In choosing the 
domestic rate, we considered the Central Bank (CB) Bills rate, that is the official 
policy rate by the NBRM, and the weighted average money market rate (MBKS). 
As already discussed in section 3.2, the CB Bills rate serves more as a rate of 
alternative investment for the banks whereas the money market rate represents 
more closely the „cost of funds‟ rate because short-term bank financing goes 
mainly through the money market. Thus, following the approach of Worms 
(2003), Ehrmann et al. (2003), Topi and Vilmunen (2003), and Havrylchyk and 
Jurzyk (2005) and assuming that changes in the CB Bills rate are directly 
transmitted to the money market rate, for which there is some empirical support in 
the case of the Republic of Macedonia (see section 2.3.4); we have selected the 
MBKS rate. Additional reasons for selecting the MBKS rate instead of CB Bills 
rate were identified in section 3.2. 
Parameter: Expected sign: Parameter: Expected sign:
β1 + β7 +
β2 − β8  + (+/−?)
β3  + (+/−?) β9  + (+/−?)
β4  + (+/−?) β10 − (+/−?)
β5  + (+/−?)
β6 +
β11 − (+/−?)
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 In selecting the representative foreign rate, we chose the 3-month 
EURIBOR rate as in other studies for CSEE (see section 4.5.2). The argument for 
using this rate is that: first, a substantial proportion of foreign currency loans are 
denominated in Euros and second, domestic banks borrow funds in foreign 
markets mainly in Euros. Accordingly, the interest rate on what they borrow is 
determined by the 3-month EURIBOR rate plus a mark-up. An additional reason 
for this selection is that the majority of foreign-owned banks in Macedonia are 
from EMU economies whose internal borrowing is largely denominated in Euros. 
However, a few of them are from countries outside the EMU, i.e. Turkey and 
Iceland, but their internal borrowing is also mainly denominated in Euros. 
 Regarding the issue of endogeneity, there is no consensus as whether the 
domestic money market rate should be treated as exogenous or endogenous. Some 
studies assume that it is strictly exogenous whereas in other studies it is argued to 
be endogenous (Bernanke and Mihov 1998 and see section 4.5.3). In the latter 
case, the argument is that a relatively high credit expansion may force the policy-
makers into a more restrictive monetary policy by raising the policy rate and vice 
versa. Therefore, having in mind the monetary policy regime in Macedonia and 
how monetary policy is conducted (see section 1.2), in our model we treat the 
domestic money market rate as endogenous. The EURIBOR rate is treated as 
exogenous because the monetary policy and the credit growth in Macedonia do 
not have any impact on the determination of euro interest rates.  
 GDP and CPI serve as macroeconomic control variables that capture the 
demand side effects and the business cycle in the economy. A higher price level 
and GDP are expected to positively influence loans (see sections 4.2 and 4.4). 
However, from the current literature it is again not clear whether they should be 
taken as exogenous or endogenous in the model (see section 4.5.3). We assume 
that they are endogenous because in the Bernanke and Blinder model changes in 
loans may affect the overall economic activity. For instance, a higher level of 
loans may result in higher aggregate demand through higher investment and 
personal consumption that may induce higher output and the reverse. This may 
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also create a demand pressure that may affect the price level. The estimated sign 
and size of these two variables should be treated with caution, though these are 
not a main concern in this study. CPI and GDP are macroeconomic control 
variables for loan demand, under the assumption of homogenous elasticity of loan 
demand among the borrowers
30
. However, in the case of the transition economies, 
they may be capturing something else that is not included in the model but is 
related to the process of transition. For example, it may be expected that loan 
elasticity is highly related to changes in CPI and GDP, reflecting a catching-up 
process of loan demand, which usually in the transition economies from CSEE is 
estimated to be below the equilibrium level during the initial period of transition 
(Egert et al., 2006; Boissay et al., 2006 and Cottarelli et al., 2005). This expected 
high elasticity may be based upon the higher confidence of economic agents in the 
macroeconomic environment, since in the last 10 years the inflation in Macedonia 
has been relatively low and stable compared to the initial period of transition (see 
table 1.1). Additionally, GDP and CPI may also capture some other non-economic 
factors that may influence the loan demand. In the case of Macedonia, the loan 
demand may also be affected by the banking failures in the initial period of 
transition, with another failure of saving houses in a later period. The loan 
demand may also have been affected by the political instability in the region i.e. 
NATO intervention in Serbia and Kosovo in 1998 and the armed conflict in 
Macedonia in 2001. Although only relating to the bivariate relationship, the 
descriptive statistics on GDP and loans do not suggest a straightforward 
relationship. In Macedonia in 2001 real GDP fell by 4.5%, whereas in the 
subsequent years it had moderate growth reaching the level of the year 2000 in 
2004 (see table 1.1). In contrast, the aggregate level of total loans has been 
growing continually since 2000 (see section 1.6), suggesting a negative 
association between the two in this period. 
                                                 
30
 Some studies (Worms, 2003 and Hernando and Martinez-Pages, 2003) have attempted to modify 
the model by including borrowers‟ specific variables. Nonetheless, the results were in line with the 
assumption of homogeneous demand among the borrowers (see section 4.4). 
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 The rationale for adding the REER as a macroeconomic control variable 
(see section 4.5.2) is that a measure of the price competitiveness of domestic 
products is important, given the openness of the Macedonian economy (see table 
1.1). As discussed in section 4.5.2, this variable is expected to capture the effect 
of changes in the price competitiveness of the Macedonian economy on banks‟ 
assets and their lending potential by the inflow and outflow of funds through the 
capital account. Nevertheless, this argument should be taken with caution because 
the capital account in Macedonia is not fully liberalised and may not directly 
affect banks‟ assets as in most other CSEE economies. Moreover, trade balance 
deterioration caused by appreciation of the REER is not fully covered by capital 
inflows that may affect banks‟ assets. It is partially covered by other sources, such 
as private transfers that in 2007 and 2008 accounted around 17% and 14% of the 
nominal GDP respectively. Therefore, it is expected that this variable may not 
have as large impact as in other CSEE economies that have fully liberalised 
capital account. The REER is taken as endogenous because it is directly affected 
by the CPI. The sign of the parameter is expected to be negative.  
 Each of the three bank specific characteristics (size, liquidity and 
capitalisation) and their interaction terms with the money market rate serve as 
proxy variables for banks‟ standing in financial markets. Unlike some of the 
empirical studies, we do not include all the three of them in the same model (see 
section 4.5.3). We include only one at a time in order to be consistent with the 
empirical model derived by Ehrmann et al. (2001 and 2003) (see section 4.4). The 
rationale for this is due to the following arguments: first, an economic argument 
that all these three aforementioned bank specific characteristics serve as proxy 
variables for the same thing, i.e. a banks‟ possibility to raise non-deposit funding 
in the financial markets. Second, a statistical reason: a small cross-sectional 
sample and the danger of creating too many instruments (see section 5.4).  
The single terms of the bank specific variables indicate the impact of 
banks‟ characteristics on the quantity of banks‟ loans, independent of the money 
market rate. The interaction terms of the bank specific variables with the money 
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market rate indicate whether the loan function differs between banks (see section 
4.4), which is one of the core variables of interest. The rationale for inclusion of 
the interaction terms in respect of these three variables is that more liquid, bigger 
or more capitalised banks can issue time deposits or they can more easily borrow 
from other financial institutions because they are seen as less risky for investors in 
periods when the reference rate changes (Kashyap and Stein, 1995 and Kishan 
and Opiela, 2000). Therefore, the sign of the single and the interaction terms of 
these variables are expected to be positive. In our model we follow the 
conventional empirical approach in treating these three variables (liquidity, size 
and capitalisation) as endogenous.  
However, the sign of liquidity variable for Macedonia, given that banks 
have structural excess liquidity (see section 1.4), does not have an a priori 
expectation, perhaps because the liquidity variable may not be good proxy any 
more for banks‟ possibility to get non-deposit funding in this type of banking 
system. In previous studies for the ten new EU member states from CSEE 
(Jimborean, 2009), in the Baltic States (Kohler et al., 2006) and in Poland 
(Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002; Havrylchyk and Jurzyk, 2005, Chmielewski, 
2006), whose banking systems also have structural excess liquidity, the sign of 
liquidity variable and/or its interaction term has been estimated as negative (see 
section 4.5.2). A possible explanation for this, according to Jimborean (2009) and 
Kohler et al. (2006), is that banks have accumulated more liquid assets in order to 
serve as a buffer against the existence of relatively high level of asymmetric 
information in the loan market caused by the transition process. Kohler et al. 
(2006) argue that the estimated negative sign of liquidity reflects the previously 
large accumulation of non-performing loans in some banks. Consequently, those 
banks have intentionally built-up a higher buffer of liquid assets in order to hedge 
against borrowers‟ default in a case of deposit withdrawal. For these reasons, 
those banks are more vigilant about their lending activities and they actually cut 
the quantity of loans proportionately more when the reference rate increases. 
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Another explanation for the estimated negative impact of the liquidity 
variable (Wrobel and Pawlowska, 2002), is that in Poland liquidity may not be a 
good proxy for a banks‟ possibility of raising non-deposit funding. According to 
the authors, when the banking system is characterised by surplus liquidity, it is 
difficult to distinguish the different loan functions between the banks that have 
below the average level and those banks that have above the average level of 
liquid assets. The reason for this is because, in the case of persistent liquidity, 
almost all banks keep a higher level of liquid assets from what is needed. A 
different explanation is suggested by Chmielewski (2006) who argues that banks 
that have accumulated a large amount of securities holdings (liquid assets) and 
have not hedged against the interest rate risk; they thus find that their opportunity 
costs increase when reference rate increases. Therefore, those banks reduce the 
quantity of loans proportionately more than less liquid ones. However, all of these 
authors do not empirically investigate these possible explanations.  
 The single term of the NPL ratio may indicate the ex-post quality of the 
loan portfolio of a bank. Banks with a higher NPL ratio may currently have a 
poorer loan quality portfolio and are expected to have lower proportion of 
quantity of loans, ceteris paribus, due to the higher risk of bank default. The 
interaction term with the money market rate is included to indicate banks‟ 
different risk-taking attitudes. Namely, when a bank has a certain proportion of 
NPL in its asset portfolio, it usually compensates for the risk of borrowers‟ default 
with a higher mark-up margin between the yield of the risk-free portfolio (risk-
free rate) and the current lending rate (Chmielewski, 2006). However, in periods 
of monetary policy tightening (an increase of the reference rate), the mark-up 
margin may even decrease as the risk-free rate increases because some of the loan 
contracts have fixed lending rates and thus, the bank may not fully increase its 
lending rate. Another reason why the bank may not fully raise its lending rates is 
because, according to the theory of asymmetric information and lending rate 
stickiness (see section 2.2.2), in periods of monetary tightening asymmetric 
information on the loan market worsen. Consequently, if banks raise the lending 
rates in the same proportion as the reference rate, they may attract even more 
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risky borrowers due to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Thus, all of 
the aforementioned factors may indicate to a reduction of the current mark-up 
margin that ultimately will increase the risk of a bank failure.  
 In these circumstances, the management and/or shareholders of the bank, 
in order to restore the previous level of risk present in the asset structure (the asset 
risk), under the assumption that their risk preferences are constant, have three 
alternatives: First, re-allocation of the bank‟s own funds, i.e. the reserve fund, in 
order to compensate for the potential default of borrowers. Second, to get 
additional non-deposit funding and/or to raise additional capital. Third, to change 
the asset structure by reducing the newly issued loans. The first option does not 
give much space for manoeuvre because of the binding legal capital requirements 
(see section 4.3). Banks usually keep the level of capital (own funds) equal or 
slightly above the regulatory capital requirements in order to maximise the rate of 
return. The second option is not desirable for the bank management because in 
such conditions, bank‟s costs will be higher for the bank as the presence of the 
NPL that puts additional pressure on the risk premium. Moreover, the alternative 
of raising additional capital may also not be feasible in the short-run because, as 
argued by Bolton and Freixas (2006), it takes time for the legal procedures to be 
carried out; which seems to be relevant for the case of Macedonia. Accordingly, 
banks in order to restore the previous level of risk, may in general choose the third 
option (changing their asset structure) mainly by reducing the quantity of loans 
particularly in the short run. According to the theory, which is reflected in the 
empirical model specified in this chapter, there is symmetrical response to 
changes in the policy rate. However, in the case of Macedonia, the response may 
not be symmetrical. For instance, when the reference rate loosens, banks with 
higher NPL ratio may not expand the quantity of loans proportionately more due 
to already high level of accumulated reserves that serve as a buffer in a case of 
borrowers‟ default. However, this possible asymmetric response is not 
incorporated into the model due to problems in identifying the business cycles in 
the Macedonian economy and lack of data.  
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The NPL variable provides an additional dimension to the common 
empirical approach to examining the determinants of the stock of loans, in that it 
may be an indicator of the healthiness of the banking sector by measuring the 
level of risk present in banks‟ asset structure. Hence, the impact of the single and 
the interaction term of the NPL variable is expected to be negative and this 
balance sheet item is taken as endogenous in the model. However, the quality of 
the loan portfolio measured by the NPL ratio can be significantly influenced by 
factors that are beyond the banks‟ control. For instance, a loan that was 
considered relatively safe two years ago might have turned into a non-performing 
loan due to adverse economic conditions. In that direction, the recent strand of 
literature (Altunbas et al., 2010; Angeloni et al., 2010 and Borio and Zhu, 2008) 
argue that the so-called banks‟ “risk-taking channel” may be determined by 
various factors outside the banks‟ control. The above authors suggest that banks‟ 
risk taking preferences may not only be determined by the NPL ratio, but also by 
the monetary policy stance and the overall economic activity of a certain 
economy. Moreover, Altunbas et al. (2010) indicate that banks‟ risk preferences 
may additionally be determined by the volatility of asset prices, whereas Angeloni 
et al. (2010) argue that changes in the fiscal policy stance may also play an 
important role. Consequently, the NPL ratio may not be a significant determinant. 
A foreign ownership dummy variable and its interaction term with the 
reference rate are incorporated in the model for the reasons already discussed in 
section 4.5.2. The signs of both parameters are expected to be positive. However, 
as argued in section 1.4, there may be a divergence between the legal definition of 
foreign-owned banks (de jure) and the one in practice (de facto) for the reasons 
explained in section 1.4. In the case of Macedonia, thus it is not clear that the 
foreign-ownership variable will have a significant impact on the bank lending 
channel. 
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5.3 Data issues 
 
 We use bank balance sheet data obtained from the NBRM. We work with 
an annual data set, although monthly and quarterly frequencies of the data are 
available. The rationale for using an annual data is because lower frequency data 
provide greater variability of the balance sheet items compared to higher 
frequency data. 
 The data is available from 2000 to 2008, but due to the lagged dependent 
variable in the model (see equation 5.1), the sample period is from 2001 to 2008, 
giving a maximum number of observations for each bank of 8. The sample is 
restricted to this time span as data before 2000 are not available, while at the 
beginning of 2009 a new accounting methodology was applied which distorts 
comparisons with the rest of the data. The number of banks
31
 at the beginning of 
the sample period was 22 while at the end of the sample period was 17 (for details 
see section 1.4). The sample was adjusted for mergers and acquisitions among 
banks by backward aggregation of the balance sheet items. Although this is the 
most commonly used approach in the literature (Ehrmann et al., 2003; Worms, 
2003; Gambacorta, 2005; Farinha and Marques, 2003; de Haan, 2003; Havrylchyk 
and Jurzyk, 2005; Prutenau-Podpiera, 2007; Juks, 2004 and Benkovskis, 2008) 
and no other approach appears preferable, we have to be aware that this may bias 
the data because changes in the management of the merged bank and the gained 
know-how from the staff are not controlled for.  
 Over the whole sample period, for the domestic currency loans we work 
with a set of 20 banks, whereas for the foreign currency loans the cross-sectional 
sample consists of only 16 banks. The reason for the lower number of banks in the 
latter case is because some of the banks had a licence to perform only domestic 
payment operations which includes granting loans only in domestic currency and 
were not licensed to perform international payment operations and to extend 
                                                 
31
 We do not consider the state-owned bank “Macedonian Bank for Development Promotion” a.d. 
Skopje for the reasons explained in section 1.4. 
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foreign currency loans (NBRM, 2002b-2009b). According to Roodman (2009a), 
the size of these cross-sectional samples may be problematic, especially in the 
case of foreign currency loans because the General Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator for dynamic panel data models is designed for large N and small T (see 
section 5.4). However, for this analysis the sample cannot be extended because 
covers all banks in Macedonia. A possible solution would be to include in the 
sample banks from the neighbouring economies or some other transitional 
economies but this it is problematic because of data unavailability and different 
monetary policy regimes. 
 Detailed description of each data series is presented in table 5.2:  
Table 5.2: Data description 
 
Source: NBRM and SSO. 
 The bank specific characteristics have been normalised according to their 
averages across all banks in the sample and they sum up to zero over all 
Variable: Description: Value Source:
LoansDen Outstanding loans to non-financial private sector in domestic currency (Denars). Nominal NBRM
LoansFX Outstanding loans to non-financial private sector in foreign currency. Nominal NBRM
MBKS Average weighted interbank interest rate. % annualised NBRM
EUR 3-month EURIBOR rate % annualised EUROSTAT
GDPr Real Gross Domestic Product.
In denars from 
1997
SSO and NBRM 
staff calculations
CPI1 Consumer price index.
Index, base year 
2000=100
SSO and NBRM 
staff calculations
REER Real effective exchange rate, 2003=100.
Index, base year 
2003=100
NBRM
Size Log of total assets. Normalised according to equation 5.2. Nominal NBRM
Liquid2
Ratio of liquid over total assets. It includes: cash in vault at the NBRM + short 
term deposits in accounts in banks abroad + CB bills and treasury bills with 
maturity up to 1 year + cheques and overdrafts + short term restricted deposits in 
accounts in banks abroad + short term security holdings issued by banks and 
saving houses + short term bonds issued by the state + short term credits granted 
to banks abroad. Normalised according to equation 5.3.
Nominal NBRM
Capital
Ratio of equity plus reserves over total assets. Normalised according to equation 
5.4.
Nominal NBRM
NPLTratio Ratio of NPL over total outstanding loans. Normalised according to equation 5.5. Ratio NBRM
ForOwn
Foreign ownership dummy variable.1 if foreign owned (50% of the total issued 
shares are owned by non-residents), 0 otherwise.
Dummy NBRM
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observations (Ehrmann et al., 2003). In other words, they are expressed as 
deviations from their cross sectional means. The size variable has been 
additionally normalised to each period mean in order to remove the general trend 
from this variable (Ehrmann et al., 2003). This procedure of normalisation of 
these three variables is usual in most of the empirical studies and is according to 
the equations below: 
 Sizeit = logAit - logAit                        (5.2) 
 Liqit =  -                           (5.3) 
 Capit =  -            (5.4) 
       NPLratioit =  -               (5.5) 
Where:  
 A, L, C and NPL represent bank assets, liquidity, size and non-performing 
loans respectively; 
 N and T indicate the size and the time length of the sample respectively; 
 i and t are bank and time specific subscripts. 
 
The main reason for this normalisation is that the average value of the bank 
specific variables equals zero. Hence, if we want to assess the impact of the 
reference interest rate over the stock of loans, we need to do a first order 
differentiation of the model 5.1 in respect of the reference rate (see section 3.2 for 
details). Hence, by normalising  the bank specific variables, the interaction terms 
XitMPIt and MPIt(NPLit/Lit) from the equation 5.1 on average are equal to zero, and 
the coefficient β2 is interpreted as a direct impact of the reference rate on the stock 
of loans on average (Ehrmann et al., 2003 and Gambacorta, 2005). An additional 
reason for the normalisation is that in this way any disturbances caused by minor 
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methodological changes in the balance sheet data can be reduced (Chmielewski, 
2006).  
There are some limitations of the data in terms of their reliability, 
methodological consistency and the way they have been collected and revised. 
Some of the data series have had minor methodological changes and have not 
been revised backwards i.e. balance sheet data for the banks and GDP. However, 
these limitations are perceived as minor and unlikely to affect the results 
significantly.  
 The summary statistics of each variable is presented in table 5.3, while the 
estimation strategy and method are presented in the next section.  
Table 5.3: Summary statistics 
 
Source: author‟s own calculations done in Eviews 6. 
As can be seen from table 5.3, the number of observations for the foreign 
ownership variable is lower compared to the other bank specific variables due to 
missing data for some banks at the beginning of the sample period.  
 
5.4 Estimation strategy and method 
 
 The estimation strategy goes from a general (unrestricted) to a more 
specific model in order to select the most parsimonious model. We use a panel 
Variable:  Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Observations
LoansDen 2906879 952248.5 36311387 21117 5245215 164
LoansFX 925946.1 167303.5 16892128 0 2240230 164
MBKS 8.156111 8.518964 12.00115 3.598527 3.055624 180
EUR 3.398889 3.32 4.63 2.11 0.968146 180
lCPI1 4.563905 4.554903 4.684727 4.4702 0.055731 180
GDPr 222455.5 216163 259838.2 200284 19744.69 180
REER 97.26046 96.8561 113.0669 88.444 7.706822 180
Size 7798137 2668321 59590494 464779 12400347 164
Liquid2 2712777 1016651 21570496 26367 4384432 164
Capital 1170754 785602 4885904 94041 997178.3 164
NPL 530602.7 120896.5 5285288 0 1080437 164
ForOwnDum 0.455696 0 1 0 0.499617 158
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data model in order to exploit the cross sectional and time variations among banks 
in exploring what are the major determinants of the stock of loans. It also controls 
for all unobservable factors that may also have an influence over banks‟ loans, 
which are captured by banks‟ specific characteristics; assuming that they are 
stable over the whole sample period. This is the major advantage of panel data 
models over the cross section and time series models.  
In selecting the most appropriate model and estimation method, we have 
firstly considered pooled OLS, Within Groups Estimator (WGE), fixed (FE) and 
random effects (RE) models, respectively. Due to the autoregressive nature of our 
model, none of these methods may be appropriate because of endogeneity arising 
from the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term, 
which means that these provide inconsistent and biased estimators. For example, 
the OLS provides upward biased estimates, while FE provides downward biased 
estimates (Roodman 2009a). Therefore, the most suitable approach is to use a 
dynamic panel model by employing the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and augmented by Arellano 
and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The reason for choosing this 
method is because it provides the most appropriate model specification in both 
economic and statistical senses. For instance, the regression is better specified 
than the other methods because it deals with the problem of endogeneity by using 
„internal‟ instruments (lagged and differenced lagged values of the endogenous 
regressors). Another advantage of this method is that it is able to disentangle 
between short-run and long-run relationships, which is considered important here. 
As we noted in the previous chapter, dynamic GMM is used in majority of the 
empirical studies in this area, although not without some problems (see section 
4.5.3). With this model the endogeneity of the lagged dependent variable is 
treated along with the possible endogenous nature of the other explanatory 
variables in the model discussed in section 5.2.  
However, a weakness of these models is that they are based on the 
assumption of no cross-sectional correlation among the units, which we will 
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empirically examine in section 5.5.3. In order to alleviate this problem time 
dummies are normally included. These would serve in this case to capture the 
effect of the overall expansion of the financial sector that otherwise may be 
included in the residuals of the model. In this way the correlation among 
individual banks may be reduced (Roodman 2009a). However, since the 
macroeconomic control variables (CPI and GDP) are included in the model (and 
given the estimation covers only one country these are constant over all banks for 
each year), time dummies are not included because of collinearity. Overall, due to 
the complexity of the whole area, as with other empirical studies in this field, we 
cannot predict and control for all possible complications. However, we use a 
method that is seen to deal most appropriately with the autoregressive nature of 
the model as well as the endogeneity of some of the other regressors which we 
argue is of importance. 
 There are two types of GMM estimators. The first one is the “difference” 
GMM that estimates the equation in first differences of the variables and uses the 
past level values of the endogenous regressors as instruments. However, this 
method in our case may perform poorly because most of the variables may have a 
unit root
32
. According to Bover (1995), Blundell and Bond (1998), Levine et al. 
(2000) and Roodman (2009a), the estimates from this method may be biased 
when the variables have near unit root process as here, since the lagged levels of 
the variables used as instruments may reveal little information on the differenced 
endogenous regressors. 
 The second one is the Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond 
(1998) “system” GMM estimator. It is more efficient than the “difference” GMM 
as it creates additional moment conditions and is argued to be preferable in these 
                                                 
32
 We have performed several tests for panel unit root like: Fisher ADF; Fisher PP; Im, Pesaran 
and Shin and Hadri tests, with constant and constant and trend by using Schwartz and Akaike lag 
length selection criteria, respectively. The results indicated that the outstanding loans in both 
domestic and foreign currency are not stationary. Regarding GDP, monetary policy rate and CPI, 
we have performed the Augmented Dickey Fuller and Phillips Perron tests with both, Akaike and 
Schwartz lag length selection criteria. The test results suggested that these variables are not 
stationary as well. Performing the same tests on the first differences of these variables, the test 
results implied that they are stationary. This may imply that these variables are I(1). 
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circumstances. Namely, this method simultaneously for each period, estimates 
system of equations in levels by using instruments in 1
st
 differences and equations 
in 1
st
 differences by using instruments in levels of the variables, as in the 
equations below: 
Yit = β1Yit-1 + Xitβ2 + (ui + εit)                   (5.6)          
Yit − Yit-1 = β1(Yit-1 − Yit-2) + β2 (Xit − Xit-1) + (εit  − εit-1 )                (5.7) 
where: yit is the dependent variable; yit-j is the lagged dependent variable; xit is a vector of 
exogenous, predetermined and/or endogenous variables, ui is a bank-specific error term and εit is 
the usual i.i.d. error term; i and t are bank and time specific subscripts, respectively; l indicates the 
number of lags.   
Nevertheless, the main problem with this method is that it is efficient for large N 
and small T, but for small N and relatively large T it gives a biased estimator. 
More specifically, as Roodman (2009b) argues, when T is large then there is a 
problem of overidentification because „too many‟ instruments are created. 
Consequently, this may weaken the results of Sargan/Hansen tests in a direction 
of under-rejection of the null hypothesis of joint validity of the instruments
33
, 
leading to a p-value of 1 or close to 1. According to the literature on “difference” 
and “system” GMM, the number of instruments (I) should be at least less than or 
equal to N (Roodman, 2009a). In many earlier studies in this area, estimated with 
“difference” GMM, the p-value of Sargan test was 1 or 0.99, even when these 
studies were conducted on samples with substantially greater N than here (see 
tables 4.1 and 4.2 and section 4.5.3). However, there are also other empirical 
studies in this area conducted on similar or even smaller cross-sectional size than 
the one used in this thesis. 
 With relatively small N and large T, Alvarez and Arellano (2003) argue 
for the use of Limited Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) in panels. 
However, as the authors explain, both of the above mentioned methods perform 
well for models with stationary variables but not for variables that have near unit 
root process. In our sample we have a small N and T is not large.   
                                                 
33
 The problem of „too many‟ instruments is relevant for “difference” GMM as well.  
n
l 1
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 In order to counteract the problem of creation of „too many‟ instruments 
relative to N, the number of instruments per period can be restricted using only 
certain lags. An associated procedure presented in Roodman (2009b) is 
“collapsing” the instruments by combining them into smaller sets. A third way 
suggested is a combination of these two methods. In the estimations reported in 
this chapter we have approached the problem of too many instruments by 
restricting and collapsing the instrument set(s).  Consequently, the total number of 
instruments created was reduced considerably and ranges from 16 (regression 2, 
table 5.4) to 29 (regression 2, tables 5.5). Even by applying this method in our 
investigation (restricting and collapsing the instrument set), we do not satisfy the 
condition I ≤ N, “..... as a minimally arbitrary rule of thumb....” (Roodman, 2009a, 
p. 99) in all cases. We are aware of the problems that may be caused by having 
“too many” instruments and this means that our results have to be treated with 
caution. 
 In “system” GMM dynamic panel estimation, the two-step estimator is 
more efficient than the one-step estimator, but nevertheless it is argued that two-
step standard errors estimates may be biased downwards in small (finite) samples 
(Roodman 2009a). Windmeijer (2005) develops a small sample correction of two-
step standard errors. The results using two-step estimators with Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard errors by restricting and collapsing the instrument set 
with the command xtabond2 are reported in tables 5.4 and 5.5. For a robustness 
check, the results of one-step estimators with robust standard errors are discussed 
in section 5.5.4.    
 In estimating each equation, a set of diagnostic tests are undertaken, and  
special attention is paid to the Hansen test for the validity of the instruments and 
the Arellano-Bond test for second order serial correlation in the error terms. The 
Hansen test is preferred over the Sargan test because it is robust in a presence of 
heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation, although the latter may not be so 
directly weakened by „too many‟ instruments (Roodman, 2009a).   
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 The results of the most restricted (parsimonious model) will be reported 
given the small N of only 20 for the domestic currency loans and 16 for the 
foreign currency loans and consequently, the relatively small number of 
observations. Having more variables in the model, leads to the creation of more 
instruments that may give rise to the previously mentioned problem of „too many‟ 
instruments. Moreover, estimating a model with more variables absorbs additional 
degrees of freedom that may bias the results of the GMM estimator for the reasons 
discussed previously in this section. 
 
5.5 Estimation results 
 
 This section discusses the estimation results of various model 
specifications going from the most general, equation 5.1, to the most 
parsimonious model. The same model specifications were estimated for both 
domestic and foreign currency loans. This section is divided into separate 
subsections in which we provide general discussion about the interpretation of the 
results, the process of selection of the most parsimonious model and finally, we 
interpret the results of the most restricted model selected. A robustness check is 
presented in subsection 5.5.4. 
 
5.5.1 General discussion about the interpretation of the results  
In interpreting the results, the main emphasis will be on the short-run 
estimates. The reason for this focus is that exploring banks‟ short-run reaction to 
changes in the money market rate is of more interest to monetary policy-makers. 
More precisely, monetary policy authorities in order to achieve their policy goals 
may use that information as an input in their decision-making process when 
attempting to smooth the short-run fluctuations of the economy. 
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Regarding the long-run estimates, the 3-year long-run cumulative effect 
will be briefly discussed. The rationale for choosing this period is that in the 
process of economic transition, other non-economic factors, such as legal reforms, 
are likely to affect the impact of the right hand side variables over a longer time 
period. The 3-year cumulative effect, the overall long-run effect
34
 and the 
respective multipliers of the final model specification are provided in appendix 
5.1.  
Where possible, a comparison of the results will be made with the 
empirical studies conducted for the CSEE economies, given that their financial 
structures are more like those of Macedonia. Nevertheless when comparing these 
results with those of other studies, some differences may appear that, as discussed 
in section 4.5.3, those might be due to the differences in the model specifications 
and the estimator employed, i.e. majority of the empirical studies use “difference” 
GMM (see table 4.3). Moreover, in comparing the results with the previous 
empirical studies, we need to be aware of the high variation of the reported 
estimates in respect of the coefficient size and magnitudes (see section 4.5.3). 
In selecting the most parsimonious model, firstly we will assess the 
diagnostic tests such as, Arellano-Bond test for the second order serial correlation 
and Sargan and Hansen tests for the joint validity of the instrument sets. 
Additionally, we have performed the difference-in-Hansen test that may be used 
to test if “system” GMM is „more appropriate‟ than the “difference” GMM. As 
suggested by Sarafidis et al. (2006), this test may also be used as a proxy indicator 
for the presence of cross-sectional dependence. 
We decided to include the contemporary values of the independent 
regressors and only one lag of the dependent variable. This was done for two 
                                                 
34
 The overall long-run effect is calculated with the following formula: / (1 - ), 
where β is the coefficient(s) of the independent variable, y is the coefficient(s) of the lagged 
dependent variable, t is the time subscript and l indicates the number of lags. In STATA 10 we use 
the nlcom command for calculating the long-run coefficients and their statistical significance 
(Papke and Wooldridge, 2005). 
t
t
1l
lty
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reasons: first, because we work with an annual data set and therefore, including 
more time lags does not seem appropriate from an economic viewpoint as 
adjustment in the financial sector is considered to be relatively quick. Second, to 
generate a better model specification, in a statistical sense, when selecting the 
most parsimonious model.  
The final model specifications are variants on the general form presented 
in equation 5.1. The initial investigation started from this as reflecting the 
underlying theory and variables found to be important elsewhere in the transition 
environment.  However, in our specification search we were aware of the need to 
specify as restricted a model as possible, given the need to keep the number of 
instruments relatively low. 
 
5.5.2 Estimation strategy for selecting the most parsimonious model 
Starting from the most general model presented in equation 5.1, the 
estimated results for both domestic and foreign currency loans indicate that the 
model suffers from the problem of „too many‟ instruments. The most general 
model specification contains „too many‟ variables relative to the cross-sectional 
dimension of the sample. Even by restricting and collapsing the instrument set 
there remained a problem of „too many‟ instruments, implied by the value of 
Hansen test equal close to 1. In order to get a more restricted model selection we 
have assessed the economic rationale for the inclusion of some variables in the 
model and the arguments for their possible ambiguous implication in the case of 
Macedonia (as discussed in section 5.2). We have also considered their statistical 
significance (while acknowledging that such estimates of significance are the 
result of problematic estimation). In restricting the model we choose not to 
exclude the basic variables that are included in the original model of Bernanke 
and Blinder (see section 4.2).  
We started first by assessing the impact and the statistical significance of 
the REER variable. The results from both models for domestic and foreign 
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currency loans indicated that this variable is statistically insignificant at the 10% 
level of significance. Thus, given the economic arguments that in the case of 
Macedonia this variable may a priori have an ambiguous impact (see section 5.2), 
we decided to exclude it from the model. 
In the more restricted model there was again a problem of „too many‟ 
instruments, implied by the p-value of Hansen test that was equal to 1. We next 
assessed the statistical significance of the foreign ownership variable and its 
interaction term with the money market rate. The results indicated that the 
interaction term of the foreign ownership variable is individually statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level of significance and in all model specifications, 
whereas both terms (single and the interaction terms) are jointly insignificant at 
10% level of significance as well. Moreover, even using some insider information 
from the bank supervision department from the NBRM in order to clearly 
distinguish which banks are de facto foreign-owned and which only de jure (as it 
was discussed in section 5.2) in defining the dummy variable; the foreign 
ownership was again statistically insignificant. This may be due to the impact of 
long-term borrowings from abroad (see sections 1.5 and 5.2). Consequently, we 
decided to exclude it from the models. 
The more parsimonious model for the domestic and foreign currency loans 
thus was reduced to the following form:  
log(Loansit) = β0 + β1log(Loansit-1) + β2MPIt + β3log(GDPt) + β4logCPIt + β5Xit + 
β6XitMPIt + β7NPLit/Lit + β8MPIt(NPLit/Lit) + (ui + εit)                                        (5.8)                            
However, this model specification again had the problem of too many 
instruments. The p-value of the Hansen test in the majority of the regressions was 
around 1. We decided to assess the statistical impact of the NPL ratio and its 
interaction term, given the discussion in section 5.2. In most of the cases they had 
a contrary sign from what was expected and were jointly insignificant at 10% 
level of significance. Accordingly, we decided to exclude this variable from the 
model and proceed with the final, most restricted model below: 
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log(Loansit) = β0 + β1log(Loansit-1) + β2MPIt + β3log(GDPt) + β4logCPIt + β5Xit + 
β6XitMPIt +  (ui + εit)                           (5.9)   
The estimates for the remaining variables changed a little with the deletions and 
are discussed in the following subsection.  
 
5.5.3 Interpretation of the results of the most parsimonious models 
The two-step results with Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors for 
the currency disaggregated loans are presented in tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. 
The regressions are classified according to the interaction term of each bank 
specific characteristic (size, liquidity and capitalisation). The STATA printouts 
are given in appendices 5.2 and 5.3.  
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Table 5.4: Estimates of outstanding loans in domestic currency 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in domestic currency. 
 
Notes: estimated by two-step “system” GMM estimator with Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
standard errors, by restricting and collapsing the instrument set with the command xtabond2.  
***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. 
Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
Computations have been done in STATA 10. 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for Size Controlling for Liquidity2 Controlling for Capital 
L.lLoansDen 0.823*** 0.851*** 0.823***
(0.274) (0.275) (0.171)
MBKS  -0.047*  -0.083**  -0.042**
(0.0247) (0.0350) (0.0198)
lCPI1 3.797** 2.935* 3.113**
(1.756) (1.649) (1.380)
lGDPr -2.054 -2.802 -2.079
(2.212) (1.915) (1.327)
SizeNorm 0.365
(0.228)
SizenormMBKS -0.014
(0.019)
Liquid2Norm 0.630
(1.574)
Liquid2normMBKS -0.210
(0.182)
CapitalNorm -2.175**
(0.797)
CapitalnormMBKS 0.210***
-0.046
Constant 10.92 23.99 14.31
Number of observations: 144 144 144
Number of banks 20 20 20
Number of instruments 17 16 25
F-test for the significance of the 
whole regression (p-value)
F(6, 19) = 170.10 (0.00)                                      F(6, 19) = 38.6 (0.00)                                      F(6, 19) = 425.53 (0.00)                                      
F-test for the joint significance of 
the bank specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
F(2, 19) = 1.45 (0.26) F(2, 19) = 1.84 (0.19) F(2, 19) = 10.53 (0.00)
AR(1)/(p-value) -1.59 (0.11)  -1.67 (0.10)  -1.64 ( 0.10)
AR(2)/(p-value)  -1.04 (0.30)  0.37 (0.71)  -1.29 ( 0.20)
Sargan (p-value) 0.08 0.09 0.19
Hansen (p-value) 0.35 0.40 0.74
Diff. in Hansen for "system" over 
"difference" GMM (p-value)
0.43 0.29 1.0
Diff. in Hansen for the instruments 
for the lagged dependent variable 
(p-value)
0.36 0.70 0.81
Estimates of L.lLoansDen with FE 0.51 0.37 0.58
Estimates of L.lLoansDen with 
OLS
0.84 0.96 0.91
VARIABLES:
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Table 5.5: Estimates of outstanding loans in foreign currency 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in foreign currency 
 
Notes: estimated by two-step “system” GMM estimator with Windmeijer (2005) corrected 
standard errors, by restricting and collapsing the instrument set with the command xtabond2.  
***/**/* denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively. Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard errors in parenthesis. 
Computations have been done in STATA 10.  
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for Size Controlling for Liquidity2 Controlling for Capital 
L.lLoansFX 0.314** 0.456** 0.583**
(0.135) (0.179) (0.231)
EUR -0.270* -0.259** -0.197**
(0.142) (0.102) (0.0877)
lCPI1 2.665 5.572 1.262
(4.678) (7.670) (3.591)
lGDPr 0.415 0.0959 0.468
(3.094) (4.144) (1.904)
SizeNorm 0.433
(0.462)
SizenormEUR 0.170***
(0.0561)
Liquid2Norm -0.336
(11.86)
Liquid2normEUR 0.384
(3.122)
CapitalNorm -2.749
(2.211)
CapitalnormEUR 0.112
(0.431)
Constant -7.974 -18.83 -5.531
(27.390) (36.359) (16.134)
Number of observations: 105 105 105
Number of banks 16 16 16
Number of instruments 18 29 21
F-test for the significance of the 
whole regression (p-value)
F(6, 15) = 19.89 (0.00)                                      F(6, 15) = 8.42 (0.00)                                      F(6, 15) = 19.89 (0.00)                                      
F-test for the joint significance of 
the bank specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
F(2, 15) = 23.10 (0.00) F(2, 15) = 0.11 (0.90) F(2, 15) = 0.95 (0.41)
AR(1)/(p-value)  -0.98 (0.33)  -0.98 (0.33)  -0.98 (0.33)
AR(2)/(p-value)  -0.94 (0.35)  -0.95 (0.34)  -0.94 (0.35)
Sargan (p-value) 0.92 0.00 0.92
Hansen (p-value) 0.85 0.93 0.85
Diff. in Hansen for "system" over 
"difference" GMM (p-value)
1.0 0.98 1.0
Diff. in Hansen for the instruments 
for the lagged dependent variable 
(p-value)
0.90 0.46 1.0
Estimates of L.lLoansFX with FE 0.15 0.10 0.17
Estimates of L.lLoansFX with OLS 0.57 0.79 0.86
VARIABLES:
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All model specifications reported satisfy the criteria of no second order 
serial correlation in the residuals. The null hypothesis of the Arellano-Bond test 
cannot be rejected at 10% level of significance. Regarding the validity of the 
instruments, the results of Hansen test point to non rejection of the null hypothesis 
of validity of the over-identifying restrictions at the 10% level of significance. By 
restricting and collapsing the instrument sets we managed to substantially reduce 
the number of instruments. Unlike the case of the more general models discussed 
in the previous subsection, we managed to reduce the p-value of Hansen test 
below 1. It now ranges from 0.35 (regression 1, table 5.4) to 0.93 (regression 2, 
table 5.5). These p-values of the Hansen test are greater than the rule of thumb of 
0.25 that is suggested by Roodman (2009b). However, the value of 0.93 might 
still be close enough to 1 to be worrisome. The results of Sargan test, apart from 
regression 2, table 5.5, give the non rejection of the null hypothesis of validity of 
the over-identifying restrictions at the 5% level of significance. However, the 
results of Sargan test should be taken with caution because as mentioned in 
section 5.4, they are not robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
As additional specification test we have conducted the difference-in-
Hansen test for the joint validity of the differenced instruments used for the level 
equation. The results indicated that at 10% level of significance we cannot reject 
the null hypothesis of their joint validity, supporting the choice of “system” over 
“difference” GMM (see appendices 5.2 and 5.3). Moreover, as a „rough‟ test for 
the presence of cross-sectional dependence in the model we also used the 
difference-in-Hansen test for the validity of the instruments for the lagged value 
of the dependent variable (Sarafidis et al., 2006 and Pugh et al., 2010). 
Accordingly, the test results indicated that at 25% level of significance we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis for the joint validity of the instruments for the lagged 
value of the dependent variable in each regression (see tables 5.4 and 5.5 and 
appendices 5.2 and 5.3, respectively). This implies that there is not sufficient 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous error cross section 
dependence. Overall, although the diagnostics appear to be satisfactory, though it 
should be born in mind that due to the relatively small N, the interpretation of the 
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results should be taken with caution, particularly for the foreign currency loans 
estimations.  
 Related to the identification of the loan supply function of domestic 
currency loans, from the results presented in Table 5.4 in all three regressions, it 
can be noticed that the loan supply function is identified, since one of the 
variables that is unique to the loan demand function, such as CPI (see equation 
4.19), is statistically significant in all three regressions. However, regarding the 
loan supply function of foreign currency loans, from the results presented in Table 
5.5 in all three regressions none of the variables that are unique to the loan 
demand function, such as GDP and CPI, are statistically significant. This suggests 
that the loan supply function of foreign currency loans is not identified.  
We proceed by comparing and contrasting the interpretation of the results 
in respect of domestic and foreign currency loans. The lagged coefficient of the 
log of outstanding loans for both domestic and foreign currency loans is, as 
expected, highly significant and has a positive sign. Regarding the domestic 
currency loans, the short-run coefficient is around 0.82 in all three specifications. 
In respect of foreign currency loans, the magnitude of this coefficient is lower and 
varies more between the specifications, ranging from 0.31 to 0.58. These results 
imply relatively high inertia in the adjustment process of the stock of both 
domestic and foreign currency loans. This indicates that a relatively high 
proportion of the current value is determined by its own past value. Compared to 
estimates for other economies, these coefficients are much higher. In the Czech 
Republic estimates range from -0.11 to 0.08 (Pruteanu-Podpiera, 2007) estimated 
on quarterly data. In Ukraine the estimate is 0.12 (Golodnuik, 2006) while in 
Slovenia, Poland and Hungary the highest estimates are 0.2, 0.3 and 0.3, 
respectively (Matousek and Sarantis, 2009). Both of latter studies utilise annual 
data sets. Some of the possible reasons for the differences among the coefficients 
are already discussed in section 5.5.1.  
 For domestic currency loans, the domestic money market rate (MBKS) has 
a negative estimated coefficient as expected and is significant in all regressions in 
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both the short-run and 3-year cumulative effect. The size of the short-run 
estimates ranges from -4% (regression 3, table 5.4) to -8% (regression 2, table 
5.4), for a one percentage point increase in MBKS. This suggests that domestic 
currency loans react significantly to changes in the domestic money market rate, 
implying the existence of a bank lending channel. Compared to the other studies 
conducted for various transition economies, a similar adjustment size of around 
8% is estimated in Ukraine (Golodniuk, 2006). However, a lower impact of the 
domestic reference rate on the quantity of loans is estimated in Poland 
(Havrylchyk and Jurzyk 2005), ranging from 1.3% to 2.2%. The 3-year long-run 
cumulative effect and the multiplier of MBKS rate are again significant in all 
three model specifications. The three year cumulative effect ranges from -14% to 
-28% (see appendix 5.1).  
The results for foreign currency loans imply that they react significantly 
and more strongly to changes in the foreign money market rate in both the short-
run and in 3-year cumulative period than do domestic currency loans to the 
domestic interest rate. The size of the short-run estimates ranges from 20% up to 
27%. This suggests that foreign currency loans are much more sensitive to 
changes in the relevant money market rate compared to the loans in domestic 
currency. This finding is in line with the results of Schmitz (2004) for the eight 
CSEE economies and Kohler et al. (2006) for the Baltic States (both of them 
based on aggregated stock of loans), where in the latter study the coefficient 
ranges from 12% to 20%. The 3-year long-run multipliers and the cumulative 
effect of foreign reference rate are again always significant. The three year 
cumulative effect ranges from -47% to -55% (see appendix 5.1). 
 The price level (CPI) enters positively as expected and is statistically 
significant in all three regressions in the supply function for domestic currency 
loans in the estimates for both, short- and 3-year cumulative period. However, in 
the regressions for foreign currency loans, the price level is insignificant in all 
model specifications. This may be because banks in granting foreign currency 
loans believe that are partially hedged from the possible risks of an unstable 
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macroeconomic environment and higher inflation, as these risks are largely 
transmitted to the borrowers. Consistent results, where the price level has a 
significant impact for the loans denominated in domestic currency but not for 
loans denominated in foreign currency are presented in Benkovskis (2008) for the 
case of Latvia.  
In the regressions for domestic currency loans, the size of the short-run 
estimates of price level coefficient are of a similar magnitude, ranging from 3 to 
3.8, implying a relatively high elasticity of the stock of domestic currency loans to 
changes in the price level. This estimated loan elasticity to variations in price level 
in Macedonia is considerably higher than estimates for Hungary where the price 
elasticity is estimated from 0.1 to 0.3 (Horvath et al., 2006). In Poland estimates 
of the price elasticity are more spread and range from 2 up to 10 depending from 
the model specification (Chmielewski, 2006). In Latvia, this coefficient ranges 
from 2 up to 4.5 (Benkovskis, 2008). Some of the possible reasons for the 
relatively high sensitivity of loans to price variations in Macedonia were 
discussed in section 5.2. The 3-year long-run cumulative effect of the price level 
is much stronger; the coefficients range from 10 to 13 (see appendix 5.1).    
 The other macroeconomic control variable (GDP) is statistically 
insignificant in both short- and long-run estimates in the two sets of domestic and 
foreign currency loans functions. In the regressions for the domestic currency 
loans, GDP enters with a negative sign, which is contrary to what is normally 
expected. Some possible reasons are considered in section 5.2. GDP has also been 
estimated to have a negative effect in other studies. For example, it has a negative 
sign in most of the estimates for Poland (Chmielewski, 2006), Slovenia and 
Hungary (Matousek and Sarantis, 2009) and in some of the estimates for 
Netherlands (de Haan, 2003), as well as in France and Spain (Ehrmann et al., 
2003). Regarding the foreign currency loans, the GDP coefficient has, as 
expected, a positive sign but is again statistically insignificant. 
 Regarding the single and interaction terms of the bank specific 
characteristics, the results for the domestic currency loans suggest that capital, as 
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a proxy for banks‟ standing in the financial market, has a statistically significant 
impact in both the short- and 3-year cumulative period estimates. However, the 
single term of capital is estimated with a contrary sign to the theoretical 
predictions. The interaction term of the capital variable with the domestic money 
market rate is also significant and enters with the expected (positive) sign. The 
estimate suggests that more capitalised banks reduce the quantity of loans 
proportionately less when the domestic money market rate increases compared to 
the less capitalised banks. However, in order to investigate whether the positive 
effect is greater than the negative, we did a first order differentiation of the model 
in respect of the capital variable, as explained in section 3.2, conditional on the 
weighted mean value of the domestic reference rate. The estimates indicated that 
the overall effect in respect of the capital variable is positive (but quite small). 
The two other single and interaction terms of the banks‟ specific characteristics 
(size and liquidity) are insignificant. We have performed a joint F-test of the 
single and the interaction terms of the bank specific characteristics for the short-
run estimates. The results (see table 5.4 and appendix 5.2) indicate that the single 
and interaction term of capital are jointly significant at 1% level of significance. 
However, the F-test for the other two bank specific characteristics gives jointly 
insignificance at the 10% level. The long-run estimates for the single and 
interaction terms of bank specific variables and their joint significance are given 
in appendix 5.1. The results are in line with the short-run estimates, suggesting 
that the variables containing capital (the single and interaction term), are 
individually and jointly significant, whereas the other two variables and their 
interaction terms (size and liquidity) are jointly insignificant. 
With the foreign currency loans, none of the single terms of the bank 
specific characteristics has a statistically significant impact on the stock of loans  
in the short-run estimates. Regarding the interaction terms the results imply that 
only the asset size is significant and is of the expected sign. The estimate suggests 
that larger banks reduce the quantity of loans by proportionately less when the 
foreign money market rate tightens compared to the smaller banks. The other two 
interaction terms with the bank specific characteristics do not have a statistically 
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significant impact. We have again performed the F-test to investigate the joint 
significance of the single and the interaction terms of the bank specific variable. 
The results imply that asset size is jointly significant at 1% level of significance, 
whereas the other two bank specific characteristics are jointly insignificant at 10% 
level of significance. The long-run estimates (the 3-year cumulative effects) for 
the individual and the interaction terms of bank specific variables and their joint 
significance are given in appendix 5.1. The estimates for the long-run and the 3-
year cumulative effect suggest that the single terms of size and capital are 
statistically significant, but the latter is estimated with contrary sign from the prior 
expectations. Regarding the interaction terms of the bank specific variables and 
the foreign reference rate, the results are in line with the short-run estimates, with 
the interaction term of size being statistically significant with the expected 
positive sign. Assessing the joint significance of the single and interaction terms 
of the bank specific variable, the estimates indicated that only the terms 
containing the asset size are jointly significant (see appendix 5.1), which is again 
consistent with the short-run estimates. 
 Overall, the short-run and 3-year long-run estimates suggest that the 
domestic currency loans significantly react to changes in the domestic reference 
rate, implying that the bank lending channel exists in the Macedonian banking 
system. However, the loan adjustment of foreign currency loans with respect of 
foreign reference rate is stronger, which is beyond the control of domestic 
monetary policy makers. These results may suggest that the fixed exchange rate 
regime, the possibility for banks to borrow financial resources from abroad and 
the continual increase of the share of the foreign currency loans in the total loans 
(see section 1.6 and figure 1.14) may weaken the impact of the domestic money 
market rate on the overall loans. 
 
5.5.4 Robustness check 
 The robustness of the results has been checked by using different GMM 
estimators. We have re-estimated the same model specifications with a one-step 
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“system” GMM estimator with robust standard errors by restricting and collapsing 
the number of instrument sets, using the xtabond2 command (see appendix 5.4). 
When re-estimating the same regressions by one-step “system” GMM with robust 
standard errors and reducing and collapsing the instrument sets (see appendix 
5.4), the results indicate that all model specifications again satisfy all diagnostic 
criteria. Regarding the significance of the coefficients, the major difference for 
domestic currency loans is that the price level is now statistically insignificant for 
the regression containing the liquidity variable. The significance of the rest of the 
variables for both the domestic and foreign currency loans  is in line with the 
previously discussed results in section 5.5.3. Regarding the sign and size of the 
significant coefficients, the results in general are consistent with the ones 
discussed previously. 
 As additional informal robustness check of the estimates, suggested by 
Roodman (2009a) and Bond (2002), is to verify if the estimates of the lagged 
dependent variable lie between the estimates using FE and OLS (see tables 5.4 
and 5.5). The first method tends to bias the estimates downwards, while the 
second method tends to bias the estimates upwards. The results indicate that the 
reported estimates in the previous subsection appear to be acceptable. More 
precisely, the estimates of the lagged dependent variables (the stock of loans) in 
all model specifications lie between the estimates obtained by FE and OLS (see 
the last two columns in tables 5.4 and 5.5). 
 
5.5.5 Comparison of the results with “difference” GMM 
 This subsection compares the results discussed in section 5.5.3 with the 
results estimated by employing the “difference” GMM estimator, as this method is 
employed by the majority of the empirical studies for the CSEE (see table 4.3). 
On a priori grounds we expect the results to be different because, as it is argued in 
section 5.4, the “difference” GMM estimator does not deal adequately with 
instrumenting variables that have near unit root.  
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We report the results estimated by one-step “difference” GMM estimator 
with robust standard errors (see appendix 5.5). The one-step, instead of two-step 
estimator, is reported because in “difference” GMM a two-step estimator biases 
the standard errors downwards (de Haan, 2003 and Roodman, 2009a).  
Considering the diagnostic tests (see appendix 5.5), they are quite different 
from the ones discussed in section 5.5.3. The major difference is that now, in two 
out of three regressions for the domestic currency loans, the null hypothesis of no 
second order serial correlation cannot be rejected at 10% level of significance. 
Another noticeable difference is the Sargan test for the foreign currency loans. In 
all three model specifications the test results indicate that the null hypothesis for 
joint validity of the instruments can be rejected at 5% level of significance. The 
significance of the parameters are also quite different. For example, the reference 
rate in the regressions with liquidity is now insignificant for both domestic and 
foreign currency loans. Moreover, the lagged value of the dependent variable is 
insignificant in all three regressions for the foreign currency loans. In the 
regressions for the domestic currency loans, now the single and interaction terms 
in respect of liquidity variable are jointly significant, but with a contrary 
(negative) sign from the prior expectations. Regarding the foreign currency loans, 
unlike before, all the three bank specific characteristics are estimated as jointly 
significant at the 1% level of significance.  
Overall, in section 4.5.3 we noted the variation in the results found in the 
existing literature and the differences between these results and our own (section 
5.5.3). The estimates presented in this subsection suggest that these differences 
may not just reflect between country differences, but may also reflect the 
estimation method used. 
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5.6 Conclusions 
 
 The aim of this chapter was to empirically investigate the bank lending 
channel and its determinants in Macedonia. Due to the specific structure of the 
banking system, the monetary policy regime and the high trade openness of the 
economy, we investigated two loan functions according to the currency of the 
loans. Given recent developments in econometric techniques, we use a different 
estimation method from majority of the empirical studies in this area that is 
arguably preferable given the likely non-stationarity of our data. The factors that 
were considered to proxy banks‟ standing on the financial markets were asset size, 
liquidity, capitalisation ratio, and we also considered the impact of the foreign 
ownership and the NPL ratio as possible important factors affecting the stock of 
loans from the supply side in Macedonia.  
 The discussed short-run and 3-year long-run estimates provide evidence in 
favour of the existence of a lending channel. Changes in the money market rates 
do have a significant influence on the stock of of both domestic and foreign 
currency loans. The major difference is that the foreign currency loans react more 
strongly to changes in the foreign money market rate, than the domestic currency 
loans to the domestic rate. These findings are robust to different model 
specifications and different estimation methods. This suggests that the specific 
currency structure of the outstanding loans such as the relatively high proportion 
of the foreign currency loans (see section 1.6), the fixed exchange rate regime and 
the possibility of banks to borrow funds from abroad may weaken the impact of 
domestic money market rate on the overall loan function. More precisely, banks 
may borrow at a cheaper price from foreign financial markets and place those 
funds in the domestic loan market where they can get relatively a high rate of 
return.    
Of the bank specific factors that proxy a banks‟ access to non-deposit 
funding, the results indicated that only bank capital has a significant role 
determining banks‟ supply of domestic currency loans. Regarding the foreign 
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currency loans, there is statistical evidence that only the asset size is a significant 
determinant of the different loan reaction functions among banks. These findings 
are robust to the number of instruments selected and estimation methods. 
However, the caveat considered earlier on the number of instruments relative to 
the cross-sectional sample, means that these results have to be treated with 
caution, particularly for the foreign currency estimations.   
 Overall, this analysis has presented empirical evidence indicating that 
banks in Macedonia react to changes in domestic and foreign money market rates 
by adjusting the quantity of loans supplied. However, banks‟ reaction function to 
changes in domestic money market rate is weaker than their reaction to foreign 
money market rates. This is similar with the findings for the other transition 
economies that have either fixed exchange rate regime or a currency board, such 
as the Baltic States. The presented findings in this chapter may imply that the 
specific structure of the banking system, the regime of de facto fixed exchange 
rate and the relatively high share of the foreign currency loans in the total 
outstanding loans (section 1.6) may limit the independent impact of the domestic 
monetary policy on banks‟ lending decisions. 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
The main motivation for starting this research four years ago was to assess 
whether the current monetary policy regime in the Republic of Macedonian, as 
well as in the rest of the CSEE economies that have a de facto fixed exchange rate 
or currency board regime, was appropriate for achieving the price stability goal. In 
addition, this research programme questions whether an alternative monetary 
policy regime would be more effective. One alternative for example might be an 
inflation targeting regime, which is now operative in some CSEE economies 
(Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary). Hence, an aim of this thesis was to assess 
whether some of the main preconditions for adopting this latter regime are met in 
Macedonia (see section 1.1). This thesis therefore provides evidence of relevance 
to monetary policy makers about their preparedness and readiness to maintain the 
current peg of the national currency to the Euro during the forthcoming period of 
EMU accession together with full capital account liberalisation. Accordingly, the 
findings of this thesis have some relevance for the transition economies that have 
similar economic and financial structure and monetary policy regime like the 
Baltic States, Croatia and Bulgaria.  
In order to fulfill these aims and to provide policy implications, this 
research has focused on investigating the effectiveness of two major channels of 
monetary transmission: the interest rate and bank lending channels. The reason for 
focusing on these two channels is that according to Carrere et al. (2002) and 
Batini et al. (2006), their effectiveness in transmitting changes in the monetary 
policy stance is one of the main preconditions for implementation of an inflation 
targeting regime, although as we discuss in section 6.3, they may be to some 
extent endogenous to the monetary policy regime. However, in the case of the 
transition economies that have a fixed exchange rate, a high level of currency 
substitution and where banks‟ are dependent on foreign financing with a relatively 
high level of foreign ownership in the banking sector, these factors may weaken 
the impact of the domestic monetary policy instruments. Thus, this may make the 
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domestic monetary policy „ineffective‟. Hence, the main research questions of this 
thesis were:  
1) What is the size of the short-run lending rate adjustment to changes in 
the domestic „cost of funds‟ rate in Macedonia and is it homogeneous 
among banks? 
2) What factors affect the size of the short-run lending rate adjustment in 
Macedonia?  
3) Does a bank lending channel exist in an economy with a fixed exchange 
rate like Macedonia and what is the size of the adjustment of banks‟ 
loans to changes in the reference rate? 
4) Is the loan adjustment heterogenous across banks and,if so, what are 
the major determinants for this heterogenous adjustment? 
5) Do the interest rate and bank lending channels work in the same 
direction (complement each other) or in the opposite direction (conflict 
with each other) and are they operational from the monetary policy 
point of view? 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 6.2 summarises the main 
findings of each of the previous five chapters and discusses how those findings 
relate to the five main research questions. The policy implications of these 
findings are examined in section 6.3. In sections 6.4 and 6.5 the limitations of the 
research and areas for further research will be assessed. In the final section of this 
chapter the main contributions to knowledge of this research programme are 
summarised. 
 
6.2 Main findings of the research 
 
In order to address the major research questions of this thesis presented in 
the previous section, chapter 1 provides a general discussion of the monetary 
policy and the banking system in the Republic of Macedonia. This assessment of 
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these areas was undertaken to identify the specific characteristics of the 
Macedonian banking system, the way monetary policy is conducted and their 
relevance for the empirical investigations conducted in chapters 3 and 5. The 
major findings of chapter 1 are that the Macedonian banking sector is among the 
most concentrated in CSEE and according to the EBRD‟s index for banking sector 
reforms and interest rate liberalisation, it lacks additional banking sector reforms 
associated with reducing further the entry costs into the banking market (see 
section 1.4). An additional finding of chapter 1 is that banks are to a great extent 
dependent on foreign financing (see section 1.5), and the presence of foreign 
ownership in the banking sector and the level of currency substitution is amongst 
the highest in CSEE (see sections 1.4 and 1.6).  
Related to the first and the second research questions, chapter 2 critically 
assesses the theory and empirical studies related to the issue of how banks‟ set 
their retail rates and what determines their retail rate-setting decisions. This 
enabled us to identify what factors we should take into account in our empirical 
model in chapter 3 as possible determinants of banks‟ retail rate setting. 
Furthermore, by the critical analysis of empirical studies we were able to identify 
the main gaps and weaknesses in the empirical literature, which helped us in 
selecting the estimation strategy and method to be adopted in the empirical 
analysis reported in chapter 3. It was argued that the main weaknesses of previous 
studies were related to their data series and estimation method(s) used (see section 
2.3.5). Regarding the former, the majority of the empirical studies examined the 
size of the interest rate pass-through with aggregated data set(s) that, as discussed 
in section 2.3.5, may lead to aggregation bias. Moreover, in empirical studies 
related to the transition economies, the majority of them have used an aggregated 
interest rate series that include loans in all currency denominations. Accordingly, 
the results in those studies do not clearly indicate to what extent banks‟ adjust 
their lending rates to changes in the domestic and foreign „cost of funds‟ rates, 
respectively. This may lead to „inappropriate‟ policy implications being drawn 
regarding whether the interest rate channel is operational. Related to the 
estimation methods applied, the majority of these studies do not control for cross-
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sectional correlation among the units (banks), which given that they face a similar 
economic environment, at any point in time may be expected.  
By critically assessing the theoretical background of how banks set their 
retail rates and identifying the major weaknesses and gaps in previous empirical 
studies, the empirical investigation conducted in chapter 3 enables the first and the 
second research questions to be addressed. Regarding the first research question, 
one of the main findings of the analysis presented in chapter 3 is that the size of 
the short-run lending rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate was 
incomplete (much below 1) and differed across individual banks in Macedonia 
(see section 3.5.1). Additionally, the results implied that the stability of the size of 
the lending rate adjustment also differs among banks (see section 3.5.1). These 
findings imply that the short-run pass-through process is unsynchronised across 
the banks in the Macedonian economy. Moreover, the results indicated that the 
key policy rate (CB Bills) does not significantly affect banks‟ short-run 
adjustment of the lending rates (see section 3.5.2). A possible explanation for this, 
as argued in section 3.2, may be that the key policy rate may serve more as an 
alternative investment for the banks, instead of the cost of financing their lending 
activities. This might be due to the de facto fixed exchange rate regime and the 
way monetary policy is currently conducted in the Republic of Macedonia (see 
sections 1.4 and 1.7). 
With respect to the second research question, the empirical findings in 
chapter 3 indicate that various bank specific characteristics play different roles in 
determining the size of the lending rate adjustment. One of the major findings of 
the thesis is that the relationship between the size of the pass-through multiplier 
and the effect of banks‟ specific characteristics, the two macroeconomic control 
variables and the banking concentration index variable differ considerably among 
the banks (see section 3.5.1). More precisely, the significance and sign of the 
estimated coefficients of these variables are not consistent across the cross-
sectional units. These findings question the appropriateness of most previous 
research that has explored the determinants of the interest rate pass-through using 
CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
264 
 
aggregated data sets (see section 2.3.1). These studies assumed that the impact of 
these variables on banks‟ retail rate setting decisions was homogeneous. 
Overall, the findings of chapter 3 suggest that the short-run lending rate 
adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate is heterogeneous among the 
banks. Given this, using aggregated data set(s) that are constructed by averaging 
bank-level series before the estimation process will suppress banks‟ 
heterogeneous behaviour and will give rise to aggregation bias as discussed in 
section 2.3.5. In our case, this can be inferred by heterogeneity in the estimated 
size of the lending rate adjustment to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate and the 
heterogeneous impact of the control variables on the size of the pass-through 
among the Macedonian banks. 
In respect of the third and fourth research question, chapter 4 provided an 
assessment of the theoretical foundations and empirical studies of the bank 
lending channel. This chapter presented a critical appraisal of the theory related to 
the bank lending channel and investigated the main modifications to the Bernanke 
and Blinder (1988a, b) model. Additionally, by surveying the empirical studies for 
developed and the transition economies from CSEE, we were able to identify the 
main gaps and weaknesses of the estimation method(s) used in previous empirical 
studies and hence, to select the most appropriate method for our empirical 
analysis presented in chapter 5. More precisely, the majority of the empirical 
studies estimate the loan function with “difference” GMM that in the case when 
variables contain near unit root process may provide biased and less efficient 
estimates compared to “system” GMM (see section 5.4). An additional weakness 
of these empirical studies, arising from the estimation method applied, was related 
to the problem of creating „too many‟ instruments (see section 4.5.3). A further 
possible weakness of the empirical studies conducted for the transition economies 
was associated with the data series used: the majority of these studies use 
aggregated stock of loans series that include all currency denominations. We 
argue that this may bias the results because the impact of changes in the domestic 
and the foreign reference rates on banks‟ loans cannot be clearly disentangled. In 
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assessing the empirical studies for transition economies we considered some 
additional variables specific to the case of these economies. Those variables were: 
the REER, the foreign reference rate, foreign ownership of the banking sector and 
additionally, unlike majority of the empirical studies, we have considered the NPL 
ratio as a proxy indicator for banks‟ risk preferences. The analysis presented in 
chapter 5 responds directly to the third and fourth research questions by 
empirically examining the functioning of the bank lending channel and what 
determines variations in the stock of loans. Accordingly, it investigates two loan 
functions according to the currency denomination of the loans. This enables us to 
draw conclusions on the effect of the domestic reference rate on domestic 
currency loans and the foreign reference rate (that is outside the control of 
domestic policy makers) on foreign currency loans. 
Related to the third research question, the investigation in chapter 5 
provided some evidence that the bank lending channel exists in the Republic of 
Macedonia in both the short- and long-run. Nonetheless, the results indicated that 
there is a significant reaction of foreign currency loans to changes in the foreign 
reference rate, whose share in banks‟ total loans is relatively high, with an 
increasing trend over time (see section 1.6) that may limit the impact of the 
domestic reference rate on overall loans. This is consistent with the findings of 
many of the empirical studies conducted for the transition economies of CSEE. 
This finding may be due to the specific characteristics of the banking system that 
are common to many transition economies, especially those with fixed exchange 
rates or currency board regimes, including the Macedonian economy. Namely, as 
in some other CSEE economies (the Baltic States, Croatia and Bulgaria), the de 
facto fixed exchange rate regime, the relatively high level of currency substitution 
and foreign ownership in the banking sector, and banks‟ dependence on foreign 
financing may make domestic monetary policy „ineffective‟. 
With regards to the fourth research question, the results presented in 
chapter 5 indicate that various banks in Macedonia react differently in adjusting 
their quantity of loans to changes in reference rate. Among the control variables 
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considered as proxy variables for banks‟ dependence on deposit funding (asset 
size liquidity or capital), the results implied that for the domestic currency loans, 
bank capital has a statistically significant impact in the short- and long-run. The 
estimates imply that more capitalised banks reduce their quantity of domestic 
currency loans proportionally less when the domestic referent interest rate 
increases compared to the less capitalised banks. Regarding the foreign currency 
loans, the results implied that asset size has a statistically significant influence 
over banks‟ loans. These estimates suggest that larger banks reduce the quantity 
of foreign currency loans proportionally less when the foreign reference rate 
increase than the smaller banks. The results in respect of the rest of the bank-
specific variables considered in the empirical model (liquidity, foreign ownership 
and the NPL ratio) suggest that they do not have a significant influence on banks‟ 
lending decisions. Their lack of impact may be related to the specific structure of 
the Macedonian banking system as discussed in section 5.2. The last research 
question of the thesis is addressed in the following section.  
 
6.3 Policy implications 
 
As discussed in sections 3.2 and 4.5.3, an important issue for the central 
bank in designing its monetary policy is to have information on whether the 
interest rate and bank lending channels of monetary transmission mechanism are 
effective and operational. If they are, then the central bank may pursue its 
objectives by taking the appropriate monetary policy measures that will be 
passed-through to prices and economic activity via these two channels. Hence, in 
order to address these issues we need to summarise and link the findings of 
chapters 3 and 5.  
As argued in the previous section, the findings of both chapters suggest 
that banks in the Republic of Macedonia react significantly to changes in the 
domestic reference rate by adjusting their lending rates and the quantity of loans. 
CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
267 
 
Moreover, the adjustment of both, the lending rates (the interest rate channel) and 
the quantity of domestic currency loans (the bank lending channel), is in the same 
direction. This implies that both channels of the monetary transmission 
supplement each other. However, as argued in the previous section, this research 
has also provided evidence that banks‟ adjustment of the lending rates and the 
quantity of domestic currency loans to changes in domestic reference rate is 
incomplete and heterogeneous among banks (see sections 3.5.1 and 5.5.3, 
respectively). Furthermore, the lending rate adjustment significantly differs 
among banks (see section 3.5.1). Regarding the bank lending channel, this 
analysis has examined if the impact of the domestic reference rate is additionally 
limited by the presence of foreign currency loans. The latter significantly reacts to 
changes in the foreign reference rate (see section 5.5.3) that is beyond the 
influence of domestic monetary policy makers. Moreover, the share of foreign 
currency loans in the total loans in Macedonia has been increasing gradually 
through time and if this trend continues, it may limit the impact of the domestic 
reference rate on the overall stock of loans even more in future (see section 1.6).  
The afore-mentioned findings may suggest that it is difficult to design and 
implement an independent monetary policy in Macedonia that will operate 
efficiently through the interest rate and bank lending channels. Moreover, the 
implementation of the monetary policy through utilisation of these two channels 
may be additionally complicated by the complexity of the whole forecasting 
process of banks‟ reaction to changes in the domestic reference rate. For example, 
complications might arise from predicting (forecasting) the values of the variables 
used in the model and further complications may also arise from the measurement 
errors in the variables such as the GDP that is prone to substantial revisions from 
one period to another. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in banks‟ reaction to 
changes in domestic reference rate may impose additional forecasting difficulties 
and errors because there are more variables that need forecasting. All of these 
problems may lead to significant forecasting errors. An additional problem is 
related to the possible changing relationship among the variables over time, 
especially after the beginning of economic recession in 2009. Further on, an open 
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issue for the monetary policy makers is to know to what extent are these two 
channels of monetary transmission endogenous to the monetary policy regime, 
which is one of the limitations of our research (see section 6.3). For example some 
authors argue that as the monetary policy changes towards inflation targeting, 
their effectiveness may „improve‟ (Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2006). 
Nonetheless, a sudden switch towards an inflation targeting regime may incur 
risks of losing the credibility of the central bank in the short- and medium-term 
(Brito and Bystedt, 2010), which is seen as an  important factor affecting the 
expectations of the economic agents (Cukierman and Liviatan, 1992). 
All of these arguments in this and the previous sections imply that at this 
stage of financial and economic development of the Macedonian economy, it may 
be difficult for the policy makers to use effectively the interest rate and bank 
lending channels. This may indicate that, as discussed in sections 1.1 and 6.1, the 
main requirements for a switch to inflation targeting are not fully satisfied at this 
moment. Namely, due to banks‟ sluggish and heterogeneous response to changes 
in the domestic reference rate, the Central Bank cannot predict their reactions in 
adjusting their lending rates and quantity of loans with any accuracy when the 
domestic reference rate changes.  
As outlined in chapter 1, there are some additional factors in Macedonia 
that may affect the interest rate and bank lending channels of monetary 
transmission, which may make them less effective, or indeed ineffective. Some of 
those factors may be: a) a relatively high level of foreign currency substitution; b) 
banks‟ dependence on foreign financing and c) a strong presence of foreign 
capital in the banking system. This suggests that the current monetary policy 
regime of a de facto fixed exchange rate regime may be appropriate at this stage 
of development of the overall financial system in achieving the price stability 
goal. Anchoring the inflationary expectations of the economic agents through a 
stable nominal exchange rate when the domestic final consumption and the 
production processes are highly import dependent may be the most efficient way 
of maintaining price stability. 
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A future challenge for monetary policy-makers in Macedonia is the issue 
of maintaining the nominal exchange rate fixed after full capital account 
liberalisation. Currently the relatively high differential between domestic and 
foreign interest rates may cause, following full liberalization, large capital 
movements that may threaten the stability of the nominal exchange rate. 
Moreover, the interest rate differential between the domestic and foreign reference 
rates increased substantially during 2009, due largely to the different reactions of 
monetary policy authorities at home and abroad (see section 1.7). For example, 
the European Central Bank, as well as the economies from CSEE that conduct an 
explicit or implicit inflation targeting regime, have been reducing their key policy 
rate continually through 2009. In contrast, the Macedonian monetary policy 
authorities in order to maintain the stability of the nominal exchange rate and to 
stabilise pressures on the foreign exchange market have substantially increased 
their key policy rate. This was done in order to reduce the liquidity of the banks 
by making CB Bills more attractive investment for the banks (see section 1.7).  
These arguments would suggest that the forthcoming full capital account 
liberalisation in Macedonia should be postponed until both the domestic economy 
and international economic environment recover and cause a decline in the 
interest rate differential. In the Euro-zone, the economic recovery should lead to a 
revitalisation of domestic demand (private consumption and investment) and an 
increase in their reference rates. Moreover, the economic recovery in the Euro-
zone is expected to result in a recovery in exports from the Macedonian economy. 
This may lead to stabilisation of the pressures in the foreign exchange market that 
should ultimately result in a reduction of the key policy rate. The recovery in the 
Macedonian exports may also increase the pace of the economic recovery of the 
Macedonian economy and thus the recent increase in the country risk premium in 
2009 (see figure 1.27), should decline. Consequently, within the fixed exchange 
rate setting, the reduction of the differential between the domestic and foreign 
reference rates may ultimately affect banks‟ behaviour towards relying more on 
borrowing in domestic than foreign financial markets, which should also increase 
the effectiveness of the domestic reference rate over the bank lending channel.   
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6.4 Limitations of the research 
 
The main limitations of this research arise from the following: I) 
limitations in the theoretical analysis related to the absence of a more explicit 
exposition of what effective and operational interest rate and bank lending 
channels are and how these can be empirically assessed; II) wider limitations 
related to the applied model specifications for the interest rate and bank lending 
channels and the estimation methods used; III) the relatively small cross-sectional 
sample (which is determined by the small number of banks in Macedonia); IV) 
data unavailability and V) the methodological changes in some of the data series 
from 2009. Related to the first limitation, the theoretical literature of the interest 
rate and bank lending channels does not provide any specific indication as to how 
the effective and operational interest rate and bank lending channels from the 
monetary policy makers‟ point of view should be defined and how this may be 
empirically explored. Additionally, there is a limitation related to the issue 
regarding to what extent are these two channels endogenous to the monetary 
policy regime and how this endogeneity can be assessed. These limitations have 
restricted our analysis from providing more explicit policy recommendations as to 
whether the monetary policy can be efficiently utilised through the interest rate 
and bank lending channels and how these two channels may be affected by any 
change in the monetary policy regime. 
The second limitation of our research is related to the derivation of the 
applied model for assessing banks‟ lending rate setting behaviour. Theory is 
unclear about some issues such as what macroeconomic control variables should 
be considered, leading to inclusion of some ad hoc variables in the applied 
research (see sections 2.2.5 and 2.3). Moreover, the switching costs theory 
indicates the importance of such costs in affecting the size of lending rate 
adjustments, but fails to specify how these costs can be empirically measured or 
proxied (see section 2.2.5 and 3.2). Related to the bank lending channel theory, 
there is also a limitation in specifying the applied model arising from some of the 
assumptions made in the Bernanke and Blinder model. For instance, this model is 
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based on the assumption of constant expected inflation and the adaptation of it to 
environments where such an assumption would appear unreasonable, has led to 
some inconsistencies among the empirical studies that assess the bank lending 
channel (see section 4.5.3). There are also some wider limitations related to the 
estimation methods used in chapters 3 and 5 that cannot encompass all possible 
complications. For example, a limitation of the estimation method applied in 
chapter 3 is that the SUR model has not been developed for unbalanced panels. 
This precludes us from exploiting a greater cross-sectional dimension of the data 
by necessitating the exclusion of those banks that have not operated continually 
during the whole sample period (see section 3.4). Regarding the estimator applied 
in chapter 5 (the “system” GMM), its major limitation is that it is based on the 
assumption that there is no cross-sectional correlation among the units, although 
there are some indications (Roodman 2009a) how this problem may be alleviated 
and there is a statistical test by which this can be examined (see section 5.4 and 
5.5.3). In our estimates, the statistical test conducted indicated that there is a lack 
of evidence of cross-sectional correlation (see section 5.5.3).  
Regarding the small cross sectional sample, the research reported above 
included all banks that operated in Macedonia during the sample period. 
However, this small sample limited the analysis that could be undertaken. A 
possible solution to this problem might have been a use of larger sample by 
including banks from other transition economies with similar banking systems and 
policy regimes (the Baltic States, Croatia and Bulgaria). However, loan data 
disaggregated by the currency of the loan are not available for those economies, 
even if we use the BankScope
35
 data set. Even if this was possible, there are also 
differences in the monetary and economic policies among these economies which 
would make the modelling more difficult. 
The absence of disaggregated loan rate series by sector, maturity and the 
type of loans by purpose has precluded us from further investigation of the causes 
of the differences among Macedonian banks in their size of the lending rate 
                                                 
35
 This data base is provided by Bureau van Dijks and FITCH IBCA. 
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adjustment. An additional limitation was the unavailability of a lending rate series 
of loans denominated in foreign currency that precluded analysing the impact of 
changes in the foreign „cost of funds‟ rate.  
Methodological changes to the treatment of bank balance sheet items 
restricted our sample period to the end of 2008. At the beginning of 2009, a new 
reporting accounting methodology was imposed by the NBRM that made the 
banks‟ balance sheet items not directly comparable with the previous period. This 
restricted us from employing a longer time series of data.  
 
6.5 Further research 
 
This research was focused on investigating the effectiveness of the „first 
round‟ effects of the interest rate and bank lending channels. It has investigated 
the effectiveness of the monetary transmission from changes in the „cost of funds‟ 
rate to banks‟ lending rates and the adjustment of their stock of loans. Further 
research should be in the direction of investigating the so-called „second round‟ 
effects of the effectiveness of these two channels of the monetary transmission. 
For instance, investigating the impact of changes in the lending rates and the 
adjustment of the stock of loans on private consumption and investments and how 
these in turn may affect overall aggregate demand in the Macedonian economy. 
Broadening this research in this way would provide a more comprehensive picture 
about the overall effectiveness of domestic monetary policy. 
The analysis can also be extended by incorporating the spillover effects of 
the worlds‟ financial crisis by extending the sample period and augmenting the 
models used. For example, during 2009 Macedonian banks were faced with 
reduced sources of financing from abroad and substantial deterioration in the 
quality of their loan portfolio as measured by the NPL ratio. These banks, apart 
from increasing their lending rates, additionally tightened their lending conditions 
by imposing, for example, a higher collateral coverage. Investigating the impact 
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of these changes caused by the world‟s financial crisis may provide additional 
useful insights for the Macedonian monetary policy makers.  
An additional area recommended for further research is the examination of 
the existence of the housing price channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism. This channel is seen to be a separate channel of the monetary 
transmission mechanism that is considered to be quite important in many 
developed economies. Moreover, this channel of the monetary transmission has 
been argued to gain greater importance in the more advanced transition 
economies, such as Czech Republic, Poland and the Baltic States (Coricelli et al., 
2006). Regarding the case of Macedonia, there is an indication of gradual increase 
in housing prices during the period 2000-2007 (Davidovska-Stojanova et al., 
2008). Hence, investigating what have caused this gradual increase of the housing 
prices and how, if this is related to the monetary transmission mechanism; may 
provide some relevant information for the monetary policy makers.  
 
6.6 Contributions to knowledge 
 
After the earlier summary of the main findings of the thesis in relation to 
the main research questions, this subsection summarises the main contributions to 
knowledge of the thesis. The major contributions to knowledge can be grouped in 
the following three areas: theoretical, application of method and empirical. The 
majority of these contributions to knowledge do not just refer to the analysis of 
the Macedonian economy, but can be utilised in the analysis of other transition 
economies, especially those with a fixed exchange rate or currency board regime. 
Moreover, some of the theoretical and methodological contributions are also 
relevant for developed and/or developing economies as well. 
A theoretical contribution to knowledge of this research is that it provides 
pioneering analyses of the issue concerning the meaning of „effective‟ and 
„operational‟ interest rate and bank lending channels from the monetary policy 
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point of view. The theory of both the interest rate and bank lending channels does 
not provide any explicit indications about this issue that, as discussed in sections 
3.2 and 4.5.3, it is an important limitation when designing and implementing the 
monetary policy. Hence, this thesis has argued that for the interest rate and bank 
lending channels to be effective and operational, then there should be a sizeable, 
stable and homogeneous reaction among banks in adjusting their lending rates and 
quantity of loans to changes in the domestic reference rate (see sections 3.2 and 
4.5.3, respectively). 
The application of method contributions can be summarised as follows. 
First, in chapter 3 we have used an estimation method that controls for the 
contemporaneous cross-sectional correlation among the units, i.e. Zellner‟s (1962 
and 1963) SUR model. This was done because, as argued in section 3.3, we 
expect that banks‟ activities are interrelated. The empirics presented in sections 
3.5.1 and 3.5.2, indicate that controlling for this provides efficiency gains. 
Furthermore, an additional reason for employing the SUR model was because it 
provided the possibility of estimating banks‟ individual slope coefficients and 
exploring whether they statistically differ, which allows us to examine banks‟ 
individual lending rate setting behaviour. From the central bankers‟ perspective, 
modelling the individual bank lending rate adjustment provides quite important 
information as to whether the individual banks respond equally in adjusting their 
lending rates when the domestic „cost of funds‟ rate changes. Hence, the use of 
the SUR method contributes not only to the literature related to the transition 
economies, but also to the wider literature by providing evidence that controlling 
for the cross-sectional correlation among the units and modelling for banks‟ 
individual lending rate setting behaviour is important. 
Second, unlike the majority of the studies for the developed and transition 
economies, an „originality‟ of our study is that in chapter 5 in examining the bank 
lending channel, we employ an econometric method for dynamic panel data 
models that has been recently developed, that is the “system” GMM. Thus, as 
argued in sections 4.5.3 and 5.4, this econometric technique is seen to be more 
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appropriate when some of the variables exhibit random walk. Consequently, the 
results presented in section 5.5.5 suggest that in the latter case using the “system” 
instead of “difference” GMM considerably alters the results. Additionally, using 
the “system” GMM estimator enables us to restrict and collapse the instrument 
sets which alleviates the problem of creating „too many‟ instruments relative to 
the number of cross-sectional units that may violate the validity of Hansen test. 
This problem was found in most existing studies (see section 4.5.3). The estimates 
assessed in section 5.5.3 indicate that applying this procedure may be important in 
reducing the number of instruments created with the p-value of the Hansen test in 
the majority of the regressions being reduced below 1.  
The major empirical contributions to knowledge are in the following areas. 
First, this is the pioneering analysis for the Macedonian literature and among the 
few in the context of the transition, developed and developing economies that 
investigates bank-level differences in the size of short-run lending rate adjustment 
to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate. According to the findings presented in 
section 3.5.1, this research has concluded that the extent to which various banks 
adjust their lending rates to changes in the „cost of funds‟ rate differs 
considerably. This implies that banks are agents with heterogeneous lending rate 
adjustment behavior, suggesting that empirical investigations using aggregate data 
suffer from aggregation bias (see section 2.3.5). 
Second, this is the first Macedonian analysis that examines factors that 
affect the size of the short-term lending rate adjustment by considering a set of 
bank-balance sheet items, two macroeconomic control variables and a banking 
concentration index variable. According to the empirical results discussed in 
section 3.5.1, this research has concluded that the afore-mentioned factors have 
different impact on the size of the short-run pass-through multipliers in different 
banks. This empirical finding contributes to the wider literature because it 
provides some empirical support for the predictions of various theories assessed in 
section 2.2 concerning the factors that may affect banks‟ lending rate setting 
decisions.  
CHAPTER 6:  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
276 
 
Third, this study is one of the unique analyses among the empirical 
literature for the transition economies in that it examines the functioning of the 
bank lending channel by exploring two loan reaction functions among banks 
according to their currency denomination. According to the results discussed in 
section 5.5.3, this study has concluded that there is a difference in how banks 
adjust their foreign currency loans to changes in the foreign reference rate, 
compared to the domestic currency loans to changes in domestic reference rate. 
These findings may be generalised to other transition economies with currency 
pegs, suggesting that the impact of the domestic reference rate over the domestic 
currency loans may be limited due to the relatively high presence of foreign 
currency loans, whose share in the total loans is not negligible and is gradually 
increasing through time. 
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APPENDIX A: APPENDICES FROM CHAPTER 3 
Appendix 3.1: Results for the cointegration relationship between 
banks‟ lending rates and „cost of funds‟ rate. 
 
 
Note: critical values of the Engle-Granger cointegration test adjusted for a small sample according 
to MacKinnon (1991): for the 10% level of significance: 2.583; for the 5% level of sigifcance: 
2.891. 
Source: author‟s own calculations performed in Eviews 6 
** significant at 5% level. 
Bank:
Estimated      
t-statistics
Rejection of the null 
hypothesis of non-
cointegration at 10% level
Value of the ECT 
coefficient
t-statistics
bank 1 -1.755 NO -0.157 -1.241
bank 2 -2.404 NO  -0.126** -2.051
bank 3 -2.373 NO -0.053 -0.600
bank 5 -2.019 NO -0.082 -1.080
bank 6 -1.911 NO -0.068 -0.647
bank 7 -3.360 YES  -0.132** -2.359
bank 8 -3.465 YES  -0.171** -2.092
bank 9 -2.050 NO -0.107 -1.309
  bank 10 -1.668 NO -0.086 -1.108
  bank 11 -2.389 NO -0.072 -0.911
  bank 12 -5.040 YES  -0.145** -2.071
  bank 13 -2.117 NO -0.078 -0.845
  bank 14 -0.986 NO -0.035 -0.730
  bank 16 -2.103 NO -0.019 -0.246
  bank 27 -2.256 NO -0.105 -1.280
Estimate of the Error Correction 
Term (ECT) from the Error 
Correction Model (ECM)
Engle-Granger test for cointegration 
between banks' lending rate and money 
market rate
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Appendix 3.2: Figures of 1st differences of the loan interest rates 
of the Macedonian banks for the period 2001-2008. 
 
Source: author‟s own calculation based upon the data from NBRM. 
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Appendix 3.3: Unit root tests of the variables that enter in model 
3.1 and diagnostic tests of unit root tests for the 
interets rate series (banks‟ lending rates and „cost 
of funds‟ rate). 
a) Unit root tests of the macroeconomic control and banks‟ specific variables 
that enter in equation 3.1. 
 
Continued on next page. 
Variable:
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Akaike
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Schwarz
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Akaike
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Schwarz
dmbksinfl -6.83*** -5.01*** -7.02*** -4.99*** -5.1*** -5.07*** 0.107 0.148
dmbksipi -5.85*** -7.71*** -6.05*** -7.5*** -7.82*** -7.66*** 0.061 0.217
dmbkslhhi -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.47*** -5.48*** 0.072 0.082
dmbkslassets1 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.46*** -5.48*** 0.072 0.081
dmbksliquidity1 -4.76*** -5.62*** -5.65*** -5.65*** -5.62*** -5.65*** 0.049 0.048
dmbkscapital1 -5.17*** -5.17*** -5.17*** -5.17*** -5.13*** -5.13*** 0.074 0.095
dmbksNPLratio1 -5.44*** -5.51*** -5.07*** -5.54*** -5.21*** -5.24*** 0.047 0.045
dmbksmatmisub1 -4.34*** -6.69*** -4.36*** -6.72*** -6.95*** -6.98*** 0.108 0.121
dmbksrellending1 -5.7*** -5.7*** -5.69*** -5.69*** -5.72*** -5.7*** 0.105 0.143
dmbksportdiv1 -5.3*** -5.3*** -5.31*** -5.31*** -5.4*** -5.41*** 0.074 0.085
dmbkslassets2 -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.48*** -5.49*** 0.072 0.081
dmbksliquidity2 -5.74*** -5.74*** -5.77*** -5.77*** -5.79*** -5.82*** 0.064 0.065
dmbkscapital2 -4.86*** -5.03*** -4.78*** -5.01*** -5.03*** -5*** 0.078 0.119
dmbksNPLratio2 -5.72*** -5.72*** -5.72*** -5.72*** -5.79*** -5.78*** 0.08 0.116
dmbksmatmisub2 -4.42*** -6.49*** -4.44*** -6.53*** -6.71*** -6.74*** 0.125 0.124
dmbksrellending2 -5.63*** -5.63*** -5.66*** -5.66*** -5.66*** -5.68*** 0.083 0.09
dmbksportdiv2 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.5*** -5.51*** 0.077 0.087
dmbkslassets3 -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.49*** -5.49*** -5.5*** -5.51*** 0.069 0.077
dmbksliquidity3 -5.19*** -5.19*** -5.18*** -5.18*** -5.23*** -5.21*** 0.088 0.125
dmbkscapital3 -5.18*** -5.18*** -5.13*** -5.13*** -5.26*** -5.2*** 0.095 0.179
dmbksNPLratio3 -5.36*** -5.36*** -5.36*** -5.36*** -5.43*** -5.43*** 0.085 0.107
dmbksmatmisub3 -3.43* -3.43* -3.65*** -3.65*** -7.57*** -7.43*** 0.105 0.216
dmbksrellending3  -2.89* -7.52*** -3.06** -7.46*** -7.7*** -7.67*** 0.105 0.159
dmbksportdiv3 -5.3*** -5.3*** -5.29*** -5.29*** -5.33*** -5.32*** 0.091 0.118
dmbkslassets5 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.46*** -5.47*** 0.072 0.082
dmbksliquidity5 -5.28*** -5.28*** -5.3*** -5.3*** -5.2*** -5.22*** 0.065 0.07
dmbkscapital5 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.37*** -5.37*** 0.067 0.079
dmbksNPLratio5 -4.85*** -5.08*** -4.59*** -5.1*** -4.65*** -4.66*** 0.066 0.071
dmbksmatmisub5 -5.72*** -5.72*** -5.75*** -5.75*** -5.77*** -5.8*** 0.071 0.073
dmbksrellending5 -5.84*** -5.84*** -5.85*** -5.85*** -5.83*** -5.85*** 0.088 0.099
dmbksportdiv5 -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.35*** -5.35*** -5.37*** -5.39*** 0.073 0.081
dmbkslassets6 -5.46*** -5.46*** -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.49*** -5.5*** 0.072 0.081
dmbksliquidity6 -5.19*** -5.44*** -5.1*** -5.45*** -5.39*** -5.39*** 0.063 0.083
dmbkscapital6 -4.98*** -5.02*** -5.02*** -5.02*** -5.01*** -4.99*** 0.076 0.107
dmbksNPLratio6 -6.39*** -4.91*** -6.18*** -4.89*** -4.92*** -4.89*** 0.071 0.11
dmbksmatmisub6 -5.46*** -5.46*** -5.48*** -5.48*** -5.54*** -5.55*** 0.074 0.08
dmbksrellending6 -6.37*** -6.37*** -6.41*** -6.41*** -6.36*** -6.39*** 0.079 0.079
dmbksportdiv6 -5.39*** -5.39*** -5.4*** -5.4*** -5.42*** -5.34*** 0.068 0.082
dmbkslassets7 -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.49*** -5.49*** -5.5*** -5.51*** 0.072 0.08
dmbksliquidity7 -4.87*** -5.59*** -4.69*** -5.62*** -5.49*** -5.51*** 0.053 0.054
dmbkscapital7 -4.89*** -4.89*** -4.85*** -4.85*** -4.92*** -4.86*** 0.08 0.154
dmbksNPLratio7 -4.2*** -4.2*** -4.13*** -4.13*** -4.43*** -4.34*** 0.113 0.199
dmbksmatmisub7 -4.34*** -4.34*** -4.03*** -4.03*** -4.34*** -4.03*** 0.138 0.407
dmbksrellending7 -4.69*** -6.89*** -4.71*** -6.93*** -7.08*** -7.12*** 0.104 0.103
dmbksportdiv7 -5.32*** -5.32*** -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.36*** -5.36*** 0.071 0.086
Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) test 
with constant
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
with constant and trend
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
with constant
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test with 
constant and trend
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test with 
constant
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) test with 
constant and trend
APPENDIX A:            APPENDICES FROM CHAPTER 3 
300 
 
 
 
Notes: for the ADF and PP tests, ***/**/* denotes rejection of the the null hypothesis of unit root 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, whereas for the KPSS test, ***/**/* denotes 
rejection of the the null hypothesis of no unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
Source: author‟s own calculations performed in Eviews 6. 
Variable:
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Akaike
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Schwarz
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Akaike
Lag length 
selection criteria: 
Schwarz
dmbkslassets8 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.46*** -5.48*** 0.072 0.082
dmbksliquidity8 -5.51*** -5.51*** -5.54*** -5.54*** -5.58*** -5.61*** 0.08 0.08
dmbkscapital8 -5.28*** -5.28*** -5.29*** -5.29*** -5.33*** -5.33*** 0.072 0.092
dmbksNPLratio8 -5.6*** -5.6*** -5.62*** -5.62*** -5.65*** -5.66*** 0.072 0.083
dmbksmatmisub8 -4.16*** -4.16*** -4.17*** -4.17*** -6.56*** -6.56*** 0.132 0.176
dmbksrellending8 -4.21*** -6.39*** -4.23*** -6.42*** -6.64*** -6.67*** 0.114 0.112
dmbksportdiv8 -5.24*** -5.24*** -5.25*** -5.25*** -5.34*** -5.35*** 0.076 0.086
dmbkslassets9 -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.47*** -5.48*** 0.072 0.083
dmbksliquidity9 -5.21*** -5.76*** -5.11*** -5.79*** -5.48*** -5.52*** 0.042 0.042
dmbkscapital9 -5.96*** -5.96*** -5.98*** -5.98*** -5.96*** -5.98*** 0.074 0.079
dmbksNPLratio9 -3.77** -3.77** -3.73*** -3.73*** -10.96*** -10.97*** 0.071 0.11
dmbksmatmisub9 -3.48** -3.77** -3.31** -3.53*** -3.79** -3.53*** 0.136 0.353
dmbksrellending9 -4.64*** -6.47*** -4.66*** -6.5*** -6.55*** -6.58*** 0.103 0.109
dmbksportdiv9 -5.31*** -5.31*** -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.38*** -5.4*** 0.086 0.088
dmbkslassets10 -5.46*** -5.46*** -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.49*** -5.5*** 0.073 0.082
dmbksliquidity10 -5.32*** -5.32*** -5.34*** -5.34*** -5.24*** -5.27*** 0.059 0.063
dmbkscapital10 -5.17*** -5.25*** -5.02*** -5.25*** -5.22*** -5.21*** 0.069 0.094
dmbksNPLratio10 -4.16*** -6.06*** -4.19*** -6.07*** -6.1*** -6.11*** 0.099 0.121
dmbksmatmisub10 -6*** -6*** -6.02*** -6.02*** -6.05*** -6.07*** 0.065 0.074
dmbksrellending10 -5.56*** -5.56*** -5.58*** -5.58*** -5.58*** -5.6*** 0.07 0.078
dmbksportdiv10 -5.31*** -5.31*** -5.32*** -5.32*** -5.4*** -5.41*** 0.078 0.085
dmbkslassets11 -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.49*** -5.49*** -5.5*** -5.51*** 0.071 0.08
dmbksliquidity11 -5.8*** -5.8*** -5.83*** -5.83*** -5.78*** -5.74*** 0.055 0.056
dmbkscapital11 -4.8*** -4.8*** -4.77*** -4.77*** -4.92*** -4.88*** 0.087 0.142
dmbksNPLratio11 -5.97*** -5.97*** -5.99*** -5.99*** -5.97*** -5.99*** 0.077 0.088
dmbksmatmisub11 -5.4*** -5.4*** -5.42*** -5.42*** -5.49*** -5.46*** 0.074 0.079
dmbksrellending11 -5.21*** -5.21*** -5.22*** -5.22*** -5.26*** -5.26*** 0.078 0.092
dmbksportdiv11 -5.32*** -5.32*** -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.36*** -5.37*** 0.07 0.079
dmbkslassets12 -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.46*** -5.46*** -5.47*** -5.48*** 0.072 0.082
dmbksliquidity12 -5.84*** -5.84*** -5.88*** -5.88*** -5.84*** -5.88*** 0.075 0.077
dmbkscapital12 -5.26*** -5.26*** -5.27*** -5.27*** -5.31*** -5.31*** 0.072 0.091
dmbksNPLratio12 -6.56*** -6.56*** -6.57*** -6.57*** -6.54*** -6.54*** 0.046 0.078
dmbksmatmisub12 -5.32*** -5.32*** -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.36*** -5.36*** 0.066 0.085
dmbksrellending12 -5.37*** -5.37*** -5.38*** -5.38*** -5.4*** -5.35*** 0.065 0.089
dmbksportdiv12 -5.21*** -5.21*** -5.22*** -5.22*** -5.26*** -5.27*** 0.076 0.089
dmbkslassets13 -5.45*** -5.45*** -5.47*** -5.47*** -5.48*** -5.49*** 0.071 0.081
dmbksliquidity13 -4.53*** -6.63*** -3.92*** -6.54*** -6.72*** -6.66*** 0.091 0.187
dmbkscapital13 -5.07*** -5.07*** -5.06*** -5.06*** -5.14*** -5.12*** 0.081 0.112
dmbksNPLratio13 -4.72*** -4.66*** -4.43*** -4.65*** -4.79*** -4.76*** 0.079 0.108
dmbksmatmisub13 -5.73*** -5.73*** -5.74*** -5.74*** -5.8*** -5.81*** 0.067 0.079
dmbksrellending13 -5.9*** -5.9*** -5.94*** -5.94*** -5.95*** -5.98*** 0.067 0.066
dmbksportdiv13 -4.4*** -6.86*** -6.71*** -6.71*** -6.89*** -6.74*** 0.101 0.237
dmbkslassets14 -5.41*** -5.41*** -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.45*** -5.46*** 0.071 0.082
dmbksliquidity14 -5.89*** -5.89*** -5.5*** -6.73*** -6.47*** -6.5*** 0.032 0.234
dmbkscapital14 -5.41*** -5.41*** -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.45*** -5.46*** 0.074 0.083
dmbksNPLratio14 -5.96*** -5.94*** -6*** -5.96*** -5.47*** -5.5*** 0.119 0.128
dmbksmatmisub14 -6.61*** -6.61*** -6.65*** -6.65*** -6.67*** -6.7*** 0.077 0.077
dmbksrellending14 -5.15*** -5.15*** -5.13*** -5.13*** -5.19*** -5.16*** 0.109 0.148
dmbksportdiv14 -5.33*** -5.33*** -5.35*** -5.35*** -5.42*** -5.44*** 0.072 0.078
dmbkslassets16 -5.42*** -5.42*** -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.45*** -5.46*** 0.072 0.082
dmbksliquidity16 -5.36*** -5.36*** -5.37*** -5.37*** -5.45*** -5.45*** 0.079 0.096
dmbkscapital16 -5.63*** -5.63*** -5.64*** -5.64*** -5.68*** -5.69*** 0.074 0.088
dmbksNPLratio16 -7.43*** -7.43*** -7.36*** -7.36*** -6.49*** -6.33*** 0.051 0.132
dmbksmatmisub16 -4.24*** -4.24*** -4.25*** -4.25*** -6.32*** -6.32*** 0.096 0.128
dmbksrellending16 -5.62*** -5.62*** -5.63*** -5.63*** -5.63*** -5.65*** 0.068 0.08
dmbksportdiv16 -5.78*** -5.78*** -5.81*** -5.81*** -5.83*** -5.86*** 0.063 0.066
dmbkslassets27 -5.43*** -5.43*** -5.44*** -5.44*** -5.46*** -5.47*** 0.072 0.083
dmbksliquidity27 -5.58*** -5.58*** -5.61*** -5.61*** -5.64*** -5.67*** 0.058 0.057
dmbkscapital27 -4.86*** -5.4*** -4.75*** -5.41*** -5.32*** -5.33*** 0.064 0.076
dmbksNPLratio27 -5.93*** -5.25*** -5.38*** -5.25*** -5.03*** -5.02*** 0.065 0.087
dmbksmatmisub27 -5.09*** -5.09*** -5.09*** -5.09*** -5.14*** -5.13*** 0.096 0.119
dmbksrellending27 -6.01*** -6.01*** -6.04*** -6.04*** -6.01*** -6.05*** 0.091 0.092
dmbksportdiv27 -6.04*** -6.04*** -6.06*** -6.06*** -5.91*** -5.93*** 0.084 0.094
Kwiatkowski-
Phillips-Schmidt-
Shin (KPSS) test 
with constant
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
with constant and trend
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
with constant
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test with 
constant and trend
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test with 
constant
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin 
(KPSS) test with 
constant and trend
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b) Unit root tests and diagnostic tests of the unit root test (ADF) of the 
interest rate series (banks‟ lending rates and „cost of funds‟ rate) that enter 
in equation 3.1. 
 
 
 
Notes: for the ADF and PP tests, ***/**/* denotes rejection of the the null hypothesis of unit root 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance respectively, whereas for the KPSS test, ***/**/* denotes 
rejection of the the null hypothesis of no unit root at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance 
respectively. 
Source: author‟s own calculations performed in Eviews 6. 
Variable:
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) test with 
constant
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) 
test with constant
Lag length 
selection criteria
Number 
of lags
dmbks  -4.59*** aic 4 -5.46*** 0.08
dlendrateden1  -4.23*** aic 8 -9.28*** 0.14
dlendrateden2  -2.91** aic 8 -9.28*** 0.27
dlendrateden3  -3.19** aic 8 -10.33*** 0.06
dlendrateden5  -4.06*** aic 10 -10.51*** 0.04
dlendrateden6  -3.61*** aic 9 -11.76*** 0.07
dlendrateden7  -2.95** aic 8 -12.98*** 0.15
dlendrateden8  -3.13** aic 7 -11.06*** 0.08
dlendrateden9  -3.01** aic 7 -10.4*** 0.09
dlendrateden10  -4.83*** aic 4 -9.99*** 0.20
dlendrateden11  -3.29*** aic 6 -16.8*** 0.17
dlendrateden12  -4.05*** aic 8 -12.74*** 0.08
dlendrateden13  -3.18** aic 6 -10.05*** 0.10
dlendrateden14  -3.04** aic 7 -9.44*** 0.15
dlendrateden16  -3.68*** aic, sic 7 -9.7*** 0.35
dlendrateden27  -2.92** aic, sic 9 -9.94*** 0.13
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
with constant
Variable:
Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey test for 
autocorrelation           
(p-value)
Ramsey RESET 
test for functional 
form (p-value)
Koenker-Bassett test 
for heteroskedasticity    
(p-value)
dmbks 0.51 0.49 0.20
dlendrateden1 0.16 0.45 0.89
dlendrateden2 0.86 0.25 0.48
dlendrateden3 0.88 0.44 0.90
dlendrateden5 0.81 0.47 0.75
dlendrateden6 0.40 0.39 0.97
dlendrateden7 0.14 0.12 0.39
dlendrateden8 0.99 0.62 0.80
dlendrateden9 0.99 0.11 0.97
dlendrateden10 0.60 0.59 0.81
dlendrateden11 0.88 0.69 0.87
dlendrateden12 0.54 0.56 0.82
dlendrateden13 0.97 0.62 0.88
dlendrateden14 0.12 0.90 0.87
dlendrateden16 0.52 0.71 0.51
dlendrateden27 0.20 0.73 0.11
Diagnostic tests of the ADF unit root test
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Appendix 3.4: Estimation output of the final model 
specification by using SUR model with FGLS 
estimator, including the Breusch-Pagan test and 
the F-tests for the joint significance of the 
regressors in the model. 
 
. sureg (dlendrateden1= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets1 l.dmbksliquidity1  l.dmbkscapital1 
l.dmbksNPLratio1 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub1 l.dmbksrellending1 l.dmbksportdiv1  l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) 
/* 
> */ (dlendrateden2= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets2 l.dmbksliquidity2  l.dmbkscapital2 
l.dmbksNPLratio2 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub2 l.dmbksrellending2 l.dmbksportdiv2 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden3= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets3 l.dmbksliquidity3  l.dmbkscapital3 
l.dmbksNPLratio3 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub3 l.dmbksrellending3 l.dmbksportdiv3 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden5= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets5 l.dmbksliquidity5  l.dmbkscapital5 
l.dmbksNPLratio5 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub5 l.dmbksrellending5 l.dmbksportdiv5 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden6= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets6 l.dmbksliquidity6  l.dmbkscapital6 
l.dmbksNPLratio6 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub6 l.dmbksrellending6 l.dmbksportdiv6 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden7= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets7 l.dmbksliquidity7  l.dmbkscapital7 
l.dmbksNPLratio7 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub7 l.dmbksrellending7 l.dmbksportdiv7 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden8= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets8 l.dmbksliquidity8  l.dmbkscapital8 
l.dmbksNPLratio8 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub8 l.dmbksrellending8 l.dmbksportdiv8 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden9= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets9 l.dmbksliquidity9  l.dmbkscapital9 
l.dmbksNPLratio9 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub9 l.dmbksrellending9 l.dmbksportdiv9 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden10= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets10 l.dmbksliquidity10  
l.dmbkscapital10 l.dmbksNPLratio10 l.dmbks 
> matmisub10 l.dmbksrellending10 l.dmbksportdiv10 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden11= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets11 l.dmbksliquidity11  
l.dmbkscapital11 l.dmbksNPLratio11 l.dmbks 
> matmisub11 l.dmbksrellending11 l.dmbksportdiv11 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden12= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets12 l.dmbksliquidity12  
l.dmbkscapital12 l.dmbksNPLratio12 l.dmbks 
> matmisub12 l.dmbksrellending12 l.dmbksportdiv12 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden13= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets13 l.dmbksliquidity13  
l.dmbkscapital13 l.dmbksNPLratio13 l.dmbks 
> matmisub13 l.dmbksrellending13 l.dmbksportdiv13 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden14= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets14 l.dmbksliquidity14  
l.dmbkscapital14 l.dmbksNPLratio14 l.dmbks 
> matmisub14 l.dmbksrellending14 l.dmbksportdiv14 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden16= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets16 l.dmbksliquidity16  
l.dmbkscapital16 l.dmbksNPLratio16 l.dmbks 
> matmisub16 l.dmbksrellending16 l.dmbksportdiv16 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden27= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets27 l.dmbksliquidity27  
l.dmbkscapital27 l.dmbksNPLratio27 l.dmbks 
> matmisub27 l.dmbksrellending27 l.dmbksportdiv27 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */   , small corr 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A:            APPENDICES FROM CHAPTER 3 
303 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"     F-Stat        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1       94     11    .0098268    0.5076       9.84   0.0000 
dlendrate~n2       94     11    .0052423    0.2143       3.32   0.0002 
dlendrate~n3       94     11    .0098832    0.1099       1.59   0.0950 
dlendrated~5       94     11    .0122105    0.5135      10.45   0.0000 
dlendrate~n6       94     11    .0045411    0.2291       3.53   0.0001 
dlendrate~n7       94     11    .0059765    0.0467       0.64   0.7924 
dlendrated~8       94     11    .0092397    0.2944       3.75   0.0000 
dlendrated~9       94     11    .0126656    0.1280       2.86   0.0010 
dlendrate~10       94     11    .0047583    0.0472       0.62   0.8096 
dlendrate~11       94     11    .0054517    0.0841       1.63   0.0841 
dlendrate~12       94     11    .0052273    0.2691       2.86   0.0010 
dlendrate~13       94     11    .0073939    0.0921       1.58   0.0996 
dlendrate~14       94     11    .0135382    0.1476       2.29   0.0090 
dlendrate~16       94     11    .0094686    0.2008       2.41   0.0059 
dlendrate~27       94     11    .0070736    0.1915       2.33   0.0077 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   92.34472   49.77309     1.86   0.064    -5.304826    189.9943 
dmbkslass~s1 | 
         L1. |  -10.06286   2.827524    -3.56   0.000    -15.61017   -4.515558 
dmbksliqu~y1 | 
         L1. |   33.72923   5.707048     5.91   0.000      22.5326    44.92585 
dmbkscapi~l1 | 
         L1. |   27.58731   24.23432     1.14   0.255    -19.95787    75.13249 
dmbksNPLr~o1 | 
         L1. |  -26.19527   5.048149    -5.19   0.000    -36.09921   -16.29133 
dmbksmatm~b1 | 
         L1. |  -.1242323   .1587401    -0.78   0.434    -.4356636     .187199 
dmbksrell~g1 | 
         L1. |  -11.42973    5.05366    -2.26   0.024    -21.34448   -1.514986 
dmbksport~v1 | 
         L1. |  -9.663811   3.294637    -2.93   0.003    -16.12754   -3.200082 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   48.03154    10.4692     4.59   0.000     27.49207    68.57101 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   2.590553   1.353466     1.91   0.056    -.0648055    5.245911 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   12.07293   4.723695     2.56   0.011     2.805538    21.34032 
       _cons |  -.0020565    .001021    -2.01   0.044    -.0040596   -.0000534 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n2 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   91.39723   50.74899     1.80   0.072     -8.16694    190.9614 
dmbkslass~s2 | 
         L1. |  -2.947832   2.922086    -1.01   0.313    -8.680656    2.784992 
dmbksliqu~y2 | 
         L1. |  -3.818499   3.237984    -1.18   0.239    -10.17108    2.534084 
dmbkscapi~l2 | 
         L1. |  -36.34179   17.37047    -2.09   0.037    -70.42082   -2.262754 
dmbksNPLr~o2 | 
         L1. |   1.000415   2.670289     0.37   0.708    -4.238411    6.239241 
dmbksmatm~b2 | 
         L1. |  -.3772697   .2866432    -1.32   0.188    -.9396335     .185094 
dmbksrell~g2 | 
         L1. |   15.79901   5.151273     3.07   0.002     5.692752    25.90526 
dmbksport~v2 | 
         L1. |   3.600758   2.389687     1.51   0.132    -1.087555    8.289071 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   6.637038   6.350807     1.05   0.296    -5.822575    19.09665 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   1.909042   .7221425     2.64   0.008     .4922744    3.325809 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -5.702319   1.908993    -2.99   0.003    -9.447562   -1.957075 
       _cons |  -.0009372   .0005325    -1.76   0.079     -.001982    .0001076 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n3 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -52.48381   20.00828    -2.62   0.009    -91.73796   -13.22967 
dmbkslass~s3 | 
         L1. |   1.019202   .5719661     1.78   0.075    -.1029352    2.141339 
dmbksliqu~y3 | 
         L1. |   .0315741   1.336027     0.02   0.981     -2.58957    2.652719 
dmbkscapi~l3 | 
         L1. |    .919978   1.974989     0.47   0.641    -2.954742    4.794698 
dmbksNPLr~o3 | 
         L1. |  -1.900977   1.042798    -1.82   0.069    -3.946837    .1448825 
dmbksmatm~b3 | 
         L1. |  -.2190124   .9518129    -0.23   0.818    -2.086369    1.648344 
dmbksrell~g3 | 
         L1. |  -8.625943   9.862118    -0.87   0.382    -27.97438    10.72249 
dmbksport~v3 | 
         L1. |   2.022085   1.363841     1.48   0.138    -.6536271    4.697797 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |    13.6044   11.49259     1.18   0.237    -8.942849    36.15164 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .3766749   1.485221     0.25   0.800    -2.537173    3.290522 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   5.175698    2.33503     2.22   0.027     .5946158     9.75678 
       _cons |    .000331   .0010231     0.32   0.746    -.0016761    .0023381 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~5 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   456.8462   68.97749     6.62   0.000     321.5197    592.1728 
dmbkslasse~5 | 
         L1. |  -26.13058   4.069053    -6.42   0.000    -34.11363   -18.14753 
dmbksliqui~5 | 
         L1. |  -14.64723   4.455585    -3.29   0.001    -23.38862    -5.90584 
dmbkscapit~5 | 
         L1. |  -139.7176   21.78151    -6.41   0.000    -182.4506   -96.98457 
dmbksNPLra~5 | 
         L1. |   43.20206   8.540142     5.06   0.000      26.4472    59.95692 
dmbksmatm~b5 | 
         L1. |   5.879531   1.302378     4.51   0.000     3.324403    8.434658 
dmbksrelle~5 | 
         L1. |    3.62271    2.76692     1.31   0.191    -1.805695    9.051114 
dmbksportd~5 | 
         L1. |   2.483808    3.59709     0.69   0.490    -4.573303    9.540919 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   13.13673   11.74678     1.12   0.264    -9.909216    36.18267 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   5.991558   1.746674     3.43   0.001     2.564768    9.418348 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -6.069326   4.609076    -1.32   0.188    -15.11185    2.973195 
       _cons |  -.0020364   .0012221    -1.67   0.096     -.004434    .0003613 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n6 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -10.23273   19.33431    -0.53   0.597     -48.1646    27.69915 
dmbkslass~s6 | 
         L1. |  -.9597794   .8421165    -1.14   0.255    -2.611923    .6923644 
dmbksliqu~y6 | 
         L1. |  -2.557735   1.412251    -1.81   0.070    -5.328423    .2129527 
dmbkscapi~l6 | 
         L1. |   3.190963   3.128997     1.02   0.308      -2.9478    9.329726 
dmbksNPLr~o6 | 
         L1. |  -5.115906   2.614586    -1.96   0.051    -10.24545    .0136363 
dmbksmatm~b6 | 
         L1. |  -1.956119   .4579104    -4.27   0.000    -2.854491   -1.057747 
dmbksrell~g6 | 
         L1. |   1.164645   1.305209     0.89   0.372    -1.396038    3.725328 
dmbksport~v6 | 
         L1. |   1.659876    1.46378     1.13   0.257    -1.211906    4.531659 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -4.141527   3.977276    -1.04   0.298    -11.94452    3.661468 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .0574923   .6656178     0.09   0.931     -1.24838    1.363364 
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   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   3.610457   1.768122     2.04   0.041     .1415889    7.079325 
       _cons |   .0000626   .0004653     0.13   0.893    -.0008503    .0009756 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n7 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   41.41637   23.98257     1.73   0.084    -5.634914    88.46765 
dmbkslass~s7 | 
         L1. |  -2.048689   1.224973    -1.67   0.095    -4.451957    .3545778 
dmbksliqu~y7 | 
         L1. |  -.4121785   1.566693    -0.26   0.793    -3.485865    2.661508 
dmbkscapi~l7 | 
         L1. |  -5.585771   3.369906    -1.66   0.098    -12.19717     1.02563 
dmbksNPLr~o7 | 
         L1. |   .9158516   2.187506     0.42   0.676    -3.375805    5.207508 
dmbksmatm~b7 | 
         L1. |  -.0032621   .0133259    -0.24   0.807    -.0294061    .0228819 
dmbksrell~g7 | 
         L1. |   1.861786   1.666711     1.12   0.264    -1.408125    5.131697 
dmbksport~v7 | 
         L1. |  -.1325282   3.651848    -0.04   0.971     -7.29707    7.032013 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   4.126418   6.024882     0.68   0.494    -7.693765     15.9466 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .0941532   .8323845     0.11   0.910    -1.538897    1.727204 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.283735   2.741053    -0.47   0.640    -6.661391    4.093921 
       _cons |  -.0011763   .0006379    -1.84   0.065    -.0024277    .0000752 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
dlendrated~8 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   34.21207   104.7728     0.33   0.744     -171.341    239.7652 
dmbkslasse~8 | 
         L1. |  -5.477015   7.292669    -0.75   0.453    -19.78446    8.830432 
dmbksliqui~8 | 
         L1. |   17.19069   6.339818     2.71   0.007     4.752639    29.62875 
dmbkscapit~8 | 
         L1. |   9.504138   9.929536     0.96   0.339    -9.976564    28.98484 
dmbksNPLra~8 | 
         L1. |  -1.504891   2.413021    -0.62   0.533    -6.238983    3.229201 
dmbksmatm~b8 | 
         L1. |   -.296141   .2553447    -1.16   0.246    -.7971005    .2048184 
dmbksrelle~8 | 
         L1. |   6.291298   5.262285     1.20   0.232     -4.03275    16.61535 
dmbksportd~8 | 
         L1. |   2.007435   1.790913     1.12   0.263    -1.506148    5.521017 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -13.22504   8.718845    -1.52   0.130    -30.33049    3.880419 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   1.326197   1.230816     1.08   0.281    -1.088534    3.740929 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   4.058392   3.525055     1.15   0.250    -2.857394    10.97418 
       _cons |  -.0018025   .0010037    -1.80   0.073    -.0037716    .0001666 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~9 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -93.83575   41.64002    -2.25   0.024    -175.5291   -12.14243 
dmbkslasse~9 | 
         L1. |   5.031677   1.516404     3.32   0.001     2.056651    8.006702 
dmbksliqui~9 | 
         L1. |   .1454861   2.628055     0.06   0.956    -5.010481    5.301453 
dmbkscapit~9 | 
         L1. |    22.3711   4.669074     4.79   0.000     13.21087    31.53133 
dmbksNPLra~9 | 
         L1. |  -9.197848   2.202531    -4.18   0.000    -13.51898   -4.876715 
dmbksmatm~b9 | 
         L1. |  -.0094856   .0258616    -0.37   0.714    -.0602233    .0412521 
dmbksrelle~9 | 
         L1. |  -4.708037   2.700634    -1.74   0.082     -10.0064    .5903221 
dmbksportd~9 | 
         L1. |   1.816193   1.779234     1.02   0.308    -1.674477    5.306863 
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   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   5.656939   9.364413     0.60   0.546    -12.71505    24.02893 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |    .385747   1.837148     0.21   0.834    -3.218544    3.990038 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   1.870578   5.015311     0.37   0.709    -7.968933    11.71009 
       _cons |  -.0014957    .001314    -1.14   0.255    -.0040737    .0010823 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~10 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   8.095724   16.95374     0.48   0.633    -25.16573    41.35718 
dmbkslass~10 | 
         L1. |    .530337   .9445682     0.56   0.575    -1.322806     2.38348 
dmbksliqu~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.568369   1.806942    -1.42   0.155      -6.1134    .9766611 
dmbkscapi~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.899201   6.271068    -0.46   0.644    -15.20238    9.403974 
dmbksNPLr~10 | 
         L1. |  -5.892491   8.444204    -0.70   0.485    -22.45913    10.67415 
dmbksmat~b10 | 
         L1. |  -.3607309   .2737581    -1.32   0.188    -.8978154    .1763536 
dmbksrell~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.874749   3.331381    -0.86   0.388    -9.410566    3.661069 
dmbksport~10 | 
         L1. |  -.3429443   2.384474    -0.14   0.886     -5.02103    4.335141 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -4.713047   5.041449    -0.93   0.350    -14.60384    5.177744 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.3990701   .6813286    -0.59   0.558    -1.735765    .9376247 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   -1.64446   2.455999    -0.67   0.503    -6.462871     3.17395 
       _cons |  -.0008291   .0005015    -1.65   0.099    -.0018129    .0001547 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
dlendrate~11 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -18.67646   20.97088    -0.89   0.373    -59.81912     22.4662 
dmbkslass~11 | 
         L1. |   .6348145   1.170151     0.54   0.588    -1.660898    2.930527 
dmbksliqu~11 | 
         L1. |  -2.089403   1.768223    -1.18   0.238     -5.55847    1.379664 
dmbkscapi~11 | 
         L1. |   2.437053   9.624962     0.25   0.800    -16.44611    21.32021 
dmbksNPLr~11 | 
         L1. |  -6.642538    8.81431    -0.75   0.451    -23.93528    10.65021 
dmbksmat~b11 | 
         L1. |  -.0482143   .5739483    -0.08   0.933     -1.17424    1.077812 
dmbksrell~11 | 
         L1. |  -3.555776   1.797414    -1.98   0.048    -7.082111   -.0294395 
dmbksport~11 | 
         L1. |   .4592165   2.058269     0.22   0.823    -3.578891    4.497324 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   7.348365   5.268002     1.39   0.163      -2.9869    17.68363 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .2932864   .7393907     0.40   0.692     -1.15732    1.743893 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   1.428619   1.916453     0.75   0.456     -2.33126    5.188498 
       _cons |  -.0008924   .0005659    -1.58   0.115    -.0020026    .0002177 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~12 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -55.95764   34.01442    -1.65   0.100    -122.6903    10.77506 
dmbkslass~12 | 
         L1. |   2.633027   2.439293     1.08   0.281    -2.152607    7.418662 
dmbksliqu~12 | 
         L1. |  -4.058571   2.792717    -1.45   0.146    -9.537587    1.420445 
dmbkscapi~12 | 
         L1. |   4.617286   11.17378     0.41   0.680     -17.3045    26.53907 
dmbksNPLr~12 | 
         L1. |   5.275861   4.991134     1.06   0.291    -4.516218    15.06794 
dmbksmat~b12 | 
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         L1. |   .1706998   1.082836     0.16   0.875    -1.953711     2.29511 
dmbksrell~12 | 
         L1. |  -6.138524    3.83304    -1.60   0.110    -13.65854    1.381496 
dmbksport~12 | 
         L1. |  -.0364489   2.163471    -0.02   0.987    -4.280951    4.208054 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |    5.09155   4.808501     1.06   0.290    -4.342221    14.52532 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -1.845681   .7110501    -2.60   0.010    -3.240686   -.4506754 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |    2.24314    1.84952     1.21   0.225    -1.385424    5.871703 
       _cons |  -.0005821   .0005355    -1.09   0.277    -.0016326    .0004684 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~13 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -5.161985   25.38697    -0.20   0.839    -54.96855    44.64458 
dmbkslass~13 | 
         L1. |   .8629791   1.640306     0.53   0.599    -2.355129    4.081087 
dmbksliqu~13 | 
         L1. |  -.7220636   1.554151    -0.46   0.642    -3.771143    2.327016 
dmbkscapi~13 | 
         L1. |   7.167843   5.252915     1.36   0.173    -3.137822    17.47351 
dmbksNPLr~13 | 
         L1. |  -4.293394    2.05275    -2.09   0.037    -8.320673   -.2661156 
dmbksmat~b13 | 
         L1. |  -2.828972      1.022    -2.77   0.006    -4.834027   -.8239159 
dmbksrell~13 | 
         L1. |   3.686696   2.467209     1.49   0.135    -1.153708    8.527101 
dmbksport~13 | 
         L1. |   .0036885   .0189022     0.20   0.845    -.0333955    .0407726 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   1.617839   6.033735     0.27   0.789    -10.21971    13.45539 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -2.008251   .9944264    -2.02   0.044    -3.959211   -.0572909 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.000825   1.847612    -0.54   0.588    -4.625645    2.623995 
       _cons |  -.0010794    .000762    -1.42   0.157    -.0025744    .0004156 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
dlendrate~14 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   652.7195   147.4711     4.43   0.000     363.3967    942.0423 
dmbkslass~14 | 
         L1. |  -32.39401   7.716255    -4.20   0.000    -47.53248   -17.25553 
dmbksliqu~14 | 
         L1. |   1.109335   1.728423     0.64   0.521    -2.281649    4.500319 
dmbkscapi~14 | 
         L1. |   -2.34723   2.979515    -0.79   0.431    -8.192724    3.498265 
dmbksNPLr~14 | 
         L1. |  -9.175762     2.7437    -3.34   0.001    -14.55861   -3.792912 
dmbksmat~b14 | 
         L1. |  -.7376357   .5504115    -1.34   0.180    -1.817485    .3422136 
dmbksrell~14 | 
         L1. |  -4.056312   3.091801    -1.31   0.190     -10.1221    2.009475 
dmbksport~14 | 
         L1. |   14.35459   5.874365     2.44   0.015     2.829709    25.87948 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -49.04058   17.74561    -2.76   0.006    -83.85559   -14.22557 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -1.666961   2.096594    -0.80   0.427    -5.780256    2.446335 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -30.65938   7.274969    -4.21   0.000    -44.93211   -16.38666 
       _cons |  -.0013082   .0014909    -0.88   0.380    -.0042332    .0016169 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~16 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -71.39001   34.82303    -2.05   0.041    -139.7091   -3.070898 
dmbkslass~16 | 
         L1. |    6.17317   3.278367     1.88   0.060    -.2586396    12.60498 
dmbksliqu~16 | 
         L1. |   2.362943   2.334651     1.01   0.312    -2.217397    6.943283 
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dmbkscapi~16 | 
         L1. |   9.429519    6.24144     1.51   0.131    -2.815529    21.67457 
dmbksNPLr~16 | 
         L1. |  -3.337131   5.612489    -0.59   0.552    -14.34824    7.673979 
dmbksmat~b16 | 
         L1. |   .1906806   1.173949     0.16   0.871    -2.112484    2.493845 
dmbksrell~16 | 
         L1. |   1.593676   1.642158     0.97   0.332    -1.628064    4.815415 
dmbksport~16 | 
         L1. |  -2.274039   2.919961    -0.78   0.436    -8.002695    3.454617 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |    9.87018   7.745739     1.27   0.203    -5.326144     25.0665 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   -.993535   1.355959    -0.73   0.464    -3.653783    1.666713 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -3.219737   4.389651    -0.73   0.463    -11.83177    5.392294 
       _cons |  -.0003556   .0009568    -0.37   0.710    -.0022328    .0015215 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~27 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -9.911123   38.93497    -0.25   0.799    -86.29742    66.47518 
dmbkslass~27 | 
         L1. |  -.5893057   2.074012    -0.28   0.776    -4.658298    3.479687 
dmbksliqu~27 | 
         L1. |  -2.170141   2.329895    -0.93   0.352     -6.74115    2.400868 
dmbkscapi~27 | 
         L1. |   1.019941   4.118909     0.25   0.804    -7.060923    9.100806 
dmbksNPLr~27 | 
         L1. |   2.192856   2.388987     0.92   0.359    -2.494085    6.879796 
dmbksmat~b27 | 
         L1. |  -.5117128   .2038034    -2.51   0.012    -.9115535    -.111872 
dmbksrell~27 | 
         L1. |   4.216134   2.920649     1.44   0.149    -1.513871     9.94614 
dmbksport~27 | 
         L1. |  -.4140211   .5622673    -0.74   0.462     -1.51713     .689088 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   5.191656   6.468451     0.80   0.422    -7.498762    17.88207 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.6191848    .971383    -0.64   0.524    -2.524936    1.286566 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |    2.46791   2.934797     0.84   0.401    -3.289852    8.225673 
       _cons |  -.0007804   .0007216    -1.08   0.280     -.002196    .0006353 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
Correlation matrix of residuals: 
 
 
                 dlendrateden1   dlendrateden2   dlendrateden3   dlendrateden5   dlendrateden6 
 dlendrateden1          1.0000 
 dlendrateden2          0.2255          1.0000 
 dlendrateden3         -0.1717         -0.2534          1.0000 
 dlendrateden5          0.0245         -0.2782          0.0512          1.0000 
 dlendrateden6         -0.1121         -0.0574          0.4357         -0.0245          1.0000 
 dlendrateden7          0.0323         -0.1744         -0.0806          0.0698         -0.3270 
 dlendrateden8          0.0937         -0.0696         -0.0532          0.1129         -0.1547 
 dlendrateden9         -0.0943          0.0094          0.0058          0.1157          0.1175 
dlendrateden10          0.0262          0.0441         -0.0629          0.0397         -0.0172 
dlendrateden11         -0.0319         -0.3496         -0.3168          0.2765         -0.4602 
dlendrateden12         -0.0116         -0.0793         -0.1537         -0.1446         -0.0020 
dlendrateden13         -0.1229         -0.0018         -0.1999         -0.1540         -0.2353 
dlendrateden14         -0.0782         -0.0799          0.1100         -0.0969          0.1463 
dlendrateden16         -0.1815          0.0518          0.0427         -0.3658         -0.1224 
dlendrateden27         -0.1370         -0.0876          0.1711          0.0951          0.3707 
 
                 dlendrateden7   dlendrateden8   dlendrateden9  dlendrateden10  dlendrateden11 
 dlendrateden7          1.0000 
 dlendrateden8          0.0197          1.0000 
 dlendrateden9         -0.1380         -0.1446          1.0000 
dlendrateden10          0.0172         -0.1251         -0.0308          1.0000 
dlendrateden11          0.2765          0.2090         -0.2395         -0.0686          1.0000 
dlendrateden12         -0.0812         -0.0021         -0.2486          0.1731          0.1558 
dlendrateden13          0.0315         -0.0219          0.7022         -0.0929          0.1271 
dlendrateden14         -0.0048         -0.1976          0.0701         -0.0144         -0.1070 
dlendrateden16         -0.0727          0.0421         -0.0095          0.0368         -0.3085 
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dlendrateden27         -0.1629          0.0294          0.0462          0.1584         -0.1828 
 
                dlendrateden12  dlendrateden13  dlendrateden14  dlendrateden16  dlendrateden27 
dlendrateden12          1.0000 
dlendrateden13         -0.1015          1.0000 
dlendrateden14         -0.0328          0.1780          1.0000 
dlendrateden16          0.1706          0.1283          0.1289          1.0000 
dlendrateden27          0.3120         -0.2121         -0.0234          0.2251          1.0000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(105) = 305.253, Pr 
= 0.0000 
 
F-test for joint significance of the parameters of the 
variables in all bank specific equations: 
 
. test l.dmbks 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbks = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbks = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbks = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbks = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbks = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbks = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbks = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    6.19 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksinfl 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.76 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksipi 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksipi = 0 
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 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.61 
            Prob > F =    0.0007 
 
. test l.dmbkslhhi 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.55 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbkslassets1 l.dmbkslassets2 l.dmbkslassets3 l.dmbkslassets5 
l.dmbkslassets6 l.dmbkslassets7 l.d 
> mbkslassets8 l.dmbkslassets9 /* 
> */ l.dmbkslassets10 l.dmbkslassets11 l.dmbkslassets12 l.dmbkslassets13 
l.dmbkslassets14 l.dmbkslassets16 
>  l.dmbkslassets27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkslassets1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkslassets2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkslassets3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkslassets5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkslassets6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkslassets7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkslassets8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkslassets9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkslassets10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkslassets11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkslassets12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkslassets13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkslassets14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkslassets16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkslassets27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    6.46 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksliquidity1 l.dmbksliquidity2 l.dmbksliquidity3 l.dmbksliquidity5 
l.dmbksliquidity6 l.dmbksli 
> quidity7 l.dmbksliquidity8 l.dmbksliquidity9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksliquidity10 l.dmbksliquidity11 l.dmbksliquidity12 l.dmbksliquidity13 
l.dmbksliquidity14 l.dmbk 
> sliquidity16 l.dmbksliquidity27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksliquidity1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksliquidity2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksliquidity3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksliquidity5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksliquidity6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksliquidity7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksliquidity8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksliquidity9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksliquidity10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksliquidity11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksliquidity12 = 0 
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 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksliquidity13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksliquidity14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksliquidity16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksliquidity27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    4.69 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbkscapital1 l.dmbkscapital2 l.dmbkscapital3 l.dmbkscapital5 
l.dmbkscapital6 l.dmbkscapital7 l.d 
> mbkscapital8 l.dmbkscapital9 /* 
> */ l.dmbkscapital10 l.dmbkscapital11 l.dmbkscapital12 l.dmbkscapital13 
l.dmbkscapital14 l.dmbkscapital16 
>  l.dmbkscapital27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkscapital1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkscapital2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkscapital3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkscapital5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkscapital6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkscapital7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkscapital8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkscapital9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkscapital10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkscapital11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkscapital12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkscapital13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkscapital14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkscapital16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkscapital27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    5.05 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksNPLratio1 l.dmbksNPLratio2 l.dmbksNPLratio3 l.dmbksNPLratio5 
l.dmbksNPLratio6 l.dmbksNPLrati 
> o7 l.dmbksNPLratio8 l.dmbksNPLratio9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksNPLratio10 l.dmbksNPLratio11 l.dmbksNPLratio12 l.dmbksNPLratio13 
l.dmbksNPLratio14 l.dmbksNPLr 
> atio16 l.dmbksNPLratio27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksNPLratio1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksNPLratio2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksNPLratio3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksNPLratio5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksNPLratio6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksNPLratio7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksNPLratio8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksNPLratio9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksNPLratio10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksNPLratio11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksNPLratio12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksNPLratio13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksNPLratio14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksNPLratio16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksNPLratio27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    6.11 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksmatmisub1 l.dmbksmatmisub2 l.dmbksmatmisub3 l.dmbksmatmisub5 
l.dmbksmatmisub6 l.dmbksmatmisu 
> b7 l.dmbksmatmisub8 l.dmbksmatmisub9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksmatmisub10 l.dmbksmatmisub11 l.dmbksmatmisub12 l.dmbksmatmisub13 
l.dmbksmatmisub14 l.dmbksmatm 
> isub16 l.dmbksmatmisub27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksmatmisub1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksmatmisub2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksmatmisub3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksmatmisub5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksmatmisub6 = 0 
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 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksmatmisub7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksmatmisub8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksmatmisub9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksmatmisub10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksmatmisub11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksmatmisub12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksmatmisub13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksmatmisub14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksmatmisub16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksmatmisub27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    4.19 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksrellending1 l.dmbksrellending2 l.dmbksrellending3 l.dmbksrellending5 
l.dmbksrellending6 l.dm 
> bksrellending7 l.dmbksrellending8 l.dmbksrellending9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksrellending10 l.dmbksrellending11 l.dmbksrellending12 
l.dmbksrellending13 l.dmbksrellending14 l 
> .dmbksrellending16 l.dmbksrellending27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksrellending1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksrellending2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksrellending3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksrellending5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksrellending6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksrellending7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksrellending8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksrellending9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksrellending10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksrellending11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksrellending12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksrellending13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksrellending14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksrellending16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksrellending27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.85 
            Prob > F =    0.0002 
 
. test l.dmbksportdiv1 l.dmbksportdiv2 l.dmbksportdiv3 l.dmbksportdiv5 
l.dmbksportdiv6 l.dmbksportdiv7 l.d 
> mbksportdiv8 l.dmbksportdiv9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksportdiv10 l.dmbksportdiv11 l.dmbksportdiv12 l.dmbksportdiv13 
l.dmbksportdiv14 l.dmbksportdiv16 
>  l.dmbksportdiv27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksportdiv1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksportdiv2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksportdiv3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksportdiv5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksportdiv6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksportdiv7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksportdiv8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksportdiv9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksportdiv10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksportdiv11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksportdiv12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksportdiv13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksportdiv14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksportdiv16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksportdiv27 = 0 
       F( 15,  1230) =    1.75 
 
            Prob > F =    0.0366 
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Appendix 3.5: Estimation results and estimation output of the 
final SUR model specification estimated with 
MLE, including the Breusch-Pagan test and the 
F-tests for the joint significance of the regressors 
in the model. 
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a) Estimation results of the model estimated with MLE. 
 
  
Source: Author‟s own calculations performed in STATA 10. 
VARIABLE: Bank1 Bank2 Bank3 Bank5 Bank6 Bank7 Bank8 Bank9 Bank10 Bank11 Bank12 Bank13 Bank14 Bank16 Bank27
L.dmbks 133.0*** –47.47 –52.36** 368.0*** –3.03 45.89* 76.84 –82.66** 9.3 8.27 –59.52* –16.49 677.4*** –108.9*** –31.85
(43.13) (50.56) (20.56) (57.83) (17.44) (23.79) (103.7) (35.51) (16.94) (19.16) (31.55) (20.30) (147.8) (32.66) (35.88)
L.dmbkslassets –13.50*** 5.141* 0.83 –20.80***  –1.52*  –2.16* –8.38 6.12*** 1.22 –0.56 2.54 2.17* –34.14*** 11.48*** 1.29
(2.42) (2.90) (0.58) (3.40) (0.78) (1.21) (7.21) (1.13) (0.94) (1.05) (2.28) (1.23) (7.72)  (–2.99)  (–1.88)
L.dmbksliquidity 34.69*** –5.56* 1.02 –13.52***  –0.1  –0.55 19.40***  –3.15 –3.12* –2.35 –1.6 0.1 0.72 1.12 1.16
(4.93) (3.2) (1.28) (3.74) (1.20) (1.54) (6.28) (2.06) (1.81) (1.58) (2.51) (1.23) (1.73) (2.17) (2.23)
L.dmbkscapital 12.85 16.25 –0.06 –105.3*** –0.81 –6.28* 7.88 23.11*** –2.80 –4.81 10.87 12.45*** 0.83 18.02*** 2.87
(19.88) (17.25) (1.94) (17.65) (2.85) (3.33) (9.84) (3.32) (6.26) (8.66) (10.28) (3.93) (2.99) (5.63) (3.71)
L.dmbksNPLratio –28.84*** 1.78 –1.42 31.72*** –4.86** 0.61 –1.72 –8.21*** –15.41* 5.14 5.78 –5.74*** –9.57*** –10.52** 5.04**
(4.39) (2.65) (1.02) (7.00) (2.24) (2.15) (2.41) (1.61) (8.33) (7.31) (4.55) (1.58) (2.74) (5.04) (2.22)
L.dmbksmatmisub –0.22 –0.86*** –0.53 4.54*** –1.54*** –0.00 –0.33 –0.04* –0.51* 0.23 0.26 –2.52*** –0.9 0.13 –0.49**
(0.14) (0.29) (0.91) (1.09) (0.38) (0.01) (0.25) (0.02) (0.27) (0.52) (0.97) (0.84) (0.55) (1.09) (0.2)
L.dmbksrellending –12.62*** 17.05*** –5.62 3.07 –0.17 1.93 8.28 –6.16*** –5.62* –2.81* –6.75* 3.14 –6.06** 1.34 6.79**
(4.43) (5.09) (9.46) (2.47) (1.16) (1.65) (5.22) (2.15) (3.29) (1.64) (3.47) (2.07) (3.08) (1.45) (2.71)
L.dmbksportdiv –13.09*** 2.01 –0.15 0.12 –0.27 0.34 1.41 2.05 –1.66 –2.31 0.32 0.01 13.76** –3.30 –1.4***
(2.85) (2.37) (1.31) (2.85) (1.23) (3.58) (1.78) (1.43) (2.36) (1.82) (1.89) (0.01) (5.87) (2.64) (0.51)
L.dmbksinfl 47.92*** 1.78 19.27* 8.72 –1.44 5.14 –14.69* 7.35 –6.06 11.44** 4.89 –0.70 –54.58*** 4.28 1.27
(9.96) (6.34) (11.44) (11.14) (3.89) (5.9) (8.72) (9.40) (5.07) (5.18) (4.60) (5.59) (17.77) (7.69) (6.65)
L.dmbksipi 2.37* 2.02*** 0.68 5.59*** –0.42 0.22 1.34 –0.10 –0.35 0.27 –1.99*** –2.05** –2.57 –0.97 –0.01
(1.39) (0.76) (1.53) (1.8) (0.67) (0.84) (1.24) (1.82) (0.69) (0.77) (0.73) (1.02) (2.13) (1.40) (1.04)
L.dmbkslhhi 15.41*** –6.19*** 5.62** –5.28 4.01** –1.68 3.8 –1.65 –2.84 0.56 2.57 –2.13 –31.06*** –8.77** 1.29
(4.41) (1.96) (2.42) (4.57) (1.65) (2.73) (3.52) (4.53) (2.46) (1.92) (1.87) (1.83) (7.32) (4.14) (2.96)
Constant –0.00** –0.00* 0.00 –0.00 0.00 –0.00* –0.00* –0.00 –0.00 –0.00* –0.00 –0.00* –0.00 0.00 –0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.48 0.15 0.04 0.47 0.18 0.04 0.29 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.04 0.12 0.12 0.09
RMSE 0.0101 0.0055 0.0103 0.0127 0.0047 0.0060 0.0093 0.0131 0.0048 0.0056 0.0053 0.0076 0.0138 0.0099 0.0075
F-stat for joint 
significance of the 
bank specific eqution
12.29*** 2.95*** 1.73* 10.03*** 3.7*** 0.72 3.83*** 6.01*** 1.17 2.61*** 2.77*** 3.21*** 2.79*** 3.48*** 2.69***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan test for the contemporaneous covariance independence between the error terms chi2 (105) = 479.520; p-value = 0.000
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b) Size of the pass-through multipliers of lending rates estimated with MLE. 
 
 
***/**/* denotes joint significance by the overall F-test for the bank specific regression at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
Source: Author‟s own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      DMBKS
Bank 1     0.07***
Bank 2     0.08***
Bank 3  0.05*
Bank 5      0.28***
Bank 6      0.11***
Bank 7 –0.16
Bank 8      0.16***
Bank 9      0.48***
Bank 10 –0.17
Bank 11      0.05***
Bank 12      0.16***
Bank 13      0.13***
Bank 14      –0.29***
Bank 16      0.24***
Bank 27      0.03***
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c) Estimated signs of the rest of the independent variables in the model by 
MLE. 
 
d) Estimation output of the SUR model estimated with MLE, including the 
Breusch-Pagan test and the F-tests for the joint significance of the regressors 
in the model. 
 
. sureg (dlendrateden1= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets1 l.dmbksliquidity1  l.dmbkscapital1 
l.dmbksNPLratio1 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub1 l.dmbksrellending1 l.dmbksportdiv1  l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) 
/* 
> */ (dlendrateden2= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets2 l.dmbksliquidity2  l.dmbkscapital2 
l.dmbksNPLratio2 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub2 l.dmbksrellending2 l.dmbksportdiv2 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden3= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets3 l.dmbksliquidity3  l.dmbkscapital3 
l.dmbksNPLratio3 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub3 l.dmbksrellending3 l.dmbksportdiv3 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden5= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets5 l.dmbksliquidity5  l.dmbkscapital5 
l.dmbksNPLratio5 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub5 l.dmbksrellending5 l.dmbksportdiv5 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden6= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets6 l.dmbksliquidity6  l.dmbkscapital6 
l.dmbksNPLratio6 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub6 l.dmbksrellending6 l.dmbksportdiv6 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden7= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets7 l.dmbksliquidity7  l.dmbkscapital7 
l.dmbksNPLratio7 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub7 l.dmbksrellending7 l.dmbksportdiv7 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden8= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets8 l.dmbksliquidity8  l.dmbkscapital8 
l.dmbksNPLratio8 l.dmbksmatmi 
> sub8 l.dmbksrellending8 l.dmbksportdiv8 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden9= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets9 l.dmbksliquidity9  l.dmbkscapital9 
l.dmbksNPLratio9 l.dmbksmatmi 
VARIABLE: Assets Liquidity Capital NPLratio Mat–mismatch Rel. lending Portdiv. Inflation IPI HHI
Bank 1        + ***        – *** –        + *** +        + ***        + ***        – ***    – *        – ***
Bank 2   – *    + * – –        + ***        – *** – –        – ***        + ***
Bank 3 – – + + + + +   – * –      – **
Bank 5       + ***        + ***        + ***        – ***       – *** – – –        – *** +
Bank 6   + * + +      + **       + *** + + + +      – **
Bank 7   + * +    + * – + – – – – +
Bank 8 +       – *** – + + – –    + * – –
Bank 9       – *** +        – ***        + ***   + *        + *** – – + +
Bank 10 –    + * +    + *   + *    + * + + + +
Bank 11 + + + – –    + * +     – ** – –
Bank 12 – + – – –    + * – –        + *** –
Bank 13   – * – – ***        + ***        + *** – – +      + ** +
Bank 14       + *** – –        + *** +      + **      – **        + *** +        + ***
Bank 16       – *** – – ***      + ** – – + – +      + **
Bank 27 – – –      – **     + **      – **        + *** – + –
F-stat for joint 
signiicance of the 
variable in all bank 
specific regressions.
9.98*** 5.84*** 6.52*** 8.21*** 5.10*** 3.84*** 2.99*** 5.17*** 2.91*** 4.72***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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> sub9 l.dmbksrellending9 l.dmbksportdiv9 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden10= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets10 l.dmbksliquidity10  
l.dmbkscapital10 l.dmbksNPLratio10 l.dmbks 
> matmisub10 l.dmbksrellending10 l.dmbksportdiv10 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden11= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets11 l.dmbksliquidity11  
l.dmbkscapital11 l.dmbksNPLratio11 l.dmbks 
> matmisub11 l.dmbksrellending11 l.dmbksportdiv11 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden12= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets12 l.dmbksliquidity12  
l.dmbkscapital12 l.dmbksNPLratio12 l.dmbks 
> matmisub12 l.dmbksrellending12 l.dmbksportdiv12 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden13= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets13 l.dmbksliquidity13  
l.dmbkscapital13 l.dmbksNPLratio13 l.dmbks 
> matmisub13 l.dmbksrellending13 l.dmbksportdiv13 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden14= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets14 l.dmbksliquidity14  
l.dmbkscapital14 l.dmbksNPLratio14 l.dmbks 
> matmisub14 l.dmbksrellending14 l.dmbksportdiv14 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden16= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets16 l.dmbksliquidity16  
l.dmbkscapital16 l.dmbksNPLratio16 l.dmbks 
> matmisub16 l.dmbksrellending16 l.dmbksportdiv16 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden27= l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets27 l.dmbksliquidity27  
l.dmbkscapital27 l.dmbksNPLratio27 l.dmbks 
> matmisub27 l.dmbksrellending27 l.dmbksportdiv27 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi) /* 
> */   , isure small corr 
 
Iteration 1:   tolerance =   11.16935 
Iteration 2:   tolerance =   1.029817 
Iteration 3:   tolerance =   1.713325 
Iteration 4:   tolerance =   3.395104 
Iteration 5:   tolerance =   .4223553 
Iteration 6:   tolerance =   .1921408 
Iteration 7:   tolerance =      .2201 
Iteration 8:   tolerance =   .2640581 
Iteration 9:   tolerance =   .2155524 
Iteration 10:   tolerance =   .1670694 
Iteration 11:   tolerance =   .1350381 
Iteration 12:   tolerance =   .1462089 
Iteration 13:   tolerance =   .1617844 
Iteration 14:   tolerance =    .182453 
Iteration 15:   tolerance =   .2110862 
Iteration 16:   tolerance =   .2532158 
Iteration 17:   tolerance =   .3210511 
Iteration 18:   tolerance =   .4479279 
Iteration 19:   tolerance =   .7688605 
Iteration 20:   tolerance =   2.052753 
Iteration 21:   tolerance =   .6375623 
Iteration 22:   tolerance =   .5779624 
Iteration 23:   tolerance =     .61929 
Iteration 24:   tolerance =   .3627846 
Iteration 25:   tolerance =   .2525297 
Iteration 26:   tolerance =   .1912547 
Iteration 27:   tolerance =   .1522927 
Iteration 28:   tolerance =   .1253608 
Iteration 29:   tolerance =   .1056525 
Iteration 30:   tolerance =  .09062104 
Iteration 31:   tolerance =  .07879077 
Iteration 32:   tolerance =  .06924787 
Iteration 33:   tolerance =  .06139618 
Iteration 34:   tolerance =  .05483021 
Iteration 35:   tolerance =  .04926462 
Iteration 36:   tolerance =   .0444927 
Iteration 37:   tolerance =  .04036107 
Iteration 38:   tolerance =  .03675353 
Iteration 39:   tolerance =  .03358041 
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Iteration 40:   tolerance =  .03077138 
Iteration 41:   tolerance =  .02827053 
Iteration 42:   tolerance =  .02603285 
Iteration 43:   tolerance =  .02402164 
Iteration 44:   tolerance =  .02220674 
Iteration 45:   tolerance =  .02056306 
Iteration 46:   tolerance =  .01906963 
Iteration 47:   tolerance =  .01770872 
Iteration 48:   tolerance =  .01646526 
Iteration 49:   tolerance =  .01532636 
Iteration 50:   tolerance =  .01428092 
Iteration 51:   tolerance =  .01331933 
Iteration 52:   tolerance =  .01243322 
Iteration 53:   tolerance =  .01161529 
Iteration 54:   tolerance =  .01085911 
Iteration 55:   tolerance =  .01015901 
Iteration 56:   tolerance =  .00950997 
Iteration 57:   tolerance =  .00890753 
Iteration 58:   tolerance =  .00834772 
Iteration 59:   tolerance =  .00782696 
Iteration 60:   tolerance =  .00734207 
Iteration 61:   tolerance =  .00689016 
Iteration 62:   tolerance =  .00646864 
Iteration 63:   tolerance =  .00607515 
Iteration 64:   tolerance =  .00570758 
Iteration 65:   tolerance =  .00536396 
Iteration 66:   tolerance =  .00504255 
Iteration 67:   tolerance =  .00474174 
Iteration 68:   tolerance =  .00446003 
Iteration 69:   tolerance =  .00419609 
Iteration 70:   tolerance =  .00394868 
Iteration 71:   tolerance =  .00371666 
Iteration 72:   tolerance =  .00349897 
Iteration 73:   tolerance =  .00329466 
Iteration 74:   tolerance =  .00310282 
Iteration 75:   tolerance =  .00292265 
Iteration 76:   tolerance =  .00275336 
Iteration 77:   tolerance =  .00259426 
Iteration 78:   tolerance =  .00244469 
Iteration 79:   tolerance =  .00230404 
Iteration 80:   tolerance =  .00217174 
Iteration 81:   tolerance =  .00204728 
Iteration 82:   tolerance =  .00193015 
Iteration 83:   tolerance =  .00181991 
Iteration 84:   tolerance =  .00171613 
Iteration 85:   tolerance =  .00161841 
Iteration 86:   tolerance =  .00152639 
Iteration 87:   tolerance =   .0014397 
Iteration 88:   tolerance =  .00135805 
Iteration 89:   tolerance =  .00128111 
Iteration 90:   tolerance =  .00120862 
Iteration 91:   tolerance =  .00114029 
Iteration 92:   tolerance =  .00107589 
Iteration 93:   tolerance =  .00101519 
Iteration 94:   tolerance =  .00095796 
Iteration 95:   tolerance =    .000904 
Iteration 96:   tolerance =  .00085312 
Iteration 97:   tolerance =  .00080514 
Iteration 98:   tolerance =  .00075988 
Iteration 99:   tolerance =   .0007172 
Iteration 100:   tolerance =  .00067695 
Iteration 101:   tolerance =  .00063897 
Iteration 102:   tolerance =  .00060314 
Iteration 103:   tolerance =  .00056934 
Iteration 104:   tolerance =  .00053745 
Iteration 105:   tolerance =  .00050736 
Iteration 106:   tolerance =  .00047897 
Iteration 107:   tolerance =  .00045217 
Iteration 108:   tolerance =  .00042689 
Iteration 109:   tolerance =  .00040302 
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Iteration 110:   tolerance =   .0003805 
Iteration 111:   tolerance =  .00035925 
Iteration 112:   tolerance =  .00033919 
Iteration 113:   tolerance =  .00032025 
Iteration 114:   tolerance =  .00030238 
Iteration 115:   tolerance =   .0002855 
Iteration 116:   tolerance =  .00026958 
Iteration 117:   tolerance =  .00025454 
Iteration 118:   tolerance =  .00024035 
Iteration 119:   tolerance =  .00022695 
Iteration 120:   tolerance =   .0002143 
Iteration 121:   tolerance =  .00020236 
Iteration 122:   tolerance =  .00019108 
Iteration 123:   tolerance =  .00018044 
Iteration 124:   tolerance =  .00017039 
Iteration 125:   tolerance =   .0001609 
Iteration 126:   tolerance =  .00015194 
Iteration 127:   tolerance =  .00014348 
Iteration 128:   tolerance =  .00013549 
Iteration 129:   tolerance =  .00012795 
Iteration 130:   tolerance =  .00012083 
Iteration 131:   tolerance =   .0001141 
Iteration 132:   tolerance =  .00010775 
Iteration 133:   tolerance =  .00010176 
Iteration 134:   tolerance =   .0000961 
Iteration 135:   tolerance =  .00009075 
Iteration 136:   tolerance =  .00008571 
Iteration 137:   tolerance =  .00008093 
Iteration 138:   tolerance =  .00007643 
Iteration 139:   tolerance =  .00007218 
Iteration 140:   tolerance =  .00006817 
Iteration 141:   tolerance =  .00006438 
Iteration 142:   tolerance =   .0000608 
Iteration 143:   tolerance =  .00005742 
Iteration 144:   tolerance =  .00005423 
Iteration 145:   tolerance =  .00005121 
Iteration 146:   tolerance =  .00004836 
Iteration 147:   tolerance =  .00004567 
Iteration 148:   tolerance =  .00004314 
Iteration 149:   tolerance =  .00004074 
Iteration 150:   tolerance =  .00003847 
Iteration 151:   tolerance =  .00003633 
Iteration 152:   tolerance =  .00003432 
Iteration 153:   tolerance =  .00003241 
Iteration 154:   tolerance =  .00003061 
Iteration 155:   tolerance =  .00002891 
Iteration 156:   tolerance =   .0000273 
Iteration 157:   tolerance =  .00002578 
Iteration 158:   tolerance =  .00002435 
Iteration 159:   tolerance =  .00002299 
Iteration 160:   tolerance =  .00002172 
Iteration 161:   tolerance =  .00002051 
Iteration 162:   tolerance =  .00001937 
Iteration 163:   tolerance =  .00001829 
Iteration 164:   tolerance =  .00001728 
Iteration 165:   tolerance =  .00001632 
Iteration 166:   tolerance =  .00001541 
Iteration 167:   tolerance =  .00001455 
Iteration 168:   tolerance =  .00001375 
Iteration 169:   tolerance =  .00001298 
Iteration 170:   tolerance =  .00001226 
Iteration 171:   tolerance =  .00001158 
Iteration 172:   tolerance =  .00001094 
Iteration 173:   tolerance =  .00001033 
Iteration 174:   tolerance =  9.756e-06 
Iteration 175:   tolerance =  9.212e-06 
Iteration 176:   tolerance =  8.701e-06 
Iteration 177:   tolerance =  8.217e-06 
Iteration 178:   tolerance =  7.761e-06 
Iteration 179:   tolerance =  7.329e-06 
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Iteration 180:   tolerance =  6.922e-06 
Iteration 181:   tolerance =  6.537e-06 
Iteration 182:   tolerance =  6.174e-06 
Iteration 183:   tolerance =  5.832e-06 
Iteration 184:   tolerance =  5.508e-06 
Iteration 185:   tolerance =  5.200e-06 
Iteration 186:   tolerance =  4.914e-06 
Iteration 187:   tolerance =  4.639e-06 
Iteration 188:   tolerance =  4.384e-06 
Iteration 189:   tolerance =  4.138e-06 
Iteration 190:   tolerance =  3.907e-06 
Iteration 191:   tolerance =  3.692e-06 
Iteration 192:   tolerance =  3.486e-06 
Iteration 193:   tolerance =  3.293e-06 
Iteration 194:   tolerance =  3.109e-06 
Iteration 195:   tolerance =  2.936e-06 
Iteration 196:   tolerance =  2.773e-06 
Iteration 197:   tolerance =  2.619e-06 
Iteration 198:   tolerance =  2.473e-06 
Iteration 199:   tolerance =  2.337e-06 
Iteration 200:   tolerance =  2.207e-06 
Iteration 201:   tolerance =  2.085e-06 
Iteration 202:   tolerance =  1.969e-06 
Iteration 203:   tolerance =  1.859e-06 
Iteration 204:   tolerance =  1.756e-06 
Iteration 205:   tolerance =  1.657e-06 
Iteration 206:   tolerance =  1.567e-06 
Iteration 207:   tolerance =  1.480e-06 
Iteration 208:   tolerance =  1.397e-06 
Iteration 209:   tolerance =  1.320e-06 
Iteration 210:   tolerance =  1.246e-06 
Iteration 211:   tolerance =  1.177e-06 
Iteration 212:   tolerance =  1.109e-06 
Iteration 213:   tolerance =  1.050e-06 
Iteration 214:   tolerance =  9.924e-07 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression, iterated  
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"     F-Stat        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1       94     11    .0101111    0.4787      12.29   0.0000 
dlendrate~n2       94     11    .0054533    0.1498       2.95   0.0007 
dlendrate~n3       94     11    .0102552    0.0416       1.73   0.0612 
dlendrated~5       94     11    .0127092    0.4730      10.03   0.0000 
dlendrate~n6       94     11    .0046717    0.1840       3.70   0.0000 
dlendrate~n7       94     11    .0060029    0.0383       0.72   0.7190 
dlendrated~8       94     11    .0092801    0.2882       3.83   0.0000 
dlendrated~9       94     11    .0130628    0.0725       6.01   0.0000 
dlendrate~10       94     11    .0048274    0.0193       1.17   0.3033 
dlendrate~11       94     11    .0056297    0.0233       2.61   0.0027 
dlendrate~12       94     11    .0053473    0.2352       2.77   0.0015 
dlendrate~13       94     11    .0076192    0.0359       3.21   0.0003 
dlendrate~14       94     11    .0137809    0.1168       2.79   0.0014 
dlendrate~16       94     11    .0099235    0.1222       3.48   0.0001 
dlendrate~27       94     11    .0075113    0.0883       2.69   0.0020 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   133.0369   43.13261     3.08   0.002     48.41531    217.6586 
dmbkslass~s1 | 
         L1. |   -13.5034   2.414548    -5.59   0.000    -18.24049   -8.766309 
dmbksliqu~y1 | 
         L1. |   34.68963   4.925829     7.04   0.000     25.02567    44.35358 
dmbkscapi~l1 | 
         L1. |   12.84803   19.87968     0.65   0.518     -26.1538    51.84986 
dmbksNPLr~o1 | 
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         L1. |  -28.83805   4.387688    -6.57   0.000    -37.44623   -20.22987 
dmbksmatm~b1 | 
         L1. |  -.2175591   .1430595    -1.52   0.129    -.4982266    .0631085 
dmbksrell~g1 | 
         L1. |  -12.61953   4.433999    -2.85   0.004    -21.31857   -3.920493 
dmbksport~v1 | 
         L1. |  -13.09393   2.849491    -4.60   0.000    -18.68433   -7.503532 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   47.92288   9.964285     4.81   0.000       28.374    67.47176 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   2.373003   1.385351     1.71   0.087    -.3449087    5.090915 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |    15.4147   4.408741     3.50   0.000     6.765215    24.06419 
       _cons |  -.0022115   .0010519    -2.10   0.036    -.0042752   -.0001477 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n2 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -47.47062    50.5587    -0.94   0.348    -146.6615    51.72022 
dmbkslass~s2 | 
         L1. |   5.140818   2.903393     1.77   0.077    -.5553337    10.83697 
dmbksliqu~y2 | 
         L1. |  -5.555022    3.19938    -1.74   0.083    -11.83187    .7218243 
dmbkscapi~l2 | 
         L1. |   16.24958    17.2501     0.94   0.346     -17.5933    50.09245 
dmbksNPLr~o2 | 
         L1. |   1.781183   2.648655     0.67   0.501    -3.415199    6.977564 
dmbksmatm~b2 | 
         L1. |  -.8562663   .2850631    -3.00   0.003     -1.41553   -.2970025 
dmbksrell~g2 | 
         L1. |   17.05063   5.093498     3.35   0.001     7.057724    27.04354 
dmbksport~v2 | 
         L1. |    2.01295   2.368127     0.85   0.395    -2.633066    6.658966 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   1.780658   6.337435     0.28   0.779    -10.65272    14.21404 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   2.016384   .7552197     2.67   0.008     .5347223    3.498045 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -6.188176   1.961815    -3.15   0.002    -10.03705   -2.339302 
       _cons |   -.000937   .0005592    -1.68   0.094    -.0020341    .0001602 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n3 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -52.35528    20.5552    -2.55   0.011    -92.68242   -12.02815 
dmbkslass~s3 | 
         L1. |   .8270286    .579599     1.43   0.154    -.3100835    1.964141 
dmbksliqu~y3 | 
         L1. |   1.023224   1.283327     0.80   0.425    -1.494529    3.540977 
dmbkscapi~l3 | 
         L1. |  -.0575841   1.943826    -0.03   0.976    -3.871166    3.755998 
dmbksNPLr~o3 | 
         L1. |  -1.414842   1.015648    -1.39   0.164    -3.407436    .5777519 
dmbksmatm~b3 | 
         L1. |  -.5309824   .9105495    -0.58   0.560    -2.317384     1.25542 
dmbksrell~g3 | 
         L1. |  -5.622757   9.463282    -0.59   0.553    -24.18872     12.9432 
dmbksport~v3 | 
         L1. |  -.1509964   1.312805    -0.12   0.908    -2.726581    2.424588 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   19.27209   11.44226     1.68   0.092    -3.176424     41.7206 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .6826157   1.529389     0.45   0.655    -2.317884    3.683115 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   5.615068   2.416001     2.32   0.020     .8751282    10.35501 
       _cons |   .0004479   .0010737     0.42   0.677    -.0016587    .0025544 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~5 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   368.0195   57.82982     6.36   0.000     254.5635    481.4755 
dmbkslasse~5 | 
         L1. |  -20.79769   3.402624    -6.11   0.000    -27.47328    -14.1221 
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dmbksliqui~5 | 
         L1. |   -13.5241   3.740726    -3.62   0.000    -20.86301   -6.185187 
dmbkscapit~5 | 
         L1. |  -105.3426   17.64699    -5.97   0.000    -139.9642   -70.72111 
dmbksNPLra~5 | 
         L1. |   31.72315   7.001325     4.53   0.000     17.98729    45.45901 
dmbksmatm~b5 | 
         L1. |   4.543474   1.093908     4.15   0.000     2.397342    6.689606 
dmbksrelle~5 | 
         L1. |   3.070648   2.467328     1.24   0.214     -1.76999    7.911287 
dmbksportd~5 | 
         L1. |   .1240771   2.847451     0.04   0.965    -5.462321    5.710475 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   8.723613   11.13757     0.78   0.434    -13.12713    30.57436 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   5.592856   1.797358     3.11   0.002      2.06663    9.119083 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -5.276646   4.564613    -1.16   0.248    -14.23193    3.678643 
       _cons |  -.0017734   .0012997    -1.36   0.173    -.0043232    .0007764 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
dlendrate~n6 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -3.033655   17.43555    -0.17   0.862    -37.24036    31.17305 
dmbkslass~s6 | 
         L1. |  -1.522914   .7789074    -1.96   0.051    -3.051048    .0052203 
dmbksliqu~y6 | 
         L1. |  -.9960674   1.202549    -0.83   0.408    -3.355341    1.363207 
dmbkscapi~l6 | 
         L1. |  -.8070679   2.844684    -0.28   0.777    -6.388037    4.773901 
dmbksNPLr~o6 | 
         L1. |  -4.858421   2.243947    -2.17   0.031     -9.26081   -.4560329 
dmbksmatm~b6 | 
         L1. |  -1.543199   .3813163    -4.05   0.000    -2.291301   -.7950965 
dmbksrell~g6 | 
         L1. |  -.1739594   1.161283    -0.15   0.881    -2.452274    2.104356 
dmbksport~v6 | 
         L1. |  -.2711075    1.23354    -0.22   0.826    -2.691184    2.148969 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -1.444057   3.885128    -0.37   0.710    -9.066269    6.178156 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.4231277   .6648456    -0.64   0.525    -1.727485    .8812293 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   4.008327     1.6518     2.43   0.015     .7676703    7.248984 
       _cons |    .000175   .0004787     0.37   0.715    -.0007641    .0011141 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n7 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |    45.8932   23.79103     1.93   0.054    -.7822894    92.56869 
dmbkslass~s7 | 
         L1. |  -2.163208   1.212783    -1.78   0.075     -4.54256    .2161437 
dmbksliqu~y7 | 
         L1. |  -.5520511   1.542061    -0.36   0.720    -3.577412     2.47331 
dmbkscapi~l7 | 
         L1. |   -6.27749   3.324937    -1.89   0.059    -12.80067    .2456851 
dmbksNPLr~o7 | 
         L1. |   .6054463   2.148613     0.28   0.778    -3.609905    4.820798 
dmbksmatm~b7 | 
         L1. |  -.0003662   .0130649    -0.03   0.978    -.0259982    .0252658 
dmbksrell~g7 | 
         L1. |   1.928494   1.646739     1.17   0.242    -1.302234    5.159222 
dmbksport~v7 | 
         L1. |   .3349567   3.580766     0.09   0.925    -6.690129    7.360042 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   5.136068   5.994544     0.86   0.392    -6.624594    16.89673 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .2215944   .8375366     0.26   0.791    -1.421564    1.864753 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.680577     2.7266    -0.62   0.538    -7.029878    3.668724 
       _cons |  -.0011763   .0006421    -1.83   0.067    -.0024361    .0000834 
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-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~8 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   76.84358   103.6769     0.74   0.459    -126.5596    280.2467 
dmbkslasse~8 | 
         L1. |  -8.382984   7.210272    -1.16   0.245    -22.52878    5.762809 
dmbksliqui~8 | 
         L1. |   19.39971   6.276561     3.09   0.002     7.085763    31.71366 
dmbkscapit~8 | 
         L1. |   7.875686   9.837678     0.80   0.424     -11.4248    27.17617 
dmbksNPLra~8 | 
         L1. |  -1.723351   2.407302    -0.72   0.474    -6.446224    2.999523 
dmbksmatm~b8 | 
         L1. |  -.3273894    .253386    -1.29   0.197    -.8245061    .1697272 
dmbksrelle~8 | 
         L1. |   8.275492   5.217272     1.59   0.113    -1.960245    18.51123 
dmbksportd~8 | 
         L1. |   1.412582   1.777108     0.79   0.427    -2.073917    4.899082 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -14.69207   8.716592    -1.69   0.092     -31.7931    2.408965 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   1.344207   1.239529     1.08   0.278    -1.087618    3.776032 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   3.796246   3.519764     1.08   0.281    -3.109159    10.70165 
       _cons |  -.0018496   .0010094    -1.83   0.067      -.00383    .0001308 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
dlendrated~9 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -82.65665   35.51214    -2.33   0.020    -152.3277   -12.98558 
dmbkslasse~9 | 
         L1. |   6.114547   1.125574     5.43   0.000      3.90629    8.322805 
dmbksliqui~9 | 
         L1. |  -3.144995   2.059455    -1.53   0.127    -7.185428    .8954387 
dmbkscapit~9 | 
         L1. |   23.11281   3.320894     6.96   0.000     16.59757    29.62806 
dmbksNPLra~9 | 
         L1. |  -8.209928   1.606432    -5.11   0.000    -11.36158   -5.058277 
dmbksmatm~b9 | 
         L1. |  -.0418047   .0213976    -1.95   0.051    -.0837844    .0001751 
dmbksrelle~9 | 
         L1. |  -6.159725   2.154249    -2.86   0.004    -10.38614   -1.933316 
dmbksportd~9 | 
         L1. |   2.054066   1.425656     1.44   0.150    -.7429199    4.851053 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   7.352836   9.400595     0.78   0.434    -11.09014    25.79581 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.1026595   1.818943    -0.06   0.955    -3.671235    3.465916 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.648804   4.534265    -0.36   0.716    -10.54455    7.246945 
       _cons |  -.0018306   .0013525    -1.35   0.176    -.0044841    .0008228 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~10 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   9.299999   16.94044     0.55   0.583    -23.93535    42.53535 
dmbkslass~10 | 
         L1. |   1.214712   .9415124     1.29   0.197     -.632436     3.06186 
dmbksliqu~10 | 
         L1. |  -3.116642   1.804565    -1.73   0.084    -6.657009    .4237239 
dmbkscapi~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.801191   6.261447    -0.45   0.655    -15.08549    9.483106 
dmbksNPLr~10 | 
         L1. |  -15.40511   8.325047    -1.85   0.064    -31.73797    .9277547 
dmbksmat~b10 | 
         L1. |   -.512003   .2724606    -1.88   0.060    -1.046542    .0225359 
dmbksrell~10 | 
         L1. |  -5.621705   3.290161    -1.71   0.088    -12.07665    .8332446 
dmbksport~10 | 
         L1. |  -1.662304   2.355736    -0.71   0.481    -6.284011    2.959402 
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   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -6.059609   5.070321    -1.20   0.232    -16.00704    3.887825 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.3543071   .6907607    -0.51   0.608    -1.709507    1.000893 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -2.842859   2.463798    -1.15   0.249     -7.67657    1.990853 
       _cons |  -.0007304   .0005092    -1.43   0.152    -.0017294    .0002686 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~11 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |    8.26562   19.15592     0.43   0.666    -29.31628    45.84752 
dmbkslass~11 | 
         L1. |   -.557416    1.05377    -0.53   0.597    -2.624802     1.50997 
dmbksliqu~11 | 
         L1. |  -2.348594   1.583246    -1.48   0.138    -5.454756    .7575674 
dmbkscapi~11 | 
         L1. |  -4.806907   8.657343    -0.56   0.579     -21.7917    12.17789 
dmbksNPLr~11 | 
         L1. |   5.134597   7.313879     0.70   0.483    -9.214461    19.48366 
dmbksmat~b11 | 
         L1. |   .2315549   .5161322     0.45   0.654    -.7810421    1.244152 
dmbksrell~11 | 
         L1. |   -2.80905   1.640523    -1.71   0.087    -6.027583    .4094828 
dmbksport~11 | 
         L1. |  -2.307213   1.814571    -1.27   0.204    -5.867209    1.252784 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   11.44202   5.177799     2.21   0.027     1.283726    21.60032 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .2669313    .765994     0.35   0.728    -1.235868    1.769731 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   .5587463   1.921965     0.29   0.771    -3.211946    4.329439 
       _cons |  -.0011152   .0005882    -1.90   0.058    -.0022692    .0000388 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
dlendrate~12 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -59.52117   31.54572    -1.89   0.059    -121.4106    2.368216 
dmbkslass~12 | 
         L1. |   2.536768   2.274511     1.12   0.265    -1.925581    6.999118 
dmbksliqu~12 | 
         L1. |  -1.596236   2.507303    -0.64   0.524      -6.5153    3.322828 
dmbkscapi~12 | 
         L1. |   10.87033   10.27752     1.06   0.290    -9.293093    31.03374 
dmbksNPLr~12 | 
         L1. |   5.779746   4.549512     1.27   0.204    -3.145917    14.70541 
dmbksmat~b12 | 
         L1. |   .2623761   .9690937     0.27   0.787    -1.638884    2.163636 
dmbksrell~12 | 
         L1. |  -6.745812   3.470625    -1.94   0.052    -13.55481    .0631879 
dmbksport~12 | 
         L1. |   .3197345   1.893163     0.17   0.866    -3.394452    4.033921 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   4.886832   4.600811     1.06   0.288    -4.139475    13.91314 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -1.992863   .7278455    -2.74   0.006    -3.420819   -.5649069 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   2.567865   1.866529     1.38   0.169    -1.094068    6.229797 
       _cons |  -.0005493    .000553    -0.99   0.321    -.0016342    .0005356 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~13 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -16.49177   20.30292    -0.81   0.417    -56.32396    23.34041 
dmbkslass~13 | 
         L1. |   2.167754   1.225297     1.77   0.077    -.2361489    4.571657 
dmbksliqu~13 | 
         L1. |   .0990819   1.231745     0.08   0.936    -2.317473    2.515636 
dmbkscapi~13 | 
         L1. |   12.44685    3.93045     3.17   0.002     4.735719    20.15798 
dmbksNPLr~13 | 
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         L1. |  -5.741936   1.579019    -3.64   0.000    -8.839805   -2.644067 
dmbksmat~b13 | 
         L1. |  -2.524032   .8349981    -3.02   0.003     -4.16221   -.8858533 
dmbksrell~13 | 
         L1. |   3.141008   2.071281     1.52   0.130    -.9226273    7.204643 
dmbksport~13 | 
         L1. |   .0133667   .0138196     0.97   0.334    -.0137459    .0404793 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -.6997181   5.591926    -0.13   0.900    -11.67049    10.27105 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -2.045893   1.021653    -2.00   0.045    -4.050269   -.0415165 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -2.128884   1.830501    -1.16   0.245    -5.720135    1.462366 
       _cons |  -.0013591   .0007824    -1.74   0.083    -.0028941     .000176 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~14 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   677.3629   147.7837     4.58   0.000     387.4269     967.299 
dmbkslass~14 | 
         L1. |   -34.1378   7.723863    -4.42   0.000    -49.29121    -18.9844 
dmbksliqu~14 | 
         L1. |    .717844   1.726107     0.42   0.678    -2.668596    4.104284 
dmbkscapi~14 | 
         L1. |   .8252107       2.99     0.28   0.783    -5.040855    6.691276 
dmbksNPLr~14 | 
         L1. |  -9.568224   2.743435    -3.49   0.001    -14.95055   -4.185894 
dmbksmat~b14 | 
         L1. |  -.8964508   .5515774    -1.63   0.104    -1.978588    .1856859 
dmbksrell~14 | 
         L1. |  -6.060396   3.076723    -1.97   0.049     -12.0966   -.0241898 
dmbksport~14 | 
         L1. |   13.76152   5.867213     2.35   0.019     2.250671    25.27238 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -54.58295   17.76838    -3.07   0.002    -89.44264   -19.72327 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -2.572531   2.130458    -1.21   0.227    -6.752265    1.607203 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -31.06338   7.320826    -4.24   0.000    -45.42607   -16.70069 
       _cons |  -.0014251   .0015206    -0.94   0.349    -.0044085    .0015582 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
dlendrate~16 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -108.8797     32.661    -3.33   0.001    -172.9572    -44.8023 
dmbkslass~16 | 
         L1. |   11.47948   2.989908     3.84   0.000     5.613596    17.34536 
dmbksliqu~16 | 
         L1. |   1.119782   2.166194     0.52   0.605    -3.130062    5.369626 
dmbkscapi~16 | 
         L1. |   18.01822   5.633967     3.20   0.001      6.96497    29.07147 
dmbksNPLr~16 | 
         L1. |  -10.52456   5.037389    -2.09   0.037    -20.40739   -.6417316 
dmbksmat~b16 | 
         L1. |   .1305346   1.088426     0.12   0.905    -2.004843    2.265912 
dmbksrell~16 | 
         L1. |   1.335095   1.452315     0.92   0.358    -1.514193    4.184384 
dmbksport~16 | 
         L1. |  -3.303288   2.638886    -1.25   0.211    -8.480504    1.873928 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   4.275502   7.687585     0.56   0.578    -10.80673    19.35773 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.9687207   1.400547    -0.69   0.489    -3.716445    1.779004 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -8.773592   4.141286    -2.12   0.034    -16.89836   -.6488256 
       _cons |  -.0000627   .0010145    -0.06   0.951     -.002053    .0019276 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~27 | 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -31.84713   35.88446    -0.89   0.375    -102.2487     38.5544 
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dmbkslass~27 | 
         L1. |   1.289323   1.883786     0.68   0.494    -2.406466    4.985112 
dmbksliqu~27 | 
         L1. |   1.160115   2.230201     0.52   0.603    -3.215303    5.535534 
dmbkscapi~27 | 
         L1. |   2.867379   3.709705     0.77   0.440    -4.410671    10.14543 
dmbksNPLr~27 | 
         L1. |   5.036074   2.217976     2.27   0.023      .684639    9.387509 
dmbksmat~b27 | 
         L1. |  -.4868298   .1968039    -2.47   0.014    -.8729384   -.1007213 
dmbksrell~27 | 
         L1. |   6.786308   2.712633     2.50   0.012     1.464408    12.10821 
dmbksport~27 | 
         L1. |  -1.395606   .5109216    -2.73   0.006    -2.397981    -.393232 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   1.272688   6.653943     0.19   0.848    -11.78165    14.32702 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.0135658   1.043377    -0.01   0.990    -2.060562     2.03343 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   1.292048    2.95664     0.44   0.662    -4.508568    7.092663 
       _cons |  -.0005309   .0007832    -0.68   0.498    -.0020675    .0010057 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Correlation matrix of residuals: 
 
                 dlendrateden1   dlendrateden2   dlendrateden3   dlendrateden5   dlendrateden6 
 dlendrateden1          1.0000 
 dlendrateden2          0.1862          1.0000 
 dlendrateden3         -0.1961         -0.2355          1.0000 
 dlendrateden5          0.0281         -0.4928          0.0314          1.0000 
 dlendrateden6         -0.2113         -0.0487          0.6068         -0.0764          1.0000 
 dlendrateden7          0.0350         -0.1860         -0.1168          0.0811         -0.3694 
 dlendrateden8          0.1189         -0.0506         -0.0902          0.0547         -0.1775 
 dlendrateden9         -0.1121         -0.0365         -0.0078          0.1475         -0.0365 
dlendrateden10         -0.0944          0.0492         -0.0434          0.0603          0.0253 
dlendrateden11          0.0330         -0.3620         -0.3290          0.4035         -0.5046 
dlendrateden12         -0.0799          0.0736         -0.0809         -0.3053          0.1355 
dlendrateden13         -0.2573          0.0466         -0.2233         -0.1514         -0.3233 
dlendrateden14         -0.2132         -0.0686          0.1370         -0.1334          0.2280 
dlendrateden16         -0.4169          0.2693         -0.0572         -0.4999          0.0002 
dlendrateden27         -0.2595         -0.0344          0.2876         -0.0591          0.5038 
 
                 dlendrateden7   dlendrateden8   dlendrateden9  dlendrateden10  dlendrateden11 
 dlendrateden7          1.0000 
 dlendrateden8          0.0495          1.0000 
 dlendrateden9         -0.0936         -0.1319          1.0000 
dlendrateden10         -0.0122         -0.1108         -0.0418          1.0000 
dlendrateden11          0.3046          0.2549         -0.2340         -0.0608          1.0000 
dlendrateden12         -0.1236         -0.0376         -0.3106          0.2189          0.0390 
dlendrateden13          0.0850         -0.0124          0.7470         -0.0947          0.1222 
dlendrateden14         -0.0166         -0.2329          0.0661         -0.0230         -0.0503 
dlendrateden16         -0.1096         -0.0199          0.0924          0.0722         -0.3804 
dlendrateden27         -0.1880          0.0243         -0.0129          0.2467         -0.2114 
 
                dlendrateden12  dlendrateden13  dlendrateden14  dlendrateden16  dlendrateden27 
dlendrateden12          1.0000 
dlendrateden13         -0.0823          1.0000 
dlendrateden14          0.0642          0.1572          1.0000 
dlendrateden16          0.2663          0.2373          0.1099          1.0000 
dlendrateden27          0.4839         -0.1409          0.0260          0.3246          1.0000 
 
Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(105) = 479.520, Pr 
= 0.0000 
 
 
 
F-test for joint significance of the parameters of the 
variables in all bank specific equations: 
  
 
. test l.dmbks 
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 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbks = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbks = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbks = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbks = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbks = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbks = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbks = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbks = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    6.64 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksinfl 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksinfl = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    5.17 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksipi 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksipi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.91 
            Prob > F =    0.0001 
 
. test l.dmbkslhhi 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
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 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkslhhi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    4.72 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbkslassets1 l.dmbkslassets2 l.dmbkslassets3 l.dmbkslassets5 
l.dmbkslassets6 l.dmbkslassets7 l.d 
> mbkslassets8 l.dmbkslassets9 /* 
> */ l.dmbkslassets10 l.dmbkslassets11 l.dmbkslassets12 l.dmbkslassets13 
l.dmbkslassets14 l.dmbkslassets16 
>  l.dmbkslassets27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkslassets1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkslassets2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkslassets3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkslassets5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkslassets6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkslassets7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkslassets8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkslassets9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkslassets10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkslassets11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkslassets12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkslassets13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkslassets14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkslassets16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkslassets27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    9.98 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksliquidity1 l.dmbksliquidity2 l.dmbksliquidity3 l.dmbksliquidity5 
l.dmbksliquidity6 l.dmbksli 
> quidity7 l.dmbksliquidity8 l.dmbksliquidity9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksliquidity10 l.dmbksliquidity11 l.dmbksliquidity12 l.dmbksliquidity13 
l.dmbksliquidity14 l.dmbk 
> sliquidity16 l.dmbksliquidity27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksliquidity1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksliquidity2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksliquidity3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksliquidity5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksliquidity6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksliquidity7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksliquidity8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksliquidity9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksliquidity10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksliquidity11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksliquidity12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksliquidity13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksliquidity14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksliquidity16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksliquidity27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    5.84 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbkscapital1 l.dmbkscapital2 l.dmbkscapital3 l.dmbkscapital5 
l.dmbkscapital6 l.dmbkscapital7 l.d 
> mbkscapital8 l.dmbkscapital9 /* 
> */ l.dmbkscapital10 l.dmbkscapital11 l.dmbkscapital12 l.dmbkscapital13 
l.dmbkscapital14 l.dmbkscapital16 
>  l.dmbkscapital27 
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 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbkscapital1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbkscapital2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbkscapital3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbkscapital5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbkscapital6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbkscapital7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbkscapital8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbkscapital9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbkscapital10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbkscapital11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbkscapital12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbkscapital13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbkscapital14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbkscapital16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbkscapital27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    6.52 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksNPLratio1 l.dmbksNPLratio2 l.dmbksNPLratio3 l.dmbksNPLratio5 
l.dmbksNPLratio6 l.dmbksNPLrati 
> o7 l.dmbksNPLratio8 l.dmbksNPLratio9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksNPLratio10 l.dmbksNPLratio11 l.dmbksNPLratio12 l.dmbksNPLratio13 
l.dmbksNPLratio14 l.dmbksNPLr 
> atio16 l.dmbksNPLratio27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksNPLratio1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksNPLratio2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksNPLratio3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksNPLratio5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksNPLratio6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksNPLratio7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksNPLratio8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksNPLratio9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksNPLratio10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksNPLratio11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksNPLratio12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksNPLratio13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksNPLratio14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksNPLratio16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksNPLratio27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    8.21 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksmatmisub1 l.dmbksmatmisub2 l.dmbksmatmisub3 l.dmbksmatmisub5 
l.dmbksmatmisub6 l.dmbksmatmisu 
> b7 l.dmbksmatmisub8 l.dmbksmatmisub9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksmatmisub10 l.dmbksmatmisub11 l.dmbksmatmisub12 l.dmbksmatmisub13 
l.dmbksmatmisub14 l.dmbksmatm 
> isub16 l.dmbksmatmisub27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksmatmisub1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksmatmisub2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksmatmisub3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksmatmisub5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksmatmisub6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksmatmisub7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksmatmisub8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksmatmisub9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksmatmisub10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksmatmisub11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksmatmisub12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksmatmisub13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksmatmisub14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksmatmisub16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksmatmisub27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    5.10 
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            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksrellending1 l.dmbksrellending2 l.dmbksrellending3 l.dmbksrellending5 
l.dmbksrellending6 l.dm 
> bksrellending7 l.dmbksrellending8 l.dmbksrellending9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksrellending10 l.dmbksrellending11 l.dmbksrellending12 
l.dmbksrellending13 l.dmbksrellending14 l 
> .dmbksrellending16 l.dmbksrellending27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksrellending1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksrellending2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksrellending3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksrellending5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksrellending6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksrellending7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksrellending8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksrellending9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksrellending10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksrellending11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksrellending12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksrellending13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksrellending14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksrellending16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksrellending27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.84 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dmbksportdiv1 l.dmbksportdiv2 l.dmbksportdiv3 l.dmbksportdiv5 
l.dmbksportdiv6 l.dmbksportdiv7 l.d 
> mbksportdiv8 l.dmbksportdiv9 /* 
> */ l.dmbksportdiv10 l.dmbksportdiv11 l.dmbksportdiv12 l.dmbksportdiv13 
l.dmbksportdiv14 l.dmbksportdiv16 
>  l.dmbksportdiv27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dmbksportdiv1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dmbksportdiv2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dmbksportdiv3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dmbksportdiv5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dmbksportdiv6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dmbksportdiv7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dmbksportdiv8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dmbksportdiv9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dmbksportdiv10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dmbksportdiv11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dmbksportdiv12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dmbksportdiv13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dmbksportdiv14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dmbksportdiv16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dmbksportdiv27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.99 
            Prob > F =    0.0001 
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Appendix 3.6: Estimation results and estimation output of the 
final model specification estimated with OLS 
equation-by-equation.
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a) Estimation results of the model estimated with OLS equation-by-equation. 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations performed in STATA 10. 
VARIABLE: Bank1 Bank2 Bank3 Bank5 Bank6 Bank7 Bank8 Bank9 Bank10 Bank11 Bank12 Bank13 Bank14 Bank16 Bank27
L.dmbks 82.52 112.4* -53.47** 527.8*** -3.94 28.58 1.89 -134.5* 4.71 -32.03 -64.16 -0.19 582.3*** -51.08 19.27
(56.88) (65.43) (22.82) (90.09) (26.04) (27.08) (121.1) (75.21) (18.63) (31.14) (40.95) (48.69) (167.2) (42.80) (51.81)
L.dmbkslassets -10.01*** -4.55 1.05 -29.26*** -0.72 -1.32 -3.5 3.89 0.68 0.50 3.35 -0.18 -28.47*** 4.26 -2.94
(3.25) (3.77) (0.66) (5.33) (1.07) (1.39) (8.45) (3.08) (1.04) (1.77) (2.92) (3.29) (8.75) (4.18) (2.79)
L.dmbksliquidity 37.17*** 0.22 -1.67 -20.94*** -3.96* 0.34 15.95** -0.06 -2.17 -2.98 -8.18** -2.23 0.55 4.90 -6.97**
(6.55) (4.16) (1.70) (5.73) (2.03) (1.82) (7.27) (4.56) (1.99) (2.81) (3.45) (2.87) (1.97) (3.00) (2.9)
L.dmbkscapital 33.08 -43.03* 1.74 -170.6*** 4.14 -4.36 11.03 23.52** 0.2 1.30 -1.79 1.49 -3.58 3.49 -1.12
(28.05) (22.78) (2.47) (29.11) (4.19) (3.87) (11.46) (9.87) (6.92) (14.58) (13.57) (9.87) (3.36) (7.90) (5.58)
L.dmbksNPLratio -29.98*** -1.07 -1.80 57.67*** -4.88 1.4 -2.57 -12.05*** -2.63 -26.42* 5.1 -1.44 -7.22** -3.40 -0.91
(5.77) (3.50) (1.31) (11.32) (3.77) (2.55) (2.72) (4.43) (9.41) (15.36) (6.09) (3.49) (3.16) (7.55) (3.14)
L.dmbksmatmisub 0.02 -0.21 -0.28 7.02*** -2.14*** 0.00 -0.24 0.00 -0.37 -0.47 -0.31 -3.62** -0.61 0.97 -0.55**
(0.18) (0.37) (1.22) (1.68) (0.7) (0.02) (0.29) (0.04) (0.30) (0.91) (1.34) (1.78) (0.62) (1.49) (0.25)
L.dmbksrellending -17.17*** 13.61** -5.98 2.13 1.54 1.04 4.31 -4.84 -1.8 -2.94 -5.73 6.72* -3.39 1.76 1.73
(5.75) (6.56) (12.68) (3.4) (1.71) (1.90) (6.03) (4.96) (3.71) (2.74) (4.65) (3.84) (3.53) (2.3) (3.81)
L.dmbksportdiv -7.76** 1.05 4.19** 7.8 2.16 -0.69 2.83 0.2 -0.38 0.39 0.97 0.01 13.91** 1.56 0.72
(3.77) (3.05) (1.74) (4.8) (2.18) (4.29) (2.04) (3.42) (2.64) (3.24) (2.71) (0.04) (6.71) (3.75) (0.75)
L.dmbksinfl 49.05*** 12.99* 4.98 7.8 -5.49 1.65 -13.72 8.64 -5.77 2.68 4.00 5.65 -44.84** 13.24 9.72
(11.59) (7.41) (13.83) (14.07) (4.67) (6.73) (9.72) (11.44) (5.49) (6.71) (5.59) (8.68) (19.95) (9.00) (7.46)
L.dmbksipi 3.09** 1.67** -0.42 5.55*** 0.34 0.01 1.36 0.46 -0.41 0.50 -1.8** -1.96* -0.87 -0.39 -1.46
(1.46) (0.79) (1.68) (1.95) (0.78) (0.9) (1.32) (2.48) (0.73) (0.84) (0.78) (1.14) (2.29) (1.55) (1.07)
L.dmbkslhhi 13.26** -4.67** 5.16* -8.87* 2.29 -1.04 4.65 9.76 -1.71 3.75 2.29 0.38 -28.07*** -2.40 3.67
(5.29) (2.17) (2.61) (5.27) (2.22) (3.07) (3.9) (8.27) (2.68) (2.38) (2.05) (2.23) (8.19) (5.53) (3.52)
Constant -0.00* -0.00 0.00 -0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.52 0.23 0.14 0.54 0.24 0.06 0.3 0.16 0.05 0.12 0.29 0.12 0.16 0.23 0.24
RMSE 0.00969 0.00518 0.00971 0.01187 0.00451 0.00595 0.00921 0.01245 0.00474 0.00536 0.00515 0.00729 0.01347 0.00932 0.00685
F-stat for joint 
significance of the 
bank specific eqution
8.11*** 2.25** 1.22 8.76*** 2.37** 0.44 3.18*** 1.39 0.42 0.97 3.05*** 1 1.38 2.18** 2.36**
Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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b) Size of the pass-through multipliers of lending rates estimated with OLS 
equation-by-equation. 
 
 
***/**/* denotes joint significance by the overall F-test for the bank specific regression at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
Source: Author‟s own calculations. 
 
c) Estimated signs of the rest of the independent variables in the model by 
OLS equation-by-equation. 
 
      DMBKS
Bank 1        0.00***
Bank 2      0.11**
Bank 3 0.24
Bank 5        0.46***
Bank 6     0.18**
Bank 7 -0.15
Bank 8       0.21***
Bank 9 0.29
Bank 10 0.05
Bank 11 0.03
Bank 12        0.15***
Bank 13 0.07
Bank 14 -0.33
Bank 16    0.15**
Bank 27    0.15**
VARIABLE: Assets Liquidity Capital NPLratio Mat–mismatch Rel. lending Portdiv. Inflation IPI HHI
Bank 1        + ***         – *** –         + *** –        + ***       + **         – ***      – **      – **
Bank 2 + –    + * + +       – ** –     – *       – **      + **
Bank 3 – + – + + +       – ** – +   – *
Bank 5         + ***         + ***        + ***         – ***         – *** – – –         – ***    + *
Bank 6 +    + * – +         + *** – – + – –
Bank 7 + – + – – – + – – +
Bank 8 +      – ** – + + – – + – –
Bank 9 – +      – **         + *** – + – – – –
Bank 10 – + – + + + + + + +
Bank 11 – + –    + * + + – – – –
Bank 12 –      + ** + – + + – –      + ** –
Bank 13 + + – +       + **    – * – –    + * –
Bank 14         + *** – +       + ** + +       – **      + ** +         + ***
Bank 16 – – – + – – – – + +
Bank 27 +      + ** + +       + ** – – – + –
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d) Estimation output of the model estimated with OLS equation-by-equation. 
. regress dlendrateden1 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets1 l.dmbksliquidity1  l.dmbkscapital1 
l.dmbksNPLratio1 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub1 l.dmbksrellending1 l.dmbksportdiv1  l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi  
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    8.11 
       Model |  .008377899    11  .000761627           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .007703825    82  .000093949           R-squared     =  0.5210 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4567 
       Total |  .016081724    93  .000172922           Root MSE      =  .00969 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~n1 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   82.52462   56.87814     1.45   0.151    -30.62412    195.6734 
dmbkslass~s1 | 
         L1. |  -10.01001    3.24511    -3.08   0.003    -16.46557   -3.554458 
dmbksliqu~y1 | 
         L1. |   37.16702   6.547766     5.68   0.000     24.14143    50.19261 
dmbkscapi~l1 | 
         L1. |   33.07987   28.05295     1.18   0.242    -22.72638    88.88611 
dmbksNPLr~o1 | 
         L1. |   -29.9793   5.769142    -5.20   0.000    -41.45596   -18.50264 
dmbksmatm~b1 | 
         L1. |   .0191582   .1806887     0.11   0.916    -.3402893    .3786056 
dmbksrell~g1 | 
         L1. |  -17.17019    5.74926    -2.99   0.004     -28.6073   -5.733085 
dmbksport~v1 | 
         L1. |  -7.763437   3.764802    -2.06   0.042    -15.25283   -.2740461 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   49.04686   11.58875     4.23   0.000     25.99315    72.10058 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   3.085163   1.461809     2.11   0.038     .1771597    5.993165 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |     13.258   5.292338     2.51   0.014     2.729852    23.78615 
       _cons |  -.0018308   .0010987    -1.67   0.099    -.0040165     .000355 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden2 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets2 l.dmbksliquidity2  l.dmbkscapital2 
l.dmbksNPLratio2 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub2 l.dmbksrellending2 l.dmbksportdiv2 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    2.25 
       Model |  .000665758    11  .000060523           Prob > F      =  0.0188 
    Residual |  .002202355    82  .000026858           R-squared     =  0.2321 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1291 
       Total |  .002868112    93   .00003084           Root MSE      =  .00518 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~n2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   112.3856   65.42985     1.72   0.090    -17.77518    242.5464 
dmbkslass~s2 | 
         L1. |  -4.551724   3.772897    -1.21   0.231    -12.05722     2.95377 
dmbksliqu~y2 | 
         L1. |   .2180745   4.156117     0.05   0.958    -8.049766    8.485915 
dmbkscapi~l2 | 
         L1. |  -43.02647    22.7763    -1.89   0.062    -88.33578    2.282844 
dmbksNPLr~o2 | 
         L1. |   -1.06561   3.504197    -0.30   0.762    -8.036574    5.905354 
dmbksmatm~b2 | 
         L1. |  -.2098086    .368212    -0.57   0.570    -.9422996    .5226825 
dmbksrell~g2 | 
         L1. |   13.61164   6.560109     2.07   0.041     .5614981    26.66179 
dmbksport~v2 | 
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         L1. |   1.047695   3.048461     0.34   0.732    -5.016665    7.112055 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   12.98531   7.406038     1.75   0.083     -1.74766    27.71828 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   1.673488   .7876007     2.12   0.037     .1066991    3.240277 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   -4.66489   2.167065    -2.15   0.034    -8.975873   -.3539067 
       _cons |  -.0008852   .0005721    -1.55   0.126    -.0020233    .0002529 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden3 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets3 l.dmbksliquidity3  l.dmbkscapital3 
l.dmbksNPLratio3 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub3 l.dmbksrellending3 l.dmbksportdiv3 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    1.22 
       Model |  .001265851    11  .000115077           Prob > F      =  0.2871 
    Residual |  .007732692    82  .000094301           R-squared     =  0.1407 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0254 
       Total |  .008998544    93  .000096759           Root MSE      =  .00971 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~n3 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -53.46612   22.81622    -2.34   0.022    -98.85486   -8.077383 
dmbkslass~s3 | 
         L1. |   1.048889   .6583913     1.59   0.115    -.2608607    2.358639 
dmbksliqu~y3 | 
         L1. |  -1.665514   1.703249    -0.98   0.331    -5.053818     1.72279 
dmbkscapi~l3 | 
         L1. |   1.742277   2.472506     0.70   0.483    -3.176326    6.660879 
dmbksNPLr~o3 | 
         L1. |  -1.804448   1.312284    -1.38   0.173       -4.415    .8061035 
dmbksmatm~b3 | 
         L1. |   -.279975   1.222053    -0.23   0.819    -2.711028    2.151078 
dmbksrell~g3 | 
         L1. |   -5.98099   12.68373    -0.47   0.639    -31.21296    19.25098 
dmbksport~v3 | 
         L1. |   4.192854   1.736622     2.41   0.018     .7381594    7.647548 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   4.983224    13.8276     0.36   0.719    -22.52428    32.49072 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.4196117   1.680726    -0.25   0.803    -3.763111    2.923887 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   5.160977   2.613358     1.97   0.052    -.0378248    10.35978 
       _cons |   .0002211   .0011095     0.20   0.843    -.0019861    .0024283 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden5 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets5 l.dmbksliquidity5  l.dmbkscapital5 
l.dmbksNPLratio5 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub5 l.dmbksrellending5 l.dmbksportdiv5 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    8.76 
       Model |  .013576954    11  .001234269           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .011554708    82  .000140911           R-squared     =  0.5402 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4786 
       Total |  .025131661    93  .000270233           Root MSE      =  .01187 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrated~5 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |    527.799   90.09384     5.86   0.000     348.5737    707.0244 
dmbkslasse~5 | 
         L1. |  -29.25752   5.331947    -5.49   0.000    -39.86446   -18.65058 
dmbksliqui~5 | 
         L1. |  -20.93771   5.725044    -3.66   0.000    -32.32665   -9.548771 
dmbkscapit~5 | 
         L1. |    -170.56   29.11028    -5.86   0.000    -228.4696   -112.6504 
dmbksNPLra~5 | 
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         L1. |   57.66814   11.32331     5.09   0.000     35.14247    80.19381 
dmbksmatm~b5 | 
         L1. |   7.021846   1.683042     4.17   0.000     3.673739    10.36995 
dmbksrelle~5 | 
         L1. |   2.127277    3.39788     0.63   0.533    -4.632188    8.886743 
dmbksportd~5 | 
         L1. |   7.797349   4.795404     1.63   0.108    -1.742237    17.33694 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   7.797425   14.06638     0.55   0.581    -20.18508    35.77993 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   5.546017   1.948166     2.85   0.006     1.670494     9.42154 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -8.866011   5.265324    -1.68   0.096    -19.34042    1.608396 
       _cons |  -.0024594    .001319    -1.86   0.066    -.0050834    .0001645 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden6 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets6 l.dmbksliquidity6  l.dmbkscapital6 
l.dmbksNPLratio6 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub6 l.dmbksrellending6 l.dmbksportdiv6 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    2.37 
       Model |  .000528966    11  .000048088           Prob > F      =  0.0135 
    Residual |  .001664385    82  .000020297           R-squared     =  0.2412 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1394 
       Total |  .002193351    93  .000023584           Root MSE      =  .00451 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~n6 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |    -3.9409   26.04152    -0.15   0.880    -55.74577    47.86397 
dmbkslass~s6 | 
         L1. |  -.7235559   1.066785    -0.68   0.500    -2.845731    1.398619 
dmbksliqu~y6 | 
         L1. |  -3.963238   2.031116    -1.95   0.054    -8.003774    .0772981 
dmbkscapi~l6 | 
         L1. |   4.137099   4.193511     0.99   0.327    -4.205131    12.47933 
dmbksNPLr~o6 | 
         L1. |  -4.879545   3.774175    -1.29   0.200    -12.38758    2.628492 
dmbksmatm~b6 | 
         L1. |  -2.135916   .6946919    -3.07   0.003    -3.517879   -.7539521 
dmbksrell~g6 | 
         L1. |   1.534901   1.710422     0.90   0.372    -1.867674    4.937476 
dmbksport~v6 | 
         L1. |   2.160286   2.175689     0.99   0.324    -2.167853    6.488426 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -5.488694   4.672688    -1.17   0.244    -14.78416     3.80677 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .3398314   .7773868     0.44   0.663    -1.206639    1.886301 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   2.286388   2.218238     1.03   0.306    -2.126395     6.69917 
       _cons |  -.0000145   .0005076    -0.03   0.977    -.0010242    .0009952 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden7 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets7 l.dmbksliquidity7  l.dmbkscapital7 
l.dmbksNPLratio7 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub7 l.dmbksrellending7 l.dmbksportdiv7 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    0.44 
       Model |  .000169682    11  .000015426           Prob > F      =  0.9355 
    Residual |  .002902717    82  .000035399           R-squared     =  0.0552 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0715 
       Total |  .003072399    93  .000033037           Root MSE      =  .00595 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~n7 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   28.58264   27.08247     1.06   0.294    -25.29301     82.4583 
dmbkslass~s7 | 
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         L1. |  -1.315499   1.390147    -0.95   0.347    -4.080944    1.449947 
dmbksliqu~y7 | 
         L1. |   .3360915   1.820881     0.18   0.854     -3.28622    3.958403 
dmbkscapi~l7 | 
         L1. |  -4.361051   3.864985    -1.13   0.262    -12.04974    3.327636 
dmbksNPLr~o7 | 
         L1. |   1.396956   2.550409     0.55   0.585    -3.676621    6.470533 
dmbksmatm~b7 | 
         L1. |   .0009106   .0155968     0.06   0.954    -.0301165    .0319377 
dmbksrell~g7 | 
         L1. |   1.037197   1.902887     0.55   0.587    -2.748251    4.822645 
dmbksport~v7 | 
         L1. |  -.6870377   4.288939    -0.16   0.873    -9.219104    7.845029 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   1.653701    6.72978     0.25   0.807    -11.73398    15.04138 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .0072379   .8987253     0.01   0.994    -1.780613    1.795089 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   -1.04316    3.07094    -0.34   0.735    -7.152238    5.065917 
       _cons |  -.0011187   .0006882    -1.63   0.108    -.0024877    .0002503 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden8 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets8 l.dmbksliquidity8  l.dmbkscapital8 
l.dmbksNPLratio8 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub8 l.dmbksrellending8 l.dmbksportdiv8 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    3.18 
       Model |   .00296683    11  .000269712           Prob > F      =  0.0012 
    Residual |  .006954012    82  .000084805           R-squared     =  0.2991 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2050 
       Total |  .009920841    93  .000106676           Root MSE      =  .00921 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrated~8 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   1.893504   121.1129     0.02   0.988    -239.0386    242.8256 
dmbkslasse~8 | 
         L1. |  -3.496554   8.450954    -0.41   0.680    -20.30819    13.31508 
dmbksliqui~8 | 
         L1. |   15.94774   7.268405     2.19   0.031     1.488569    30.40691 
dmbkscapit~8 | 
         L1. |   11.02871   11.46275     0.96   0.339    -11.77435    33.83177 
dmbksNPLra~8 | 
         L1. |  -2.573752   2.717677    -0.95   0.346    -7.980077    2.832573 
dmbksmatm~b8 | 
         L1. |  -.2358299   .2920615    -0.81   0.422    -.8168332    .3451734 
dmbksrelle~8 | 
         L1. |    4.31231   6.030079     0.72   0.477    -7.683438    16.30806 
dmbksportd~8 | 
         L1. |   2.834257   2.042363     1.39   0.169    -1.228653    6.897168 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -13.72119   9.716179    -1.41   0.162    -33.04976    5.607388 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   1.362746   1.321553     1.03   0.305    -1.266244    3.991736 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   4.652707   3.894985     1.19   0.236    -3.095659    12.40107 
       _cons |  -.0016231   .0010842    -1.50   0.138    -.0037799    .0005336 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden9 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets9 l.dmbksliquidity9  l.dmbkscapital9 
l.dmbksNPLratio9 l.dmbksma 
> tmisub9 l.dmbksrellending9 l.dmbksportdiv9 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    1.39 
       Model |  .002372542    11  .000215686           Prob > F      =  0.1928 
    Residual |  .012713105    82  .000155038           R-squared     =  0.1573 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0442 
       Total |  .015085647    93  .000162211           Root MSE      =  .01245 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrated~9 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   -134.452   75.21065    -1.79   0.078      -284.07    15.16592 
dmbkslasse~9 | 
         L1. |   3.891409   3.076469     1.26   0.209    -2.228668    10.01149 
dmbksliqui~9 | 
         L1. |  -.0569173    4.55575    -0.01   0.990    -9.119755    9.005921 
dmbkscapit~9 | 
         L1. |    23.5246   9.871849     2.38   0.019     3.886346    43.16285 
dmbksNPLra~9 | 
         L1. |  -12.05013   4.430802    -2.72   0.008    -20.86441   -3.235852 
dmbksmatm~b9 | 
         L1. |   .0020024   .0451224     0.04   0.965    -.0877603    .0917651 
dmbksrelle~9 | 
         L1. |  -4.837868   4.962939    -0.97   0.333    -14.71073    5.034998 
dmbksportd~9 | 
         L1. |   .1964907   3.414577     0.06   0.954    -6.596191    6.989172 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   8.642312   11.43772     0.76   0.452    -14.11095    31.39557 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .4614469   2.482296     0.19   0.853     -4.47663    5.399523 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   9.757271    8.26529     1.18   0.241    -6.685024    26.19957 
       _cons |  -.0015992   .0015035    -1.06   0.291    -.0045902    .0013918 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden10 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets10 l.dmbksliquidity10  
l.dmbkscapital10 l.dmbksNPLratio10 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub10 l.dmbksrellending10 l.dmbksportdiv10 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    0.42 
       Model |   .00010341    11  9.4009e-06           Prob > F      =  0.9443 
    Residual |  .001845154    82  .000022502           R-squared     =  0.0531 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0740 
       Total |  .001948565    93  .000020952           Root MSE      =  .00474 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~10 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   4.704683   18.63382     0.25   0.801    -32.36393    41.77329 
dmbkslass~10 | 
         L1. |   .6777204   1.039208     0.65   0.516    -1.389596    2.745037 
dmbksliqu~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.164736   1.989963    -1.09   0.280    -6.123407    1.793934 
dmbkscapi~10 | 
         L1. |   .1986214   6.917521     0.03   0.977    -13.56253    13.95977 
dmbksNPLr~10 | 
         L1. |  -2.632528   9.407215    -0.28   0.780    -21.34648    16.08142 
dmbksmat~b10 | 
         L1. |  -.3708971   .3014552    -1.23   0.222    -.9705876    .2287934 
dmbksrell~10 | 
         L1. |  -1.797092   3.711624    -0.48   0.630    -9.180695    5.586511 
dmbksport~10 | 
         L1. |  -.3780762   2.641824    -0.14   0.887    -5.633506    4.877354 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -5.770373   5.493279    -1.05   0.297    -16.69825     5.15751 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.4079395   .7338268    -0.56   0.580    -1.867755    1.051876 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.709636   2.681287    -0.64   0.525     -7.04357    3.624297 
       _cons |  -.0008448   .0005383    -1.57   0.120    -.0019158    .0002261 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden11 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets11 l.dmbksliquidity11  
l.dmbkscapital11 l.dmbksNPLratio11 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub11 l.dmbksrellending11 l.dmbksportdiv11 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
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      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    0.97 
       Model |  .000305861    11  .000027806           Prob > F      =  0.4817 
    Residual |  .002354989    82  .000028719           R-squared     =  0.1149 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0038 
       Total |   .00266085    93  .000028611           Root MSE      =  .00536 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~11 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -32.03115   31.14227    -1.03   0.307    -93.98306    29.92075 
dmbkslass~11 | 
         L1. |   .5002787   1.772052     0.28   0.778    -3.024897    4.025455 
dmbksliqu~11 | 
         L1. |  -2.982993   2.806155    -1.06   0.291     -8.56533    2.599344 
dmbkscapi~11 | 
         L1. |   1.300449    14.5763     0.09   0.929    -27.69645    30.29735 
dmbksNPLr~11 | 
         L1. |  -26.42202   15.36111    -1.72   0.089    -56.98017    4.136122 
dmbksmat~b11 | 
         L1. |  -.4741683   .9120468    -0.52   0.605     -2.28852    1.340183 
dmbksrell~11 | 
         L1. |   -2.93917   2.743437    -1.07   0.287     -8.39674      2.5184 
dmbksport~11 | 
         L1. |   .3918492   3.240589     0.12   0.904    -6.054715    6.838413 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   2.681961   6.710419     0.40   0.690     -10.6672    16.03112 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   .5038795   .8396524     0.60   0.550    -1.166457    2.174216 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   3.746055   2.377191     1.58   0.119    -.9829347    8.475045 
       _cons |  -.0006443   .0006293    -1.02   0.309    -.0018961    .0006075 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden12 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets12 l.dmbksliquidity12  
l.dmbkscapital12 l.dmbksNPLratio12 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub12 l.dmbksrellending12 l.dmbksportdiv12 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    3.05 
       Model |  .000891017    11  .000081002           Prob > F      =  0.0018 
    Residual |  .002174701    82  .000026521           R-squared     =  0.2906 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1955 
       Total |  .003065719    93  .000032965           Root MSE      =  .00515 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~12 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -64.16057   40.94975    -1.57   0.121    -145.6227    17.30152 
dmbkslass~12 | 
         L1. |   3.344855   2.924124     1.14   0.256    -2.472158    9.161868 
dmbksliqu~12 | 
         L1. |   -8.17862   3.449243    -2.37   0.020    -15.04026   -1.316976 
dmbkscapi~12 | 
         L1. |  -1.790191   13.56611    -0.13   0.895    -28.77751    25.19713 
dmbksNPLr~12 | 
         L1. |   5.098153   6.089866     0.84   0.405    -7.016531    17.21284 
dmbksmat~b12 | 
         L1. |   -.306842   1.340383    -0.23   0.820    -2.973291    2.359607 
dmbksrell~12 | 
         L1. |  -5.724865   4.653352    -1.23   0.222    -14.98186    3.532135 
dmbksport~12 | 
         L1. |   .9697863   2.707141     0.36   0.721    -4.415579    6.355151 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   4.004448   5.591472     0.72   0.476    -7.118771    15.12767 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -1.796907   .7757502    -2.32   0.023    -3.340121   -.2536923 
   dmbkslhhi | 
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         L1. |   2.285777   2.046658     1.12   0.267    -1.785679    6.357232 
       _cons |  -.0006069   .0005772    -1.05   0.296    -.0017551    .0005413 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden13 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets13 l.dmbksliquidity13  
l.dmbkscapital13 l.dmbksNPLratio13 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub13 l.dmbksrellending13 l.dmbksportdiv13 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    1.00 
       Model |  .000584074    11  .000053098           Prob > F      =  0.4536 
    Residual |  .004353351    82   .00005309           R-squared     =  0.1183 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0000 
       Total |  .004937425    93  .000053091           Root MSE      =  .00729 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~13 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -.1900397   48.68556    -0.00   0.997    -97.04113    96.66105 
dmbkslass~13 | 
         L1. |  -.1752378   3.289869    -0.05   0.958    -6.719834    6.369359 
dmbksliqu~13 | 
         L1. |   -2.23073   2.870916    -0.78   0.439    -7.941897    3.480437 
dmbkscapi~13 | 
         L1. |   1.490767   9.869052     0.15   0.880    -18.14192    21.12346 
dmbksNPLr~13 | 
         L1. |  -1.440779   3.494288    -0.41   0.681     -8.39203    5.510472 
dmbksmat~b13 | 
         L1. |  -3.620446   1.776652    -2.04   0.045    -7.154773   -.0861197 
dmbksrell~13 | 
         L1. |   6.721705   3.843397     1.75   0.084    -.9240358    14.36745 
dmbksport~13 | 
         L1. |   .0083569   .0386707     0.22   0.829    -.0685715    .0852852 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   5.646902   8.679594     0.65   0.517    -11.61958    22.91338 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -1.960137    1.13641    -1.72   0.088    -4.220819    .3005456 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   .3775512   2.226483     0.17   0.866    -4.051632    4.806734 
       _cons |  -.0007676   .0008739    -0.88   0.382     -.002506    .0009708 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden14 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets14 l.dmbksliquidity14  
l.dmbkscapital14 l.dmbksNPLratio14 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub14 l.dmbksrellending14 l.dmbksportdiv14 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    1.38 
       Model |  .002761063    11  .000251006           Prob > F      =  0.1961 
    Residual |  .014871596    82  .000181361           R-squared     =  0.1566 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0434 
       Total |  .017632659    93  .000189598           Root MSE      =  .01347 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~14 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   582.3208   167.1887     3.48   0.001     249.7292    914.9123 
dmbkslass~14 | 
         L1. |  -28.46813    8.75065    -3.25   0.002    -45.87596   -11.06029 
dmbksliqu~14 | 
         L1. |   .5492261   1.974469     0.28   0.782    -3.378622    4.477074 
dmbkscapi~14 | 
         L1. |  -3.574627   3.363005    -1.06   0.291    -10.26472    3.115461 
dmbksNPLr~14 | 
         L1. |  -7.215206   3.163432    -2.28   0.025    -13.50828   -.9221322 
dmbksmat~b14 | 
         L1. |  -.6130781    .615709    -1.00   0.322    -1.837919    .6117631 
dmbksrell~14 | 
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         L1. |  -3.394325   3.531094    -0.96   0.339    -10.41879    3.630145 
dmbksport~14 | 
         L1. |   13.90861   6.709968     2.07   0.041     .5603499    27.25688 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |  -44.84349   19.94899    -2.25   0.027    -84.52839   -5.158598 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.8650012    2.28812    -0.38   0.706    -5.416801    3.686799 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -28.07034    8.18926    -3.43   0.001    -44.36138   -11.77929 
       _cons |  -.0013275   .0016085    -0.83   0.412    -.0045274    .0018724 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden16 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets16 l.dmbksliquidity16  
l.dmbkscapital16 l.dmbksNPLratio16 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub16 l.dmbksrellending16 l.dmbksportdiv16 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    2.18 
       Model |  .002080719    11  .000189156           Prob > F      =  0.0233 
    Residual |  .007118178    82  .000086807           R-squared     =  0.2262 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1224 
       Total |  .009198897    93  .000098913           Root MSE      =  .00932 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~16 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |  -51.07732   42.80006    -1.19   0.236    -136.2203    34.06564 
dmbkslass~16 | 
         L1. |   4.264439   4.177441     1.02   0.310    -4.045822     12.5747 
dmbksliqu~16 | 
         L1. |   4.902822     3.0012     1.63   0.106    -1.067522    10.87317 
dmbkscapi~16 | 
         L1. |   3.493284   7.903928     0.44   0.660    -12.23015    19.21671 
dmbksNPLr~16 | 
         L1. |  -3.401698    7.55294    -0.45   0.654     -18.4269    11.62351 
dmbksmat~b16 | 
         L1. |   .9700018   1.489092     0.65   0.517    -1.992277    3.932281 
dmbksrell~16 | 
         L1. |   1.761572   2.296738     0.77   0.445    -2.807371    6.330515 
dmbksport~16 | 
         L1. |    1.55903   3.754358     0.42   0.679    -5.909583    9.027644 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   13.23681   9.003493     1.47   0.145    -4.674002    31.14763 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |  -.3868147   1.536125    -0.25   0.802    -3.442657    2.669027 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |  -2.401479   5.533536    -0.43   0.665    -13.40945    8.606487 
       _cons |  -.0006002   .0010307    -0.58   0.562    -.0026505    .0014501 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
. regress dlendrateden27 l.dmbks l.dmbkslassets27 l.dmbksliquidity27  
l.dmbkscapital27 l.dmbksNPLratio27 l.dm 
> bksmatmisub27 l.dmbksrellending27 l.dmbksportdiv27 l.dmbksinfl l.dmbksipi 
l.dmbkslhhi 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      94 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    82) =    2.36 
       Model |  .001222136    11  .000111103           Prob > F      =  0.0136 
    Residual |  .003852438    82  .000046981           R-squared     =  0.2408 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1390 
       Total |  .005074575    93  .000054565           Root MSE      =  .00685 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
dlendrate~27 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       dmbks | 
         L1. |   19.27302   51.80657     0.37   0.711    -83.78676    122.3328 
dmbkslass~27 | 
         L1. |  -2.941283   2.791144    -1.05   0.295    -8.493758    2.611193 
dmbksliqu~27 | 
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         L1. |  -6.967809   2.897541    -2.40   0.018    -12.73194   -1.203677 
dmbkscapi~27 | 
         L1. |  -1.120265   5.582157    -0.20   0.841    -12.22495    9.984423 
dmbksNPLr~27 | 
         L1. |  -.9089528   3.139808    -0.29   0.773    -7.155032    5.337126 
dmbksmat~b27 | 
         L1. |  -.5535619   .2539932    -2.18   0.032    -1.058835   -.0482885 
dmbksrell~27 | 
         L1. |   1.726617   3.809956     0.45   0.652    -5.852599    9.305833 
dmbksport~27 | 
         L1. |   .7172387   .7499406     0.96   0.342     -.774632     2.20911 
   dmbksinfl | 
         L1. |   9.716702   7.454649     1.30   0.196    -5.112969    24.54637 
    dmbksipi | 
         L1. |   -1.46271   1.067255    -1.37   0.174    -3.585821    .6604005 
   dmbkslhhi | 
         L1. |   3.668995   3.517045     1.04   0.300    -3.327528    10.66552 
       _cons |  -.0010997   .0007841    -1.40   0.165    -.0026595      .00046 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 3.7: Estimation results and estimation output of the SUR model 
specification estimated by FGLS by substituting the MBKS 
rate with the CB Bills rate, including the Breusch-Pagan 
test and the F-tests for the joint significance of the 
regressors in the model. 
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a) Estimation results of the model by substituting the MBKS rate with the CB Bills rate. 
 
Source: Author‟s own calculations performed in STATA 10. 
VARIABLE: Bank1 Bank2 Bank3 Bank5 Bank6 Bank7 Bank8 Bank9 Bank10 Bank11 Bank12 Bank13 Bank14 Bank16 Bank27
L.cb_rate_28_days -0.06** -0.03* 0.03 0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.11*** 0.05**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
L.dcb28lassets -1.49 0.38 0.34 1.94 0.25 -0.51 -3.22** 2.28 2.21*** -0.23 0.98 -0.48 1.78 -4.74** 1.19
(0.94) (0.68) (0.47) (1.62) (0.66) (0.86) (1.52) (1.45) (0.84) (0.62) (0.83) (0.58) (1.79) (1.87) (1.14)
L.dcb28liquidity 19.90*** 6.85* 0.2 -20.72*** 0.99 0.64 5.54 1.11 0.03 -2.74 2.5 1.77 -0.88 -1.93 -0.22
(3.56) (3.67) (1.27) (4.08) (1.59) (1.53) (3.98) (2.45) (1.83) (1.68) (2.76) (1.16) (1.84) (2.68) (2.73)
L.dcb28capital 58.78*** 20.09** -1.05 6.66 0.09 -0.21 -1.15 5.71 6.07 -5.59 9.38 0.97 -2.78 -4.69 2.13
(12.82) (8.38) (1.84) (9.11) (2.58) (2.69) (4.74) (4.76) (4.23) (5.31) (6.78) (2.29) (4.49) (3.80) (1.83)
L.dcb28NPLratio -9.27*** -5.87** -0.7 34.11*** -1.84 -0.43 0.26 0.73 -13.17* -7.96 -7.45* -2.53** 2.04 11.70** 0.47
(2.68) (2.69) (0.99) (7.15) (2.08) (2.13) (2.15) (2.67) (6.92) (6.97) (4.38) (1.24) (2.62) (5.30) (1.77)
L.dcb28matmisub 0.39*** 0.42* 0.24 4.76*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 0.02 -1.02*** -0.52 -0.63 1.83** 0.30 -1.59 -0.33**
(0.13) (0.24) (0.97) (1.21) (0.51) (0.01) (0.27) (0.026) (0.28) (0.51) (1.27) (0.89) (0.52) (1.29) (0.17)
L.dcb28rellending -4.27 -7.59 -5.59 -6.67*** -1.30 0.55 -2.51 -1.1 -4.02 -0.59 6.42 -5.79*** -1.47 1.11 1.62
(3.17) (5.85) (10.47) (2.55) (1.40) (0.93) (4.08) (1.45) (2.55) (1.5) (5.80) (1.92) (3.14) (1.17) (2.04)
L.dcb28portdiv 3.33** 0.54 1 -4.38 -1.59 -0.71 0.64 1.65 -3.09 0.53 -5.39** 0.01 10.64 -3.03 -1.11*
(1.55) (2.70) (1.62) (3.82) (1.34) (4.10) (1.68) (1.81) (2.13) (1.79) (2.67) (0.01) (7.38) (2.64) (0.59)
L.dcb28infl 40.09*** -2.34 4.44 -41.34*** -2.19 2.80 -0.93 -3.89 -8.74** 5.71 2.51 -4.44 -19.55 1.27 -5.60
(6.14) (5.72) (9.06) (10.71) (3.56) (6.13) (6.87) (9.04) (3.85) (4.57) (4.15) (5.00) (15.10) (6.38) (5.47)
L.dcb28ipi 2.11* 0.32 0.7 -2.74 0.09 -0.52 0.68 0.85 -0.3 0.9 0.23 -0.08 1.38 -2.43 0.89
(1.2) (0.85) (1.55) (1.71) (0.73) (0.89) (1.43) (1.96) (0.65) (0.82) (0.87) (1.05) (2.56) (1.6) (1.2)
L.dcb28lhhi 1.72 -1.33 -0.64 -3.12 -0.28 1.08 5.95* -4.93 -4.06** 0.86 -2.26 1.06 -3.77 9.81** -2.36
(2.30) (1.67) (0.94) (3.67) (1.39) (1.96) (3.09) (3.15) (1.7) (1.38) (1.86) (1.14) (3.32) (3.93) (2.40)
Constant 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01** -0.00* -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00** -0.01 -0.01*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
R-squared 0.72 0.17 0.02 0.57 0.06 0.07 0.20 0.03 0.2 0.08 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.13
RMSE 0.0074 0.0054 0.0104 0.0114 0.0050 0.0059 0.0098 0.0133 0.0044 0.0055 0.0062 0.0077 0.0143 0.0097 0.0073
F-stat for joint 
significance of the 
bank specific eqution
23.15*** 1.95** 0.29 12.9*** 1.29 0.6 2.48*** 1.33 2.47*** 0.75 0.62 1.7* 0.64 2.11** 1.63*
Standard Errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Breusch-Pagan test for the contemporaneous covariance independence between the error terms chi2 (105) = 328.962; p-value = 0.000
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b) Size of the pass-through multipliers of lending rates by substituting the 
MBKS rate with the CB Bills rate. 
 
***/**/* denotes joint significance by the overall F-test for the bank specific regression at 1%, 5% 
and 10% level of significance, respectively.  
Source: Author‟s own calculations. 
 
c) Estimated signs of the rest of the independent variables in the model by 
substituting the MBKS rate with the CB Bills rate. 
 
      DMBKS
Bank 1       -0.37***
Bank 2     -0.11**
Bank 3 -0.04
Bank 5        0.78***
Bank 6 0.04
Bank 7 0.05
Bank 8        -0.21***
Bank 9 0.31
Bank 10       -0.34***
Bank 11 0.07
Bank 12 0.06
Bank 13   0.19*
Bank 14 -0.43
Bank 16      0.07**
Bank 27   0.04*
VARIABLE: Assets Liquidity Capital NPLratio Mat–mismatch Rel. lending Portdiv. Inflation IPI HHI
Bank 1 –        + ***       + ***        – ***        + *** –      + **        + ***    + * +
Bank 2 +    + *      + **       – **    + * – + – + –
Bank 3 + + – – + – + + + –
Bank 5 +          – *** +         + ***         + ***         – *** –        – *** – –
Bank 6 + + + – – – – – + –
Bank 7 – + – – – + – + – +
Bank 8       – ** + – + – – + – +     + *
Bank 9 + + + + + – + – + –
Bank 10         + *** + +    – *         – *** – –      – ** –      – **
Bank 11 – – – – – – + + + +
Bank 12 + + +    – * – +       – ** + + –
Bank 13 – + +       – **       + **         – *** + – – +
Bank 14 + – – + + – + – + –
Bank 16      – ** – –       + ** – + – + –       + **
Bank 27 + – + +       – ** +    – * – + –
F-stat for joint 
signiicance of the 
variable in all 
bank specific 
regressions.
2.09*** 4.14*** 2.37*** 3.72*** 3.42*** 1.92** 1.59* 4.82*** 1.09 1.90**
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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d) Estimation output of the SUR model estimated with FGLS, including the 
Breusch-Pagan test and the F-tests for the joint significance of the regressors 
in the model. 
. sureg (dlendrateden1= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets1 l.dcb28liquidity1  
l.dcb28capital1 l.dcb28NPLratio1 
>  l.dcb28matmisub1 l.dcb28rellending1 l.dcb28portdiv1  l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden2= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets2 l.dcb28liquidity2  
l.dcb28capital2 l.dcb28NPLratio2 l. 
> dcb28matmisub2 l.dcb28rellending2 l.dcb28portdiv2 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden3= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets3 l.dcb28liquidity3  
l.dcb28capital3 l.dcb28NPLratio3 l. 
> dcb28matmisub3 l.dcb28rellending3 l.dcb28portdiv3 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden5= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets5 l.dcb28liquidity5  
l.dcb28capital5 l.dcb28NPLratio5 l. 
> dcb28matmisub5 l.dcb28rellending5 l.dcb28portdiv5 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden6= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets6 l.dcb28liquidity6  
l.dcb28capital6 l.dcb28NPLratio6 l. 
> dcb28matmisub6 l.dcb28rellending6 l.dcb28portdiv6 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden7= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets7 l.dcb28liquidity7  
l.dcb28capital7 l.dcb28NPLratio7 l. 
> dcb28matmisub7 l.dcb28rellending7 l.dcb28portdiv7 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden8= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets8 l.dcb28liquidity8  
l.dcb28capital8 l.dcb28NPLratio8 l. 
> dcb28matmisub8 l.dcb28rellending8 l.dcb28portdiv8 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden9= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets9 l.dcb28liquidity9  
l.dcb28capital9 l.dcb28NPLratio9 l. 
> dcb28matmisub9 l.dcb28rellending9 l.dcb28portdiv9 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden10= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets10 l.dcb28liquidity10  
l.dcb28capital10 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 10 l.dcb28matmisub10 l.dcb28rellending10 l.dcb28portdiv10 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden11= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets11 l.dcb28liquidity11  
l.dcb28capital11 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 11 l.dcb28matmisub11 l.dcb28rellending11 l.dcb28portdiv11 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden12= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets12 l.dcb28liquidity12  
l.dcb28capital12 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 12 l.dcb28matmisub12 l.dcb28rellending12 l.dcb28portdiv12 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden13= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets13 l.dcb28liquidity13  
l.dcb28capital13 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 13 l.dcb28matmisub13 l.dcb28rellending13 l.dcb28portdiv13 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden14= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets14 l.dcb28liquidity14  
l.dcb28capital14 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 14 l.dcb28matmisub14 l.dcb28rellending14 l.dcb28portdiv14 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden16= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets16 l.dcb28liquidity16  
l.dcb28capital16 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 16 l.dcb28matmisub16 l.dcb28rellending16 l.dcb28portdiv16 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */ (dlendrateden27= l.cb_rate_28_days l.dcb28lassets27 l.dcb28liquidity27  
l.dcb28capital27 l.dcb28NPLratio 
> 27 l.dcb28matmisub27 l.dcb28rellending27 l.dcb28portdiv27 l.dcb28infl l.dcb28ipi 
l.dcb28lhhi) /* 
> */   , small corr 
 
Seemingly unrelated regression 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Equation          Obs  Parms        RMSE    "R-sq"     F-Stat        P 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1       94     11    .0074335    0.7182      22.13   0.0000 
dlendrate~n2       94     11    .0053794    0.1727       1.85   0.0418 
dlendrate~n3       94     11    .0103537    0.0231       0.28   0.9889 
dlendrated~5       94     11    .0114447    0.5726      12.98   0.0000 
dlendrate~n6       94     11    .0050263    0.0555       1.15   0.3200 
dlendrate~n7       94     11    .0059169    0.0656       0.58   0.8425 
dlendrated~8       94     11    .0098192    0.2031       2.26   0.0101 
dlendrated~9       94     11    .0133404    0.0326       1.34   0.1975 
dlendrate~10       94     11     .004363    0.1989       2.28   0.0092 
dlendrate~11       94     11    .0054518    0.0840       0.88   0.5588 
dlendrate~12       94     11    .0062311   -0.0385       0.61   0.8214 
dlendrate~13       94     11    .0077284    0.0080       1.69   0.0696 
dlendrate~14       94     11    .0143033    0.0486       0.61   0.8189 
dlendrate~16       94     11    .0097132    0.1590       2.21   0.0122 
dlendrate~27       94     11    .0073203    0.1341       1.53   0.1151 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n1 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |  -.0567653    .022629    -2.51   0.012    -.1011611   -.0123696 
dcb28lass~s1 | 
         L1. |  -1.491053   .9396903    -1.59   0.113    -3.334626    .3525202 
dcb28liqu~y1 | 
         L1. |   19.89604   3.556961     5.59   0.000     12.91766    26.87442 
dcb28capi~l1 | 
         L1. |   58.78268   12.82003     4.59   0.000     33.63113    83.93423 
dcb28NPLr~o1 | 
         L1. |  -9.266256   2.674898    -3.46   0.001    -14.51412   -4.018388 
dcb28matm~b1 | 
         L1. |   .3933908    .129474     3.04   0.002     .1393765     .647405 
dcb28rell~g1 | 
         L1. |  -4.271547    3.17403    -1.35   0.179    -10.49866    1.955565 
dcb28port~v1 | 
         L1. |   3.334398    1.54905     2.15   0.032     .2953247    6.373471 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |    40.0932   6.140349     6.53   0.000     28.04648    52.13991 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   2.106647    1.19601     1.76   0.078    -.2397985    4.453092 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |    1.72234   2.302632     0.75   0.455    -2.795181     6.23986 
       _cons |   .0025665   .0020238     1.27   0.205    -.0014039     .006537 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n2 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |  -.0289267   .0161401    -1.79   0.073     -.060592    .0027385 
dcb28lass~s2 | 
         L1. |    .376809   .6774449     0.56   0.578    -.9522664    1.705884 
dcb28liqu~y2 | 
         L1. |   6.849999   3.671514     1.87   0.062    -.3531255    14.05312 
dcb28capi~l2 | 
         L1. |   20.08645   8.384119     2.40   0.017      3.63769     36.5352 
dcb28NPLr~o2 | 
         L1. |  -5.871437   2.688165    -2.18   0.029    -11.14533   -.5975406 
dcb28matm~b2 | 
         L1. |   .4210309   .2402629     1.75   0.080    -.0503396    .8924015 
dcb28rell~g2 | 
         L1. |  -7.589659   5.849221    -1.30   0.195    -19.06521    3.885895 
dcb28port~v2 | 
         L1. |   .5427219   2.703423     0.20   0.841    -4.761109    5.846553 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -2.342241   5.715553    -0.41   0.682    -13.55555    8.871072 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .3210099    .845359     0.38   0.704    -1.337495    1.979515 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -1.329601   1.665112    -0.80   0.425    -4.596376    1.937174 
       _cons |   .0010622   .0014811     0.72   0.473    -.0018436    .0039679 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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dlendrate~n3 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0260041   .0294997     0.88   0.378    -.0318713    .0838795 
dcb28lass~s3 | 
         L1. |   .3417259   .4695528     0.73   0.467    -.5794871    1.262939 
dcb28liqu~y3 | 
         L1. |   .1945678   1.267548     0.15   0.878    -2.292228    2.681363 
dcb28capi~l3 | 
         L1. |  -1.051269   1.844044    -0.57   0.569    -4.669089    2.566552 
dcb28NPLr~o3 | 
         L1. |  -.6951974   .9890968    -0.70   0.482    -2.635701    1.245306 
dcb28matm~b3 | 
         L1. |   .2443366   .9663457     0.25   0.800    -1.651532    2.140205 
dcb28rell~g3 | 
         L1. |  -5.594039   10.46705    -0.53   0.593    -26.12929    14.94121 
dcb28port~v3 | 
         L1. |    .994788   1.618514     0.61   0.539    -2.180565    4.170141 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |   4.439794    9.05656     0.49   0.624    -13.32822    22.20781 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .6950297   1.545919     0.45   0.653    -2.337899    3.727959 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -.6418895   .9408067    -0.68   0.495    -2.487653    1.203874 
       _cons |  -.0030629   .0027561    -1.11   0.267    -.0084701    .0023442 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~5 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0499279    .033533     1.49   0.137    -.0158603    .1157162 
dcb28lasse~5 | 
         L1. |   1.938729   1.615895     1.20   0.230    -1.231487    5.108946 
dcb28liqui~5 | 
         L1. |  -20.71518   4.078438    -5.08   0.000    -28.71665   -12.71371 
dcb28capit~5 | 
         L1. |   6.656983   9.104596     0.73   0.465    -11.20527    24.51924 
dcb28NPLra~5 | 
         L1. |   34.10886   7.153186     4.77   0.000     20.07507    48.14266 
dcb28matm~b5 | 
         L1. |   4.757948   1.204837     3.95   0.000     2.394184    7.121712 
dcb28relle~5 | 
         L1. |  -6.671654   2.545259    -2.62   0.009    -11.66518   -1.678125 
dcb28portd~5 | 
         L1. |   -4.37466   3.816292    -1.15   0.252    -11.86182    3.112503 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -41.34386   10.71039    -3.86   0.000    -62.35652    -20.3312 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   -2.74113   1.710587    -1.60   0.109    -6.097121    .6148608 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -3.122496   3.665611    -0.85   0.394    -10.31404    4.069046 
       _cons |   -.006662   .0031092    -2.14   0.032    -.0127619   -.0005622 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n6 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0201591   .0139116     1.45   0.148    -.0071341    .0474522 
dcb28lass~s6 | 
         L1. |   .2490287   .6605705     0.38   0.706    -1.046941    1.544998 
dcb28liqu~y6 | 
         L1. |   .9886423    1.58589     0.62   0.533    -2.122707    4.099991 
dcb28capi~l6 | 
         L1. |   .0944271    2.58359     0.04   0.971    -4.974303    5.163157 
dcb28NPLr~o6 | 
         L1. |   -1.84124   2.084337    -0.88   0.377     -5.93049     2.24801 
dcb28matm~b6 | 
         L1. |  -.0205358   .5085521    -0.04   0.968    -1.018261    .9771898 
dcb28rell~g6 | 
         L1. |  -1.300132   1.403218    -0.93   0.354    -4.053099    1.452834 
dcb28port~v6 | 
         L1. |  -1.587947    1.34084    -1.18   0.237    -4.218534     1.04264 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -2.185519   3.564264    -0.61   0.540    -9.178229    4.807192 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .0859151   .7343203     0.12   0.907    -1.354744    1.526574 
   dcb28lhhi | 
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         L1. |  -.2797882   1.385033    -0.20   0.840    -2.997076      2.4375 
       _cons |  -.0021529   .0012978    -1.66   0.097     -.004699    .0003932 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~n7 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |  -.0073255   .0176769    -0.41   0.679    -.0420057    .0273547 
dcb28lass~s7 | 
         L1. |  -.5135911   .8640776    -0.59   0.552     -2.20882    1.181638 
dcb28liqu~y7 | 
         L1. |   .6442946   1.530384     0.42   0.674    -2.358157    3.646747 
dcb28capi~l7 | 
         L1. |  -.2114552   2.690176    -0.08   0.937    -5.489297    5.066387 
dcb28NPLr~o7 | 
         L1. |  -.4317994   2.133461    -0.20   0.840    -4.617425    3.753826 
dcb28matm~b7 | 
         L1. |  -.0050232   .0121749    -0.41   0.680     -.028909    .0188625 
dcb28rell~g7 | 
         L1. |   .5445797   .9253489     0.59   0.556    -1.270857    2.360017 
dcb28port~v7 | 
         L1. |  -.7081736   4.102209    -0.17   0.863    -8.756275    7.339928 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |   2.803811   6.125145     0.46   0.647    -9.213078     14.8207 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   -.515822   .8909002    -0.58   0.563    -2.263674     1.23203 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |   1.077232   1.959077     0.55   0.583     -2.76627    4.920734 
       _cons |  -.0003772   .0016075    -0.23   0.815    -.0035309    .0027765 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~8 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0330687    .029202     1.13   0.258    -.0242225    .0903599 
dcb28lasse~8 | 
         L1. |  -3.222467   1.521334    -2.12   0.034    -6.207164   -.2377704 
dcb28liqui~8 | 
         L1. |    5.54012   3.981756     1.39   0.164    -2.271665    13.35191 
dcb28capit~8 | 
         L1. |   -1.15377   4.743317    -0.24   0.808    -10.45966    8.152117 
dcb28NPLra~8 | 
         L1. |   .2629564   2.146272     0.12   0.903    -3.947802    4.473715 
dcb28matm~b8 | 
         L1. |  -.1113277   .2697755    -0.41   0.680    -.6405988    .4179434 
dcb28relle~8 | 
         L1. |  -2.512892   4.076539    -0.62   0.538    -10.51063    5.484848 
dcb28portd~8 | 
         L1. |   .6349275   1.677627     0.38   0.705    -2.656399    3.926254 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |   -.927388    6.87248    -0.13   0.893    -14.41047    12.55569 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .6762104   1.427885     0.47   0.636    -2.125149    3.477569 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |   5.945608   3.088896     1.92   0.054    -.1144798     12.0057 
       _cons |  -.0040807   .0026636    -1.53   0.126    -.0093064    .0011451 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrated~9 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0227668    .036909     0.62   0.537    -.0496447    .0951784 
dcb28lasse~9 | 
         L1. |   2.283773   1.447378     1.58   0.115    -.5558311    5.123376 
dcb28liqui~9 | 
         L1. |   1.113639   2.445451     0.46   0.649    -3.684078    5.911355 
dcb28capit~9 | 
         L1. |   5.710535   4.763992     1.20   0.231    -3.635915    15.05698 
dcb28NPLra~9 | 
         L1. |    .727881   2.668438     0.27   0.785    -4.507312    5.963074 
dcb28matm~b9 | 
         L1. |   .0189955   .0260436     0.73   0.466    -.0320992    .0700902 
dcb28relle~9 | 
         L1. |  -1.098478   1.448202    -0.76   0.448    -3.939698    1.742742 
dcb28portd~9 | 
         L1. |   1.650305   1.808354     0.91   0.362    -1.897495    5.198106 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -3.893405   9.043346    -0.43   0.667     -21.6355    13.84869 
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    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .8517202   1.963997     0.43   0.665    -3.001434    4.704875 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -4.930931   3.149072    -1.57   0.118    -11.10908    1.247216 
       _cons |  -.0040295     .00343    -1.17   0.240    -.0107589    .0026999 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~10 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0034889   .0124137     0.28   0.779    -.0208653    .0278432 
dcb28lass~10 | 
         L1. |   2.207087   .8345556     2.64   0.008     .5697774    3.844397 
dcb28liqu~10 | 
         L1. |   .0267842   1.830727     0.01   0.988    -3.564909    3.618478 
dcb28capi~10 | 
         L1. |    6.06465   4.229519     1.43   0.152     -2.23322    14.36252 
dcb28NPLr~10 | 
         L1. |  -13.16729   6.919371    -1.90   0.057    -26.74237    .4077833 
dcb28mat~b10 | 
         L1. |  -1.019979   .2750591    -3.71   0.000    -1.559616   -.4803415 
dcb28rell~10 | 
         L1. |  -4.017023   2.545453    -1.58   0.115    -9.010934    .9768867 
dcb28port~10 | 
         L1. |  -3.088407   2.130345    -1.45   0.147    -7.267918    1.091105 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -8.738304   3.846654    -2.27   0.023    -16.28503   -1.191575 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |  -.2963123   .6504532    -0.46   0.649    -1.572433    .9798083 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -4.056565   1.695669    -2.39   0.017    -7.383288   -.7298423 
       _cons |  -.0008202   .0011587    -0.71   0.479    -.0030934     .001453 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~11 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0121981   .0158974     0.77   0.443    -.0189909    .0433871 
dcb28lass~11 | 
         L1. |  -.2332389   .6230559    -0.37   0.708    -1.455609    .9891311 
dcb28liqu~11 | 
         L1. |  -2.743095   1.681952    -1.63   0.103    -6.042908    .5567172 
dcb28capi~11 | 
         L1. |  -5.585552   5.309711    -1.05   0.293    -16.00265    4.831542 
dcb28NPLr~11 | 
         L1. |  -7.958881   6.968105    -1.14   0.254    -21.62957    5.711806 
dcb28mat~b11 | 
         L1. |  -.5243306    .513315    -1.02   0.307    -1.531401    .4827393 
dcb28rell~11 | 
         L1. |  -.5853298   1.496964    -0.39   0.696    -3.522214    2.351555 
dcb28port~11 | 
         L1. |   .5327569   1.785132     0.30   0.765    -2.969484    4.034998 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |   5.707385   4.566962     1.25   0.212    -3.252513    14.66728 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .8948109   .8187942     1.09   0.275    -.7115769    2.501199 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |   .8578787   1.375975     0.62   0.533    -1.841639    3.557396 
       _cons |  -.0018532   .0014442    -1.28   0.200    -.0046865    .0009802 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~12 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0013578   .0182016     0.07   0.941    -.0343518    .0370674 
dcb28lass~12 | 
         L1. |   .9778867   .8326589     1.17   0.240    -.6557021    2.611476 
dcb28liqu~12 | 
         L1. |   2.497669   2.759716     0.91   0.366    -2.916603    7.911941 
dcb28capi~12 | 
         L1. |   9.375265   6.779059     1.38   0.167    -3.924534    22.67506 
dcb28NPLr~12 | 
         L1. |   -7.45294   4.384286    -1.70   0.089    -16.05445    1.148567 
dcb28mat~b12 | 
         L1. |  -.6316922   1.273378    -0.50   0.620    -3.129926    1.866541 
dcb28rell~12 | 
         L1. |   6.417903    5.80432     1.11   0.269    -4.969561    17.80537 
dcb28port~12 | 
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         L1. |  -5.392055   2.666086    -2.02   0.043    -10.62263   -.1614752 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |    2.50518   4.154302     0.60   0.547    -5.645122    10.65548 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .2312638    .872173     0.27   0.791    -1.479848    1.942375 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -2.258422   1.854614    -1.22   0.224    -5.896979    1.380134 
       _cons |  -.0011847   .0016417    -0.72   0.471    -.0044055    .0020361 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~13 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0313884   .0203089     1.55   0.122    -.0084556    .0712324 
dcb28lass~13 | 
         L1. |  -.4817693   .5800489    -0.83   0.406    -1.619764    .6562256 
dcb28liqu~13 | 
         L1. |    1.76826   1.162703     1.52   0.129     -.512841     4.04936 
dcb28capi~13 | 
         L1. |   .9649244   2.291526     0.42   0.674    -3.530807    5.460656 
dcb28NPLr~13 | 
         L1. |  -2.532136   1.239068    -2.04   0.041    -4.963057   -.1012151 
dcb28mat~b13 | 
         L1. |   1.827306   .8929837     2.05   0.041      .075366    3.579246 
dcb28rell~13 | 
         L1. |  -5.793229   1.921989    -3.01   0.003    -9.563968    -2.02249 
dcb28port~13 | 
         L1. |    .012794   .0144849     0.88   0.377    -.0156238    .0412119 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -4.438531   5.000838    -0.89   0.375    -14.24965    5.372586 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |  -.0750914   1.049733    -0.07   0.943    -2.134558    1.984375 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |   1.061578   1.141026     0.93   0.352    -1.176995    3.300151 
       _cons |  -.0038683   .0019276    -2.01   0.045      -.00765   -.0000866 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~14 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0536729    .043789     1.23   0.221    -.0322366    .1395823 
dcb28lass~14 | 
         L1. |   1.775958   1.791827     0.99   0.322    -1.739418    5.291333 
dcb28liqu~14 | 
         L1. |   -.882556   1.835133    -0.48   0.631    -4.482894    2.717782 
dcb28capi~14 | 
         L1. |  -2.781233    4.49053    -0.62   0.536    -11.59118    6.028713 
dcb28NPLr~14 | 
         L1. |   2.036727   2.615551     0.78   0.436    -3.094708    7.168162 
dcb28mat~b14 | 
         L1. |   .3019799    .517621     0.58   0.560     -.713538    1.317498 
dcb28rell~14 | 
         L1. |  -1.474475   3.140593    -0.47   0.639    -7.635986    4.687036 
dcb28port~14 | 
         L1. |   10.64278   7.376081     1.44   0.149    -3.828311    25.11388 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -19.55129   15.09933    -1.29   0.196    -49.17458      10.072 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   1.376025   2.562093     0.54   0.591    -3.650532    6.402581 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -3.773256   3.324389    -1.14   0.257    -10.29536    2.748844 
       _cons |  -.0054583   .0039248    -1.39   0.165    -.0131584    .0022418 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~16 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .1143007   .0269478     4.24   0.000      .061432    .1671693 
dcb28lass~16 | 
         L1. |  -4.742238   1.871286    -2.53   0.011    -8.413504   -1.070972 
dcb28liqu~16 | 
         L1. |  -1.927121   2.681316    -0.72   0.472    -7.187581    3.333339 
dcb28capi~16 | 
         L1. |  -4.689229   3.800041    -1.23   0.217    -12.14451     2.76605 
dcb28NPLr~16 | 
         L1. |   11.70029   5.301092     2.21   0.027     1.300105    22.10047 
dcb28mat~b16 | 
         L1. |  -1.593359   1.293063    -1.23   0.218    -4.130212    .9434946 
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dcb28rell~16 | 
         L1. |   1.107684   1.174228     0.94   0.346    -1.196027    3.411396 
dcb28port~16 | 
         L1. |  -3.024713   2.636891    -1.15   0.252    -8.198015     2.14859 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |   1.269875   6.380054     0.20   0.842    -11.24712    13.78687 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |  -2.430744    1.59849    -1.52   0.129    -5.566813    .7053249 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |   9.809243   3.926672     2.50   0.013     2.105528    17.51296 
       _cons |  -.0091991   .0024804    -3.71   0.000    -.0140655   -.0043327 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
dlendrate~27 | 
cb_rate_28~s | 
         L1. |   .0462829   .0213567     2.17   0.030     .0043834    .0881825 
dcb28lass~27 | 
         L1. |   1.189364   1.136666     1.05   0.296    -1.040654    3.419382 
dcb28liqu~27 | 
         L1. |  -.2242598   2.734389    -0.08   0.935    -5.588842    5.140322 
dcb28capi~27 | 
         L1. |   2.129474   1.830658     1.16   0.245    -1.462084    5.721033 
dcb28NPLr~27 | 
         L1. |   .4703129    1.77003     0.27   0.791    -3.002298    3.942924 
dcb28mat~b27 | 
         L1. |  -.3335565   .1681242    -1.98   0.047    -.6633985   -.0037145 
dcb28rell~27 | 
         L1. |   1.620794   2.037791     0.80   0.427    -2.377138    5.618726 
dcb28port~27 | 
         L1. |  -1.114029   .5857489    -1.90   0.057    -2.263206    .0351487 
   dcb28infl | 
         L1. |  -5.601285   5.470751    -1.02   0.306    -16.33432    5.131752 
    dcb28ipi | 
         L1. |   .8935742   1.194505     0.75   0.455    -1.449919    3.237067 
   dcb28lhhi | 
         L1. |  -2.359811   2.400247    -0.98   0.326    -7.068844    2.349221 
       _cons |  -.0050964   .0019185    -2.66   0.008    -.0088604   -.0013325 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
Correlation matrix of residuals: 
 
                 dlendrateden1   dlendrateden2   dlendrateden3   dlendrateden5   dlendrateden6 
 dlendrateden1          1.0000 
 dlendrateden2          0.1876          1.0000 
 dlendrateden3         -0.2374         -0.0655          1.0000 
 dlendrateden5         -0.2411         -0.0935          0.0225          1.0000 
 dlendrateden6         -0.3004          0.0779          0.5683         -0.0453          1.0000 
 dlendrateden7         -0.0690         -0.1691         -0.0887          0.0076         -0.2719 
 dlendrateden8          0.1036          0.0524         -0.0255          0.1584         -0.0684 
 dlendrateden9         -0.0493          0.0032          0.0570          0.0489          0.0894 
dlendrateden10         -0.0221          0.0109         -0.0618         -0.0279          0.0589 
dlendrateden11         -0.0618         -0.3071         -0.2795          0.2124         -0.3534 
dlendrateden12         -0.0301          0.0476          0.0049         -0.0891          0.3122 
dlendrateden13          0.0601         -0.0356         -0.1653         -0.1324         -0.2267 
dlendrateden14          0.0104         -0.0989          0.1168         -0.0812          0.1523 
dlendrateden16          0.1021          0.1645          0.0350         -0.2156          0.0966 
dlendrateden27          0.0135          0.1219          0.2319          0.0077          0.4837 
 
                 dlendrateden7   dlendrateden8   dlendrateden9  dlendrateden10  dlendrateden11 
 dlendrateden7          1.0000 
 dlendrateden8          0.0256          1.0000 
 dlendrateden9         -0.0822         -0.0588          1.0000 
dlendrateden10          0.0169         -0.0584          0.0264          1.0000 
dlendrateden11          0.2998          0.2470         -0.1870         -0.0571          1.0000 
dlendrateden12          0.0265          0.0167         -0.0463          0.1689          0.2707 
dlendrateden13          0.1196          0.0046          0.7475         -0.0260          0.1977 
dlendrateden14         -0.0089         -0.1869          0.0150         -0.0538         -0.1524 
dlendrateden16         -0.0169         -0.1033          0.0692          0.0267         -0.2142 
dlendrateden27         -0.0909          0.1121          0.0831          0.1923         -0.0905 
 
                dlendrateden12  dlendrateden13  dlendrateden14  dlendrateden16  dlendrateden27 
dlendrateden12          1.0000 
dlendrateden13          0.1077          1.0000 
dlendrateden14         -0.0217          0.0494          1.0000 
dlendrateden16          0.3514          0.2254          0.0197          1.0000 
dlendrateden27          0.5012         -0.0391         -0.0524          0.4014          1.0000 
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Breusch-Pagan test of independence: chi2(105) = 328.962, Pr 
= 0.0000 
 
 
F-test for joint significance of the parameters of the 
variables in all bank specific equations: 
 
. test l.cb_rate_28_days 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.cb_rate_28_days = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.23 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dcb28infl 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28infl = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    4.82 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dcb28ipi 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28ipi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    1.09 
            Prob > F =    0.3650 
 
. test l.dcb28lhhi 
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 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28lhhi = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    1.90 
            Prob > F =    0.0197 
 
. test l.dcb28lassets1 l.dcb28lassets2 l.dcb28lassets3 l.dcb28lassets5 
l.dcb28lassets6 l.dcb28lassets7 l.d 
> cb28lassets8 l.dcb28lassets9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28lassets10 l.dcb28lassets11 l.dcb28lassets12 l.dcb28lassets13 
l.dcb28lassets14 l.dcb28lassets16 
>  l.dcb28lassets27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28lassets1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28lassets2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28lassets3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28lassets5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28lassets6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28lassets7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28lassets8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28lassets9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28lassets10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28lassets11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28lassets12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28lassets13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28lassets14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28lassets16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28lassets27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.09 
            Prob > F =    0.0085 
 
. test l.dcb28liquidity1 l.dcb28liquidity2 l.dcb28liquidity3 l.dcb28liquidity5 
l.dcb28liquidity6 l.dcb28li 
> quidity7 l.dcb28liquidity8 l.dcb28liquidity9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28liquidity10 l.dcb28liquidity11 l.dcb28liquidity12 l.dcb28liquidity13 
l.dcb28liquidity14 l.dcb2 
> 8liquidity16 l.dcb28liquidity27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28liquidity1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28liquidity2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28liquidity3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28liquidity5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28liquidity6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28liquidity7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28liquidity8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28liquidity9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28liquidity10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28liquidity11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28liquidity12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28liquidity13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28liquidity14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28liquidity16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28liquidity27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    4.14 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
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. test l.dcb28capital1 l.dcb28capital2 l.dcb28capital3 l.dcb28capital5 
l.dcb28capital6 l.dcb28capital7 l.d 
> cb28capital8 l.dcb28capital9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28capital10 l.dcb28capital11 l.dcb28capital12 l.dcb28capital13 
l.dcb28capital14 l.dcb28capital16 
>  l.dcb28capital27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28capital1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28capital2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28capital3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28capital5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28capital6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28capital7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28capital8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28capital9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28capital10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28capital11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28capital12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28capital13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28capital14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28capital16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28capital27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    2.37 
            Prob > F =    0.0023 
 
. test l.dcb28NPLratio1 l.dcb28NPLratio2 l.dcb28NPLratio3 l.dcb28NPLratio5 
l.dcb28NPLratio6 l.dcb28NPLrati 
> o7 l.dcb28NPLratio8 l.dcb28NPLratio9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28NPLratio10 l.dcb28NPLratio11 l.dcb28NPLratio12 l.dcb28NPLratio13 
l.dcb28NPLratio14 l.dcb28NPLr 
> atio16 l.dcb28NPLratio27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28NPLratio1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28NPLratio2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28NPLratio3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28NPLratio5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28NPLratio6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28NPLratio7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28NPLratio8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28NPLratio9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28NPLratio10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28NPLratio11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28NPLratio12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28NPLratio13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28NPLratio14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28NPLratio16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28NPLratio27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.72 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dcb28matmisub1 l.dcb28matmisub2 l.dcb28matmisub3 l.dcb28matmisub5 
l.dcb28matmisub6 l.dcb28matmisu 
> b7 l.dcb28matmisub8 l.dcb28matmisub9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28matmisub10 l.dcb28matmisub11 l.dcb28matmisub12 l.dcb28matmisub13 
l.dcb28matmisub14 l.dcb28matm 
> isub16 l.dcb28matmisub27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28matmisub1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28matmisub2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28matmisub3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28matmisub5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28matmisub6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28matmisub7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28matmisub8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28matmisub9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28matmisub10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28matmisub11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28matmisub12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28matmisub13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28matmisub14 = 0 
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 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28matmisub16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28matmisub27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    3.42 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
. test l.dcb28rellending1 l.dcb28rellending2 l.dcb28rellending3 l.dcb28rellending5 
l.dcb28rellending6 l.dc 
> b28rellending7 l.dcb28rellending8 l.dcb28rellending9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28rellending10 l.dcb28rellending11 l.dcb28rellending12 
l.dcb28rellending13 l.dcb28rellending14 l 
> .dcb28rellending16 l.dcb28rellending27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28rellending1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28rellending2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28rellending3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28rellending5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28rellending6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28rellending7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28rellending8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28rellending9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28rellending10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28rellending11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28rellending12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28rellending13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28rellending14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28rellending16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28rellending27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    1.93 
            Prob > F =    0.0176 
 
. test l.dcb28portdiv1 l.dcb28portdiv2 l.dcb28portdiv3 l.dcb28portdiv5 
l.dcb28portdiv6 l.dcb28portdiv7 l.d 
> cb28portdiv8 l.dcb28portdiv9 /* 
> */ l.dcb28portdiv10 l.dcb28portdiv11 l.dcb28portdiv12 l.dcb28portdiv13 
l.dcb28portdiv14 l.dcb28portdiv16 
>  l.dcb28portdiv27 
 
 ( 1)  [dlendrateden1]L.dcb28portdiv1 = 0 
 ( 2)  [dlendrateden2]L.dcb28portdiv2 = 0 
 ( 3)  [dlendrateden3]L.dcb28portdiv3 = 0 
 ( 4)  [dlendrateden5]L.dcb28portdiv5 = 0 
 ( 5)  [dlendrateden6]L.dcb28portdiv6 = 0 
 ( 6)  [dlendrateden7]L.dcb28portdiv7 = 0 
 ( 7)  [dlendrateden8]L.dcb28portdiv8 = 0 
 ( 8)  [dlendrateden9]L.dcb28portdiv9 = 0 
 ( 9)  [dlendrateden10]L.dcb28portdiv10 = 0 
 (10)  [dlendrateden11]L.dcb28portdiv11 = 0 
 (11)  [dlendrateden12]L.dcb28portdiv12 = 0 
 (12)  [dlendrateden13]L.dcb28portdiv13 = 0 
 (13)  [dlendrateden14]L.dcb28portdiv14 = 0 
 (14)  [dlendrateden16]L.dcb28portdiv16 = 0 
 (15)  [dlendrateden27]L.dcb28portdiv27 = 0 
 
       F( 15,  1230) =    1.59 
            Prob > F =    0.0685 
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Appendix 5.1: Long-run coefficients of outstanding loans in 
domestic currency and foreign currency. Two-
step “system” GMM estimates with Windmeijer 
(2005) corrected standard errors.  
 
a) Stock of loans in domestic currency. The regressions reported are ordered in 
the same order as the ones in table 5.4.   
 
Computations have been done in STATA 10. 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year Cumulative
3-Year 
multiplier
Long-run
Long-run 
multiplier
MBKS  -0.05* -0.04  -0.71*  -0.16* 3.32*** -0.27 5.66
lCPI1 3.78** 3.13  -5.70** 12.62** 3.32*** 21.49 5.66
lGDPr -2.05 -1.69 -3.08 -6.83 3.32*** 11.63 5.66
SizeNorm 0.37 0.30** 0.55*** 1.21*** 3.32*** 2.07 5.66
SizenormMBKS -0.010 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 3.32*** -0.08 5.66
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.26 0.12 0.15 0.21 0.02** 0.42 0.22
MBKS  -0.08**  -0.07*  -0.13**  -0.28** 3.43*** -0.56 6.72
lCPI1 2.94* 2.50 4.63** 10.06* 3.43*** 19.72 6.72
lGDPr -2.80 -2.38 -4.41 -9.6 3.43*** -18.83 6.72
Liquid2Norm 0.63 0.54 0.98 2.16 3.43*** 4.23 6.72
Liquid2normMBKS -0.21 -0.18 -0.33 -0.72 3.43*** -1.41 6.72
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.19 0.93 0.88 0.92 0.04** 0.94 0.44
MBKS  -0.04**  -0.03*  -0.06**  -0.14** 3.32*** -0.23 5.64
lCPI1 3.11** 2.56* 4.67** 10.34* 3.32*** 17.57 5.64
lGDPr -2.08 -1.71 -3.12 -6.91 3.32*** 11.73 5.64
CapitalNorm  -2.18**  -1.79***  -3.26***  -7.23*** 3.32*** -12.28 5.64
CapitalnormMBKS  0.21*** 1.73*** 0.31*** 0.70*** 3.39*** 1.19* 6.24
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00* 0.13
Regression 1 from table 5.4 - model with size
Regression 2 from table 5.4 - model with liquidity
Regression 3 from table 5.4 - model with capital
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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b) Stock of loans in foreign currency. The regressions reported are ordered in the 
same order as the ones in table 5.5.   
 
Computations have been done in STATA 10. 
 
1st year 2nd year 3rd year Cumulative
3-Year 
multiplier
Long-run
Long-run 
multiplier
EUR  -0.27*  -0.08*  -0.11**  -0.47** 1.73***  -0.39** 1.46***
lCPI1 2.67 0.84 1.10 4.60 1.73*** 3.89 1.46***
lGDPr 0.42 0.13 0.17 0.71 1.73*** 0.61 1.46***
SizeNorm 0.43 0.13 0.18 0.75 1.73*** 0.63 1.46***
SizenormEUR 0.17*** 0.05* 0.07** 0.29** 1.73*** 0.25** 1.46***
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.00*** 0.08* 0.06** 0.05* 0.00*** 0.09* 0.02**
EUR  -0.26** -0.12  -0.17*  -0.55* 2.12***  -0.48* 1.84***
lCPI1 5.57 2.54 3.70 11.82 2.12*** 10.25 1.84***
lGDPr 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.20 2.12*** 0.18 1.84***
Liquid2Norm -0.34 -0.15 -0.22 -0.71 2.12*** -0.62 1.84***
Liquid2normEUR 0.38 0.18 0.25 0.81 2.12*** 0.70 1.84***
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.90 0.85 0.63 0.73 0.08* 0.29 0.15
EUR  -0.20**  -0.11*  -0.18**  -0.49** 2.51***  -0.47* 2.40*
lCPI1 1.26 0.74 1.17 3.16 2.51*** 3.03 2.40*
lGDPr 0.47 0.27 0.43 1.17 2.51*** 1.12 2.40*
CapitalNorm -2.75  -1.60*  -2.54***  -6.89* 2.51***  -6.60* 2.40*
CapitalnormEUR 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.28 2.51*** 0.27 2.40*
Joint significance of the bank 
specific variable and its 
interaction term (p-value)
0.41 0.26 0.08* 0.36 0.06* 0.24 0.09*
Regression 1 form table 5.5 - model with size
Regression 2 from table 5.5 - model with liquidity
Regression 3 from table 5.5 - model with capital
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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Appendix 5.2: STATA output for the domestic currency loans. 
The regressions reported are in the same order as 
the ones in table 5.4. 
  
Printout from regression 1 from table 5.4: 
xtabond2 lLoansDen l.lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS, 
gmm(lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS , eq(diff) laglimits(5 6) 
collapse) gmm(lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS , eq(level) 
laglimits(1 1) collapse)    twostep  robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       144 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        20 
Number of instruments = 17                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 19)      =    170.10                                      avg =      7.20 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   lLoansDen |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lLoansDen | 
         L1. |   .8233207   .2740483     3.00   0.007     .2497311     1.39691 
        MBKS |  -.0473356   .0247298    -1.91   0.071    -.0990958    .0044245 
       lCPI1 |   3.796568   1.756459     2.16   0.044     .1202576    7.472878 
       lGDPr |  -2.054235   2.212017    -0.93   0.365     -6.68404     2.57557 
    SizeNorm |   .3648752   .2282489     1.60   0.126    -.1128553    .8426056 
SizenormMBKS |  -.0135983   .0187296    -0.73   0.477    -.0527998    .0256033 
       _cons |   10.92123   19.26911     0.57   0.578    -29.40948    51.25194 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(5/6).(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.59  Pr > z =  0.112 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.04  Pr > z =  0.297 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  16.72  Prob > chi2 =  0.081 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(10)   =  11.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.354 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   5.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.279 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   5.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.427 
  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS, collapse eq(diff) lag(5 
6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(10)   =  11.05  Prob > chi2 =  0.354
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  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormMBKS, collapse eq(level) lag(1 
1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(4)    =   5.08  Prob > chi2 =  0.279 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   5.96  Prob > chi2 =  0.427 
 
. test SizeNorm=SizenormMBKS=0 
 
 ( 1)  SizeNorm - SizenormMBKS = 0 
 ( 2)  SizeNorm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    19) =    1.45 
            Prob > F =    0.2597 
 
Printout from regression 2 from table 5.4: 
xtabond2 lLoansDen l.lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm  Liquid2normMBKS, 
gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm  Liquid2normMBKS , eq(diff) laglimits(6 
7) collapse)  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm  Liquid2normMBKS , 
eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse)    twostep  robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       144 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        20 
Number of instruments = 16                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 19)      =     38.60                                      avg =      7.20 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   lLoansDen |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lLoansDen | 
         L1. |   .8511829   .2754114     3.09   0.006     .2747402    1.427625 
        MBKS |  -.0826458   .0349605    -2.36   0.029    -.1558188   -.0094727 
       lCPI1 |   2.935282   1.649022     1.78   0.091    -.5161601    6.386725 
       lGDPr |  -2.801629   1.914779    -1.46   0.160    -6.809306    1.206049 
 Liquid2Norm |    .629661   1.573932     0.40   0.694    -2.664617    3.923938 
Liquid2nor~S |  -.2102705    .182219    -1.15   0.263    -.5916593    .1711182 
       _cons |   23.99175   17.64407     1.36   0.190    -12.93771     60.9212 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(6/7).(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normMBKS) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normMBKS) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.67  Pr > z =  0.095 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =   0.37  Pr > z =  0.712 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =  15.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.085 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(9)    =   9.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.397 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.542 
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    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   7.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normMBKS, collapse eq(diff) 
lag(6 7)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(9)    =   9.45  Prob > chi2 =  0.397 
  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normMBKS, collapse eq(level) 
lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(3)    =   2.15  Prob > chi2 =  0.542 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =   7.30  Prob > chi2 =  0.294 
 
. test Liquid2Norm=Liquid2normMBKS=0 
 
 ( 1)  Liquid2Norm - Liquid2normMBKS = 0 
 ( 2)  Liquid2Norm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    19) =    1.84 
            Prob > F =    0.1858 
 
Printout from regression 3 from table 5.4: 
xtabond2 lLoansDen l.lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm  CapitalnormMBKS, 
gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm  CapitalnormMBKS , eq(diff) laglimits(3 
6) collapse)  gmm(lLoansDen   MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm  CapitalnormMBKS , 
eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse)    twostep  robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       144 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        20 
Number of instruments = 25                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 19)      =    425.53                                      avg =      7.20 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
   lLoansDen |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   lLoansDen | 
         L1. |   .8228464   .1705067     4.83   0.000     .4659718    1.179721 
        MBKS |  -.0422338   .0198344    -2.13   0.047    -.0837478   -.0007199 
       lCPI1 |   3.113355   1.379536     2.26   0.036     .2259533    6.000757 
       lGDPr |  -2.078528   1.326879    -1.57   0.134    -4.855718    .6986629 
 CapitalNorm |  -2.174604   .7968783    -2.73   0.013     -3.84249   -.5067187 
Capitalnor~S |   .2102586   .0461743     4.55   0.000     .1136146    .3069026 
       _cons |   14.31266   10.31734     1.39   0.181    -7.281779    35.90711 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(3/6).(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormMBKS) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormMBKS) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.64  Pr > z =  0.100 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.29  Pr > z =  0.196 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  23.14  Prob > chi2 =  0.185 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
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Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(18)   =  13.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  15.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.226 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =  -1.38  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormMBKS, collapse eq(diff) 
lag(3 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(18)   =  13.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.735 
  gmm(lLoansDen MBKS lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormMBKS, collapse eq(level) 
lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(12)   =  15.28  Prob > chi2 =  0.226 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(6)    =  -1.38  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. test CapitalNorm=CapitalnormMBKS=0 
 
 ( 1)  CapitalNorm - CapitalnormMBKS = 0 
 ( 2)  CapitalNorm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    19) =   10.53 
            Prob > F =    0.0008 
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Appendix 5.3: STATA output for the foreign currency loans. 
The regressions reported are in the same order as 
the ones in table 5.5. 
 
Printout from regression 1 from table 5.5: 
xtabond2 lLoansFX l.lLoansFX EUR lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR , gmm(lLoansFX 
lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR , eq(diff) laglimits(6 8) collapse)  gmm(lLoansFX 
lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm  SizenormEUR , eq(level) laglimits(1 1) collapse) iv(EUR) 
twostep robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       105 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        16 
Number of instruments = 18                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 15)      =     35.84                                      avg =      6.56 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
    lLoansFX |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lLoansFX | 
         L1. |   .3139783   .1346632     2.33   0.034     .0269504    .6010062 
         EUR |  -.2702277   .1418533    -1.90   0.076    -.5725808    .0321254 
       lCPI1 |   2.665219   4.678162     0.57   0.577    -7.306049    12.63649 
       lGDPr |   .4152888   3.094225     0.13   0.895    -6.179896    7.010474 
    SizeNorm |   .4329871   .4619433     0.94   0.363    -.5516216    1.417596 
 SizenormEUR |   .1702216   .0561006     3.03   0.008      .050646    .2897972 
       _cons |  -7.973982    27.3904    -0.29   0.775    -66.35524    50.40727 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(EUR) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(6/8).(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons  
     EUR 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL.(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -1.05  Pr > z =  0.293 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -1.01  Pr > z =  0.313 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =   7.00  Prob > chi2 =  0.799 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(11)   =  10.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.463 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   3.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.698 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR, collapse eq(diff) lag(6 8)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(11)   =  10.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.463 
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  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr SizeNorm SizenormEUR, collapse eq(level) lag(1 1)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(6)    =   3.84  Prob > chi2 =  0.698 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   6.92  Prob > chi2 =  0.227 
  iv(EUR) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(10)   =   5.86  Prob > chi2 =  0.827 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =   4.90  Prob > chi2 =  0.027 
 
. test SizeNorm=SizenormEUR=0 
 ( 1)  SizeNorm - SizenormEUR = 0 
 ( 2)  SizeNorm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    15) =   23.10 
            Prob > F =    0.0000 
 
Printout from regression 2 from table 5.5: 
xtabond2 lLoansFX l.lLoansFX EUR lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR , 
gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR , eq(diff) laglimits(2 6) 
collapse)  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR , eq(level) 
laglimits(2 2) collapse) iv(EUR) twostep  robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       105 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        16 
Number of instruments = 29                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 15)      =      8.42                                      avg =      6.56 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
    lLoansFX |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lLoansFX | 
         L1. |   .4562001   .1788429     2.55   0.022     .0750054    .8373948 
         EUR |  -.2587501   .1022309    -2.53   0.023    -.4766502   -.0408501 
       lCPI1 |   5.571937   7.670002     0.73   0.479    -10.77629    21.92016 
       lGDPr |   .0958647   4.144091     0.02   0.982    -8.737056    8.928785 
 Liquid2Norm |  -.3360854   11.86262    -0.03   0.978    -25.62066    24.94849 
Liquid2nor~R |   .3836467   3.122115     0.12   0.904    -6.270984    7.038277 
       _cons |  -18.83308    36.3593    -0.52   0.612     -96.3311    58.66495 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(EUR) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(2/6).(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
    _cons 
    EUR 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -0.98  Pr > z =  0.325 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.95  Pr > z =  0.340 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(22)   =  53.24  Prob > chi2 =  0.000 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(22)   =  13.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.931 
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  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  12.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.979 
  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR, collapse eq(diff) lag(2 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(22)   =  13.09  Prob > chi2 =  0.931 
  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr Liquid2Norm Liquid2normEUR, collapse eq(level) lag(2 
2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(17)   =  12.32  Prob > chi2 =  0.780 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =   0.76  Prob > chi2 =  0.979 
  iv(EUR) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(21)   =  13.93  Prob > chi2 =  0.873 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =  -0.84  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. test Liquid2Norm=Liquid2normEUR=0 
 
 ( 1)  Liquid2Norm - Liquid2normEUR = 0 
 ( 2)  Liquid2Norm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    15) =    0.11 
            Prob > F =    0.8984 
 
Printout from regression 3 from table 5.5: 
xtabond2 lLoansFX l.lLoansFX EUR lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR , 
gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR , eq(diff) laglimits(4 6) 
collapse)  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR , eq(level) 
laglimits(2 2) collapse) iv(EUR) twostep  robust small 
Favoring space over speed. To switch, type or click on mata: mata set matafavor 
speed, perm. 
Warning: Number of instruments may be large relative to number of observations. 
Warning: Two-step estimated covariance matrix of moments is singular. 
  Using a generalized inverse to calculate optimal weighting matrix for two-step 
estimation. 
  Difference-in-Sargan/Hansen statistics may be negative. 
 
Dynamic panel-data estimation, two-step system GMM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Group variable: bank                            Number of obs      =       105 
Time variable : datevar                         Number of groups   =        16 
Number of instruments = 21                      Obs per group: min =         2 
F(6, 15)      =     19.89                                      avg =      6.56 
Prob > F      =     0.000                                      max =         8 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |              Corrected 
    lLoansFX |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
    lLoansFX | 
         L1. |   .5832316   .2314899     2.52   0.024     .0898225    1.076641 
         EUR |  -.1967412   .0876777    -2.24   0.040    -.3836217   -.0098607 
       lCPI1 |   1.262381   3.590676     0.35   0.730    -6.390963    8.915725 
       lGDPr |   .4678718   1.904109     0.25   0.809    -3.590641    4.526385 
 CapitalNorm |  -2.748932   2.210895    -1.24   0.233    -7.461342    1.963479 
Capitalnor~R |   .1115129   .4305141     0.26   0.799    -.8061061    1.029132 
       _cons |  -5.531399   16.13417    -0.34   0.736    -39.92058    28.85778 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Instruments for first differences equation 
  Standard 
    D.(EUR) 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    L(4/6).(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR) collapsed 
Instruments for levels equation 
  Standard 
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    _cons 
    EUR 
  GMM-type (missing=0, separate instruments for each period unless collapsed) 
    DL2.(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR) collapsed 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences: z =  -0.98  Pr > z =  0.325 
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences: z =  -0.94  Pr > z =  0.346 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Sargan test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =   7.46  Prob > chi2 =  0.916 
  (Not robust, but not weakened by many instruments.) 
Hansen test of overid. restrictions: chi2(14)   =   8.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.851 
  (Robust, but can be weakened by many instruments.) 
 
Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets: 
  GMM instruments for levels 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   9.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =  -1.32  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR, collapse eq(diff) lag(4 6)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(0)    =   0.00  Prob > chi2 =      . 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(14)   =   8.67  Prob > chi2 =  0.851 
  gmm(lLoansFX lCPI1 lGDPr CapitalNorm CapitalnormEUR, collapse eq(level) lag(2 
2)) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(9)    =   9.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.351 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(5)    =  -1.32  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
  iv(EUR) 
    Hansen test excluding group:     chi2(13)   =   8.99  Prob > chi2 =  0.774 
    Difference (null H = exogenous): chi2(1)    =  -0.32  Prob > chi2 =  1.000 
 
. test CapitalNorm=CapitalnormEUR=0 
 
 ( 1)  CapitalNorm - CapitalnormEUR = 0 
 ( 2)  CapitalNorm = 0 
 
       F(  2,    15) =    0.95 
            Prob > F =    0.4085 
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Appendix 5.4: Estimates of outstanding loans in domestic and 
foreign currency. One-step “system” GMM 
estimates with robust standard errors by 
restricting and collapsing the instrument sets with 
the xtabond2 command. 
 
a) in domestic currency 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in domestic currency 
 
Source: Computations have been done in STATA 10.  
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for size Controlling for liquid2 Controlling for capital
L.lLoansDen 0.822*** 0.544** 0.739***
Robust S.E. 0.149 0.229 0.145
MBKS -0.0403* -0.0321* -0.0393*
Robust S.E. 0.021 0.0179 0.0207
lCPI1 2.779* 1.695 2.502*
Robust S.E. 1.419 1.534 1.394
lGDPr -1.23 0.64 -1.298
Robust S.E. 1.593 1.644 1.218
SizeNorm 0.254
Robust S.E. 0.158
SizenormMBKS 0.00811
Robust S.E. 0.0169
Liquid2Norm -2.276**
Robust S.E. 0.943
Liquid2normMBKS 0.186
Robust S.E. 0.17
CapitalNorm -2.677***
Robust S.E. 0.707
CapitalnormMBKS 0.224***
Robust S.E. 0.04
Constant 5.4 -8.886 8.627
Robust S.E. 14.72 12.17 9.886
Number of observations: 144 144 144
Number of banks 20 20 20
Number of instruments 17 19 22
F-test for the significance of the 
whole regression (p-value)
F(6, 19) = 377.22 
(0.00)                                      
F(6, 19) = 100.15 (0.00)                                      F(6, 19) = 483.71 (0.00)                                      
F-test for the joint significance of 
the bank specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
F(2, 19) = 1.97 (0.17)                                      F(2, 19) = 3.01 (0.11)                                     F(2, 19) = 15.82 (0.00)                                      
AR(1)/(p-value) -1.61 (0.11) -1.45 (0.15) -1.60 (0.11)
AR(2)/(p-value) -1.24 (0.22) -1.92 (0.6) -1.66 (0.10)
Sargan (p-value) 0.88 0.12 0.38
Hansen (p-value) 0.74 0.20 0.62
Diff. in Hansen (p-value) 0.60 0.18 0.63
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
VARIABLES:
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b) in foreign currency 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in foreign currency 
 
Computations have been done in STATA 10.  
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for size Controlling for liquid2 Controlling for capital
L.lLoansFX 0.316* 0.399** 0.810***
Robust S.E. 0.183 0.136 0.219
EUR  -0.343*** -0.281* -0.281**
Robust S.E. 0.129 0.16 0.125
lCPI1 4.756 -2.952 8.32
Robust S.E. 5.909 4.575 7.063
lGDPr 0.186 1.427 -4.065
Robust S.E. 2.866 2.934 2.797
SizeNorm 0.425
Robust S.E. 0.517
SizenormEUR 0.161**
Robust S.E. 0.070
Liquid2Norm 12.38*
Robust S.E. 6.599
Liquid2normEUR -4.129
Robust S.E. 2.484
CapitalNorm -1.885
Robust S.E. 2.839
CapitalnormEUR -0.00513
Robust S.E. 0.577
Constant -14.575 4.492 15.31
Robust S.E. 25.763 22.91 15.24
Number of observations: 105 105 105
Number of banks 16 16 16
Number of instruments 18 22 22
F-test for the significance of the 
whole regression (p-value)
F(6, 15) = 18.84 (0.00)                                      F(6, 15) = 18.48 (0.00)                                      F(6, 15) = 79.74 (0.00)                                      
F-test for the joint significance of 
the bank specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
F(2, 15) = 14.77 (0.00)                                      F(2, 15) = 1.89 (0.12)                                      F(2, 15) = 2.27 (0.14)                                      
AR(1)/(p-value)  -2.43 (0.02) -1.84 (0.07) -1.40 (0.16)
AR(2)/(p-value)  -1.05 (0.30) -1.11 (0.27) -1.14 (0.26)
Sargan (p-value) 0.80 0.65 0.64
Hansen (p-value) 0.46 0.90 0.84
Diff. in Hansen (p-value) 0.23 1.00 0.79
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
VARIABLES:
APPENDIX B:          APPENDICES FROM CHAPTER 5 
369 
 
Appendix 5.5: Estimates of outstanding loans in domestic and 
foreign currency, respectively. One-step 
“difference” GMM estimates with robust standard 
errors (Robust S.E.). 
 
a) in domestic currency.  
 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in domestic currency. 
 
Computations have been done in STATA 10.  
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for size Controlling for liquid2 Controlling for capital
L.lLoansDen 0.541*** 0.267* 0.535***
Robust S.E. 0.102 0.139 0.0815
MBKS -0.0273** -0.0108 -0.0297*
Robust S.E. 0.0137 0.0157 0.0156
lCPI1 2.858** 1.945** 2.657**
Robust S.E. 1.117 0.936 1.069
lGDPr 0.0622 1.696 -0.0431
Robust S.E. 1.146 1.154 1.081
SizeNorm 0.175
Robust S.E. 0.164
SizenormMBKS -0.0161
Robust S.E. 0.0111
Liquid2Norm -0.464
Robust S.E. 0.678
Liquid2normMBKS -0.156
Robust S.E. 0.127
CapitalNorm -0.994
Robust S.E. 0.658
CapitalnormMBKS 0.135**
Robust S.E. 0.0559
Constant -7.072 -19.35* -4.778
Robust S.E. 9.692 9.993 9.679
Number of observations: 124 124 124
Number of banks 20 20 20
Number of instruments 58 58 63
Wald test for the significance of the 
whole regression (p-value)
chi2(6) = 365.88 (0.00) chi2(6) = 408.62 (0.00) chi2(6) = 343.83 (0.00)
Wald test for the joint significance of 
the bank specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
chi2(2) = 2.45 (0.29) chi2(2) = 17.58 (0.00) chi2(2) = 6.01 (0.05)
AR(1)/(p-value) -1.53 (0.13) -1.62 (0.11) -1.52 (0.13)
AR(2)/(p-value) -1.93 (0.05) -0.28 (0.78) -1.86 (0.06)
Sargan (p-value) 0.24 0.15 0.83
VARIABLES:
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
APPENDIX B:          APPENDICES FROM CHAPTER 5 
370 
 
 
 
 
b) in foreign currency.  
 
Dependent variable: log of the stock of loans in foreign currency 
 
Computations have been done in STATA 10.  
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Controlling for size Controlling for liquid2 Controlling for capital
L.lLoansFX 0.0107 -0.0945 0.00878
Robust S.E. 0.191 0.164 0.203
EUR -0.404* -0.107 -0.342***
Robust S.E. 0.216 0.149 0.127
lCPI1 0.509 -12.67* -0.39
Robust S.E. 6.346 7.446 5.935
lGDPr 5.334* 7.974*** 4.637
Robust S.E. 2.89 3.059 3.327
SizeNorm -0.0122
Robust S.E. 0.72
SizenormEUR 0.216**
Robust S.E. 0.088
Liquid2Norm -0.509
Robust S.E. 3.436
Liquid2normEUR -1.692
Robust S.E. 1.191
CapitalNorm 4.558*
Robust S.E. 2.337
CapitalnormEUR -1.461***
Robust S.E. 0.348
Constant -54.43* -26.21 -41.73
Robust S.E. 32.14 26.2 33.98
Number of observations: 88 88 88
Number of banks 16 16 16
Number of instruments 61 58 62
Wald test for the significance 
of the whole regression (p-
value)
chi2(6) = 65.13 (0.00) chi2(6) = 308.73 (0.00) chi2(6) = 137.99 (0.00)
Wald test for the joint 
significance of the bank 
specific char. and the 
interaction term (p-value)
chi2(2) = 12.28 (0.00) chi2(2) = 29.00 (0.00) chi2(2) = 44.51 (0.00)
AR(1)/(p-value) -0.45 (0.65) -0.47 (0.64) -0.36 (0.72)
AR(2)/(p-value) -0.93 (0.35) -0.99 (0.32) -0.93 (0.35)
Sargan (p-value) 0.01 0.02 0.03
VARIABLES:
*** / ** / * denotes significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively.
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APPENDIX C: PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
In this appendix I report the main achievements in my professional development 
during my work on this thesis (2007 – 2010). 
Professional training: 
 11/2008: Postgraduate Certificate in Research Methods, Staffordshire 
University, UK. 
 09/03/2009 – 13/03/2009: Seminar on the subject: “Macroeconomic Modelling 
and Forecasting II”, organised by the National Bank of the Republic of 
Macedonia and the JTC Economics + Finance, LLC. Skopje, Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Participation at conferences: 
 25/11/2010: “Fiscal Policy in the Crisis and Beyond: Short-term Impacts and 
Long-term Implications”, organised by The Institute of Economics Zagreb, 
Croatia. Presented paper together with Angeloska-Bezoska, A., Mitreska A. 
and Kadievska-Vojnovic M.: “Investigating the Cyclical Behaviour of Fiscal 
Policy in the Republic of Macedonia During the Period of Transition”.  
 20/09/2010: “PhD conference in Monetary and Financial Economics”, 
organised by Bristol Business School, UK. Presented paper: “Empirical 
Investigation of the Determinants of Pass-through Adjustment of Lending 
Rates in Macedonia - a SUR Approach”.  
 14/07/2010–16/07/2010: “Openness and Growth: Lessons for Transition and 
Development”, organised by the Osteuropa-Institut Regensburg and Akademie 
für Politische, Tutzing, Germany. Presented paper: “The role of banks in the 
monetary transmission in a small open transition economy with a fixed 
exchange rate regime – the case of Macedonia” 
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 17/09/2010 – 18/09/2009: “20 Years of Transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe: Money, Banking and Financial Markets”, organised by the London 
Metropolitan Business School, UK. Presented paper: “Empirical Investigation 
of the Bank Lending Channel in the Republic of Macedonia”. 
 Participant on four PhD mini-conferences on 10/12/2010; 24/11/2009; 
04/12/2008 and 19/12/2007 organised by Staffordshire University, UK; where I 
have presented some of the chapters of my PhD thesis. 
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